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Abstract 
This thesis makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of Muslims 
and multiculturalism in Britain. It specifically uses the work of the African-American 
thinker, W. E. B. Du Bois, to theorise how what I call `Muslim-consciousness' connects 
to certain Muslim mobilisations for an improvement in their `civic status. ' 
Muslim-consciousness is characterised as the advent of salient Muslim identities that are 
being adopted and deployed in various permutations by many Muslims themselves. The 
emergence of Muslim-consciousness is examined at length with reference to debates 
concerning race, religion and ethnicity. Civic status, meanwhile, is understood to be 
derived from various conceptions of citizenship. 
It is argued that under the terms of a peculiarly British multiculturalism, a differentiated 
citizenship has prevailed for some minorities, which has recognised or supported some 
minority identity related particularities, and has helped to achieve an elevation of these 
minorities' civic status. The first part of the thesis explores these issues theoretically, 
before empirically investigating them in the second half of the thesis through the use of 
multi-method case-studies (including primary interviews, documentary evidence and 
discourse analysis). More specifically, the second half focuses upon salient Muslim 
mobilisations for the state funding of Muslim schools, discrimination legislation and a 
`positive' public and media representation, as arenas in which Muslims are currently 
seeking an elevation of their civic status. 
It is argued that an exploration of what is termed Muslim-consciousness, within and 
amongst some Muslim communities themselves, alongside the way in which this 
consciousness is understood politically (at both an official, governmental, level as well as 
discursively in public and media commentary), allows us to observe the operation of at 
least two types of minority consciousness. According to this thesis, these types of 
consciousness have previously been theorised by what is called the `Hegelian Du Bois', 
and comprise the movement from a consciousness that exists in itself, and which is 
derived from the treatment of a dominant party, to a consciousness that exists for itself, 
and which, as such, is capable of mobilising on its own terms for its own interests. In Du 
Bois' terms, this consciousness risks turning in on itself, and becoming a `double 
consciousness', when it is benignly ignored or malignly coerced. 
These' distinctions are framed within a schema taken from Du Bois and become 
progressively `thicker' in capturing (a) the political dimension in which Muslim- 
consciousness in Britain is formed, (b) the nature and content of this consciousness in and 
for itself, alongside (c) the transformative potential it heralds for society as a whole. The 
thesis ends with a typology of contemporary Muslim-consciousness in Britain, before 
looking forward to emerging research agendas on these topics. 
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Yes, precisely. 
Salma Yaqoob. 
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Chapter One 
Citizenship and double consciousness - Muslims and multiculturalism in 
Britain 
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some 
through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, 
nevertheless, flutter round it... To the real question, how does it feel to be a problem? I 
answer seldom a word. [... ] It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense 
of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the 
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. 
Du Bois, Of Our Spiritual Strivings (1903). 
1. Introduction 
With these words the activist and scholar William Edward Burghart Du Bois (b. 1868- 
1963) unveiled his idea of `double-consciousness'. This is an idea borne from a concern with 
reciprocal moral obligations within a national community, and focuses mainly upon the 
racialised existence of early twentieth century African-Americans. At its very core it contains 
the view that minorities will posses an impaired civic status if the terms of incorporation 
ignore their sensibilities. ' This is because they will be prevented from participating in the 
social and political life of their society in a manner that affords them equal opportunity, 
dignity and confidence; diminishing their citizenship and giving rise to the `peculiar 
sensation' that they are indeed `a problem'. 
More than a century has passed since Du Bois delineated these thoughts in his essay Of 
Our Spiritual Strivings (1903), and this thesis argues that, in its fullness, his ideas cast light 
1 Ideas of minority and majority groupings are problematised throughout this thesis not least with 
reference to debates concerning essentialism and reification (chp. 2 sec. 2.2, chp. 3 sec. 3.10-3.12) and 
attributed or self-defined categories (chp. 3 sec. 3.6 and sec. 3.8.1). The term minority group is used 
here to denote a sizable and/or politically significant collectivity or community of people who share a 
distinctive cultural identity, differing from that of a majority or mainstream in the state. The sense of 
belonging and loyalty among minorities might result from their sharing one or several of the following 
characteristics: a distinctive language, religion, nationality, ethnicity, history, racial experience or set of 
cultural traditions, values, lifestyles, or other defining characteristics that have significantly impacted 
upon their lives and helped to define their identity, in both their and other people's perception. The 
element of perceived group membership is crucial here for - as is discussed in chapter three and chapter 
five (chp. 5 sec. 2.2/3 and sec. 3) - the sense of belonging and loyalty among a minority might 
simultaneously result from the experience of discrimination, prejudice or hostility directed toward their 
real or alleged possession of such characteristics. Du Bois demonstrates a keen awareness of these 
issues which are considered in the next chapter (chp. 2 sec. 3.1-3.2) and in chapter three. 
upon present debates concerning Muslims and multiculturalism in Britain. There are several 
reasons why this might be the case. One reason stems from the increasing recognition that Du 
Bois comprises a `founding figure' of sociology (Young, Jr., Watts, Marable, Lemert, and 
Higginbotham, 2007; Gates, 2007; Gates and Oliver, 1999; Bell, Grosholz and Stewart, 1996; 
Lemert, 1994) 2 As such we are required to take seriously a thinker whose work has so 
profoundly impacted upon the topics of difference and citizenship in the way that one might, 
for example, refer to Marx, Weber or Durkheim in an analysis of social class, status or 
solidarity (Zuckerman, 2004). More specifically, and as chapter two details, Du Bois 
bequeaths a rich body of theory and analysis concerning social-formations that strive for 
`inclusion' without `assimilation'. That is, the way in which minorities themselves seek 
incorporation into the mainstream in a manner appreciative of, and not closed to, their 
differences, interests and concerns (see chp 2. sec 4. ). This is a body of work that has had an 
enormous influence upon American conceptions of race3 and difference (Bell, Grosholz and 
Stewart, 1996). Since these American conceptions have often very directly impacted upon 
British race-relations paradigms, as chapters three and five demonstrate, it might be argued 
that Du Bois has already made an indirect contribution to the British debate which invites 
explicit inquiry. These rationales do not on their own, however, provide the basis for turning 
to Du Bois in this thesis. 
It is argued that the most compelling reason to turn to Du Bois is because the Du Boisian 
cannon includes a theorisation of forms of `consciousness' that may underpin social 
formations that emerge both in and for themselves. This describes the movement from a 
2 For example, in 2006 a group of sociologists led a successful campaign to rename the American 
Sociological Association's (ASA) highest award, the Career of Distinguished Scholarship Award, after 
Du Bois. See Morris (2007). 
3 The idea of race is vigorously debated throughout this thesis (especially in chp 3). Whilst it would be 
easy to state at the beginning that the term is used under `erasure' (Derrida, 1976) or rejected outright 
in the manner preferred by Miles (1989) (and as discussed in chp3, sec 4), it will instead be argued that 
many social and political categories including ethnicity, age, gender and class are unstable and 
contested; subject to potential reification and essentialism, and that the implication of `race' as `real' is 
therefore dismissed at the outset. It is argued that race should be understood as a social construction 
that nevertheless serves as a potential vehicle for subjective and attributed identifications. Rather than 
offering a post-race account (St. Louis, 2002; Gilroy, 2000), therefore, this thesis will make the 
argument for a widening of racial equality agendas to include those affected by the social reality of 
race. The implication this holds in conceptualising racism and race-relations are critically examined in 
chapters three and five. 
2 
consciousness that is derived from the treatment of a dominant party, existing in itself and 
bearing a historically ascribed identity, to a consciousness that is capable of mobilising on 
its own terms for its own interests, and emerges for itself in adopting a politically self- 
defined identity. It is argued that Du Bois is uniquely suited to this study because this thesis 
investigates the types of consciousness that are presently informing Muslim mobilisations and 
identity related claims-making in Britain. These are referred to by the term 'Muslim- 
consciousness'. What this means is set out fully in chapter three, following an explanation in 
chapter two of Du Bosian conceptions of consciousness, but the term Muslim-consciousness 
is used here to denote the advent of increasingly salient Muslim identities that are adopted and 
deployed in various permutations by many Muslims themselves. 
" The question the thesis examines is how Muslim-consciousness connects to 
the sorts of `civic status' that Muslims in Britain are seeking. 
The types of `civic status' referred to here include those that have prevailed for other 
minorities under the terms of a peculiarly British multiculturalism (sec. 1.3). This is a 
tradition that has sought to promote equality of access and opportunity, and has led to some 
significant recognition of certain minority `differences'. One of the aims of this introductory 
chapter is to spell out the scope of the civic status that this tradition has - and continues to - 
accord, and where Muslim minorities who are seeking specific accommodations of their 
differences fit into this tradition. 
" This is theoretically explored below, and in chapters two and three, and then 
empirically pursued through multi-method case studies examining salient 
Muslim mobilisations for the state funding of Muslim schools in chapter 
four, and legislation to protect Muslims from discrimination in chapter rive. 
" To this end, it is argued that a focus upon Muslim-consciousness within and amongst some 
Muslim communities themselves, alongside the way in which this consciousness is 
understood politically - at an official governmental level as well as discursively in the public 
and media commentary examined in chapter six - allows us to capture: (a) the political 
3 
dimension in which Muslim-consciousness is formed; (b) the nature and content of this 
consciousness in and for itself; alongside (c) the transformative potential it heralds for society 
as a whole. 
1.1. Contested civic-status 
Implicit in this schema is a view that Muslim minorities can strive for political 
recognition and incorporation through a contestation of their allocated civic status. Indeed, it 
is a sign of our times that it feels somewhat cliched to state that minority claims-making has 
increasingly `challenged' traditional conceptions of the civic status that various minorities are 
granted by programmes of democratic citizenship. As Gutmann (1994: 3) declared over a 
decade ago, "it is hard to find a democratic or democratising society these days that is not the 
site of some significant controversy over whether and how its institutions should better 
recognize the identities of cultural and disadvantaged minorities". Whether these challenges 
have contested the separation of public and private spheres (Fraser, 1991), reconfigured the 
constituents of incorporation in the country's representation of itself (Young, 1989,1990), or 
struggled for concessions in what might commonly be mistaken as mundane calls for dietary 
or school and work uniform changes (Parekh, 1994), what they all share in common is the 
view that conceptions of civic status cannot ignore the internal plurality of societies that play 
host to `difference'. 
Another way of putting this is to state that whilst citizenship takes a legal form, it also 
operates socially through the reciprocal balance of rights and responsibilities that confer upon 
its bearers a civic status that affords those bearers equal opportunity, dignity and confidence. 
As such it represents a field in which "political and social rights, and cultural obligations [can 
be] contested by collective action" (Statham, 1999: 599). Collective action is not here limited 
to `direct action' as much as the continual negotiations entered upon under the rubric of a 
meta-membership that, in Tilly's terms (1997: 600), designates "a set of mutually enforceable 
claims relating categories of persons to agents of governments". 
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Whilst it may indeed be a sign of our times, and in both resembling and deviating from T. 
H. Marshall's famous conceptualisation of citizenship as both a right and a duty, it is 
nevertheless true that a focus upon inclusion through contestation is a relatively recent 
development in accounts of citizenship and civic status. Of course in his landmark essay, 
Citizenship and Social Class (1997 [1950]), Marshall argued that the central feature of 
citizenship should be "a status bestowed on all those who are full members of the 
community" (1997 [1950]: 300). The community he imagined, however, largely assumed a 
broadly homogeneous nation-state polity (discussed below) in which the prospect of 
membership through citizenship undoubtedly heralded an increase in the rights enjoined by 
all. For example, Marshall identified a tripartite taxonomy of citizenship made up of the civil, 
the political and the social. Whilst the civil element was composed of "rights necessary for 
individual freedom - liberty of the person, freedom of speech... the right to own property 
and conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice" (1997: 294), the political referred to an 
extension of the franchise and the "right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a 
member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a 
body" (ibid). The third social element described a "right to a modicum of economic welfare 
and security to the right to share in the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilised 
being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (ibid. ). 
It is arguable that the provenance for Marshall's progressive formulations lay in the 
philosophical conceptions of John Stuart Mill, the `new Liberals' T. H. Green and L. T. 
Hobhouse, and economists such as Alfred Marshall and John Maynard Keynes, amongst 
others. This is because these thinkers contributed to the idea that citizenship should constitute 
a positive freedom that would supplement the minimum of `Life, Liberty, and Property' that 
had been advocated since at least the seventeenth century by classical liberals who 
[s]aw such rights as limited, for the most part opposing even the public provision of 
education, under the period of the welfare state 'the entitlement to membership and 
participation also came to embody rights to work, to health, and to security. As 
such, a universal citizenship expressed the new positive role of the state as the 
embodiment of social democracy (Olsenn, 2004: 180 emphasis added). 
5 
Thus, and whilst his conception of citizenship was a relative advance that marked an 
important progress upon earlier settlements, Marshall's conception of citizenship embodied a 
central axiom of liberalism to be found in its singularity or `universalism'. 
Criticisms of this tendency have been mounted from various quarters, not least in recent 
years from those engaged in the "multicultural turn" (May, Modood and Squires, 2004: 1-19). 
Authors from this tradition have argued that one problem with the liberal conception of 
universal citizenship, is that it is blind to the injustices that might arise from treating people 
marked by social, cultural and political differences in a uniform manner. As Squires (2002: 
117) has argued, however, it is essential to distinguish this complaint from a rejection of 
universal social and political inclusion per se, for what is being advocated is "a differentiated 
universalism as opposed to the false universalism of traditional citizenship theory. " 
1.2. Nation-state citizenship 
Indeed, at the root of another complaint is that Marshallian style traditional citizenship 
theory proceeds from a view of a national community, prevalent since the mid-seventeenth 
century in Europe at least, in which "the individual enjoys the rights associated with 
citizenship because she or he belongs to a political community defined as a nation - the 
nation-state" (Martinello, 2002: 117). The critique of Marshall, and the question pertinent to 
this thesis, is not so much who makes up the nation part of this citizenship equation as much 
as whether there is a tendency for some people to be left out of its construction. For example, 
according to Walzer (1997: 25) it is indeed the case that the `nation' results from "a single 
dominant group [that] organises the common life in a way that reflects its own authority and 
culture". This is a source of concern amongst scholars who have argued that minorities will 
"feel crucially left out [when] the majority understand the polity as an expression of their 
4 Any comprehensive account of citizenship and civic status would of course visit ancient Athens and 
the Platonic concern with unity through friendship, characterised as "the quality of respect for others 
and a sense of justice, so as to bring order into our cities and create a bond of friendship and union" 
(Plato, 1987: 54), even if the Aristotelian imperative of defending conviviality against external threats 
was more common. See Sayyid (2005) for an interesting discussion of Greek city state citizenship. 
What is of most relevance to this discussion, however, is the modern citizenship fashioned not around 
city states but around nation-states, as discussed above. 
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nation, or agreed purpose, whatever it may be" (Taylor, 2001: 123). To be sure, much of 
what is encapsulated in the idea of `multiculturalism' raises this concern and critiques "the 
myth of homogeneous and monocultural nation-states" when it advocates the right of 
minority "cultural maintenance and community formation, linking these to social equality and 
protection from discrimination" (Castles, 2000: 5). 
Another persistent and related charge surrounds the extent to which the non-private 
`civic' realm represents the particular communal interests and values of a dominant group, as 
if these were (or ought to be) equally held by all. As chapter two demonstrates (sec 4-4.4), 
multicultural theorists unite in their conviction that a blanket reliance on difference-blind 
individual rights cannot sufficiently register the injustices of an inevitable state partiality, 
contained in such things as public institutions, which favour majority cultural norms. Hence 
Taylor (1994: 43-4) characterises the "supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles" 
that are sometimes said to underpin public institutions as reflecting "one hegemonic culture... 
a particularism masquerading as the universal. " These can include those principles that 
inform a society's laws, its values and dominant practices, and which are presented as the 
natural order of things when in fact they are an extension of the majority group's culture. 
This is an ever present tendency, according to Morris (1997: 194), because the Westphalian 
European nation-state has 
grown up around an `ideal' of cultural homogeneity, established and reinforced 
through the state controlled acquisition of literate culture, alongside state control 
over entry and the acquisitions of citizenship: thus the nation represents 
territorialized cultural belonging, while the state formalises and controls legal 
membership. 5 
In other words, the nation-state can embody an enlightenment urge to reduce differences to 
unity, and an outcome of this is that "[dominant] group related experiences, points of view, or 
cultural assumptions will tend to become the norm biasing the standards and procedures of 
achievement and inclusion that govern social, political and economic institutions" (Young, 
s As Smith (1995: 99) has also argued: "Modern nations are simultaneously and necessarily civic and 
ethnic. In relation to the national state, the individual is a citizen with civic rights and duties, and 
receives the benefits of modernity through the medium of an impersonal, and impartial, bureaucracy". 
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1993: 133). The result - characterised by Billig (1995: 17) as a `banal nationalism' - is likely 
to be "overlooked, forgotten or theoretically denied", leaving the minority ' 
... experiencing oneself as invisible at the same time that one is marked out as different. The invisibility comes about when dominant groups fail to recognize the 
perspective embodied in their cultural expressions as a perspective. These 
dominant cultural expressions often have little place for the experience of other 
groups, at most only mentioning or referring to them in stereotyped or marginalized 
ways (Young, 1990: 60). 
In the language of Du Bois, this kind of civic status confers upon minorities a sort of veil 
from behind which they must look out at dominant society, whilst those in front of it do not 
see the minority as full and legitimate co-members of their polity. That is, institutions and 
social practices attribute minority status to some inherent qualities in the minority group, as if 
those qualities were the reason that rather than the rationalization for neither recognizing 
their presence nor taking their sensibilities into account. 
In this sense, and as discussed in the following chapter, Du Bois presents an inverted 
version of the early Rawlsian thought experiment of placing a `choosing subject' behind `a 
veil of ignorance' in an effort to ascertain unbiased propositions of human interest. In Du 
Bois' terms, minorities look out from behind their veil in full knowledge of critical aspects of 
their identity, and they see the majority through it, whilst the latter sees only a reflection of 
their own mastery or dominance (chp. 2 sec. 3-3.2). For Du Bois, therefore, conceptions of 
citizenship that proceed through an unequivocal universalism, based upon the insistence that 
everybody can access the formal rights theoretically conferred by membership to a polity, 
diminish the citizenship of minorities if their particularities are not recognised and supported 
within the terms of incorporation. This is because, and in agreement with some 
communitarians considered in chapter two (sec 4-4.4), he argues that a singular and 
categorical notion of citizenship abstracts individuals from their context and ignores the 
importance of their `cultural strivings' motivated by forms of consciousness in themselves. 
These `cultural strivings' may seek to attend to a devalued starting position or feelings of 
neglect in an effort to negate the `peculiar' sensation' that they are `a problem', or they may 
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seek to merge what he called the `double self' nto a `better truer self' s synthesised or 
hyphenated identities (chp. 2 sec. 4). 
1.3. British multicultural citizenship 
These rather abstract ideas are not entirely alien to a British policy context that has sought 
to remove barriers and contest stigmas that disadvantage ethnic and racial minorities. For 
example, post-war migrants who arrived as Citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth (CUKC)6, and subsequent British born generations, have been recognised as 
ethnic and racial minorities requiring state support and differential treatment to overcome 
obstacles in their exercise of citizenship to prevent, minimise and redress an impairment of 
their civic status. This includes how, under the remit of several Race-Relations Acts (RRAs) 
the state has sought to integrate minorities into the labour market and other key arenas of 
British society through an approach that has promoted equal access as an example of equality 
of opportunity (Lester, 1998). Indeed, and as discussed in chapters three (sec. 3-3.2) and five 
(sec. 2.1-2.3), it is now over thirty years since the introduction of a third Race-Relations Act 
(1976) cemented a state sponsorship of Race Equality by consolidating - and cumulatively 
building upon - earlier, weaker legislative instruments (RRA 1965 & 1968). Alongside. its 
broad remit spanning public and private institutions; recognition of indirect discrimination 
and the later imposition of a statutory public duty to promote `good race-relations', it also 
created the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) to assist individual complainants and 
6 The story of post-war Commonwealth Migration to Britain has been told extensively elsewhere (see 
Hiro (1991) for a well documented general survey and Ansari (2004) for a specific focus upon Muslim 
migrants to Britain). Since it is not central to this thesis it will not be discussed at length here. One 
point of interest for our discussion, however, is the impact of the introduction of Britain's first 
immigration legislation, since the 1905 Aliens Act, in the form of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act. This Act and the hastily passed 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (designed to prevent the 
entry of Kenyan and other African-Asians holding British citizenship) together conversely accelerated 
commonwealth immigration during this period. Whilst the knowledge of the impending 1962 Act led to 
a movement of mainly male migration which sought to `beat the ban', there is evidence to suggest that 
the migratory impulse for family unification arose from an anticipated total ban on immigration 
(Shukra, 1998). Areas of particular Muslim settlement were focused around older, industrial towns 
where the initial wave of male labourers had arrived to take up work. Outside London these areas 
included both East & West Midlands (Blackburn; Leicester; Birmingham) South & West Yorkshire 
(Sheffield; Leeds; Dewsbury; Bradford) and Greater Manchester (including Oldham and Burnley). See 
Appendices I and II. 
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monitor the implementation of the Act (see Dhami, Squires and Modood, 2006: 19-25 and 
chapter 5 sec. 2.1). 
This is an example, according to Joppke (1999: 642), of a citizenship that has amounted 
to "a precarious balance between citizenship universalism and racial group particularism 
[that] stops short of giving special group rights to immigrants. "7 What it also suggests is that 
the instutionalisation of a space from which to begin to redress racially structured barriers to 
participation represents a defining characteristic in the British approach to integrating 
minorities. But does this amount to a multicultural citizenship? The answer is that it amounts 
to a British multicultural citizenship for, although the UK lacks an official `Multiculturalism 
Act' or `Charter' in the way of Australia or Canada (Commission in Multi-Ethnic Britain 
(CMEB), 2000), the idea of minority integration being premised upon a drive for unity 
through an uncompromising cultural `assimilation' was something consciously rejected over 
40 years ago. This is when the then Labour home secretary Roy Jenkins' (1966) defined 
integration as "not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by 
cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance". In seeking to combat racial 
discrimination, this state sponsorship of Racial Equality has been accompanied by a form of 
cultural pluralism that has recognised and protected some religious minorities from all the 
barriers encountered by racial discrimination, and this is discussed in chapters three and five. 
1.4. Local multicultural citizenship 
Alongside this state centred, "unmistakeably national" (Joppke, 1999: 146) focus, there is 
also a tradition of what we might characterise as `municipal drift' where multiculturalist 
discourses and policies have been pursued though local councils and municipal authorities, 
making up a patchwork of British multiculturalism summarised by Singh (2005: 170) 
7 This is a valid assessment despite the very problematic nature of Joppke's conflation of equality of 
opportunity as equality of outcome which he characterises as an example of Affirmative Action (see 
Joppke, 1999: footnote 26). The Race-Relations Act does not allow positive discrimination or 
affirmative action. This means that an employer cannot try to change the balance of the workforce by 
selecting someone mainly because she or he is from a particular racial group. This would be 
discrimination on racial grounds, and unlawful (see Karim, 2004/5). What in the US is called 
`affirmative action' goes well beyond what is lawful in Britain. 
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Historically, multiculturalism as a public policy in Britain has been heavily 
localised, often made voluntary, and linked essentially to issues of managing 
diversity in areas of immigrant settlement. The legislative framework on which this 
policy is based - for example, the Race Relations Acts (1965 and 1976) - 
recognised this contingency, giving additional resources to local authorities as well 
as new powers to better promote racial and ethnic equality. With these enabling 
powers, most local authorities with large ethnic minority populations have 
transformed themselves from initially being the bastions of official racism to being 
promoters of anti-racism and multiculturalism, and with this change the strength of 
local ethnic communities and coalitions have been instrumental! 
Perhaps the best example of Singh's assessment of local multiculturalism is captured by the 
programmes of anti-racist education (Tronya, 1987; Mullard, 1985) and multicultural 
education (Swann Committee, 1985) that have historically been enacted at the Local 
Education Authority (LEA) level .9 As chapter six (sec. 
6) details, LEAs are responsible for 
education within the jurisdiction of county councils and metropolitan boroughs, and this 
includes reponsiblity for all state schools excluding those that are afforded `voluntary aided 
status' (and can therefore opt out) under the terms of the 1944 Education Act. In many multi- 
ethnic urban areas, LEAs have actively encouraged anti-racist and multicultural initiatives in 
the face of - and at the cost of - some vociferous opposition (Hewer, 2001), that has in turn 
informed the national picture. Indeed, it was through the debates at the local level that one of 
the leading public policy documents on multiculturalism from an inquiry into multicultural 
education, Education for 411,10 the Swann Report (1985: 36) characterised British 
multicultural citizenship as enabling 
... all ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to participate in fully shaping 
society ... whilst also allowing, and where necessary assisting the ethnic minority 
communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities within a framework of 
commonly accepted values. 
It is important to understand this past policy and discourse in British multiculturalism because 
it is currently alleged to be facing a `crisis', one that is purportedly precipitated by the 
4 
8 This could be an example of the way in which Banting and Kymlicka (2007: 6) argue that 
"multiculturalism has become deeply embedded in the legislation, jurisprudence, and institutions of 
many Western countries and indeed their self-image". 
9 Assisted by section 1I of the Local Government Act 1966 which afforded local authorities additional 
funds to support the presence of significant numbers of minorities requiring language and other access 
assistance. 
10 See Verma (1988) for a critical evaluation of the Swann Report. 
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exceptionality of "culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands" put forward by 
Britain's' Muslims (Modood: 2006: 37). 
1.5. A multicultural crisis of Muslim exceptionality? 
This crisis is epitomised in the work of prominent centre-Left commentators such as 
David Goodhart (2004) and his widely disseminated essay `Too Diverse? ' Invoking a 
monocultural-nationalism, Goodhart has openly argued that "we feel more comfortable with, 
and are readier to share with and sacrifice for, those with whom we have shared histories and 
similar values. To put it bluntly - most of us prefer our own kind. "" To this we could add the 
comments of Trevor Phillips, previously Chair of the CRE and current head of the newly 
forming Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR) (see chp 5 sec 4.5), who has 
famously stated that Britain should "kill off multiculturalism" because it "suggests 
separateness" (quoted in The Times, 3 April, 2004). More recently and, some might suggest, 
more predictably, Goodhart and Philips' views have been re-deployed by the centre-Right 
Conservative Party leader, David Cameron, who has characterised British multiculturalism as 
a "barrier" dividing British society (Cameron, 30 January 2007). 
Whilst much stronger and vitriolic critique is not unusual from a centre-Right in Britain 
that has historically lamented and contested governmental interventions recognising the 
diversity of minority populations12, opposition to the recognition and support of minority 
cultural practices in Britain has undoubtedly had a qualitatively greater impact since it was 
joined by "the pluralistic centre-left [and] articulated by people who previously rejected 
11 Another example includes John Sentamu, the first non-white Archbishop of York, who stated that 
"multiculturalism has seemed to imply, wrongly for me, let other cultures be allowed to express 
themselves but do not let the majority culture at all tell us its glories, its struggles, its joys, its pains" 
(quoted in The Times, 22 November, 2005). Bryan Appleyard of the liberal-conservative Sunday Times, 
meanwhile, announced that "Multiculturalism is dead. It had it coming. An ideology that defined a 
nation as a series of discrete cultural and political entities that were each free to opt out of any or all 
common orthodoxies was never a serious contender in the Miss Best Political System pageant" (17 
December, 2006). All of these ideas are discussed in section 1.6. 
12 Particularly the allocation of public provisions for minority cultural practices on the grounds that 
these deviate from a core "majority" national identity to which minorities are required to assimilate. 
A good example of this view can be found in The Salisbury Review, a conservative magazine that was 
founded in 1982 with the influential conservative philosopher Roger Scruton as its editor. Its 
incendiary role in what became known as the Honneyford Affair provides an excellent case study of 
the main political argumentation contained within this position. See Halstead (1988). 
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polarising models of race and class and were sympathetic to the `rainbow', coalitional politics 
of identity" (Modood, 2005a). 13 
It is equally important to note, however, that the view that multicultural inclusion would 
prove problematic for - and with - Muslims is one that has existed for a little longer than 
recent criticism might suggests. For example, according to Favell (1998: 38), ever since the 
onset of the Satanic Verses affair "one of the hottest issues thrown up by multiculturalism in 
Britain has been the growing significance of political and social issues involving Muslims. " 
To be sure, the publication of a novel by Salman Rushdie which disparaged both the genesis 
of Islam and the biography of the Prophet Mohammed gave rise to a great deal of anger 
expressed by British Muslims who felt that, "as citizens they [were no less] entitled to 
equality of treatment and respect for their customs and religion" (Anwar, 1992: 9) than either 
the Christian majority denominations or other religious minorities. 14 Explored in relation to 
ascribed and self-defined identities in chapter three (sec 8-8.1) this episode highlighted the 
lack of political space and public sympathy experienced by Muslim minorities. As Modood 
argued 
Is not the reaction to The Satanic Verses an indication that the honour of the Prophet or 
the imani ghairat [attachment to and love of the faith] as central to the Muslim psyche 
as the Holocaust and racial slavery to others? [... ] Muslims will argue that, 
historically, vilification of the Prophet and of their faith is central to how the West has 
expressed hatred for them and has led to violence and expulsion on a large scale (2005 
[1993]: 121,122). 
In describing a European trend, Parekh (2006) has characterised these sorts of-issues as the 
`Muslim question' i. e. the norms and values of a democratic culture that does or does not 
13 As one commentator has put it, "the old alliance with the centre-left is fraying to breaking point; old 
allies in the battles against racism have jumped sides, and now routinely present arguments more 
Islamophobic than the centre-right" (Bunting, The Guardian, 27 February, 2006). See Meer (2006) 
(included as appendix III) for a typology of recent convergences between-Right and Left intellectuals 
on matters pertaining to multiculturalism in general and Muslims in particular. 
14 For example, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) tried but failed to prosecute 
Salman Rushdie for blasphemy under existing common law offences. Part of the reason for this failure 
was that Islam, unlike Christianity, is not recognised within blasphemy legislation (in 1977 the editor 
of Gay News was sentenced to six months in prison for publishing a poem that characterised Jesus 
Christ as homosexual). Other reasons include the dwindling socio-legal importance attributed to the 
charge of blasphemy. Nonetheless, the question of parity was an important issue during the Satanic 
Verses Affair and re-emerges with the examples of anti-discrimination and incitement to religious 
hatred legislation that are examined in chapter five. 
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recognise some Muslim sensitivities, which has been described elsewhere as "the nut that 
Europe has to crack" (Joppke, 1998: 37). 15 
A more recent articulation of the view that Muslims are an exceptional and problematic 
minority, however, can be found in the `parallel lives' thesis (Cantle, 2001) that followed the 
inquiry into civil unrest and `rioting' that took place in some northern towns, home to both 
small and large numbers of Muslims (Shukra, Back, Keith, Khan and Solomos, 2004). In 
charging Muslim communities with self-segregation and adoption of isolationist practices 
under a pretence of multiculturalism (see Hussain and Bagguley, 2005), the Ouseley report 
(2001) pioneered an approach found in other post-riot accounts (cf Ritchie, 2001; Clarke, 
2001; Cantle, 200 1). 16 This included its likening of Muslim settlement patterns to those of 
`colonists' (Wainwright, 2001) and which provided many influential commentators with the 
license, not always supported by the specific substance of each report, to critique Muslim 
distinctiveness in particular and multiculturalism in general. '? 
As the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, has recognised, the centrality of 
British-Muslims to these debates has meant that discussion of multiculturalism in Britain has 
a tendency to reflect "a coded way of talking about one kind of perception of Islamic groups 
in Britain" (Williams, 13 May, 2007). This is exemplified by the way in which visible 
Muslim practices such as veiling have, in all their variety, been reduced to and conflated with 
alleged Muslim practices such as forced marriages, female gential mutiliation, a rejection of 
positive law in favour of shar'ia law and so on (see chp 4 sec 4.1-4.2). Each of these 
suggests a radical `otherness' about Muslims and an illiberality about multiculturalism. Since 
" The similarities with the `Jewish question' are discussed in chapter four (see 4.1-4.2) and elsewhere 
in Meer and Noorani (forthcoming). 
16 At the same time, and once it was established in the public mind that young Muslims and 
communities were the protagonists being discussed, the official documents themselves did not always 
explicitly state this and so therefore used more universalistic language. I am grateful to Varun Uberoi 
for this point. 
17 For example, even a sympathetic commentator such as Jocelyne Cesari (2004: 23-4) inaccurately 
concluded that "[w]hether in the areas of housing, employment, schooling or social services, the report 
describes an England segregated according to the twin categories of race and religion. " More popular 
characterisations of this view in public and media discourse are explored in chapter six (4.1-4.2). 
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the latter is alleged to license these practices, opposition to the practice, therefore, it is argued, 
necessarily invalidates the policy. 18 
To this we could add that not only has Muslim claims-making appeared unreasonable, but 
that the acts of terrorism undertaken by protagonists proclaiming a Muslim agenda have, 
according to one commentator, led "British public opinion to be agreed on one thing: that 
British multiculturalism is dead and militant Islam... killed it off' (Singh, 2005: 157). 19 In 
linking the diversity and the anti-terrorism agendas, then, British multiculturalism has been 
implicated as the culprit of our security woes and this has fuelled the securitisation of ethnic 
relations. For example, whilst it is not quite the case, as Fekete (2004: 25) has suggested, that 
public policy solutions aimed at managing ethnic and religious diversity currently amount to 
being "tough on mosques, tough on the causes of mosques", it is certainly now more common 
to find statements such as that made by the Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly, that it is a 
requirement for Muslim organisations to take "a proactive leadership role in tackling 
extremism and defending our shared values" (11 October, 2006). To this end the government 
recently made available five million pounds to help local authorities monitor "Islamic 
extremists" with local councils acting as "the eyes and ears for the police in countering 
threats" (Blackman, 7 January, 2006). To this we might also add recent calls from the 
outgoing head of MI5, Dame Eliza Mannigham-Buller, for the police to develop a network of 
Muslim spies who could provide intelligence on their co-religionists (Evans and Ford, 9 July 
2007). This suggestion follows the disclosure that several British intelligence agencies have 
18 Evidenced not only in the public and media discourse examined in chapter six but also by academics 
and intellectuals including Christian Joppke. Writing in the British Journal of Sociology he states: 
"Certain minority practices, on which, so far, no one had dared to comment, have now become 
subjected to public scrutiny as never before. The notorious example is that of arranged marriage 
which, to an alarming degree, seems to be forced marriage" (2004: 251 emphasis added). Whilst this is 
an important issue that must never be ignored nor silenced, on what evidence Joppke's assumptions are 
based remains undisclosed in the rest of the article. Whilst the conflation between `forced' and 
`arranged' marriages is unfortunate and misleading, the suggestion that no one has dared to comment 
on either betrays a surprising unfamiliarity with a British case in which pressure groups and 
organisations such as Southall Black Sisters and Women Against Fundamentalism (WAF) have led 
high profile national campaigns, and governmental strategies such as the Working Group on Forced 
Marriage are operating. 
19 That this view may already have been held by some legislators is evidenced when Labour MP Tony 
Wright, commenting on Muslim faith schooling, stated that "[b]efore September 11 it looked like a bad 
idea, it now looks like a mad idea". BBC News, 22/11/2001 available at: 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/education/I 670704. stm 
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monitored over 100,000 British-Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca (Leppard, 21 
January, 2007), alongside an unpopular attempt by the DfES to encourage universities to 
report `Asian-looking' students suspected of involvement in `Islamic political radicalism' (see 
Dodd, 16 October, 2006). 
1.6. A selective retreat? 
Having been celebrated as "unique in Europe" (Statham, 2003: 123) and once recognised 
as an approach that "has not stood in the way of successful integration" (Joppke, 1999: 644), 
to what extent is it then true to say that the normative policy rhetoric from a few years ago, 
which was in favour of multiculturalism, has since shifted? Assuming for a moment that this 
is the case, one way a `shift' might be characterised is as a move from a perceived neglect to 
affirmation of British identity, presented as the meta-community to which all must subscribe. 
For example, the government endorsed report entitled `A Journey to Citizenship' (2005: 15), 
chaired by Sir Bernard Crick, states that 
To be British seems to us to mean that we respect the laws, the elected parliamentary 
and democratic political structures, traditional values of mutual tolerance, respect for 
equal rights and mutual concern; and that we give our allegiance to the state (as 
commonly symbolised in the Crown)... To be British is to respect those over-arching 
specific institutions, values, beliefs and traditions that bind us all, the different nations 
and cultures together in peace and in a legal order. [... ] So to be British does not mean 
assimilation into a common culture so that original identities are lost. 
Similarly, while the aforementioned Cantle report (2001: 10) argues for a "greater sense of 
citizenship" informed by "common elements of `nation-hood' [including] the use of the 
English language" (ibid. 19), it equally stresses that "we are never going to turn the clock 
back to what was perceived to be a dominant or monoculturalist view of nationality' (ibid. 
18), and its lead author has elsewhere pleaded: "let's not just throw out the concept of 
multiculturalism; let's update it and move it to a more sophisticated and developed approach" 
(Cantle, 2006: 91). To this we could add the conclusions of the Home Office sponsored 
Denham Report (2002: 20) which stressed that "our society is multicultural, and it is shaped 
by the interaction between people of diverse cultures. There is no single dominant and 
unchanging culture into which all must assimilate". Indeed, Tony Blair's most recent speech 
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on the topic presents this affirmation in a strong `civic' sense before endorsing an `ideal' of 
multicultural Britain that is worth quoting at length: 
... when it comes to our essential values - belief in democracy, the rule of law, 
tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage - then 
that is where we come together, it is what we hold in common; it is what gives us the 
right to call ourselves British. [... ] The whole point is that multicultural Britain was 
never supposed to be a celebration of division; but of diversity. The purpose was to 
allow people to live harmoniously together, despite their difference; not to make their 
difference an encouragement to discord. The values that nurtured it were those of 
solidarity, of coming together, of peaceful co-existence. The right to be in a 
multicultural society was always, always implicitly balanced by a duty to integrate, to 
be part of Britain, to be British and Asian, British and black, British and white. [... ] So 
it is not that we need to dispense with multicultural Britain. On the contrary we should 
continue celebrating it (Blair, 8 December 2006). 
An insight into Blair's thinking can be found in the earlier White Paper Secure Borders, Safe 
Haven (2002) which proposes measures, following the Cantle recommendations, that 
included swearing a US style oath of allegiance at naturalisation ceremonies, an English 
language proficiency requirement when seeking citizenship, as well as the Crick Report's 
(2005) recommendations for citizenship education in Schools. Meanwhile, the Government's 
current strategy for Race Equality and community cohesion, Improving Opportunity, 
Strengthening Society (Home Office, 2005: 42) states that: 
Fundamentally, national cohesion rests on an inclusive sense of Britishness which 
couples the offer of fair, mutual support - from security to health to education - 
with the expectation that people will play their part in society and respect others. 
The follow-up: One year on -A progress summary (Home Office, 2006), reiterates its two 
key aims as: "achieving equality between different races; and developing a better sense of 
community cohesion by helping people from different backgrounds to have a stronger sense 
of `togetherness"' (ibid. 1). This includes, for example, "raising the achievement of groups at 
risk of underperforming i. e. African-Caribbean, Gyspy Traveller, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, 
Turkish and Somali pupils" (ibid. 2). This is meant to contribute to a cohesive community in 
which "there is a common vision and a sense of belonging; the diversity of people's different 
backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and valued; those from different backgrounds 
have similar life opportunities' (2006, p. 7). Meanwhile, the Government sponsored 
Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC) explicitly distinguishes its definition of 
integration from potential assimilatory modes: 
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Very many of the definitions of cohesion and integration offered in the response to the 
Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC) consultation spontaneously include a 
level of concern to distinguish integration from assimilation, stressing the importance 
for true cohesion of accepting - and celebrating - difference. Individual and group 
identities shduld not be endangered by the process of integration, but rather they should 
be enriched within both the incoming groups and the host nation. Cohesion implies a 
society in which differences of culture, race and faith are recognised and 
accommodated within an overall sense of identity, rather than a single identity, based 
on a uniform similarity (COIC, Themes and Messages, 2007: 5 original emphasis). 
Thus it is still the case, to take an extreme but instructive example, that the British Airport 
Authority allows its Sikh employees (in all facets of airline duties) to wear the Kirpan (a 
traditional knife with a three inch blade), despite strong opposition from the British Pilots 
Association (Singh, 2005: 165). Given these sorts of accommodations and evidence of an 
emphasis upon recognising differences in governmental literature and rhetoric, as well as the 
polls conducted shortly after 7/7 which reported that "the majority of British people think that 
multiculturalism makes the country a better places20, how can it be said that multiculturalism 
has been rejected either in policy or practice? 
1.7. Missing Muslims in `multiculture'? 
One explanation might be to point to the very different meanings of multiculturalism. For 
example, in the above opinion poll it was noted that while 62% of the same survey sample 
stated that multiculturalism makes the country a better place, 58% declared that people who 
come to Britain should adopt its values and traditions. Of course this does not necessarily 
describe a dichotomy, for nuances of both can easily be true of the same type of 
multiculturalism. It is worth considering, however, the extent to which the poll confirms 
Giddens suspicion "that much of the debate about multiculturalism in this country is. 
misconceived" (The Guardian, 14 October, 2006) and "seems simply to be out of touch with 
what the concept actually means" (Giddens, 2007: 155). A key misconception may be found 
in the confusion between `communitarian' and individualistic `multiculture' views of British 
multiculturalism. The difference between these might be characterised thus: where the former 
emphasises the ways in which strong ethnic or cultural identities can lead to a meaningful and 
20 See 'UK majority back multiculturalism' BBC 10 August 2005, available 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/g_o/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk/4137990. stm accessed 13 November 2006. 
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self-assured integration (Parekh, 2000; Modood, 2005,2007), the latter stresses the 
possibilities of life-style identities adopted in an atmosphere of `conviviality' (Gilroy, 2004; 
Malik, 2007). 
Despite the contemporary nature of these distinctions, they have not gone unnoticed in the 
past. For example, nearly a decade and a half ago Paul Gilroy (1993: 94) asked what it meant 
if "the political and cultural gains of the emergent black Brits go hand in hand with the further 
marginalisation of `Asians' in general and Muslims in particular? ". Whilst certain events, not 
least the Rushdie Affair, had prompted his probing empathy, based upon the evidence of his 
recent theoretical advocacy of a `multiculture' that does not speak to the marginalisation of 
Muslims today, his question has not moved him to find a more inclusive formulation. This is 
particularly so because Gilroy assumes that multiculture, or at least its politics, must be 
secular in orientation and so prioritises "the process of cohabitation and interaction that have 
made multiculture an ordinary feature of social life in Britain's urban areas and in 
postcolonial cities elsewhere [hoping] an interest in the workings of conviviality will take off 
from the point where `multiculturalism' broke down" (Gilroy, 2004: xi). 
It arguable that this `breakdown' consists of a failure to take up the political claims of 
Muslims and re-focus instead upon socio-cultural interactions and expressions. More 
specifically, it takes place along the fault-lines of `essentialism' and `reification' that is felt, 
certainly by Gilroy and others (including Alexander, 2002), to underpin the conception of 
multiculturalism presented in the aforementioned CMEB (2000), and elsewhere by writers 
such as Parekh (2000: 6), in his description of a multicultural society as comprising 
... one that includes two or more cultural communities. 
It might respond to its cultural 
diversity in one of two ways... It might welcome and cherish it... and respect the 
cultural demands of its constituent communities; or it might seek to assimilate these 
communities into its mainstream culture either wholly or substantially. In the first case 
it is multiculturalist and in the second monoculturalist in its orientation and ethos. The 
term `multicultural' refers to the fact of cultural diversity, the term `multiculturalism' 
to a normative response to that fact (emphasis added). 
What is being argued is that, in their defence of a wholesale rejection of a normative and state 
sponsored multiculturalism, Gilroy and others have defended only the `multiculture' and not 
the communitarian version. For it is precisely the sociological and normative conceptions of 
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community that some `multiculturalists' are distancing themselves from in the 
conceptualisation of `multiculture' as multiculturalism without groups. This is for some, 
though not Gilroy, a less political project. This is apparent in Kenan Malik's (2006\7: 3) 
statement that "when most people say that multiculturalism is a good thing, they mean the 
experience of living in a society that is less insular, less homogenous, more vibrant and 
cosmopolitan that before". Hence his dramatic plea "to separate the idea of diversity as lived 
experience from that of multiculturalism as a political process", because that latter amounts to 
a political project that will "seal people into ethnic boxes and police the boundaries" (Malik, 
2007: 9, see also Alibhai-Brown, 2001: 47). 
As chapter three demonstrates, however, the charge of essentialising and reifying 
communities into ethnic boxes ignores the ways in which ethnic categories can reflect 
subjective (and not only objective or externally ascribed) positionings within and between 
sites of `boundaries'. These are not unproblematic; can be multiple, and may be informed by 
common experiences of racism; sexuality; socio-economic positions; geographical locality 
and so forth (these issues are fully unpacked and explored in chapter three). In this sense, all 
group categories are socially constructed, but it is clear that people still have a sense of groups 
(to which, amongst other things, they may feel they belong or are excluded from). 
It will be argued that one of the reasons we cannot ignore `groupist' conceptions of 
difference is that religious-minorities often see and describe themselves as sharing a `group' 
identity through such categories as `Jewish' or `Muslim' or `Sikh' amongst others (this is 
developed in Meer, 2008). If we accept that these are no less valid than categories of 
`working class', `woman', `black' or `youth', it appears inconsistent to reject some groupist 
categories simply because they are subject to the same dialectical tension between specificity 
and generality that all group categories are subject to (Modood, 1994). This is not to 
`essentialize' or `reify', however, since the category of `Jew' or `Muslim' or `Sikh' can 
remain `as internally diverse as `Christian' or `Belgian' or `middle-class', or any other 
category helpful in ordering our understanding... [D]iversity does not lead to the 
abandonment of social concepts in general' (Modood, 2003: 100). This returns us to an 
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earlier debate examined in Modood's (1998: 378,379-80) discussion of anti-essentialism and 
multiculturalism, in which he noted how 
... critics have attacked multiculturalism in very similar terms to how multiculturalism 
attacked nationalism or monoculturalism. The positing of minority or immigrant 
cultures, which need to be respected, defended, publicly supported and so on, is said to 
appeal to the view that cultures are discrete, frozen in time, impervious to external 
influences, homogeneous and without dissent... British anti-essentialists have proposed 
the ideas of hybridity and of new ethnicities as an alternative to essentialist ethnic 
identities [which] are not simply `given', nor are they static or atemporal, and they 
change (and should change) under new circumstances or by sharing space... 
Reconciled to multiplicity'to an end to itself, its vision of multiculturalism is confined 
to personal lifestyles and cosmopolitan consumerism and does not extend to the state... 
These sorts of hybridity and multiplicity are epitomised by Stuart Hall's (1988; 1991) `new 
ethnicities' thesis, and refers to a laissez faire, secular multiculturalism that is less receptive to 
the recognition of `groupings' in general, and ethno-religious community identities in 
particular. 2' This sort of multiculture seeks to engage with the cultural complexities of ethnic 
identities, specifically their processes of formation and change, which it views as being 
produced somewhere between an interaction of the local and the global, in which 
... the displacement of `centred' discourses of the West entails putting in question its 
universalist character and its transcendental claims to speak for everyone, while 
being itself everywhere and nowhere (Hall, 1996 [1988], p. 169). 
Contrast this, for example, with the way in which the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) 
described its vision of multiculturalism in a submission to the COIC 
The MCB's vision is of a multi-faith, pluralistic society with a conscious policy of 
recognising that people's cultural and faith identities are not simply a private 
matter, but ones that have public implications. This vision does not imply cultural 
separatism - the MCB is committed to working for the common good (MCB 
Briefing Paper January 2007: 2). 
It is arguably the case that if the former multiculture view is championed at the expense of 
accommodations of religious minority identities in general, the impact on Muslims may be 
particularly negative, no less than a shift toward nationalist civic-assimilationist rhetoric. 
This is because secularist `multiculture' has the effect of demarcating "the limits of their 
21 It is worth noting how Stuart Hall's seminal ideas are open to more than one interpretation. For 
example, many advocates of `multiculture' look to Halt as a stimulus but Hall was an author of the 
`communitarian' Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), and has never distanced himself from 
that report. For a discussion of Hall's ambivalences on some of these points, see Rojek (2003: 178- 
185). 
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[Muslims'] expectations for the future extension of special rights and exemptions, as well as 
perhaps having a demoralising effect because of the stigmatising and stereotypical way it 
represents them in the public domain" (Statham, 2003: 145). As a replacement, then, to a 
political multiculturalism, the `multiculture' approach appears blind to one of greatest 
challenges presently facing British multiculturalism, i. e., the inclusion of Muslim `groupings' 
and accommodations of Muslim claims-making. Two of the most salient examples of this 
claims-making concern contestations of anti-discrimination legislation and the state 
sponsorship of Muslim faith-schooling, each of which are explored in chapters five and six, 
whilst the twin issues of stigma and stereotype in public and media discourses are examined 
in chapter four. Integral each of these kinds of mobilisations, as well as the experiences of 
stigma and stereotype, are the forms of consciousness that affect and are affected by them. 
2. Methodological Issues - reflexivity, rationale, and choice of methods 
Before these forms of consciousness are set out in the next chapter, the following sections 
will discuss the methodological rationale that informs this thesis, and explain how and why a 
mixed method case-study approach has been employed. This will begin with a reflexive 
consideration of the ways in which the current theoretical and empirical work has developed 
from the initial research proposal. This is an issue that is worth exploring because my interest 
in undertaking a piece of research where the theorising and researching of dual components 
of Muslim subjectivities and public and governmental perceptions in tandem, was not built 
into the initial research proposal. A consideration of the development from research proposal 
to the actual empirical work detailed in later chapters is perhaps one way of heeding C. 
Wright-Mills' (1959) advocacy for greater reflection on the development of one's 
`sociological imagination', and his invocation to "learn to use our life experience in our 
intellectual work, continually to examine and interpret it... even if it seems altogether trivial 
and cheap" (ibid. 196,207). This is not the same as adopting a narrative self-inquiry 
methodology (Berger, 2001), however, either as a performative auto-ethnography (Spry, 
2001) or as more embedded ethnographic fieldwork (Adler, 1985; Hammersley and Atkinson, 
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1995). It is simply to recognise that biography and life experience shapes our ontology, and 
that this inevitably impacts upon our research interests. This might be drawn out by 
identifying key mediating `events' and obvious thought processes that have affected this 
transition (Gouldner, 1970). 
In charting the development of my research in this way, I owe a partial debt to Claire 
Alexander's (2000: 28) ethnographic study entitled The Asian Gang. While Alexander is 
criticised elsewhere in this thesis (chp. 3 sec. 11), it remains the case that her work has 
proved insightful because of the ways in which she has sought to begin her research without 
the presumption of "innocence" on her part. This is not "to claim a position of privileged 
knowledge" (Alexander, 2000: 29) as emerging from one's standpoint, however, for it is 
perhaps a weaker or more modest admission of the negation of `innocence' in recognising the 
impact of previous interests upon one's research. In Alexander's case this resulted from her 
work with young ethnic minority men in London, and in my case it results from research with 
Muslim communities in Bradford and Glasgow. This requires some elaboration. 
2.1. From proposal to research 
The initial PhD research proposal was informed by an ethnographic study of Pakistani 
ethnic origin communities in Bradford, which constituted part of a Masters degree submission 
(Meer, 2002a). From this study there emerged two dominant themes. The first expressed 
itself in interview data as identity articulations that accentuated various degrees of self- 
attributed Muslim identities. The second manifested itself amongst respondents in terms of 
perceptions, fears and experiences of hostility toward their being Muslim in a post-9/11 
environment. During the summer of 2002, at the time of that research, these concerns were 
visibly informed at a national level of public discourse with the revelation that several young 
British Muslims had travelled to Afghanistan, either in support of Jihadist movements or in 
opposition to the military response to 9/11. The concomitant parade of a handful of British 
Muslims detained by the US military at Guantanamo Bay, gave further weight to the 
suspicion that something was out of kilter within Britain's Muslim communities. These 
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revelations occupied and energised the mass media, a key vehicle of public discourse 
(Husband, 2000), where they were interpreted and portrayed as further evidence of Muslim 
ambivalences toward their British citizenship (Abbas, 2005: 12; Fekete, 2004). Questions of 
national loyalty thus became central to discussion, about Muslims in Britain, and the initial 
PhD research proposal reflected this interest: 
This project will investigate how far, and in what ways, current identities amongst 
youth of Pakistani descent in Britain present disjunctures in accounts of the Citizen, 
Community and Nation. The focus of the study is how forms of Islam are being 
used as expressions of ethnicity, and what affects the differential use of Islam by 
different subgroups of young people. Empirically, the project will investigate the 
hypothesis that adolescent boys of Pakistani descent are actively opposing 
definitions relating to country of origin and country of birth, favouring instead 
identification with a global notion of Islam as the most authentic description of 
their identity in Britain today (Meer, 2002b). 
In addition to the issues emerging from the ethnographic data in Bradford that I felt required 
further exploration (articulations and accentuations of Muslim identities) was added the 
consideration of `scale' (Hopkins, 2004). By this it is meant that the PhD proposal also 
sought to examine the relevance of Muslim identities in terms of individual, local and national 
accounts of belonging. 
It was at this stage, however, that I deferred the proposed research to join a Joseph 
Rowntree Funded (JRF) project in Glasgow (Cassidy, O'Connor, and Dorrer, 2006) that 
sought to explore young people's experiences of `transition' from adolescence to adulthood, 
examining in part the role of identity as a mediating variable in this transition (specifically in 
terms of self-esteem, perceived discrimination and psychological well-being (cf Verkuyten 
and Lay, 1998; Cassidy, O'Connor, Howe and Warden, 2005)). Since this was a comparative 
study of white and ethnic minority young people, and because I was encouraged to contribute 
to the research design and how it was operationalised, it also provided an opportunity to 
gauge whether identities for Muslims outside of Bradford and other familiar spaces where I 
had grown up in West Yorkshire, reflected a pattern in reporting stronger expressions of 
religious affiliation and association than of parental country of origin. 
As this research indeed began to support and concur with other work highlighting the 
self-attributed emphasis of Muslim identities (cf O'Beiren 2004; Saeed et al 1999; Jacobson, 
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1998; Modood et al 1997,1994; Samad, 1997), I simultaneously became aware that the forms 
of Muslim assertiveness discussed in chapters three, five and six were not confined to 
England alone. Although this thesis is not a comparative study, my time in Scotland alerted 
me to several cases of Muslim communities and organisations demanding civic inclusion and 
the accommodation of certain rights. One such example is discussed in chapter six where 
Muslim communities in Shawlands and Pollockshields - with the support of the Muslim 
Association of Britain (MAB) - continue a six year campaign to turn several state schools, 
with a predominantly Muslim intake, into Scotland's first state funded Muslim'school. This 
mirrors the trend of Muslim associations in Edinburgh, specifically with respect to acquiring 
some public money in the building of the central Mosque based in George Square? Z What 
interested me was that whilst such examples of mobilisation for recognition were taking 
place, obviously more numerously in England - and often presented through the lobbying of 
organisations such as the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), Association of Muslim 
Schools (AMS) and the more generic Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) - an increasingly 
negative objectification of Muslims, particularly in terms of understanding ethnic relations 
through security concerns, had gathered saliency. 
It seemed to me that this had two key elements to it. The first located the source of any 
problems facing Muslim communities firmly at the door of Muslims themselves, and 
rehearsed the common sense racism (Lawrence, 1982) that it is the presence of problematic 
ethnic minorities that heralds their own racialisation, rather than the function of certain 
societal discourses that serve to racialise minorities (Hage, 1998). It is argued in chapter three 
that this discourse in present in some of the objections to the concept of `Islamophobia' and 
anti-Muslim racism (sec. 9.1). Meanwhile, the second element increasingly became 
established as the most authentic account of why civil unrest and `rioting' had taken place 
immediately prior to 9/11 in some northern towns home to both a small and large number of 
Muslims. As this chapter has already argued, this is the `parallel lives' thesis that charges 
As a spin-off from this initial relationship, Edinburgh city council now subsidises some of the 
activities of the `Mosque Kitchen' which serves South Asian and North African food inside an area of 
the central Mosque to any diner at lunchtimes. 
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multiculturalism with encouraging Muslim communities to become self-segregating and 
isolationist (see section 1.5-1.7). Taken together, what this context provided for a research 
student was evidence of a pattern which intentionally and unintentionally positioned Muslims 
in Britain as "Public Enemy Number One - Britain's Most Unwanted, as it were" (Alexander, 
2000: 14). I was, therefore, of the opinion that the original intention to focus upon 
expressions of Muslim minority identity alone would not have adequately captured the way 
my research interests had developed. What I felt was required was some thicker 
conceptualisation that would allow me to theorise this duality where Muslim identities were 
striving to cultivate the moral and aesthetic insights to emerge from being a Muslim in Britain 
- and have them recognised - on the one hand, with this sense of public questioning, hostility 
and contempt on the other. As it is set out at the beginning of this chapter, and most fully in 
chapter two, I found this in W. E. B. Du Bois's account of `double consciousness'. What 
concerns this thesis, then, are the cases of Muslim mobilisation for certain forms of civic 
rights, how these mobilisations are related to the forms of Muslim-consciousness set out in 
chapter three, and whether we should talk about the British Muslim experience in terms of a 
`double consciousness' discussed in the following chapter. 
This perhaps raises another question concerning the nature of the relationship between 
political advocacy and research. For while I have already stated that the research has not set 
out to adopt anything like a narrative enquiry approach that would have very little distance 
between the subject and the inquiry, it has neither adopted very positivistic approach that de- 
couples my own biography from the political issues in my work. So the research has not 
necessarily pursued a conscious line of political coupling or detachment. Given the topicality 
of the issues and the examples that I have chosen to explore, however, a certain degree of 
sympathy is clearly apparent throughout the thesis. For instance, it draws attention to a 
political problem, namely the potential civic impairment of Muslims, and it does not pretend 
that we should be happy about this. So by identifying a `problem', a normative perspective is 
already in operation. Not approaching this topic entirely neutrally, however, is the standard 
of all work on race and ethnicity. By that it is meant that while researchers undertake work 
26 
with rigor, in this instance through inquiry that includes case-study instruments, and deploy 
standards of self-criticism and other criticism, it is clear that the very terms discrimination, 
exclusion, impairment are all terms in which where there is a positive and a negative. Yet it 
is unusual to hear that a researcher `likes' discrimination and that that is why they study it. 
Hence, while our concepts are a-symmetrical it makes sense to say that racial inequality is a 
bad thing and we should do something about it. This accords with Taylor's (1989b) 
description of the research field as more like a slope on which political concepts take the 
researcher in, rather than a level playing field. This means that on the one-hand our identity 
makes the difference, as to what we may be more likely to empathise with; and on the hand 
the whole field is structured around identifying problems and pointing towards remedies. 
2.2. Case Study methodology 
These concerns have been explored through the adoption of a mixed method case study 
analysis which seeks to garner a multi-perspectival analysis in which the researcher, although 
focusing upon one area, can consider the perspective of other actors and relevant groups of 
actors to examine the interaction between them. Thus in the examination of Muslim- 
consciousness that this thesis has undertaken, in chapters four, five and six the research has 
consciously garnered the views of objectors to, as well as proponents of, a more positive 
public representation in media, discourse, Muslim contestations of discrimination legislation, 
and Muslim mobilisations for faith schooling. 
Most closely associated with the work of the Chicago School, 
23 case study research has 
been marked by periods of intense use and disuse throughout the course of sociological 
inquiry (Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, 1991). Its under-use is somewhat surprising given that 
23 As discussed in chapter two with respect to the work of Park et al, this could be because the city of 
Chicago, as a site of diverse immigration to the US, has historically presented sociologists with a 
wealth of material wherein issues of poverty, social mobility, political disenfranchisement, or other 
conditions sometimes associated immigration were ideally suited to the use of case study methodology 
(Hamel et at, 1993). Du Bois himself conducted some of the earliest case study research in the 
development of sociological inquiry. One of these studies became the landmark text The Philadelphia 
Negro (1899), credited by many as creating the sub-discipline of `urban sociology' that so animated the 
Chicago School with much intensity in later years (Lewis, 1993). Du Bois' study was, simultaneously, 
heavily ethnographic and involved a great deal of participant observation; an approach that is not suited 
to the questions addressed in later chapters. 
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case study methodology is very hospitable to sociological exploration of `how', `what' and 
`why' questions (Stake, 1995), particularly when they are pursued in real life contexts (Burns, 
1990). With some cross-over between them, the multiple sources of evidence used in later 
empirical chapters accord with those set out in Robert Yin's (1994; 1988) typology to 
include: (i) documents (policy documents and government bills); (ii) archival records (official 
statistics and the mass media); and (iii) semi-structured interviews (with protagonists and 
experts listed in Appendix IV and discussed further below). In order to substantiate the 
questions relevant to this thesis and most pertinent to each chapter, data that is already in 
existence, alongside purposive data that has been originally collated, is relied upon to pursue 
the chapter specific research questions. 
A frequent criticism of case study methodology is that its dependence upon a single case 
renders it incapable of providing a generalizing conclusion. Giddens (1984), for example, has 
argued that case study methodology is too microscopic because it lacks a sufficient number of 
cases. This is an important point, because in this research only three cases are considered (see 
chapters four, five and six). To justify the validity of using only three cases one might draw 
upon Hamel et at (1993) and Robert Yin (1984,1993,1994) who forcefully argue that the 
relative size of a sample (whether 2,10, or 100 cases are used) does not transform a multiple 
case into a macroscopic study. Rathei, the goal of the study should establish the parameters 
in the way that even a single case can be considered acceptable, provided it meets the 
established objective. This is important because case study research is not meant to be a form 
of sampling research, but rather about selecting cases that maximize what can be learned in 
the period of time available for the study (Silverman, 1998). In this thesis the parameters are 
set by three broad issues that, at the beginning of each chapter, it is argued are instructive to 
our understanding of Muslim-consciousness in Britain. 
2.2.1. Interview method 
As part of the case study approach, in-depth personal interviews were carried out with 
participants (listed in Appendix IV) who were selected on the basis of their involvement, 
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advocacy or expertise on Muslim mobilisations for the state sponsorship of Muslim faith- 
schooling and protection against anti-Muslim discrimination, both of which are explored in 
chapters five and six, and issues of stigma and stereotype in public and media discourses that 
are examined in chapter four. Because the research was concerned with issues of "content 
and process" (Bernard 2000: 210), rather than an estimation of population parameters, 
focused interviews were adopted to allow people to speak for themselves in a manner less 
feasible with structured questionnaires and rigid interview guides (Hammersly and Atkinson 
1983; Burgess 1984). Open ended questions allowed the respondents to articulate their 
experiences and concerns, so that "rather than offering glib or easy answers" the discussion 
could be "as frank as possible" (Fielding, 1996: 138). The focus was, thus, on "what kinds of 
things are happening and why, rather than to determine the frequency of predetermined kinds 
of things that the researcher already believes can happen" (Loftland 1971: 76). Hence the 
respondents were encouraged to report anything they felt was either important or relevant so 
that even while the focus of the interview was defined, the respondents determined its 
content. A general statement of the research aims was provided to the respondents before 
each interview, and all interviewees provided informed consent to record the interview. 
2.2.2. Discourse analysis 
Another important part of the case-study approach incorporates a discourse analysis of 
public and media commentary which explores some of the negative ways in which Islam and 
Muslims are portrayed, and how some British-Muslims have responded by representing 
themselves through a proliferation of Muslim media sources. It is argued that public and 
media discourse can make a relevant contribution to the sorts of civic status that minorities 
experience, and that an inquiry into these currents might contribute something meaningful to 
the more general concern with Muslim-consciousness in Britain. 
An analysis of public and media discourses can include a range of methods that focus 
upon the ways in which text and `talk' contribute to particular modes of understanding and 
representing our social world (Silverman, 2000). Influenced by Foucault's concern to 
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signpost shifts in moral, ethical and, ultimately, historical notions of legitimising power and 
authority (processes keenly observed by Foucault in relation to conceptions of `madness', 
`sexuality', `punishment', etc), a focus upon discourses can reveal the degree to which claims 
made in relation to a specific `problem' often rest in hidden assumptions. 24 This is why 
chapter four explores the generally more negative commentary on Muslims, so that we can 
examine how and in what ways discourses of the `Muslim problem' do indeed rest on or 
depart from what we know of Muslim minorities in Britain. Whilst it is true that the way in 
which things are represented are at any one time open to various in interpretations, this does 
not prevent some interpretations from carrying greater authority and or legitimacy than others. 
In part this is can be due to the context in which an interpretation is made, but it is also the 
case that things can be `encoded' to offer limited range of `preferred readings' in a way that 
suggests that representations do not solely reflect phenomena but that they also construct or 
support a particular idea of that phenomena. This has long been an argument of some cultural 
studies writers discussed in chapter three, and who have taken the idea of `discourse' in talk 
and text to explore issues of power in the manner alluded to in Foucault's work. Thus Hall 
(1992: 291) has argued: 
Discourse is a group of statements which provide a language for talking about - i. e. 
a way of representing -a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When 
statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse 
makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other 
ways in which the topic can be constructed. 
Whilst not exclusive, there is a primary focus in chapter four upon newspaper and journalist 
commentary that is taken to be an important barometer of public and media discourse (Poole 
24 In The History of Sexuality (1979: 93), for example, Foucault argues that power emanates from 
every point in the social field, since it is not a monolithic force, "an institution, and nor a structure; 
neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name one attributes to a complex 
strategical situation in a given society". Consequently, dominant discourses or modes of knowledge 
can reinforce particular perceptions and understandings, norms and values amounting to a form of 
power that often passes `unseen'. Although one might not agree with this interpretation and, amongst 
other things, the patent denial of structure in Foucaults account of power (Fraser, 1989; Harstock, 
1990), particularly as a coercive force (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 1993), it is important to recognise 
his insight not as a teleological theory, but as a sort of "toolkit" as Foucault (1980: 145) himself 
suggested. Dyer (1993: 31) supports this reading in his argument that the ways "we are seen in part 
determines the way we are treated; how we treat others is based on how we see them; such seeing is 
based on representation. " 
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and Richardson, 2006; Meer, 2006: Franklin, 2004; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2001). The 
importance of print media discourse is supported in the writer and broadcaster Alibhai- 
Brown's (1998: 118) argument that "print media journalists set the agenda. What appears in 
the newspapers is picked up by the broadcasters who frequently recycle in more subtle and 
acceptable forms". Similarly, Van Dijk (1999) has argued that print journalism often 
supplies the currency of media discourse in general - since "speakers routinely refer to 
newspapers as their source (and authority) of knowledge or opinions". Furthermore, he 
claims, "by influencing majority audience attitudes, values and beliefs", the power of print 
media discourses disproportionately shape what is know of ethnic minorities (Van Dijk, 1999, 
cited in Richardson, 2001: 148). What is cumulatively being argued, then, is that an analysis 
of public and media discourses might reveal something valuable about common beliefs and 
underlying value systems (McQuail, 1994), so that if one was to consider the dynamics of 
media discourse as being more epiphenomenal with respect to wider societal concerns, 
analysis would still reveal views held, even if these are not in and of themselves efficacious. 
This is ' particularly relevant because chapter four explores some of the commonsense 
arguments that, as Favell and Modood (2004: 493) have argued, fail to do justice to the 
complexity of `hard cases', and encourage a conflation between fact and fiction when there is 
a reliance "on the unchallenged reproduction of anecdotal facts usually taken from 
newspapers". This is a key point because while it is may be difficult to gage a link between 
`thought' and `action', or how negative or positive conceptions Muslims may translate into 
racist violence against, or beneficial treatment of, these minorities, what we can point to are 
the studies of Wilson and Gutierrez (1995: 45) which show that "negative, one-sided or 
stereotypical media portrayals and news coverage do reinforce racist attitudes in those 
members of the audience who do have them and can channel mass actions against the group 
that is stereotypically portrayed". To this end chapter four reports on a general level content 
analysis of argumentation strategies evidenced in specifically negative public and media 
discourse to help unpack the internal content of these discourses (for detailed discussion of 
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`argumentation strategies' see Meer, 2006 (included as appendix III); Poole, 2002 and 
Richardson, 2001). 
3. Chapter outline 
The next chapter turns to the work of W. E. B. Du Bois to explore the utility of his idea of 
`double consciousness. ' In dialoguing this idea with Hegelian phenomenology, the chapter 
delineates a central distinction between two kinds of consciousness: one in itself and one for 
itself. It argues that these ideas prove invaluable in capturing the dual character of 
unrecognised Muslim minority subjectivities and their transformative potential, as well as the 
conditions of impaired civic status that are sometimes afforded to minorities by mainstream 
society. The chapter ends by identifying points of convergence between Du Bois and key 
contemporary theorists of multiculturalism, demonstrating the strengths and multifaceted 
nature of Du Bois before summarising the theoretical framework that is applied in later 
chapters. It is then argued that because Muslim-consciousness in Britain has emerged 
relatively recently, an inquiry into the discursive currents through which post-immigrant 
minority identities have historically been framed and affected is required. 
To this end chapter three explores the nature and fruition of Muslim identities; their 
form, their content, and how they contrast with other minority identities within the British 
political context. Particular attention in this chapter is afforded to the fields of race-relations 
and anti-racism, and the enormous influence they have had upon the political (not least legal) 
conceptualisation of minorities as racial, ethnic or other political subjects, from the early 
periods of post-war Commonwealth immigration to the present day. The chapter concludes 
by addressing the charges of essentialism (and/or the negation of `hybridity') directed toward 
the idea of Muslim `group' identities, before setting out the implications of the preceding 
discussion in the subsequent analysis. 
This is then related to the first of the multi-method case-studies set out in chapter four 
which examines the public and media discourses about Muslims in Britain, specifically the 
manner in which minorities are publicly represented. This chapter demonstrates how this 
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process is integral to Du Bois' account of double consciousness. It is argued that public and 
media discourses can contribute to the sorts of civic status that minorities possess, and that an 
inquiry into these discursive currents could contribute something meaningful to the broader 
concern with Muslim-consciousness in Britain. With this in mind, the chapter explores some 
of the ways in which Islam and Muslims are portrayed across salient axis, and comparatively, 
in relation to some other groups, and how Muslims themselves have responded through a 
proliferation of Muslim media outlets. 
Reporting on the second of three case studies, chapter five extends this analysis to the 
arena of anti-discrimination formulas that, alongside education, are understood as forming a 
cornerstone to the sorts of British multicultural citizenship surveyed earlier in this chapter, 
and civic status that this confers. By applying the discussion of cultural racism and 
Islamophobia that was critically set out in chapter three, chapter five evaluates how and why 
these racisms are or are not recognised within current discrimination legislation. This 
proceeds through consideration of how we have reached the current situation; to what extent 
it works, and where Muslims in Britain are positioned within it. It is argued that if we reject a 
normative grammar of race and accept that legal categories of race and ethnicity must not be 
foreclosed to the complexities of socially contingent periods of Muslim racialisation, a 
coherent argument can be made for Muslim inclusion under existing anti-discrimination 
formulae. That Muslims presently remain outside the reach of these can be accounted for by 
the lack of political will and social importance attributed to challenging anti-Muslim 
discrimination. 
Chapter six then examines why there have been sustained Muslim mobilisations on the 
issue of Muslim schools within and across diverse Muslim communities. It considers what 
the engagement or non-engagement of Muslims over the issue of education reveals about the 
incorporation of Muslims into a rubric of British-citizenship, specifically with respect to civic 
and political participation; and whether a recognition and reflection of the substantive 
elements of a Muslim-consciousness within the sphere of education address the sorts of 
double-consciousness discussed in chapter two. 
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Chapter seven concludes by delineating and describing four tendencies in the emergence 
of a Muslim-consciousness. The implications of these are discussed in the ensuing chapters, 
from which four main types of Muslim-consciousness are deciphered. Whilst in truth there is 
overlap and interaction between each kind, it is argued that enough consistency exists in their 
form and content to delineate the following four, progressively outwardly moving, tendencies 
that reflect the Du Bosian characterisation of the development of a minority consciousness 
from being in itself (as (i) `impaired' and (ii) `reactive') to a minority consciousness that is 
for itself (as (iii) `pragmatic' and (iv) potentially `synthesized'). The thesis ends by looking 
forward to emerging research agendas concerning Muslim-consciousness in Britain. 
34 
Chapter Two 
The value of Du Bois and the meaning of `double consciousness'. 
[I]t is our duty to conserve our physical powers, our intellectual endowments, our spiritual 
ideals; as a race we must strive by race organisation, by race solidarity, by race unity to that 
broader humanity which freely recognises differences but sternly deprecates inequalities in 
their opportunities of development. 
Du Bois, The Conservation of Races (1897). 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter claimed that W. E. B. Du Bois bequeaths a rich body of work that 
can theorise, as the opening quotation describes, social-formations which strive for an 
elevation of their civic status, specifically through an incorporation of their `difference' into 
prevailing citizenship practices. While this body of work is certainly not limited to the 
American context, ' it remains the case that a great deal of his analysis took place there. 
As chapters three and five recognise, America is a country from which Britain has 
historically learned a great deal about race and racism; sometimes adopting or incorporating 
much in the way of approaches to race-relations and anti-racism. It is a little surprising, 
therefore, to learn that whilst Du Bois continues to be resurrected and celebrated in the 
American literature on race, ethnicity and political incorporation, there is no evidence of such 
research on this side of the Atlantic. 3 In accounting for this, one might reason that his 
relevance to contemporary Britain has expired. Or, alternatively, that he provides such a 
contextually specific narrative on the experience of African-Americans, that it could never 
have been satisfactorily applied to Britain anyway. Moreover, since Du Bois is largely 
1 And therefore capable of eschewing the increasingly prevalent charge of `methodological 
nationalism' (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002: 301) against the historical legacies of thinkers writing in an 
era not characterised by the globalisation or comparative methodology debates we are familiar with 
today. See Marable's (1996) `The Pan-Africanism of W. E. B. Du Bois' in Bell et al (1996). Though 
interesting, this charge can be overdone and sometimes obscures more than it illuminates. For 
example, see chapter three (sec. 7) and chapter five (sec. 2, footnote 4) for a critique of Favell (1998) 
on this issue. 
2 See Bell, Grosholz and Stewart (1996) for a historical account of Du Bois' impact on American `race 
thinking'. 
3 With the possible exception of Paul Gilroy's (1993) The Black Atlantic which is discussed later in this 
and the next chapter. As it will become apparent, even Gilroy's treatise does not so much innovate 
with, as much as expertly re-affirm, aspects of Du Bois' contribution. 
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understood as having pioneered the sociology of colour racism, does a modern Britain that is 
not marked solely by the effects of colour racism, but is instead punctuated by multiple 
racisms, alongside ethnic and religious diversity, invalidate the application of his work? 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why this is not the case. It does this by 
reconsidering arguably the most important concept to emerge from Du Bois' attempt to 
theorise the inclusion of minorities. This is his idea of `double consciousness' as set out in 
his essay entitled Of Our Spiritual Strivings, which was published in his 1903 collection The 
Souls of Black Folk. 4 Through re-reading this concept, Du Bois will be presented as a pre- 
cursor to later advocates of `difference' (Young, 1990), `cultural diversity' (Parekh, 2000), 
and `recognition' (Taylor, 1992). Prior to this, however, and due mainly to their similar 
conceptions of consciousness and ideas of reciprocity, it is argued that a rewarding method of 
decoding novel implications from Du Bois' concept is to dialogue it with Hegel's Master- 
Slave dialectic (hereafter MSD) outlined in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Indeed such 
an approach does not require a great intellectual leap from Du Bois' own work because 
throughout the composition of his texts relevant to this discussion, Du Bois was already 
drawing inspiration from Hegel's conception of consciousness and synthesising this with his 
own sociological imagination (Gilroy, 2004,1993; Stevens, 1995; Gooding-Williams, 1987; 
Williamson, 1984). 5 Of course this needs to be demonstrated textually, which in turn requires 
some appreciation of Hegelian consciousness. Consequently, this chapter begins with an 
exploration of Hegelian consciousness as outlined in the MSD; before we discuss its impact 
4 This was based upon his earlier essay in the Atlantic Monthly entitled `Strivings of a Negro People' 
(published in August, 1897). As it will become apparent, this thesis does not attempt to draw upon the 
entirety of the Du Boisian cannon, quite the opposite in fact. The thesis limits itself to re-reading the 
cited essay rather than trying to reconcile the different trajectories of Du Bois' contribution. These are 
wide and varied and include, for example, intellectual and political excursions during later life that led 
Du Bois to embrace Communism and Pan-Africanism (indeed, Du Bois died in Ghana in 1963 and was 
given a state funeral by President Kwame Nkrumah). See Lewis (2000,1993) for a 'periodisation' 
account of Du Bois' work, and Kendhammer (2007) for a critical but constructive response to reading 
Du Bois in this manner. 
s It is worth noting, as Zamir (1995) does, that Du Bois does not always make explicit reference to 
Hegel in his work, which informs Reed Jr. 's (1997) rebuttal of the view that Hegel's influence on Du 
Bois is obvious. Since a historical, genealogical analysis of the influence of one author on another is 
beyond the focus of this thesis, this argument will not be pursued further. Instead, it is the 
complementarity of the two thinkers that is of greatest interest here, and it is equally accepted that 
reading Du Bois into Hegel could be just as fruitful as looking for the Hegel in Du Bois. 
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upon a reading of Du Boisian accounts of the interaction between self and society - 
particularly with forms of consciousness - racialised or other - that strive for `recognition' in 
or for themselves. 
" The implication this holds for thinking about Muslim mobilisations is taken up 
and considered at length through the lens of ethnicity in the following chapter, 
and adopted in the empirical analyses set out in chapters four, five and six. 
The next section will show how an understanding of Hegel's MSD is helpful in grasping how 
Du Bois conceives of the power held by a dominant group6 to afford status, invoke 
complicity or use coercion in denying recognition or affording misrecognition to a minority, 
and that the constituent parts of double consciousness emerge as an outcome and a resource 
in relation to the need to maintain a sense of self in response to this misrecognition. It is to 
this that the thesis now turns. 
2. Hegelian consciousness 
In his famous allegory of the master and the slave, Hegel outlines a series of conflicts and 
their dialectical relationship to different forms of consciousness. In examining reciprocal 
relations of power, he attempts to `lift the veil' and reveal the processes mediating the 
transformation of a consciousness from dependence to one of self-consciousness and 
6 As the previous chapter states (footnote I and sec. 1.7), ideas of `group-ness' are thoroughly 
problematised and reconstructed in chapters three, four and five, but it is worth noting that Du Bois 
defines a `group' in several ways. His most obvious criteria is derived from his socio-historical 
understanding of race, something best seen as a precursor to Omi and Winant's (1986: 68-9) idea of 
race as a `cluster concept' -a way of referring to a group of persons who share, and are thereby 
distinguished by, several properties `disjunctively'. Thus Du Bois (1939: 1) writes: "It is generally 
recognized today that no scientific definition of race is possible. [... ] Race would seem to be a dynamic 
and not a static conception. Within this, however, he also uses the anthropological conception of 
culture to refer to groups who have developed a comprehensive way of life or a layered and 
distinguishable system of practices. It is also worth noting, as the opening quotation makes clear, that 
Du Bois uses race as criteria for group definition in order to explicitly advance an account of social 
pluralism (in which each group has something to teach other groups so that people are encouraged to 
cultivate the moral and aesthetic insights that are contained within their culture for the benefit of 
humanity). As such his definition of a group is actually much closer to the idea of cultural groups 
espoused in some Anglophone political philosophy, specifically in debates concerning multiculturalism 
and citizenship. This is explored with reference to advocates of `difference' (Young, 1990) `cultural 
diversity' (Parekh, 2000), and `recognition' (Taylor, 1992) in sections 4.1-4.4 of this chapter but 
pursued with more sociological rigour, in reference to identity categories and groupings vis-A-vis 
Muslim-consciousness, throughout chapter three. 
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independence. It is worth clarifying at the outset that rather than providing an empirical 
account of power-relations in actual slave societies, Hegel's master-slave dialectic should 
instead be understood as an abstracted `state of nature' argument conceived as a corrective to 
Hobbes (Davis, 1975). By this it is meant that through the MSD, Hegel is trying to draw our 
attention to the manner in which a Hobbesian war of `all against all' is unable to maintain the 
very individuality or independence upon which it is premised. ' This is perhaps best captured 
in Guyora Binder's (1989: 1435) reading of the MSD as an attempt to show that "freedom 
[has] to be conceived as some form of association rather than independence; and that it [has] 
to be mediated by politics rather than defended from politics". Besides stressing the primacy 
of the political, Binder seeks to position the MSD as "an intellectual foundation for modern 
communitarian conceptions of freedom in its devastating critique of the ideal of 
independence" (ibid: 1437). 
Why Binder might make such a bold claim stems from a question that Hegel posed 
himself, namely: how does a person come to conceive herself as an independent being and/or 
when do they become conscious of themselves as such? Hegel's answer rests on a process of 
objectification which reasons that we must first identify - outside of ourselves - some 
"purposive intelligence" (Binder, ibid) from which it proceeds that others are required to 
establish our own independent selfhood or identity 
A self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside 
itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its own self, since it finds 
itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not 
regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other (Hegel, 2003 
[1910]: 105). 
What prevents our collapse into our own perceptions, therefore, is our ability to see "our own 
self in the other". The ethical basis this provides in terms of its potential normative, political 
7 In Leviathan, Hobbes set out what he understands to be the foundation of societies and legitimate 
governments. He argues that, although in their `natural condition' some people may be stronger or 
more intelligent than others, none are a strong or intelligent enough to eschew the fear of violent death. 
When faced by this stark reality, our `natural state' cannot help but to want defend ourselves in any 
way possible. Self-defence against violent death is Hobbes' highest human necessity and, from this, 
rights are borne. In Hobbes' `state of nature', then, each of us as individuals have a right to everything 
in the world, yet due to the scarcity of resources there is a constant, and rights-based, `war of all against 
all' (bellum omnium contra omnes). Individual life in the `state of nature' is thus "solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short". See Introduction in Tuck (1989). 
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implications for Du Boisian conceptions of consciousness is what this first section on Hegel 
seeks to establish. To this end, it will be argued that we cannot receive recognition outside of 
a political community characterised by reciprocal or mutual recognition. That is, the 
obligations rendered under conditions of Sittlichkeit8 or ethical life, "by virtue of being 
members of one of the ongoing bonded communities of common life and common freedom" 
(Taylor, 1989a: 864). To satisfactorily understand the meaning of this, we must unpack-the 
complexities and rewards of the MSD. 
2.1. The Master-Slave Dialectic 
Hegel's dialectic, presented as an allegory or vignette, begins with two independent 
beings that - at an underdeveloped stage of history - try to "wrest recognition from one 
another without reciprocating" (Taylor, 1975: 153). The reason "each aims at the destruction 
and death of the other" (Hegel, 2003 [1910]: 12), or is driven to demand recognition while 
conferring none, fighting for it instead of cooperatively conferring it, is because each carries a 
distorted conception of individual identity, struggling for Hobbesian like survival. Unlike the 
Hobbesian predicament (see footnote 7), however, Hegel's framing of this `state of nature' 
scenario posits that when this struggle takes place and one of the protagonists is defeated, 
rather than being slain they are instead enslaved by the victor. According to Hegel, this is 
because the victor cannot receive the desired recognition from the defeated if they do not 
exist, and so the whole process would have been futile. The completion of this first conflict 
is best described in Hegel's own terms: 
The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience; through this 
there is posited a pure self-consciousness and a consciousness which is not purely 
for itself... [... ] The one is independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself, 
the other is dependent, and its essence is life or existence for another. The former is 
the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman. (Hegel, 2003: 108) 
The master is then positioned as an independent being and is recognised as such by the 
enslaved. There emerges, however, a discrepancy between the master's consciousness and 
8 Defined by Taylor (1975: 376) as referring to "the moral obligations I have to an ongoing community 
of which I am a part. " 
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the reality of the situation; between the master's idea of himself as a true independent being, 
and his concept of the outside world. This is because the master's conception of himself - as 
truly independent and recognised as such by the slave - is necessarily mediated through this 
two party relationship. 
Having argued that the master achieves a dependent rather than an absolute status, Hegel 
insists that it is in fact the very freedom of the master that is determined through his relation 
to the slave, specifically because the consciousness of the one party is necessarily mediated 
through its relation to the other: 
In all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, the object which 
embodies the truth of his certainty for himself. But it is evident that this object does 
not correspond to its notion; for just where the master has effectively achieved 
Lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an 
independent consciousness. It is not independent, but rather a dependent 
consciousness that he has achieved (ibid: 109-10). 
Before we critically assess this understanding, by writing in the next section of dialectics in 
the plural rather than the singular, we should recognise that Hegel's position brings the 
master to a point which Alexandre Kojeve (1969: 22) describes as an "existential impasse", 
where the recognition sought by the master during the initial conflict is not what is achieved. 
For in enslaving the other and relegating them to a position of subordination, the master 
cannot receive the recognition of them self as an independent being because (a) their own 
notion of mastery is dependent upon that of the slave, and (b) recognition is not of sufficient 
value coming as it does from one relegated in status. As Hegel argues above, at first the 
master does not realise the disparity between the reality of the situation and their impression 
of it. 
2.2. Teleology and group psyches 
Following the initial conflict then, Hegel sees the dialectic as a representation of how the 
fate and consciousness of the two parties is no longer independent but, albeit unequally, 
interdependent in that they have become inextricably linked in a process that necessitates 
some form of resolution; that they effectively have to sink or swim together. Taylor (1975: 
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155) shares this interpretation when he stresses that the process of coming to self- 
consciousness is a "dualistic" one. For both Taylor and Kojeve the slave must recover their 
self-consciousness not only for their own survival, but also to resolve the existential impasse 
of the master. Similarly, the master must recognize the fact that their fate is now directly 
dependent upon the development of the consciousness of the slave. The anticipated 
independence of the master becomes not only a dependence upon the slave for his present 
form of self-consciousness, but, more importantly, rests upon the possibility of the future 
development of that consciousness to a state of true self-consciousness or independence. 
" Specifically: the movement from a self-consciousness in itself to the 
transformative potential of a self-consciousness for itself, or from one's 
historically ascribed identity to one's politically self-constructed identity. 
There is of course a teleological prescription in some of these readings but what is of interest 
is the way in which something valuable can be stated, as it was by Du Bois, without it 
necessitating a teleological course, and this is no less true with the leap that Hegel makes 
from individual to group psyches. In common with a tradition amongst philosophers to begin 
with the rational self, Hegel also starts with the self but, as we have seen, argues that this 
cannot exist in a self substantiating process, and so therefore communalises it. Thus in 
contrast to Hobbes who argued that in leaving a `state of nature' we lose freedom, Hegel 
shows that the social and the political is the condition of freedom in which self is a social or 
communal self. As it is argued below, however, the sorts of multicultural recognition that Du 
Bois espouses does not follow from this alone. 
" That is that the case for mutual recognition does not on its own establish the 
legitimacy of multicultural inclusion for Du Bois, since, as we shall see, Du Bois 
makes a universalistic ethical move in arguing for the equal but differentiated 
inclusion of all peoples on the basis of their common membership of a polity. 
What is required at this stage, however, is a closer inspection of the internal logic of Hegel's 
dialectic, where it is revealed that during his initial discussion of the development of 
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consciousness, Hegel fails to distinguish between what appear to be three separate constructs 
in the MSD. 
2.3. Multiple dialectics and corresponding relationships 
These multiple dialectics roughly divide between (a) the present focused as a logical 
interaction or binary, which distinguishes between the existence and non-existence of an 
interaction between two parties and (b) the empirical possibilities to emerge from the power 
retained by the master who, in the final analysis, possesses an autonomy that the slave lacks. 
These possibilities shape the future of this relationship and the ways in which it might 
continue (reciprocity being one possibility, coercion another). The nature of the relationship 
as it exists and changes may then be described by tracing (c) the moral dialectic, which seeks 
to engage - through the masters' authoritative paternalism - the slaves' reciprocal complicity 
in the dialectic, serving to externalise and normalise the ethical constraints of this 
relationship. In what one might cite as an unreasoned inference, Hegel utilises the two 
constructs of the dialectic, outlined as (a) and (c), which herald a mutual dependency for 
attaining status (however uneven that may be) between the master and the slave, before - 
without clear reason - moving to tie the very development of consciousness9 upon this 
struggle for status recognition. 
" Hegel circumvents a step in his allegory (b) which pertains to the empirical 
possibilities that, should the slave refuse to acquiesce with the master's 
dominance, the master can coerce the slave as a subordinate and thwart the 
reciprocity required to make the dialectic function on the basis of recognition 
alone. 
Regardless, therefore, of the appropriate recognition granted to the master by the slave, the 
slave is dependent upon the Master for their coming to self-consciousness, whilst the master 
9 Including the subsequent development of freedom because, for Hegel and later Du Bois, one can 
never be `free' without at first developing a sense of consciousness, since the latter governs the former. 
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retains the agency to minimise their own dependence upon the slave. Thus, Hegel ignores the 
extent to which coercion can be either a competitor or partner of recognition. 
In light of this, it might be more helpful to speak of master-slave dialectics in the plural, 
rather than the singular, and to suggest that there are actually three different interactions 
taking, place in this allegory. This appears to be a more promising insight than the initial 
reading offered by Taylor and Kojeve, specifically because it can be employed to probe the 
intricacies of forms of consciousness developed in the present-focused and moral dialectic 
outlined by Hegel, in order to distinguish between these and the empirical dialectic of 
majority-minority relations that so occupied Du Bois. 
2.4. Touchstones for Du Bois 
Leaving the master at the impasse earlier identified by Kojeve, Hegel turns his attention 
to the position of the slave, which is also contrary to what might be expected, since the 
consciousness of the slave is essentially in a position of `potentiality': 
Just as lordship showed its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, 
so, too, bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it 
immediately is: being a consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter into 
itself, and change round into real and true independence. (Hegel, 2003: 110) 
In a strong reading, Kojeve places the slave as the instrument and agent of all historical 
change: 
There is nothing fixed in him. He is ready for change; in his very being, he is 
change, transcendence, transformation, education; he is historical becoming at his 
origin, in his essence, in his very existence... the experience of the fight predisposes 
the slave. to transcendence, to progress, to History (1969: 22). 
Given the tension we have identified, Kojeve's deterministic reading might better be 
interpreted as offering only a potential avenue rather than a determinate outcome. The 
transformative possibility provided by this sort of context can be contrasted with Du Bois' 
reading of the broader sense of consciousness developed among African-Americans, and 
particularly in their conception of freedom as newer, and possibly richer, because: 
... out of slavery and out of the later striving of black 
folk... in an oppressive white 
world came a rising sense of black soul. Thus it was that white thesis bred black 
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antithesis, which took the best of white culture and moved it upward towards a new 
synthesis. (Williamson, 1984: 405) 
This end stage of the dialectic, however, does not generally constitute our main concern. Of 
far greater relevance in contrasting Du Bois with Hegel are the intricacies in the processes of 
the development of consciousness. As Binder (1989) suggests, rather than being a specific 
model of dominance and submission, the MSD is a series of wheels within wheels; an attempt 
to explain historical processes, through an examination of the transformation of 
consciousness within a social relationship that is, itself, transformed by and through these 
shifts in consciousness. With the distinction between those three separate constructs in mind, 
we can infer from Binder some sympathy to the multi-faceted nature of the development of 
consciousness. 
3. What is double consciousness? 
Like all forms of dialectic, 1° the MSD is a process in which concepts and categories are 
never static but are marked by constant transformation and mediation. This becomes evident 
in Du Bois' account of the political development of America in that -just as it is the case for 
the master and the slave - in Of Our Spiritual Strivings (1903) the fate of American 
consciousness is dependent upon the unfolding relationships and the dialogue or interaction 
between minority and majority subjectivities; as two separate but entwined forms of 
consciousness. It is, moreover, these dialectics which will, for Du Bois, determine the course 
of American history. " Du Bois introduces his account of double consciousness in the 
10 Although conceptions of the dialectic include `thesis', `antithesis' and `synthesis', these terms were 
never actually employed by Hegel but according to Young (1972: 132) come from the work of Fichte 
and Schelling. Thus Hegel does not define the dialectic in terms of this triadic movement, arguing 
instead that the dialectic "is characterised as negative reason, the function of which is to dissolve the 
fixed concepts of the understanding... By Contradiction, Hegel intends not simply a logical relation 
between incompatible propositions, but a relationship of conflict between things in the world. He does 
not mean that a formal logical relation is the moving principle of the world but that all finite things in 
nature and in history exhibit conflicting tendencies in themselves, by which they are driven on to the 
realisation of a more complete and concrete situation" (ibid). 11 Gooding-Williams (1987) argues that Du Bois explicitly offers a kind of Hegelian philosophy of 
African American history, and that the philosophical model for Du Bois' conception of historical 
process is Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. See footnote five of this chapter. 
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following passage from Strivings, and since this is the main text that I wish to focus upon in 
the proceeding discussion, it is worth quoting at length: 
... the Negro is... born with a veil, and gifted with a second-sight in this American 
world, -a world which yields to him no true self consciousness, but only lets him 
see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this 
double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of 
others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused 
contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, - an American, a Negro; two souls, 
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, 
whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the 
American Negro is the history of this strife, -this longing to attain self-conscious 
manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he 
wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for 
America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his 
Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a 
message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible to be both a Negro 
and an American, without being cursed and spat upon by his fellows, without 
having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face (Du Bois, 1999 [1903]: 
10-11). 12 
On the surface, this passage has as its fundamental theme a duality in African American life. 
Fuelled largely - but not exclusively - by colour racism, this duality is a kind of paradox 
which stems from being intimately part of a polity but not excluded from its public culture, 
or, as Du Bois characteristically puts it, `being an outcast and stranger in mine own house 
(ibid)'. Yet further scrutiny reveals four different issues, loosely grouped into two sets, 
which encompass much more than an outcome predicated upon the effects of colour racism. 
Moreover, since there are a range of issues signalled in his description of double 
consciousness, and because this range attempts to mediate between agency and structure, 
individual and society, and between minority and majority subjectivities, there has on 
occasions been a tendency to conflate, reduce or confuse the role of one to the other. 13 This 
concern further instils the need to unpack Du Bois' description before we analyse and adapt it 
" for conceptual use in any normative sense. 
In the opening half of the passage, Du Bois outlines his reading of the self, specifically 
the significance of (la) the internalisation by African-Americans of the contempt white 
12 In some versions that reproduce the Atlantic Monthly (August, 1897) essay, the ending of the final 
line reads: "without losing the opportunity of self-development. " 
13 Cornel West and Kwame Anthony Appaih- both recognised as Du Bois experts, albeit with 
ambiguous relationships to Du Bois' work - have shown little interest in unpacking and re-reading this 
canonical passage in their commentaries (see West and Gates Jr., 1996 and Appaih, 1992). 
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America has for them, and (lb) the creation of an additional perspective in the form of a 
`gifted second sight' to which experiencing this gives rise. In the second half of the passage 
he identifies how societal in-congruencies emerge from (2a) conceiving of African- 
Americans as having fewer civic rights but no less the duties or responsibilities of an ideal of 
American citizenship, and (2b) diverging sets of un-reconciled ideals or `strivings' held by 
African-Americans which are objected to by white society, specifically emerging from an 
`enduring hyphenation' signalled in his notion of `twoness'. In sum, these four interacting 
constructs give rise to a condition of double consciousness as Du Bois understood it. The 
function of descriptive metaphors such as the `veil' cut across and straddle these interacting 
issues, and are therefore discussed when they appear relevant. 
3.1(a) The conflicted construction of the self 
The notion of the self plays an important role in Du Bois' concept, and - beginning with 
his reference to looking at one's self through the eyes of others - Du Bois, like Hegel, seeks 
to illustrate how our sense of self is necessarily constructed in a social context that is 
continually subject to implicit power relations. If we recall, Hegel suggests that our idea of 
ourselves, what we claim to be, and what we really think we are can be dependent upon how 
others come to view us, to the extent that our sense of self is developed in a continuing 
dialogue. 14 
" Self-consciousness exists here "only by being acknowledged or recognised". 
Thus, like the master and the slave, each of us derives our sense of self through 
an interaction with others, through coming to view our individual selves as 
others see us, such that the refusal of others to acknowledge our humanity, our 
14 Of course all theories of the self in sociology emphasize the importance of the `generalised other' 
and the `significant other'. Thus Mead (1934) would later refer to this process as `engaging with our 
significant others', Goffman (1959) would situate it in the context of `dramaturgy', and later still 
Taylor (1994) would see it as part of the `dialogical' construction of identity. This is returned to later 
in the discussion but distinction here is between a benign self-other relationship from one predicated 
on subordination. 
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existence or our faculty to contribute something meaningful, inevitably 
underscores a sense of alienation. " 
In using this Hegelian perspective to understand the Du Boisian position, it can be argued that 
Du Bois sees something unique about the consciousness of the self among African- 
Americans. As an Other and as `a problem', `black folk' developed a double consciousness 
where they have a sense "of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others". This is 
because negative disapproval in the form of presenting African-Americans as possessing a 
degraded cultural heritage or limited contribution to American life creates an internal echo of 
white America's racist judgements. 
It should be clear then that this conception of the self is not, for Du Bois, a reflection of 
the atomistic self. It is instead conceived of as culturally embedded and socially mediated, 
leading Du Bois to argue that self recognition is a form of cultural recognition which, 
necessarily, sees one's cultural identity in connection with the cultural identities of other 
members of one's community. Hence the injuries suffered from prejudice are not only due to 
the overt hostility from the majority, but also come from minority invisibility. 
This first source of conflict in Du Bois' passage can then be seen as contributing to a 
sense of double consciousness through the unwillingness of one group, contingent on their 
historical dominance as `master', to recognise African-Americans satisfactorily, to the extent 
that the consciousness of self is established distortedly through that of another. 
3.1(b) The creation of an additional perspective or `gifted second sight'. 
Accompanying Du Bois' understanding of the self is the role of subjectivity, for he 
situates the standpoint developed within minority-majority relations at the centre of his 
account of double consciousness. This is exemplified in his suggestion that the experience of 
15 Taylor (1994) goes further in sharing with Du Bois the view that systematised mis-recognition or 
negative disapproval compromises our sense of self worth and constitutes a moral injury; Young 
(1990) characterises such a tendency as a form of majoritarianist oppression, whilst Parekh (2000) 
deploys a pluralist argument beginning with a communitarian account of the culturally embedded self 
and the necessity of recognising how the self is formed, before making the stronger case that cultural 





oppression allows African-Americans to understand the promise of freedom in a way that 
white Americans cannot. 16 
In the passage from Strivings Du Bois refers to this as `a second sight', a way of seeing 
things that escape the notice of the majority, specifically the distance between democratic 
ideals and the practice of racial exclusion, so that "once in a while through all of us there 
flashes some clairvoyance, some clear idea of what America really is. We who are dark can 
see America in a way that Americans cannot" (Du Bois, 1971: 416). This is realised in 
everyday scenarios where it is raised to a conscious level, serving as a means to probe deeper 
meanings and contradictions of a racialized experience and providing the resource for 
transformative change. For Du Bois, then, racial alienation is arguably similar to forms of 
class alienation in its potential for initiating change. 
This notion of `second sight' also ties into his metaphor of the veil which, in the passage, 
serves as an expression of how those behind it - African-Americans - see the dominant 
society, whilst those in front of it - white America - may not see the excluded as full co- 
members of their polity. In this way, it might be argued that Du Bois presents an inverted 
version of the Rawlsian thought experiment of placing a `choosing subject' behind `a veil of 
ignorance' in an effort to ascertain unbiased, and transcending, propositions of human 
interest. What such an understanding means is that the Du Boisian subject is looking out 
from behind a socially constructed apartheid, in full knowledge of critical aspects of their 
identity. Moreover, and unlike the early Rawls (1971), Du Bois does not consider it possible 
to presuppose that a person can be detached from the contingent aspects provided by society, 
history and culture. '? 
16 Lukacs (1971) later argued that structurally defined class positions could offer a superior vantage 
point with which to view social realities. Later still some feminists, particularly Harding (1986), put 
forward the idea of `standpoint epistemologies' which stressed that women's experiences and location 
- their standpoint - could provide a better place from which to view knowledge production. This is 
implicit in some contemporary multiculturalists' positions discussed in this chapter (sec. 4.1-4.4. ). 17 In fact, he explicitly advances an account of social pluralism in which people are encouraged to 
cultivate the moral and aesthetic insights that are contained in their culture for the benefit of humanity; 
this is developed with reference to Parekh (2000) later in the chapter (sec. 4.3). 
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Du Bois' veil might then best be described as a one-way mirror, with the minority seeing 
the majority through the glass, whilst the latter sees only their own reflection (of mastery or 
dominance) as the former remain hidden behind the mirror. This quite obviously 
complements Hegel's MSD, specifically in Du Bois' suggestion that those without power are 
able to see those with power in a different light, since the actions of those without power 
must always take the powerful into account. Reading his, account in this manner adds further 
import to the second of Hegel's dialectics, specifically that the master can coerce the slave 
with a power that the slave lacks, which may explain why Du Bois argues that `second sight' 
is both a gift and a burden. 
3.2(a) Bound by the requirements but not the rewards of citizenship. 
The overarching structural factors which Du Bois identifies as contributing to a sense of 
double consciousness are twofold. The first of these is outlined in his assertion that 
historically embedded racial dualism in mainstream American society denies African- 
Americans the same degree of civil liberties afforded to their white American counterparts. 
Simultaneously, however, this racial dualism continues to conceive of African-Americans as 
having fewer civic rights but no less the duties or responsibilities of an ideal of American 
citizenship. He, thus argues that within the rhetoric of democratic citizenship and its attendant 
ideals, `the Nation has not yet found peace from its sins; the freedman has not yet found in 
freedom his promised land' (Du Bois, 1999 [1903]: 12). This `promised land' is of course the 
stage in which racial and cultural differences are not taken as grounds for the justification of 
natural inequality or superiority. 
For Du Bois however, an important symptom of this dichotomy is the effect it has in 
stifling internal criticism and descent, giving rise to what he describes as a "moral hesitancy 
that is fatal to self confidence" (1999 [1903]: 127). This is because internal criticism is 
impeded or sacrificed within the minority group, because the starting point of representation 
takes the form of a combative defence against societal biases. Du Bois calls these "peculiar 
problems of inner life" which occur because "our worst side has been so shamelessly 
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emphasised that we are denying that we ever had a worst side [so that] in all sorts of ways we 
are hemmed in (ibid). " 
3.2(b) Diverging strivings and two-ness. 
The second structural factor which Du Bois identifies as contributing to a sense of double 
consciousness is outlined both in his discussion of different sets of `strivings' or claims upon 
the public sphere, and twoness as a hyphenated identity. These are both quite distinct from 
the potentially debilitating effects evident in 3.1(a) and 3.2(a), since they, like 3.1(b), provide 
a resource for something beneficial to both minority and majority and achieved in a new 
synthesis. This derives from `strivings' or cultural attributes amongst African-Americans 
who seek to affirm both their American and African identities. The following statement, 
repeated from the passage taken from Strivings, tries to sketch this out: 
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife... to attain self- 
conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this 
merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize 
America for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He simply 
wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without 
being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of opportunity 
closed in his face. (Du Bois, 1999 [1903]: 10-11) 
Du Bois here is encouraging a reflexive understanding between origin and destination, 
between what Gilroy (1993) has called `roots' and `routes', and not only arguing that there is 
space for both, but that both be positively cultivated in an effort to maintain a critical 
perspective towards a new synthesis or hyphenation. As he put it in another essay, The 
Conservation of Races, from a similar period: 
Here, then, is the dilemma, and it is a puzzling one, I admit. No Negro who has 
given earnest thought to the situation of his people in America has failed, at some 
time in life, to find themselves at these crossroads; has failed to ask at some time: 
What, after all, am I? Am I an American or am Ia Negro? Can I be both? [... ] We 
are Americans, not only by our birth and citizenship, but by our diverging political 
ideals... (Du Bois, 2003 [1897]: 24). 
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This is then an unapologetic objection to forms of cultural assimilation or separatism, 
strongly endorsing a view that cultural and/or moral diversity may be captured within 
hyphenated identities. 
4. `Enduring hyphenation'? 
Expressions of double consciousness are neither mutually exclusive nor one and the 
same. By definition they must interact, but are suitably distinctive to be discussed separately. 
What they all have in common is the sense of an unresolved - but not irresolvable - conflict, 
anchored in a process of structural and discursive misrecognition. Thus, although formed in a 
specific context and concerned with the conditions of a particular peoples, it is clear that in 
many ways Du Boisian conceptions of consciousness are relevant to the contention that 
socio-cultural self-esteem emerges from forms of group recognition, alongside personal 
recognition. The relationship between personal and group recognition that is alluded to in Du 
Bois' account is characterised by the idea that the "inner strife" affecting African-Americans 
individually is informed by the mastery or dominance possessed by white Americans in 
depreciating their African-American counterparts. This is captured well in the following 
passage: 
... that nameless prejudice that leaps beyond all this, 
he stands helpless, dismayed 
and well-nigh speechless; before that personal disrespect and mockery, the ridicule 
and systematic humiliation, the distortion of fact and wanton license of fancy, the 
cynical ignoring of the better and boisterous welcoming of the worse, the all 
pervading desire to inculcate disdain... (Du Bois, 1999 [1903]: 15). 
In this sense, the subject group are more disenfranchised than alienated so that it is not so 
much cultural difference but cultural disfranchisement that shapes their struggle. This means 
that - as outlined in chapter one - institutions and social practices attribute minority status to 
some inherent qualities in the minority group, as if those qualities were the reason rather than 
the rationalization for not taking their sensibilities into account. This leads Du Bois to raise 
the following question: how can one achieve a mature self-consciousness and an integrity or 
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wholeness of self in an alienating environment? If, in the eyes of another, your humanity is 
perceived as lacking self-evidential qualities, how do you go about showing its existence? 
Self assertion holds many benefits, but for Du Bois - and this is where he differs from 
some of his contemporaries and later Black Nationalists - overzealous self-assertions appear 
(a) unnecessarily outwardly threatening, (b) too often draw upon fictitious claims of 
authenticity, so that (c) they are, in the end, counter productive. To openly plead for respect 
on the other hand would effectively forfeit any self-respect in the process. The solution that 
Du Bois points to is not one of abandoning the double self but is, instead, to merge the 
"double self into a better and truer self "- one that does not deny experience and history but 
seeks to build on it. As Lewis (1993: 281) argues: 
The genius of The Souls of Black Folks was that it transcended this dialectic in the 
most obvious way-by affirming it in a permanent tension. Henceforth, the 
destiny of the race could be conceived as leading neither to assimilation nor 
separatism but to proud, enduring hyphenation. 
This is a kind of multiculturalism in which minorities can espouse a hyphenated identity, 
contribute and participate equally but not necessarily uniformly. This would not only produce 
a better America but the `better and truer self' Du Bois thought possible. At the same time, 
and although Du Bois implies the eventual resolution of this paradox of a divided self in time, 
much of what he writes simultaneously suggests that African-Americans should accept - and 
embrace - this contradiction arising from dual consciousness. This is because "living in two 
worlds at once" furnishes the minority subjectivity with powers to see what the majority are 
blind to and so, through `second sight', add something to the equation of diversity in the way 
Parekh (2000) would later describe as an expansion of each other's horizons of thought and 
human fulfillment. 
4.1. Contemporary theorists of Multiculturalism 
Du Bois is, therefore, trying to reconcile the strivings for group recognition with more 
traditional accounts of the nation-state, in an effort to capture a multiculturalism in which 
cultural and/or moral diversity would be considered an asset. In this sense, he leaves us with 
the basis of a normative concept in debates advancing an ethic of multiculturalism that 
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encompasses a pragmatic logic, beginning with a rebuttal of narrow preferences for territorial 
and cultural congruencies. But where does he sit in relation to contemporary authors that 
have theorised the contestations of civic-status discussed in chapter one? 
The following sections explore this with reference to three prominent thinkers who have 
made seminal contributions to what May et al (2004: 1-19) have described as the 
"multicultural turn" in recent social and political theory. The selection of only three 
obviously omits many others of significant standing but, it is argued, that these three in 
particular share with Du Bois a striking yet overlooked similarity in key aspects of their work. 
The aim, therefore, is not to offer a descriptive commentary and overview, but to pick out 
some points of convergence that help further elucidate the operation of double-consciousness 
for the conceptualisation of Muslim-consciousness in later chapters. For example, how do 
ideas of difference, diversity and recognition, as they are presented in Du Bois' contributions 
contrast with those of Iris Marion Young (1990), Bhikhu Parekh (2000) and Charles Taylor 
(1994), respectively? 18 
4.2. Iris Marion Young's `difference'. 
In her landmark Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young (1990) presents 
a series of objections to modes of political incorporation which, as a precondition of being 
afforded full and unimpaired civic status, require minorities to reject their own particularity in 
a process of cultural assimilation to the dominant norms, values and customs of that society or 
polity. In Young's view such a requirement is unjust because "assimilation always implies 
coming to the game after it is already begun, after the rules and standards have been set, and 
having to prove oneself accordingly" (1990: 165). Although Young argues that there are 
different types of assimilation which can seek to assimilate different things, what they all 
share in common is the disproportionate burden of change that they place upon the minority. 
18 It would be impossible to try to offer a detailed account of each thinker's sophisticated arguments. 
Given the enormous influence of their work, secondary accounts are widespread and range in quality. 
For a general but critical reading of Taylor, see Appiah (2005) and Bauman (2000, chapter six), for 
Young, see Faulks (2000) and for Parekh see Modood (2005). For a critique of each see Barry (2001). 
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Assimilation is certainly an obstacle to the sorts of strivings imagined by Du Bois, 
memorably objected to by his belief that the African-Americans would not `bleach' their 
"Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism", for, with their message for the world, they 
simply wish to make it, possible for "to be both a negro and an American. " This is a good 
example of twoness as an expression of `enduring hyphenation' which contests the singularity 
of a civic status that cannot, for example, incorporate the public recognition of identities 
marked by `difference'. 19 
Young's work is a response to the view that citizenship achieved through individual rights 
alone, based upon blindness to difference, can satisfy principles of social justice by, for 
example, relegating differences to the private realm in favor of equal treatment in the public 
sphere. By drawing attention to the context of groupings that are founded upon non-voluntary 
aspects of social identity, she points to the disproportionate impact of past domination or 
present disadvantage. She thus argues that focusing upon individuals ignores how citizenship 
already fails to treat people equally, or where "blindness to group difference disadvantages 
groups whose experience, culture and socialized capacities differ from those of privileged 
groups" (ibid. 165). Not being attentive to group differences can, therefore, lead to a form of 
oppression in itself and/or can contribute to further oppression: 
... by allowing norms expressing the point of view and experiences of privileged 
groups to appear neutral and universal. [... ] Because there is no such unsituated 
group-neutral point of view, the situation and experience of dominant groups tends 
to define the norms of any such humanity in general. Against such a supposedly 
neutral humanist ideal, only the oppressed groups come to be marked with 
particularity; they, and not the privileged groups, are marked, objectified as the 
Others (Young, 1990: 165). 
It is striking how, in holding this view, she offers a similar objection to the idea of neutrality 
presented by Du Bois in his account of the operation of the veil. Since "privileged groups 
implicitly define the standards according to which all will be measured... their privilege 
involves not recognizing these standards as culturally and experientially specific (Young, 
1990: 165). If we recall, the Du Boisian veil imagines that those who are `veiled' become 
19 This point is elaborated upon later but it is worth mentioning here that it includes such things as 
greater inclusion in expressions of national belonging, culturally relevant educational provisions or 
group-specific legal protections. 
54 
marked by dominant society as deviating from the `norm', while those in front of it may not 
see anything other than their own rightful mastery or dominance. It was argued that this 
presents an inverted version of the Rawlsian `veil of ignorance', for what such an 
understanding means for Young, like Du Bois, is that the minority looks out from behind a 
socially constructed disparity, in full knowledge of critical aspects of their identity. By the 
very nature of this state of affairs, where past dominance informs contemporary disparities in 
power, she argues that it is periodically raised to a conscious level: 
When participation is taken to imply assimilation, the oppressed person is caught in 
an irresolvable dilemma: to participate means to accept or adopt an identity one is 
not, to try to participate means to be reminded by oneself and others of the identity 
one is (Young: ibid. ). 
This double consciousness, this sense of looking at oneself through the eyes of another, 
accords with Du Bois' view that self recognition is a form of cultural recognition which, 
necessarily, sees one's own cultural identity in connection with the cultural identities of other 
members of one's community. Hence, the injuries suffered from prejudice are not merely due 
to the overt hostility from the majority, but also arise from minority invisibility in not being 
recognised or represented as a legitimate constituent of society. This links to Young's 
complaint that it is an unhelpful liberal fetishism to presuppose that a person can be detached 
from the contingent aspects of their social identity, history and culture. 
These separate points are nicely drawn together by her advocacy of the institutional 
incorporation of group identities into a democratic cultural pluralism, one that can reconcile a 
general system of rights that is the same for all, and a more specific system of group- 
conscious policies such that 
... a 
democratic public should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and 
representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent 
groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged. Such group representation implies 
institutional mechanisms and public resources supporting (1) self organisation of 
group members so that they achieve collective empowerment and a reflective 
understanding of their collective experience and interests in the context of society; 
(2) group analysis and group generation of proposals in institutionalised contexts 
where decision makers have taken group perspectives into consideration... (ibid: 
184). 
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This is a particularly `thick' advocacy of policies capable of instantiating the recognition and 
inclusion of minorities in a reorganized public sphere with the aim of preventing minorities 
from being further frozen out or overwhelmed by majorities. Although it is expressed in a 
less technical fashion, the maintenance and promotion of such plural constituencies is 
similarly championed by Bhikhu Parekh and is expressed in his Rethinking Multiculturalism. 
4.3. Bhikhu Parekh's 'diversity'. 
There is a great deal in this offering and what is of most concern to this discussion 
probably captures the main thrust of Parekh's argument within this text as elsewhere. This is 
that cultural diversity and social pluralism are of an intrinsic value because they challenge 
people to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own cultures and ways of life. This 
distinguishes him from liberals and communitarians. The latter might recognise that cultures 
can play an important role in making choices meaningful for their members (Kymlicka, 
1995), or play host to the development of the self for the members of that culture (Tully, 
1995), or that different cultures increase autonomy by providing further `options' in ways of 
living for society as a whole (Raz, 1986). However, while such arguments suggest that culture 
is important for individual group members, they do not succeed in explaining why cultural 
diversity is necessary in itself. To this Parekh offers the following explanation: 
Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a limited range 
of them and neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others. However rich it may be, 
no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of 
human possibilities. Different cultures thus correct and complement each other, 
expand each other's horizon of thought and alert each other to new forms of human 
fulfillment. The value of other cultures is independent of whether or not they are 
options for us... inassimilable otherness challenges us intellectually and morally, 
stretches our imagination, and compels us to recognize the limits of our categories 
of thought (Parekh, 2000: 167). 
Thus there is an active promotion of cultural difference here, a clear argument in favour of 
diversity in and of itself which complements an over-arching Du Boisian prescription. This 
emerges in Du Bois' sense of the need for African-Americans to develop their "traits and 
talents" so that "someday on American soil two-races may give each to each those 
characteristics both sadly lack" (1999 [1903]: 9-10). 
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Du Bois believed that moral truths are discovered as members of a culture reflect on their 
particular historical experiences, and this idea sustained his insistence that different peoples 
discover different moral truths. Much like Parekh, Du Bois' position is not an orthodox 
liberal one that argues people have a right to pursue their own conceptions of the good, and 
that if the state neglects them benignly, rather than intervening coercively, then each state is 
likely to house many different cultures. Nor is it that Du Bois believes exposure to other 
ways of life increases the choice of options available to all in a society. His argument is rather 
that, because each culture has something to teach others, people should be allowed to 
cultivate moral and aesthetic insights for humanity as a whole. This is supported by his call 
to African-Americans to fulfil their "duty" and "maintain their race identity [because they] 
have a contribution to make to civilisation and humanity which no other race can make". 
This is not limited to African-Americans, however; this is an issue of plurality as a 
consequence of particularity. What is being advocated is both a deepening of cultural 
particularities and a broadening of these insights from different cultures. This is something 
that sits comfortably with Parekh's (2000: 167-168) view that cultural diversity is an 
objective good since it "fosters... human freedom as self-knowledge, self-transcendence and 
self criticism. " 
4.4. Charles Taylor's `recognition' 
The conception of recognition that emerges from both Parekh and Young's thesis, 
however, is most recognisable in Charles Taylor's (1994) account of the emergence of a 
modern politics of identity. In this Taylor suggests that the idea of `recognition' as we 
understand it today has developed out of a move away from conceiving historically defined or 
inherited hierarchies as the sole provenance of social status or honour (in the French sense of 
preference), and towards a notion of dignity more congruent with the ideals of a democratic 
society or polity, one more likely to confer political equality and a full or unimpaired civic 
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status upon all its citizens. ° Drawing upon his previous, densely catalogued account of the 
emergence of the modern self (Taylor, 1989b), he maps the political implications of this move 
onto two cases of Equality. The first is the most familiar and is characterised as a rights- 
based politics of universalism, with the prospect of affording equal dignity to all citizens in a 
polity; and the second denotes a politics of difference where the uniqueness of context, 
history and identity is salient and potentially ascendant. 
For Taylor, this coupling crystallises the way in which the concept of recognition has 
given rise to a search for `authenticity'. This is characterised as a move away from the 
prescriptive universalisms that have historically underwritten ideas of the Just or the Right, in 
favour of the fulfilment and realisation of one's-true self, originality or worth. That is why, 
according to Taylor, people can no longer be recognised on the basis of identities determined 
from their positions in social hierarchies alone but, rather, through taking account of the real 
manner in which people form their identities. The interface between these two issues - 
dignity and difference - forms the basis of Taylor's account of the politics of recognition, 
expressed as a dialogical interlocutor. 
So how does this relate to Du Bois? In the first instance, Taylor's emphasis on I the 
importance of `dialogical' relationships rehearses Du Bois' view that it is a mistake to suggest 
that, in Taylor's terms, people form their identities `monologically' or without an intrinsic 
dependence upon dialogue with others. We have, seen how Du Bois expresses this process, 
and Taylor (1994: 33) characterises it in a similar manner, arguing that we define our identity 
"always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want 
to see in us". Here Taylor is openly drawing upon Hegel who, if we recall, suggests that our 
idea of ourselves, what we claim to be, and what we really think we are, can be dependent 
upon how others come to view us to the extent that our sense of self is developed in a 
continuing dialogue. Self-consciousness exists "only by being acknowledged or recognised", 
and the related implication for Taylor, just like Du Bois, is that a sense of socio-cultural self- 
20 Thus making equal recognition an essential part of democratic culture, a point not lost on Habermas 
(1994: 113) who argues that "a correctly understood theory of [citizenship] rights requires a politics of 
recognition that protects the individual and the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed". 
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esteem emerges not only from personal identity, but also in relation to the group in which this 
identity is developed. This is expressed at the beginning of Taylor's account that 
.... our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non recognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning some in 
a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being (1994: 25-26). 
We return to the idea of a mode of being in the next chapter through reference to Modood's 
(1992) elaboration of the distinction between modes of `being' and `oppression', but it is 
worth noting here how Taylor's concerns rests on the need to prevent the outcome described 
in the first part of Du Bois' concept, namely (3.1a) an internalisation by a minority of the 
contempt a majority hold for them. Less directly, but equally present, is the thrust of the 
second part (3.1b) which referred to the creation of an additional perspective to which this 
experience might lend itself, as is evident in Taylor's characterisation of liberalism as a 
`fighting creed' and what this means to the being fought: 
Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, and quite incompatible 
with other ranges. ... [A]s many Muslims are well aware, Western liberalism 
is not 
so much an expression of the secular, postreligious outlook that happens to be 
popular amongst liberal intellectuals as a more organic outgrowth of Christianity... 
All this is to say that liberalism is also a fighting creed (Taylor, 1994: 62). 
What Taylor is drawing our attention to here is "a particularism masquerading as the 
universal" (ibid. 43). Simultaneously, he identifies the limitations of his own conception of 
recognition politics, concluding that the boundaries marking the legitimacy of recognition 
politics must be drawn somewhere, and that nowhere is more appropriate than on issues of 
Muslim claims-making. This is necessary, Taylor argues, because in Islam "there is no 
question of separating politics and religion in the way we have come to expect in Western 
liberal society" (ibid. 62). Whether this sort of exclusivity in predetermined notions of 
incompatibility masks a complex partiality or whether it represents legitimate caution is 
examined in chapters five and six through the 'empirical case-studies of anti-discrimination 
Muslim and educational claims-making. What, nevertheless, emerges here is Taylor's 
divergence from a Du Boisian idea of recognition, since the latter is more genuinely 
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dialogical and does not seek a priori to exclude some minority claims-making from the 
process of politics. 
Is it therefore fair to query the extent to which Muslim-consciousness is 
disproportionately objectified by liberalism's `fighting' creed? Like Hegel's master, could 
Taylor's conception of recognition be guilty of the same sleight of hand that is only ever 
revealed when recognition is replaced by coercion? These questions are pertinent to each of 
the following chapters and continue into the conclusion which traces out the relationship 
between Muslim-consciousness and the civic status that Muslims in Britain are afforded. 
5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to unpack and explore what Du Boisian ideas of 
double consciousness mean, why they are of value and worth redeeming, and where they sit 
in relation to some other, more recent, ideas in the areas of multiculturalism and recognition. 
It is argued that Du Bois' concept is premised upon the idea that a consciousness for itself is 
characterised by an active mobilisation, one that is striving to be recognised, but one that 
turns inward and becomes a double consciousness when it is benignly ignored or malignly 
coerced. Double consciousness thus captures the dual character of unrecognised minority 
subjectivities and their transformative potential, alongside the conditions of impaired civic 
status that are sometimes allocated to minorities by mainstream society. The rationale behind 
revisiting Du Bois is not, however, to present a pathology of Muslim subjectivity as 
incompatible or in conflict with the sorts of civic status conferred by the types of British 
multiculturalism surveyed in chapter one. Quite the opposite. Du Bois' concept is used to 
probe the dilemmas facing Muslim minorities who aspire to be full participants in British 
society. This can be characterised as a schema which becomes progressively `thicker' in 
capturing (a) the political dimension in which British-Muslim subjectivity is formed, (b) the 
nature and form of this subjectivity in and for itself, alongside (c) the transformative potential 
it heralds for society as a whole. This includes an examination of both the conflicting 
accounts evident in the construction of the self, and the grounds on which racial and ethnic 
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minorities who are subject to exclusionary discourses can strive for political recognition and 
incorporation. 
To this end, the preceding discussion has assumed a great deal about the importance of 
groupings in overcoming or merging these doubles into better and truer selves, whether this is 
found in `enduring hyphenation' or twoness or something else. The next chapter scrutinises 
the idea of groupings with more sociological rigour; tracing the genealogical shift from race 
to the emergence of religion as a salient marker of difference. The implications this holds for 
conceptualising Muslim-consciousness are traced back to the varieties and stages of 
consciousness delineated throughout this chapter by Du Bois, specifically the movement from 
a self-consciousness in itself to the transformative potential of a self-consciousness for itself: 
from one's historically ascribed identity to one's politically self-constructed identity. It will 
be argued that this allows us to theorise conceptions of Muslim-consciousness in later 
chapters as representing part of an attempt to pluralise the mainstream and seek reciprocity as 
co-members of a polity. 
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Chapter Three 
Race to religion: the cultural politics of race, ethnicity and `group' 
categories in the emergence of Muslim-consciousness. 
1. Introduction 
Chapter two ended by acknowledging the importance of groupings in overcoming or 
merging the duality of double-consciousness into an `enduring hyphenation'; a twoness, or a 
further expression of synthesised identity. This chapter scrutinises the politics of groupings 
with more sociological rigour; tracing the genealogical shift from race to the emergence of 
religion as a salient marker of difference in specifically understanding how expressions of 
British-Muslim identity have developed. Such an exploration is necessary because, as the 
following evaluation of conceptions of minority identity in Britain details, the category of 
`Muslim' has only relatively recently assumed the prominence we are familiar with today. ' 
This is partly due to the disrupting heterogeneity of ethnic, regional and linguistic 
backgrounds that have historically made up the constituency of Muslims in Britain. 2 
' According to the 2001 census data, there are at least 1.6 million people in the United Kingdom who 
report an affiliation with Islam by voluntarily self-defining as `Muslim'. This represents 2.9 per cent of 
the entire population and makes Islam the most populous faith in Britain after Christianity (72 per 
cent); more numerous than Hinduism (less than 1 per cent, numbering 559, '000), Sikhism (336,000), 
Judaism (267,000) and Buddhism (152,000). Of the Muslim constituency, 42.5 percent are of 
Pakistani ethnic-origin, 16.8 per cent Bangladeshi, 8.5 per cent of Indian, and - most interestingly - 7.5 
per cent of White Other. This is largely taken to mean people of Turkish, Arabic and North-African 
ethnic origin who tick White Other on the census form. It also includes East European Muslims from 
Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as white Muslims from the New Europe. Black-African (6.2), Other 
Asian (5.8) and British (4.1) dominate the remaining categories of ethnic identification in the census 
options. Even with this heterogeneity, it is still understandable - if regrettable - that British-Muslims 
are associated first and foremost with a South-Asian background, especially since those with this 
background make up roughly 68 per cent of the British Muslim population, have a greater longevity in 
residence, and have been more politically active to date. 
2 Something which has invited Humuyan Ansari (2004: 3) to argue that, "presumptions of Muslim 
homogeneity and coherence which claim to override the differences between rural and urban, rich and 
poor, educated and illiterate, do not necessarily correspond to social reality. A Sylheti from 
Bangladesh, apart from some tenets of faith, is likely to have little in common with a Mirpuri from 
Pakistan, let alone a Somali or Bosnian Muslim". This is complemented by Fred Halliday's (1999: 
897) concern to focus analysis upon "the intersection of identities" since "it is easy to.. . study an 
immigrant community and present all in terms of religion. But this is to miss other identities - of work, 
location, ethnicity - and, not least, the ways in which different Muslims relate to each other. Anyone 
with the slightest acquaintance of the inner life of the Arabs in Britain, or the Pakistani and Bengali 
communities, will know there is as much difference as commonality". Whilst these concerns are 
undoubtedly legitimate, and should help counter an understanding of Muslims in Britain as a 
monolithic group, the argument of this chapter is that certain concerns transcend ethnic or linguistic 
difference [particularly since the majority, albeit a slim majority, of British-Muslims have not migrated 
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What it perhaps also reflects is a hesitation to recognise that religious affiliation might 
provide an equally legitimate source for identity articulations akin to race, class and gender 
(Modood, 1994), particularly in what many sociologists like to believe is, by definition, a 
secularist discipline investigating a largely secular society (cf McLennan, 2007,2006). As 
Statham (2005: 164-5) has argued: 
Much migration research has maintained a built-in interpretative bias that has led scholars 
to see religious identification as a backward or reactionary form of `false consciousness' 
simply masking objectives and interests that are actually `secular'. Migrant religions with 
strange rituals and odd customs have been particularly vulnerable. They are so far removed 
from most academics' life-worlds that it is easy to see how they have been dismissed as 
reactionary relics to be swept away by a superior secular civic-culture 3 
Referring only to the South Asian (but largest) Muslim contingent, Yunus Samad (1992: 508) 
captures this tendency in his observation that "the groups which are now designated as British 
Muslims have also been studied by sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists as 
black, working class, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Mirpuirus, Sylhetis etc. " 
" One of the key arguments of this chapter is that such a shift in semantics reflects 
important internal developments, specifically the fruition of a tangible Muslim- 
consciousness amongst Muslim communities themselves. 
It remains the case, however, that until the debates generated by the Rushdie Affair (discussed 
in sec 8-8.1) and, more dramatically, since the post-9/11 securitisation of ethnic relations 
(Fekete, 2004), sociological inquiry has displayed little interest in the religious facet of 
identity construction amongst minority groups in Britain. It has instead concentrated upon 
juxtapositions between geographies of ethnic origin and localities of birth (Gilroy, 1987, 
to Britain but have been born here]. For example, shared concerns are likely to encompass the ways in 
which to combat anti-Muslim racism, or cultivate a positive public image (heterogeneous or otherwise), 
or a desire amongst some Muslim parents to expose their children to Islamic perspectives and so on. 
3 Another study might ask, for example, why it is little recognised that Muslims became the first non- 
Judea-Christians to set up places of worship in Britain as long ago as 1900 (Ansari, 2004), or why the 
desecration of the Al Asqsa mosque in the Israeli occupied Arab sector of Jerusalem in 1969, managed 
to provoke more protest from Muslims in Britain at the time, than the incendiary speeches of Enoch 
Powell (Hiro, 1991). This is augmented by the finding that whilst first generation post-immigrant 
organisations such as the Pakistani Workers Association (PWA) were concerned with organised 
workers' representation, one of their highest priorities was to secure funds to build Mosques (Meer, 
2001). One of the questions directly addressed in this chapter builds upon these others, asking why, 
whilst coping with being "the most socially deprived and racially harassed group", Muslims in Britain 
were moved to campaign against the publication of a novel by Salman Rushdie (Modood, 1992: 261)? 
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1993; Alexander, 2000), and the implications for a particular secular hybrid identity therein 
(Hall, 1991). 
At the same time, these conceptualisations themselves have marked a shift away from a 
focus upon coalition (Sivannandan, 1982; CCCS, 1982) and anti-racist or race-class identities 
(Miles, 1982), which developed in response to race-relations perspectives (Banton, 1967; 
Rex, 1973) and which dominated discussion of minority identity in Britain throughout most 
of the 1980s. Traditional-class based analysis of ethnic and racial minorities, meanwhile, has 
been subjected to significant feminist critique (Carby, 1982; Parmar, 1982; Brah, 1996), 
particularly with regards to education (Mirza, 1992) and, more recently, in response to 
concerns over South-Asian religious patriarchy (WAF, 1991; Saghal and Yuval-Davis, 1992). 
In addition, other influential British approaches have sought to examine minority ethnic 
experiences through a cultural studies lens (Hall et al 1978; Hebdige, 1979; CCCS, 1982; 
Gilroy, 1987), famously heralding the idea of `new ethnicities' (Hall, 1988), and promoting 
concepts of `diaspora' (Gilroy, 1993; Bhabha, 1994). Others, meanwhile, have adopted a 
social anthropological gaze by focusing upon family, kinships or braderi (Shaw, 1987; 
Werbner, 1990,1994,2004) and `transnationalism' (Vertovec, 1997), among south Asian 
post-immigrant groups in particular. 
" Quite how, if at all, this diverse inquiry can inform an understanding of Muslim- 
consciousness in Britain remains unclear. This chapter addresses this question 
at a general level by examining the ways in which minority identities have 
historically been conceptualised and, more specifically, by locating the extent 
and distribution of a Muslim-consciousness within these conceptualisations. 
To this end, the chapter begins by critically examining hitherto widely accepted relationships 
between specific terms and concepts describing Islam, Muslims, and identity. This is 
followed by a brief consideration of the difference between an adopted or chosen Muslim 
identity. Here, it is suggested that a willingness to protect the bearers of some identities, and 
not others, from discrimination because they are deemed `involuntary' is problematic, not 
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least because the logic invoked proceeds through the operation of a normative grammar of 
race. This is because the dominance of the current formulations of un-chosen ethnic minority 
identities is mediated by a race-relations tradition that is subject to omissions and has been 
informatively critiqued by race-coalition and racialization positions. 
The fuller implications of this critique emerge in Part B of this chapter, which turns its 
attention to ideas of ethnicity, anti-racism and agency, with specific reference to the Rushdie 
Affair. The second half of this chapter critically evaluates of the validity of Muslim `group' 
identities as embodying a fruition of Muslim-consciousness in Britain, before connecting this 
to the preceding discussion and then looking forward to chapter four 
" It is argued that Muslim-consciousness is the most suitable conceptual category 
for comprehending identity mobilisations informed by Muslim identities: a 
conclusion that is elaborated and illustrated in the reminder of the thesis. 
2. Conceptions of Islam and Muslim-consciousness 
It would be fair to say that academic and public discourse on British-Muslims can use the 
descriptive terms `Islam' and `Muslim' in ways that assume they have been operationalised so 
that we intuitively understand what they mean and represent. Yet, like many other concepts, 
once unravelled and problematised, it becomes clear they host a variety of meanings. It 
would, therefore, be helpful to unpack these terms by asking some obvious questions about 
what Islam denotes and what being Muslim entails. Oliver Roy's (2004) account of 
Globalised Islam begins in this way: 
Who do we call Muslim? A mosque-goer, the child of Muslim parents, somebody with a 
specific ethnic background (an Arab, a Pakistani), or one who shares with another a specific 
culture? What is Islam? A set of beliefs based on a revealed book, a culture linked to 
historical civilisation? A set of norms and values that can be adapted to different cultures? 
An inherited legacy based on a common origin? (Roy, 2004: 21) 
A robust account of Islamic history, civilisation and comparative ethnic relations is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, and definitive and categorical definitions are neither sought nor - it 
will be argued -a reflection of how Muslims view themselves and Islam. A more modest and 
relevant exposition could begin by exploring what we mean when we talk about Islam: is it 
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solely a religion whose first prophet was Adam and last prophet was Mohammed; or is it a 
state of peace achieved through surrender to God, or is it a political and cultural movement? 
What is meant by the phrase that `Islam is a way of life'? And can we distinguish Islam as a 
name of a religion, from the adjective `Islamic', the noun `Muslim'? To begin to answer 
these questions abstractly, Ahmet Karamustafa (2004: 108) encourages us to approach our 
conception of Islam by viewing it as a civilisational project comprising 
... a sprawling civilizational edifice under continuous construction and renovation 
in 
accordance with multiple blueprints (these are the numerous Islamic cultures at local, 
regional, and national levels encompassing innumerable individual, familial, ethnic, 
racial, and gender identities) all generated from a nucleus of key ideas and practices 
ultimately linked to the historical legacy of the Prophet Mohammed. 
With this enormous stress upon heterogeneity, how - in tangible terms - can we derive an 
understanding of Muslim identity? Karamustafa (ibid) suggests that we should begin by 
focusing on what this nucleus of ideas represents 
Minimally.. . we can assume a set of 
beliefs (a version each of monotheism, prophecy, 
genesis, and eschatology) that underwrite a set of values (dignity of human life, 
individual and collective rights and duties, the necessity of ethical human conduct - in 
short, a comprehensive moral program), in turn reflected in a set of concrete human 
acts (ranging from the necessity of greeting others to acts of humility like prayer). 
On a day-to-day basis we can find these ideas articulated in Islamic rituals and practices, 
where Muslims are reminded through the practice of the pillars of Islam - Iman (articles of 
faith), salat (daily prayer), zakat (charity), sawm (fasting during Ramadan) and hajj 
(pilgrimage) - that actions that are deeply spiritual are not devoid of politics. In this way 
Islam - comprising the beliefs, values, rights and duties emphasised 
by Karamustafa - is lived 
rather than simply practiced. As Dilwar Hussain (2005: 39) of the Islamic Foundation notes: 
The congregational prayer is often held as an example of a community in harmony with 
believers standing in rows and functioning with one body. Fasting and charity sensitise 
the believers to those who lead less fortunate lives and make the war against global 
poverty a vivid reality. The pilgrimage symbolises equality and the breaking of barriers 
between nations, classes and tongues. 
Is this, then, the most appropriate definition of what being a Muslim entails, i. e. that 
participation is necessitated in some or all of the above practices if one is to consider oneself a 
Muslim? The argument presented here is that this is not the case. Instead, is argued that the 
relationship between Islam and a Muslim identity might be analogous to the relationship 
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between the categorisation of one's sex and one's gendered identity. 4 That is, one may be 
biologically female or male in a narrow sense of the definition, but one may be a woman or 
man in multiple, overlapping and discontinuous ways. This requires some explanation, 
particularly since one's sex reflects something that emerges on a continuum that can be either 
- or both - internally defined or externally ascribed. This analogy potentially allows a range 
of factors other than religion (such as ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, and agnosticism) to 
shape Muslim identities (see also Meer, 2008 and 2007a). To interrogate these distinctions, 
we should begin by looking at the most obvious sources of Muslim identity. 
2.1. Is Muslim identity a prescriptive religiosity defined by scriptures? 
In terms of religiosity, Muslim identity might be derived from doctrinal subscription to 
the shahada (the belief that there is only one God and that Mohammed is the Messenger), 
which in turn would inform a sense of Ibadat (religious worship or duty). The implications of 
this have been examined in the work of the Muslim feminist, Katherine Bullock (2002: 154), 
who concludes that, although "linguistically a `Muslim' is someone who submits to the will 
of God", this clarifies little since the question then becomes to what exactly is a Muslim 
submitting: "To traditional practice? To unambiguous, or ambiguous text? To certain 
scholars' interpretations of text? " (ibid. ). The answer Bullock offers begins with the Qur'an 
and its different interpretations. Importantly, Bullock argues that the companions of the 
Prophet Mohammed, scholars of tafsir (explanation of the Qu'ran) and the fuqaha 
(legalists/lawyers) have always disagreed over the meaning of its verses which is why 
no one interpretation has been held to be authoritative. Naturally, too, the 
interpretation, while guided by the rules of Arabic grammar, the spirit of Islam, and the 
4 It should be stressed that this distinction is problematic, but is adopted as a heuristic device to develop 
this particular point. For example, in her landamark Gender Trouble, Butler (1990) argues that any 
coherence achieved within categories of sex, gender, and sexuality does in fact reflect a culturally 
constructed mirage of coherence that is achieved through the repetition of what she calls `stylised acts'. 
She argues that, in their repetition, these acts establish the appearance of what she describes as an 
essential or ontological `core' gender. This leads Butler to consider one's `sex' - along with one's 
`gender' and `sexuality' - as being `performative', and since this challenges biological accounts of 
sexual binaries, it is recognised that Butler would both support and problematise the above analogy. 
That is, whilst she may support it by agreeing with the contested nature of `gender', she might also 
problematise it by rejecting `sex' as something given - rather than produced. 
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example of the Prophet (that is, how he himself implemented the Qu'ranic injunctions) 
also depends upon an individual's own judgement. Context does count (ibid. 154 
emphasis added). 
The role of context in interpretation is nowhere better exemplified than by the Qu'ranic 
position on homosexuality. It is often assumed that Islam is wholly opposed to 
homosexuality: an understanding supported by the routine oppression of gays and lesbians in 
some Muslim countries. According to some contemporary Islamacist jurists (cf Al-Haqq 
Kugle, 2004; Bauhdiba, 1998; Mahmud, 1998), however, such oppression is a contextual 
construction reflecting the prejudices and pre-understanding of heterosexual men and women 
who seek to promote `hetro-normative' positions. Although the Qu'ran does assume a 
heterosexual norm amongst its readers, it is important to recognise, argues Al-Haqq Kugle 
(2004: 200-1), that the Qu'ran 
... contains no word that means 
"homosexuality" (as an abstract idea denoting the 
sexuality of men who desire pleasure with other men or a sexuality of women who 
desire pleasure with other women)... the terms that became popular in Arabic in later 
times [Liwat for the relations and Luti for the people] are not found in the Qu'ran at 
all... [and] the Qu'ran does not specify any punishment for sexual acts between two 
men and women. 
The intention here is not to re-claim the Qu'ran as a manifesto for Gay rights, 5 although Al- 
Haqq Kugle certainly adopts it as such in the context of a broader Islamic-humanist 
framework, but simply that Bullock is undoubtedly correct to emphasise the contextual and 
s 
situational nature of interpreting what Islam requires. Again, this point is lucidly made by 
Kugle when he argues that 
Commentators and jurists have drawn analogies and presented arguments to conclude 
that the Qu'ran addresses sexually unusual people [sociologists who write in Arabic 
had to create new words to define homosexuality and settled on al-shudhudh al-jinsi 
which means "sexually rare or unusual"] despite the Qu'ran's lack of a term for them 
or the actions that characterise them. Those are, however, arguments of jurists and 
commentators; they are not the words of the Qu'ran itself (Al-Haqq Kugle, 2004: 200). 
This throws up another interesting issue of interpretation since, unlike the Bible but not unlike 
the Torah, the Qu'ran is not popularly read in vernacular languages. This means that Muslims 
I share with Ebrahim Moosa (2004: 122) the view that arguing that "Muslims can act confidently in 
the present only if the matter in question was already prefigured in the past" suggests a "profound lack 
of dynamism [in] the state of Muslim self-confidence in the modern period" (emphasis added). 
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in Britain, as around the world, often read it in classical Arabic in the way that the Bible 
tended to be read in Latin throughout pre-Reformation Europe. In addition, it is important to 
note that, although the Qu'ran provides a written source of theological literature, Islam also 
displays a strong communal-oral tradition, in both practice and scripture, which means that 
Qu'ranic verses are often recited aloud and in group settings, and not simply read silently .6 
In Bullock's (2002: 155) next attempt to outline what prescriptive Islam requires, she 
turns to the Sunnah, which accounts for "what the Prophet said, did, and observed others 
doing but did not comment on". This is believed to be preserved in the Hadith and, in 
particular, in the Sirah, which is akin to a biography of the Prophet Mohammed and is found 
in the Qu'ran. However, because the Hadith are subject to a number of interpretative 
controversies, given that they were written after the life of the Prophet and are variously 
classified as "authentic, good, weak, and fabricated" (ibid), Bullock argues that up until the 
nineteenth century, Islam recognised 
... other sources of 
law after the Qu'ran and Sunnah, including the actions and opinions 
of the Companions of the Prophet, the generation after them, juristic consensus, local 
customs... analogical reasoning, considerations of the public good, and so on [... ] 
Because the early scholars recognised that there was no way of adjudicating between 
differing reasonable interpretations of the Qu'ran and Sunnah, the understanding 
between them developed that no matter what the differences in legal opinion, each was 
said to be correct (ibid. ) 
The implication is that - no less than with any other text - the Qu'ran offers guidance that is 
interpreted and applied by human agents, as Omid Safi (2004: 22) reminds us: "in all cases, 
the dissemination of the Divine teachings is achieved through human agency. Religion is 
always mediated". Hence, competing accounts of religiously-informed Muslim identities can 
simultaneously be held without necessarily invalidating one another. 
2.2. Is Muslim identity a sociological category? 
6 The implication of this strong oral tradition is returned to later in the discussion, specifically with 
reference to Samad's (1998) description of tendencies in the gravitation away from an oral tradition 
that is seeped in cultural custom, to a literal decoding of Qu'ranic scripture that eschews sectarian or 
ecclesiastical differences in favour of an Islamic universalism. 
69 
What is being argued is that in contrast to the scriptural conception, we could view 
Muslim identity as a quasi-ethnic sociological formation. `Quasi' is used to denote 
something similar but not the same as because, on the one hand, ethnic and religious 
boundaries continue to interact and are rarely wholly demarcated, hence the term `ethno- 
religious' (Modood, 1997: 337). On the other hand, as will become apparent in chapters five 
and six, the sorts of mobilisations undertaken by Muslims qua Muslims, for example against 
Islamophobia (Meer and Noorani, forthcoming; Meer, 2007b) or in favour of faith schools 
(Meer, 2007a), mirror the types of mobilisations initiated by other minority groups. 
Compared to the purely theological variety, this sociological category might be preferred as a 
less exclusive and more valid way of operationalising Muslim identity because it includes 
opportunities for self-definition (such as formally on the census or on `ethnic' monitoring 
forms (see Aspinall, 2000) or informally in public and media discourse). Equally, it can 
facilitate the description of oneself as `Muslim' and take the multiple (overlapping or 
synthesised) and subjective elements into account independently or intertwined with 
objective behavioural congruence to the religious practices outlined earlier. It will also be 
argued that this space for self-definition is a helpful way of conceptualising the difference 
between racial and ethnic categorisations, in that the former are more likely to be externally 
imposed and the latter self ascribed, with both potentially becoming more prominent at some 
times and less at others. 
2.3. Choosing a Muslim identity? 
Within this process of categorisations, however, just as on a census form or other 
prescriptive sources, when a category is operationalised and imposed externally, it need not 
constitute the making of a group identity. As Cornell and Hartman (1997: 20) argue 
... others may assign us an ethnic 
identity, but what they establish by doing so is an 
ethnic category. It is our own claim to that identity that makes us an ethnic group. The 
ethnic category is externally defined, but the ethnic group is internally defined. 
This emphasises the element of choice in self-definition. For example, one might view Islam 
as a historical, civilisational edifice that has contributed to modern science and philosophy, 
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and take pride in this but, simultaneously, disassociate oneself from the religious teachings. 
This historical or civilisational role of Islam may yet be discarded in favour of the elevation 
and re-imagining of a particular religious doctrine, or way of being a Muslim, based upon an 
adherence to articles of divine and confessional faith. It is not the concern of this thesis to 
ascertain whether the former could legitimately, with recourse to theological reasoning, 
describe the latter as being in contravention of what Islam requires, or vice-versa. The point 
is to recognise the pragmatic possibilities that emphasis and dis-emphasis confer upon the 
bearers of such identification, which includes the recognition that the element of choice is not 
a total one. By this it is meant that although one may imagine a Muslim identity in different 
ways, when one is born into a Muslim family one becomes a Muslim. This is not to impose 
an identity or a way of being onto people who may choose to passively deny or actively reject 
their Muslim identity because, consistent with the right of self-dissociation, this rejection of 
Muslim identification (or adoption of a different self-definition) should be recognised where a 
claim upon it is made. 
. What is instead being argued is that when a Muslim identity is mobilised, it 
should not be dismissed because it is an identity of personal choice, but rather 
understood as a mode of classification according to the particular kinds of 
claims Muslims make for themselves, albeit in various and potentially 
contradictory ways. 
This means that, just as we do not reject the possibility of self-dissociation, so we must 
recognise that there are various forms of self-association. 
This argument certainly has its critics, and the following statement from the Rt Hon Bob 
Marshall-Andrews MP captures the most frequent objection to this position. Contrasting it 
affectively with the chosen/unchosen analogy of sex and gender made earlier, and returning 
us to the involuntary/voluntary discussion of identity in the work of Young (1990), 
specifically in how it relates to Du Boisian double consciousness, Marshall-Andrews argues 
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The difficulty is that there is a profound difference between race and gender and 
religion. Our race and our gender are what we are and should be protected. Our 
religion is what we choose to believe. It is a system of beliefs, fundamentally and quite 
properly held. It seems to many here and out there that there is, in truth, very little 
distinction between one's religion and one's politics (Hansard, 21 June 2005, column 
676). 
Contrast this, for example, to Du Bois' argument that the identity others assign us can be a 
powerful force in shaping our own self-concepts, so that, while our self-consciousness is 
subjective, it does not free us from the impact of what others say and do. This seems 
particularly true for minorities at moments of acute objectification, which means that the issue 
of choosing Muslim identities becomes much less straightforward. As Younge (2005: 31) 
describes 
We have a choice about which identities to give to the floor, but at specific moments 
they may also choose us. Where Muslim identity is concerned, that moment is now. 
[... ] Singled out for particular interrogation in the west, Muslims have been asked to 
commit to patriotism, peace at home, war abroad, modernity, secularism, integration, 
anti-sexism, anti-homophobia, tolerance and monogamy... But Muslims are not being 
asked to sign up to them because they are good or bad in themselves, but as a pre- 
condition for belonging in the west at all. No other established community is having its 
right to live here challenged in a comparable way. 
What is most revealing in the contrast between Marshall-Andrews and Younge's comments 
is the way in which the former adopts a normative grammar of race, whilst the latter points 
to its constructedness and malleability. While the former recognises it as an involuntary 
category of birth, since "our race and our gender are what we are and should be protected" 
(emphasis added), the latter sees it as an externally imposed narrative that contributes to an 
identity which "at specific moments... may also choose us. " In one sense, the difference 
between these two positions can be expressed through different paradigms of thinking 
about race and difference. Genealogically, the first of these paradigms begins with the 
ideas of `race-relations' that have informed legislation designed to outlaw discrimination 
based on non-voluntary racial and ethnic identities. This is a formulation that is "unique in 
Europe" (Statham, 2003: 129) and has taken its lead from the American context. 
3. Race-relations 
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More precisely, it has its intellectual origins in the work of sociologists and 
anthropologists who formed part of what has become known as the Chicago School. Working 
in the early part of the twentieth century, at a time of both European immigration to America 
as well as internal migration northward from the southern states, sociologists such as Robert 
Park (1914; 1925; 1950) sought to study race-relations in terms of inter-group processes and 
"adjustments", specifically with respect to conflicts over `status-claims' and allocations of 
resources. An examination of spatial segregation and immigration in the city of Chicago (as a 
site of urban immigrant settlement), and `race consciousness' amongst African-Americans, 
who were only one or two generations away from the time of slavery, led Park (1980 [1914]: 
36-7) to conclude 
In our casual contact with aliens.. . it is the offensive rather than the pleasing traits that impress us. These impressions accumulate and reinforce natural prejudices. Where 
races are distinguished by certain external marks these furnish a permanent physical 
substratum upon which and around which the irritations and animosities, incidental to 
all human intercourse, tend to accumulate and so gain strength and volume. 
The emphasis here is clearly upon an interaction based on prejudice and conflict, and 
demonstrates an early attempt to analyse the ways in which race became "a relevant social 
category where cultural and social meanings were attached to the physical traits of a 
particular social group" (Solomos and Back, 1996: 4). Informed by the broader aim of 
encouraging group contact and social interaction so that racial conflicts could be mediated or 
overcome, this perspective advanced a tradition of thinking about race in terms of social 
relations between people with different physical characteristics. To this Park (1950: 81) later 
gave the name `race-relations' which he described as 
... the relations existing 
between peoples distinguished by marks of racial descent, 
particularly when these racial differences enter into the consciousness of the 
individuals and groups so distinguished, and by so doing determine in each case the 
individual's conception of himself as well as his status in the community. 
Although not making direct reference to his work, Park's assessment echoes one of the 
characteristics of Du Bois' (1903) concept of double consciousness (though it is worth noting 
that Park's portrayal of the interaction between an individuals' consciousness and their social 
`status' does not seek to examine the role that discrepancies in power might have in shaping 
this consciousness). At the same time, it is also true that the Chicago school saw `the race 
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problem' as being one of "integration and assimilation of minorities into the mainstream of a 
consensus based society" (Berge, 1967: 7). To achieve this, Chicago school scholars squarely 
located the propensity for problems at the door of cultural-differentiation-risks- 
incompatibility as an explanatory factor. 
This is evident in what Park (1950: 82) describes as the "cycle of race-relations", which 
moves between the four linear stages of "contact, conflict, accommodation and assimilation. " 
The burden of adapting is entirely carried by the immigrant, wherein failure to assimilate into 
this "functionalist consensus based view of society" is deemed regressive (Berghe, 1967: 7). 
In addition, and, to some more importantly (cf Miles, 1982 see this chapter sec 4. ), Park may 
be read as endorsing the erroneous, but commonly held view of `race' as biologically real. 
Nevertheless, and the main reason why the preceding discussion is necessary, the 
formulations of the Chicago School were eagerly adopted elsewhere, not least in Britain. 
3.1. Race-relations in Britain 
The initial post-war labour migration to Britain from former colonies in the West Indies 
and the Indian subcontinent between 1950 and 1962 was later accompanied by further 
immigration as families were unified. This was augmented when Asians who had settled in 
Uganda were evicted, and who voluntarily chose to leave Kenya after independence also 
migrated to the Britain (sporadically between the mid-sixties and up until the late seventies). 
During this period a very British take on race-relations was beginning to flourish through the 
work of Michael Banton (1955; 1959; 1967)', Ruth Glass (1960)8, Shelia Patterson (1965; 
1969)9 and E. J. B Rose (1969), 10 who were involved in the then government sponsored 
Institute for Race-relations (IRR). Their immediate impact was evident when the Labour 
government introduced measures to prevent discrimination against settled Commonwealth 
7 Michael Banton: The Coloured Quarter: Negro Immigrants in an English City (1955); White and 
Coloured (1959); Race-relations (1967). 
8 Ruth Glass (1960) Newcomers: West Indians in London. 
9 Sheila Patterson (1965) Dark Strangers; (1969) Immigration and Race-relations in Britain 1960- 
1967. 
10 E. J. B Rose: Colour and Citizenship (1969). 
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immigrants (discussed at length in chapter five); it proceeded through the introduction of a 
Race-Relations Act (1965). Why it was not, for example, called the `Anti-Racism Act' is 
unclear, but part of the rationale is undoubtedly the continuation of Parks' assumption that the 
relations within which such discrimination occurs, must be those of race-relations. 
Michael Banton's (1967) book, simply called Race-relations, is indicative of this way of 
thinking and serves as a useful illustration of how problematics in this period were being 
framed. " This is because it shares with the Chicago School a view that race-relations 
research should be based upon two cornerstones: (i) patterns of interaction and (ii) cultural 
conflict. Where Banton deviated from the Chicago school, however, was in adopting a global 
and historical perspective to establish `six orders of race-relations'. These are briefly worth 
examining because they identify some definitional problems that have since been repeated. 
3.2. Banton's six orders of race-relations 
The first is called `peripheral contact' and is characterised by interactions between groups 
that have little or no real influence upon one another, leading to minimal if any change in 
outlook within groups. An example of such peripheral contact can be found, according to 
Banton (1967: 68-76), in pygmies of the Ituri forest of central Africa, where goods are 
exchanged between groups by being left at a trading place independent of each groups' 
settlement. Such interactions then require little intimate contact and mutual knowledge of 
customs, habits or language. The second order he termed as `institutionalised contact', which 
is achieved when two `societies' enter into contact "principally through their outlying 
members" who live on the social boundaries of their respective groups, and so are most 
qualified to exchange with one another (ibid. 99). This vanguard "may occupy positions in 
both systems, and a new system of interrelationships develops between groups" (Kitano, 
1980: 17). The third occurs as a result of `acculturation' which, for Banton, heralds the 
"coming together" or synthesis of different cultures. This might either encourage both groups 
11 It is important to note that Banton has radically revised these positions. See Banton (2005). 
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to learn from one another or, depending upon the power relations between groups, lead to the 
cultural assimilation of the less established group. The fourth order is described as an 
"integrated order of race-relations" (Banton, 1967: 73), in which racial distinctions are 
disregarded or only given `minor' consideration. This facilitates interaction on most levels 
(including housing, schooling, employment, social relationships) so that, "race has less 
significance than the individual's occupation and his other status conferring roles". After this 
there is the order of `pluralism', which is understood by Banton as referring to "separatism" 
amongst groups who live side by side, but wish to preserve their differences in culture, with a 
minimum of social interaction, integration or assimilation. Unlike the order of `peripheral' 
contact, `pluralism', for Banton, involves a knowing choice to self-segregate in order to 
maintain group boundaries, and is not a `natural' but a forced order of race-relations. His 
final order is that of `domination', which can develop out of the idea pluralism, when power 
relations between groups are radically unequal, and where, based upon racial criteria, 
members of one category are subordinate to the other and are responded to, not as individuals, 
but as representative of a category. 
Banton's typology has been widely criticised from different quarters that seek to 
undermine both his starting point as well as the broader project of race-relations as he sees it. 
With reference to the internal consistency of the schema itself, Philip Mason (1971: 60) has 
argued that Banton's definitions break down as soon as we begin to trace a progress from one 
race-relations `order' to another 
Muslim rule in India was, I suppose, domination merging into pluralism, but what 
about British rule in India? This was, first, institutionalised contact with the servants of 
the East India Company acting as specialised go-betweens; later, it was paternalism 
perhaps the most perfect example of paternalism there has ever been. But it ended not 
in integration but in withdrawal. Again, in Rhodesia, in the Cape Colony, Mexico and 
Peru, there was first some control by the home government but independence 
meant... something nearer to domination. It might, I suppose, be argued that the arrival 
of West Indians, Pakistanis, and Indians in Britain produced a situation in which 
acculturation was taking place, but with some doubt as to whether it would turn into 
integration or unequal pluralism. 
Mason's point is that Banton ignores the "shifting and intricate patterns" (ibid. ) of minority- 
majority relations, because the lived experiences compromise his overly general formulations. 
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This is not the most wounding of criticisms, however, and could equally be made against a 
great deal of theoretical work. A more important criticism is that Banton is so dependent 
upon anthropological work with tribal societies, that it encourages race-relations analysis to 
think of racial differences in terms of cultural manifestations of difference experienced in 
neat, bounded-units-as-groups. This is arguably why he mischaracterizes the idea of 
`pluralism', describing it as something closer to separate development or `apartheid', and why 
it is so at odds with how it is understood by Du Bois, Young or Parekh, as the previous 
chapter discussed (4-4.4). Thirdly, Banton appears to conflate ideas of what constitutes a 
`group' with `society' and so is unable to comprehend the implication of different ethnic 
groups belonging to a single polity. This has obvious implications for the analysis of 
minorities in culturally heterogeneous societies and also for ideas of what constitutes a civic- 
status amongst the nation in accounts of the nation-state in the way set out in chapter one 
(1.1-2). Moreover, it is unclear as to what comprises a `culture', a `group',, or a `society' in 
his account above, since Banton uses these terms interchangeably and without clear 
definition. 
3.3. John Rex; Status and Party 
Some of these issues were addressed in John Rex's (1967; 1973; 1979 1983; 1986) 
contribution to the race-relations problematic. 12 Rex deviates from Banton in two important 
ways. First, he is keen to stress the socio-political rather than the anthropological context of 
`relations' and, second, he adopts a less global and trans-historical approach 
Race-relations... refers to situations in which two or more groups with distinct identities 
and recognisable characteristics are forced by economic and political circumstances to 
live together in a society. Within this they refer to situations in which there is a high 
degree of conflict between the groups and in which ascriptive criteria are used to mark 
out the members of each group in order that one group may pursue one of a number of 
some hostile policies against the other. Finally, within this group of situations true 
12 John Rex: Race, Colonialism and the City (1973); Race-relations in Sociological Theory (1983); 
Race and Ethnicity(1986); with Moore Race, Community and Conflict (1967); with Sally Tomlinson 
Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis (1979). As an indication of his influence, 
Jenkins (2005: 202) claims that Rex "effectively founded the Sociology departments at Aston, Durham 
and Warwick" and "was director of SSRC [ESRC] Research Unit on Ethnic Relations" as well as one 
of the creators of the New Left Review. 
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race-relations may be said to exist when the practices of ascriptive allocation of roles 
and rights referred to are justified in terms of some kind of deterministic theory, 
whether that theory be of a scientific, religious, cultural, historical, ideological or 
sociological kind (Rex, 1983: 159-60). 
For Rex, race-relations ought to begin with an examination of "structured conditions 
interacted with actors' definitions in such a way as to produce a racially structured social 
reality" (Solomos and Back, 1996: 6). In his empirical research on Sparkbrook (Rex and 
Moore, 1967) and Handsworth (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979) in Birmingham, Rex pursued this 
by investigating (i) the extent to which minorities had become incorporated into welfare state 
institutions, had access to housing, education and employment, and (ii) the impact of racial 
inequality upon "the development of a `racialised' consciousness amongst both white and 
black working class" (Solomos, 1993: 20). 
Although Rex was explicitly Weberian in his outlook 13, stressing the importance of status 
and party along with class, his conclusions from research in Birmingham draw upon a more 
Marxian style of class analysis in pointing to a `truce' between the bourgeoisie and the white 
proletariat, furnished by the concessions gained through working class movements such as 
trade unions and the Labour party. The minority ethnic groups of mainly Indians, Pakistanis, 
Bangladeshis (or Asians), and `West-Indians', however, according to Rex and Tomlinson 
(1979), had fallen outside of these negotiations and remained subject to discrimination in all 
the areas that their white working class counterparts had made gains. 14 This understanding 
would later be echoed in Paul Gilroy's (1982: 305-6) assertion that "the institutions of the 
white working class have failed to represent the interests of black workers", something 
13 In Race & Ethnicity (1986: 11-12) Rex makes this quite clear when he argues that, "for Weber there 
are many possible markets and a multiplicity of class situations. A class is simply a number of 
individuals who share any market situation. Marx, of course, confined the term class specifically to 
situations arising in the labour market. He was also much more pessimistic than Weber about this 
market situation and the class conflict to which it gives rise being peacefully resolved. My own view is 
that while class relations do not arise in the labour market as Marx suggests, the markets on which 
they rest are inherently unstable and market bargaining frequently gives way to more drastic forms of 
conflict" (emphasis added). According to Rex, these forms of conflict have adverse effects for 
minorities because they fare consistently badly in the markets for jobs, housing and education, and/or 
they can be disproportionately excluded from certain markets and opportunities and confined to 
secondary markets. 
14 For example, housing was a clear example of this differential development of white-working class 
and non-white working class in Birmingham, with the latter falling into the lower strata of Rex's 
definition of housing classes. 
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already signalled in the formation of immigrant organisations and amalgamations such as the 
Indian Workers Association (IWA), Pakistani Workers Association (PWA) and the West 
Indian Standing conference (WISC). Such organisations developed in response to collusions 
between trade councils, unions and factory managers or operators, including colour bars (such 
as that introduced in Bristol by the Transport and General Workers Unions (TGWU)) and the 
refusal to allow Asian women working in the Red Star mill in Leicester to register with the 
union (see Heineman, 1972 and Shukra, 1998). 15 What Rex and Tomlinson (1979) were keen 
to point to, however, was the emergence amongst West Indian and Asian communities of a 
type of `underclass' which, for the former, would lead to "a withdrawal from competition" 
and, for the latter, would result in "a concentration on capital accumulation and social 
mobility" (Solomos, 1993: 20-1). Thus, they argued that 
... the minorities were systematically at a 
disadvantage compared with their white peers 
and that, instead of identifying with working class culture, community and politics, 
they formed their own organisations and became effectively a separate, underprivileged 
class (quoted in Solomos, ibid. ). 
What remained integral to this tradition of race-relations was of course that `West Indian' and 
`Asian' were the preferred terms to describe minority ethnic groups in Britain, and thus there 
were few concerted attempts to incorporate religion into these perspectives, "either as an 
important component for self description or as a vehicle for the expression and mobilisation 
of collective minority interests" (Lewis, 1994: 3). This is in spite of the activities of post- 
immigrant organisations and amalgamations such as the West Indian Standing Conference 
(WISC), Indian Workers Association (IWA), and Pakistani Workers Association (PWA), 
which simultaneously mobilised against Trade Union and employment discrimination whilst 
seeking sponsorship and funding for churches, temples and mosques (Meer, 2001; Hiro, 1991; 
Heinemen, 1974). 
4. `Race' and racialization 
15 What the development of all of these organisations should also point to is the continuing significance 
of colonial history in Britain, since many of the leaders and organisers used their experience of 
organising against British colonialism as a basis from which to militate against racism in Britain - 
particularly when there was evidence of state racism i. e. discriminatory immigration legislation. 
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The absence of such a nuanced analysis was joined, at the time, by the charge from 
theorists of `racialization' that race-relations thinking failed to engage with any sustained 
analysis of questions of power, and was consequently `atheoretical' and `ahistorical'. This 
was the view of Zubaida (1972: 141) who maintained that race-relations research "concerned 
with `attitudes', `prejudice' and `discrimination' [is] remarkably uninformative". While 
Rex's work certainly eschewed a narrow focus by pointing to the importance of social and 
economic marginalisation, his detractors argued that he failed to integrate these sociological 
concerns into "wider conceptual debates about the theory of racism or into the analysis of 
processes of racialization in contemporary Britain" (Solomos, 1993: 22). At the same time it 
is worth noting that Rex displayed an interest in the continuing relevance of colonial relations 
and their articulations within Britain. One of his key texts, after all, is entitled Race, 
Colonialism and the City (1973), and in making a moderate defence, Richard Jenkins (2005: 
202) has argued that "for John Rex, theory is not a self-referential intellectual domain - in 
other words, it is not mainly about theorists and what they say - but, rather, it is a conceptual 
lens through which to observe the realities of human existence in groups. " 
Nevertheless, an early and incrementally systematic attempt to provide a theoretical 
rebuttal to the race-relations problematic (adopted, in their different ways, by Banton and 
Rex) can be found in the work of Robert Miles (1982; 1984; 1986; 1988; 1989; 1993). 16 
Miles argued that migrants to the UK did not enter a neutral political context but, rather, a 
"wider ideological context" that was shaped in part by the need to justify and rationalise three 
centuries of colonial exploitation. He then critiqued the study of minorities through an 
analytic category of `race' - placing the term within inverted commas since it is "a belief' 
and not a reality 
I recognise that people do conceive of themselves and others as belonging to `races' 
and do describe certain sorts of situations as being `race-relations', but I am also 
arguing that these categories of everyday life cannot, automatically be taken up and 
employed analytically in an inquiry which aspires to objective or scientific status... 
16 Robert Miles: Racism and Migrant Labour (1982); "The riots of 1958: notes on the ideological 
construction of `race-relations' as a political issue in Britain" (1984); "Labour Migration, Capital 
Accumulation in Western Europe Since 1945" (1986); "Racism, Marxism and British Politics" (1988); 
Racism (1989); After 'Race-relations' (1993). 
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there is no scientific basis for categorising Homo sapiens into discrete races (Miles, 
1982: 42). 17 
What we should actually be studying, according to Miles (1989: 75), is how "material 
inequalities" and "signifying processes" interact to racialize groups as `races' in "those 
instances where social relations between people have been structured by the significance of 
human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social 
collectivities". In turn, this process of `racialization' would also help sustain structures of 
class inequality and the exploitation of migrant workers. These two issues are interrelated for 
Miles since there's a contradiction between 
... on the one 
hand the need of the capitalist world economy for the mobility of human 
beings, and on the other, the drawing of territorial boundaries and the construction of 
citizenship as a legal category which sets boundaries for human mobility (Miles, 1988: 
438). 
In addition, he argued that talk of `race' served to fragment the broader struggles of the 
working class, to the extent that organisations which mobilised around an experience of `race' 
and adopted a `race-consciousness' succeeded in creating obstacles to combating processes of 
racialization. What they should instead be organising around, argued Miles, was a class- 
based formula that could account for the `racialization' process in the first instance. 
Despite the insights offered in his account of `racialization', the uncompromising 
materialist basis makes it problematic to adopt conceptually in the form Miles intended. 
However, later in the chapter it will be argued that scope exists for some application of Miles 
ideas in the analysis of Muslims in Britain with respect to the operation of `Islamophobia' or 
anti-Muslim racism. 
5. Race and political blackness 
One of the more serious charges levelled against Miles and Marxian perspectives, 
however, was that not only did it encourage a class reductionism that served to subsume all 
17 Huxley and Haddon's (1935: 220) argument that "the word race should be banished, and the 
descriptive noncommittal term ethnic group should be substituted", is probably the earliest sociological 
argument against the use of `race' as a normative concept. 
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other social relations, ultimately limiting the scope of theory, but that it disengaged or 
silenced racial subjects. As Paul Gilroy (1987: 23) argued 
This perspective presents Marxism as a privileged science allowing unique access to 
fundamental historical issues which are denied to analysts writing from other 
perspectives. Dogmatism is particularly evident in Miles' discussion of class relations 
inside the black communities. The effects of popular and institutional racisms in 
drawing together various black groups with different histories is unexplored. The idea 
that these relationships might create a new definition of black out of various different 
experiences of racial subordination is not entertained. 
Gilroy's objection had, however, already been articulated in his earlier collaborative work 
with the Race and Politics Group at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), 
The Empire Strikes Back: Race and racism in 70s Britain (1982). The concern here, echoed 
in Gilroy's comment above, was that the idea of race should not only be viewed as something 
that is used to regulate and racialize ethnic minorities, but that "the meaning of race as a 
social construction is contested and fought over" (Solomos and Back, 1996: 10). Thus CCCS 
authors agreed with Zubaida and Miles' critique of Banton and Rex's formulation of race- 
relations. They also agreed with Miles that race, as an analytical category, was socially 
constructed, and that processes of racialization which permeated mainstream society were 
integral to the function of the modern state, particularly during times of `crisis' (CCCS, 1982: 
277-8; cf Hall et al 1978). However, they deviated significantly from Miles in pointing to the 
way in which collective identities spoken through race, community and locality might become 
powerful means to co-ordinate action and create solidarity. This was particularly the case, 
according to the CCCS (1982: 277), where the `politics of race' had been successful in 
forging communities of resistance in the absence of white working class solidarity 
[T]he British left has been reluctant to approach the Pandora's box of racial politics. 
They have remained largely unaffected by over sixty years of black critical dialogue... 
The simplistic reduction of race to class, which has guided their practice has been 
thrown into confusion by intense and visible black struggles... 
The key shift here involves an objection to viewing `black' communities as passive objects of 
study in favour of viewing them as active partners in the creation of black political 
subjectivities. According to Solomos (1993: 30), "a multiplicity of political identities" could 
from here fall into "an inclusive notion of black identity", whilst allowing "heterogeneity of 
national and cultural origins within this constituency". These could then resist racialization 
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processes through co-ordinated action - not least through anti-racist struggles. So the notion 
of a `black' identity was taken to incorporate minorities of both south Asian and African 
Caribbean origin, specifically in contesting racism as something based upon colour prejudice. 
Thus a dominant strand of anti-racism emerged and sought to organise minority ethnic 
populations through a politicised - but racialized - colour based ethnicity. 
0 The rationale being that the terms of protest against discrimination both refuse 
and accept the group identities upon which discrimination is based, and that 
demands for inclusion necessarily invoke and repudiate the differences that have 
been denied inclusion in the first place. 
This is the basis of an inclusive blackness that is premised upon the desire to reclaim 
previously demeaned identities and instil a sense `group' pride. 
6. Group-pride, self-definition and ethnicity 
Positioned somewhere between Miles' coupling of race and class, and inclusive blackness 
envisioned by the CCCS (1982) on the one hand, and the emergence of the new ethnicities 
problematic (discussed below) on the other, Tariq Modood (1988; 1989; 1990; 1992)18 
pointed to the contradictory assumptions informing race-based coalitions by arguing that 
we are being asked to understand white attitudes, including what is referred to as 
common-sense or folk racism, in terms of white culture, ideology and material 
conditions, but without any reference to the groups of people about whom the attitudes 
and polices are being made. [... ] Minority groups become shadows, for by becoming 
all race and no ethnicity, their very existence as a group depends upon white people 
perceiving them (Modood, 1992: 50). 
There are two interrelated arguments informing Modood's comment. The first involves 
making a distinction between what he understands as one's `mode of being' and `mode of 
oppression', and the second seeks to attend to the silenced and/or coerced partners within this 
black perspectivism, specifically through an understanding of ethnicity and religion 
18 Tariq Modood: (1988) 'Black, racial equality and Asian identity (1989); Religious anger and 
minority rights (1990); British Asians and the Salman Rushdie affair; (1992) Not Easy Being British: 
culture, colour and citizenship; (1994) Changing Ethnic Identities (with others); (1997) Fourth 
National Survey of Ethnic Minorities: Diversity & Disadvantage (with others) (1997); Multicultural 
Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain (2005). 
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[W]hat is needed is a sociology that is able to connect a group's internal structure, 
values and understanding of itself, commonly understood as ethnicity, with how that 
group is categorised and treated as a subordinate race within wider society. The 
elements, ethnicity and race [... ] a group's mode of being and the mode of oppression it 
suffers, are familiar elements to the sociologists who provide the current frameworks 
for anti-racist policies, yet they are unable fruitfully to relate the two and thereby 
assume that ethnicity is of lesser importance (ibid. 48). 
This, of course, requires some understanding of what ethnicity actually consists of and 
Modood's idea shares something with a tradition in which ethnicity is given its most 
recognisable and modern formulation in the work of Fredrick Barth (1969). Barth's argument 
revolved around two key points. The first, in an explicit critique of anthropological traditions 
emphasising cultural content, is that it is most valid to categorise groups according to their 
own self-identification. The subjective dimension of recognition - an internal self-awareness 
- is therefore more important than the objective definition of the group designated by an 
external party. Second, and in shifting the emphasis away from the possible characteristics of 
a group, i. e. taking us-away from definitions of groups as heralding displays of particular 
traits or compromising particular behaviours in the classical anthropological sense, Barth 
(1969: 10-11) argued that we should focus upon the `boundaries' between groups as a site of 
identity maintenance. This does not mean, however, that we should think of ethnicity in 
terms of Banton's `peripheral contact' or `plural' race-relations orders, or in a way which 
suggests "a world of separate people's, each with their culture and each organised in a society 
which can legitimately be isolated for description as an island to itself". We should instead 
seek to understand how 
... ethnic 
distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, 
but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete 
categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course 
of individual life histories. [... ] The features which are taken into account are not the 
sum of the objective differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as 
significant (ibid. 10,14). 
Where Modood departs from Barth is in prioritising group pride through the projection of 
positive images and demands for respect, as a way of challenging negative and racist 
assumptions, which means that the demand for inclusion necessarily invokes and repudiates 
the differences that have been denied inclusion in the first place. Key to this `ethnic 
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assertiveness', however, is the recognition of a groups' mode of being rather than a protracted 
mode of oppression i. e. ethnic groups should not be silenced or coerced into abandoning what 
is most important to them by succumbing to a category, in this case political blackness, in the 
name of anti-racism (discussed below). 
What was being advocated here, therefore, was the space for ethnic minorities to draw 
upon internal resources to resist the external constraints of racial discrimination in creative, 
and potentially contradictory, ways. The methodological implications of listening to these 
internal voices is not only relevant to ethnographic work, however, but can be adopted in 
large-scale survey design. For example, in the ten-yearly Policy Studies Institute survey into 
the conditions of ethnic minorities in Britain (Brown, 1984; Smith, 1977; Daniel, 1968), 
Modood et al (1997: 291-338) investigated the question: "how do ethnic minority people 
think of themselves? " Recognising the situational and contextual nature of the question, they 
worked on the understanding that expressions of ethnicity entail "not what people do but 
what people say or believe about themselves". Thus self-description is central to ethnicity, 
which includes expressions of what might be called an "associational or communal identity", 
as well as cultural practices. Contrasting this with a designated ethnicity according to 
country of origin or heritage, they found that while people with African-Caribbean ethnicities 
maintained that skin colour was the most important factor in terms of their self description, 
for people with South Asian ethnicities it was religion that proved most important. Although 
they looked at various dimensions of culture and ethnicity such as marriage, language, dress - 
all of which "command considerable allegiance" - they concluded that religion "is central in 
the self definition of the majority of South Asian people". Thus when they asked South 
Asian respondents "Do you ever think of yourself as being black? " only about a fifth of over 
1500 respondents gave an affirmative answer. 
7. New ethnicities 
In their opposing ways, both the CCCS' conception of an inclusive, vehicular, `black' 
identity, and Modood's rebuttal in favour of a differentiated ethnic identity that recognises 
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peoples `mode of being', feed into the emergence of the `new ethnicities' problematic. This 
sought to engage the shifting complexities of ethnic identities, specifically their processes of 
formation and change, and was given an authoritative voice in the work of Stuart Hall (1988; 
1991). According to Cohen (2000: 5), the idea of new ethnicities seeks to capture the way in 
which "identities had broken-free of their anchorage in singular histories of race and nation", 
not least in the way that a `black' identity was meant to reference a common experience of 
racism and marginalisation. At this earlier stage, "ethnicity was the enemy" (Hall, 1991: 55) 
because it was conceived in the form of a culturally constructed sense of Englishness that was 
problematic because "a particularly closed, exclusive, and regressive form of English national 
identity is one of the core characteristics of British racism today" (Hall, 1996 [1988]: 168). 
An outcome, however, was the tendency to homogenise differences at the expense of more 
sociologically honest attempts to conceptualise the social relations of minority Britons 
`The Black Experience, ' as a singular and unifying framework based on the building up 
of identity across ethnic and cultural difference between the different communities, 
became `hegemonic' over other ethnic/racial identities - though the latter did not, of 
course, disappear (Hall, 1991 [1988]: 164). 19 
With the `end of innocence' surrounding the notion of an essential black subject, 
counterpoised as a positive identity against social relations marked by racism, "the politics of 
representation around the black subject shifts" enough for us to "begin to see a renewed 
contestation over the meaning of the term `ethnicity' itself (ibid). " 
Ethnicity, however, emerges in a different incarnation here than was earlier surveyed in 
the Barthian sense or that of Modood. The ethnicities in Hall's concept emerge in "re- 
inscribing ethnicity outside of the discourses of the sociology of race and ethnic relations and 
the rhetoric of nationalism" (Solomos and Back, 1993: 137). This is because new ethnicities" 
are individualistic, choice based and `consumed' in an interaction of the local and the global 
that displace the "centred" discourses "of the West, putting in question its universalist 
character and its transcendental claims to speak for everyone, while being itself everywhere 
and nowhere" (Hall, 1996 [1988]: 169). In many ways the new ethnicities project has been 
19 This contrasts with the more groupist and communitarian conceptions of Du Bois and rehearses the 
tensions drawn out in chapter one (sec 1.7. ). 
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highly influential in seeking to heal rifts and propel ways forward from theoretical standpoints 
that might once have seemed irreconcilable. At the same time, it successfully captures a 
movement that was already underway, specifically in resisting the master-builder attempts to 
conceptualise minority identity with imposed political objectives in mind. 20 
Hall is not, however, without his critics. Adrian Favell (2001: 47), for example, has 
lamented his "inability" to account for both what it is about Britain that has encouraged it to 
be become multicultural and how to measure the presence of racism in society; how it has 
declined and where it still needs to be eradicated. He argues that this is because Hall and the 
tradition of Black British Cultural Studies from which he emerges 
... needs constantly to uncover new 
forms of racism and discrimination [which] has 
seen it continually shift from diagnosing more obvious forms to revealing less open 
ones, such as `cultural' or `institutional' racism. By definition, then, it can offer no 
measure of the absolute salience of racism in explaining any given pattern of equality, 
because as soon as it is not visible, a new hidden form is discovered. 
Favell's two concerns might at the same time be understood as follows. Firstly, and as is 
indicated in his own comparative work between Britain and France (Favell, 1998), he seeks to 
tie down a broader philosophy of integration which he thinks can subsume Hall's project. 
That is that he awards an ontological primacy to the politics of the state as understood within 
particular philosophies and political traditions, as opposed to the politics of community action 
or aesthetic struggle in contesting accepted narratives or discourses of identity and nationality. 
This is because the latter "inevitably portrays ethnic relations in terms of their successful 
resistance to a dominant form of British nationhood" (ibid). 
Favell's position is tenable while he posits the need to observe how "mainstream culture" 
has revised its account of nationhood to include multicultural conceptions of Britain. What it 
ignores, however, is that the tradition he laments for failing to do this has, since the late 
1970s, given rise to prominent writers who have directly stressed this need. Dick Hebdige 
(1979), for example, draws our attention to a "phantom history of post-war race-relations" 
evidenced in youth cultural formations informing British popular music "from the Beatles to 
the Police". Paul Gilory (1987) meanwhile, one of Stuart Hall's intellectual heirs, has 
20 As is discussed shortly, the Rushdie affair provided an important catalyst for this. 
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famously argued that "it is impossible to theorise `black' culture in Britain without 
developing a new perspective on British culture as a whole". This is consolidated in Hall's 
(1996 [1988]: 170) own thesis that "fifteen years ago we didn't care, or at least I didn't care, 
whether there was any black in the Union Jack. Now not only do we care, we must. " The 
`new ethnicities' project is then irrevocably part of a re-negotiation of accounts of nation- 
hood, and this conjunction can be witnessed in the report by the Commission on Multi-Ethnic 
Britain (CMEB) (of which Hall was a member) which attempted to "re-think the national 
story" (2000: 14). 
Favell's second position however, does not accord with the lived experiences of 
minorities in Britain. The theoretical need "constantly to uncover new forms of racism and 
discrimination" might just as easily be based upon the empirical reality of `constantly 
experiencing newer forms of racism and discrimination'. This is returned to and discussed at 
length below, but suffice to say that neither `institutional' nor `cultural racism' are a figment 
of the imagination: the inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence (MacPherson, 1999), the 
testimonies informing the Runneymede Trust's (1997) report on `Islamaphobia', and the 
findings of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2002) bear witness 
to this (discussed further below in sec. 9-9.1 and in chp. 4 sec 3). 
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Part B: Problematics in practice 
8. The Rushdie Affair 
It still remains unclear, however, where these accounts stand in relation to Muslims. In 
trying to answer these questions and bringing together the different problematics we have 
discussed, the episode known as the Rushdie Affair provides an instructive example that 
exercises what can at times appears to be an abstract discussion. Although the literature 
surrounding this topic is very broad, 
21 the following discussion consciously limits itself to two 
interrelated debates that took place in Britain during and after the episode. 
" The first surrounds the disjuncture between the way British Muslims were 
viewing themselves, and how dominant accounts of minority identity sought to 
understand them. 
" The second considers the emergence of more complex forms of racism and 
`racialization' (as cultural racism and Islamaphobia) which affect Muslims in 
Britain. 
Soon after its publication in September 1988, Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses 
faced objections by some Muslims on the grounds that it blurred reality and fiction because it 
is based in - and draws upon - Islamic scriptural history (Parekh, 2000). Particular offence 
was taken at sections of the book that portrayed the Muslim Prophet Mohammed as "an 
unscrupulous, lecherous impostor who hoodwinked his followers... [and] included in the 
Qur'an certain verses which turned out to be the work of the devil: the satanic verses" (Hiro, 
1991: 183); as well as references to Bilal - revered as the first black convert to Islam - as "a 
big black shit"; and the portrayal of Khadija - the empowered wife of Mohammed - as a 
callous prostitute. After initial, peaceful appeals to the publisher to include something 
21 For accounts written at the time see Modood (1989) Religious anger and minority rights and (1990) 
British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie affair; Akhtar (1989) Be Careful With Muhammad!; Kabbani 
(1989) Letter to Christendom; Parekh (1989) Between holy text and moral void; Cottle (1991) 
Reporting the Rushdie Affair: A Case Study in the Orchestration of Public Opinion; Appignanesi and 
Maitland (1989) The Rushdie File. For accounts written with some benefit of hindsight see Ahmedi 
(1997) Rushdie: Haunted by his unholy Ghosts; La'Porte (1999) An Attempt to understand Muslim 
Reaction to the 'Satanic Verses'; Parekh (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism. 
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disclaiming its historical credentials fell on deaf ears, some Muslim organisations petitioned 
the government to prosecute the author under the Race-Relations Act (1976), Public Order 
Act (1986) and Incitement to Racial Hatred legislation (Jones, 1990: 416) (chapter five 
explores this legislation in great detail). Others, such as the British Muslim Action Front 
(BMAF) and the Bradford Council of Mosques (BMC), sought to mobilise the English 
common law of blasphemy as a way of precipitating a ban on the book. Both appeals to 
legislation failed, the former because Muslims - unlike Sikh and Jewish minorities - are not 
considered to be a racial group, and the latter because legislation on blasphemy does not 
cover religions other than Christianity. In the meantime Muslim protests became more active 
and included setting fire to copies of the novel, in an attempt to elicit media coverage, which 
led to comparisons with Nazi suppression of public debate (cf Weldon, 1989). 
It is important to recognise that British protests did not occur in a vacuum, but took place 
at a time when the international dimension was marked by the intervention of the Ayatollah 
Khomeini of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who issued a decree in February 1989 calling for 
the assassination of the author. Although the British protests had started much earlier and 
independently of this action, and Khomeini's authority to sanction such a decree was highly 
contested and enormously problematic, the two issues became implicitly entangled because 
Khomeini was now seen by most British Muslims simply as the leading Islamic figure 
on the world stage, upholding the sanctity of the Prophet Mohammed. Soon 
Khomeini's pictures became a regular feature of the demonstrations which Muslims 
mounted in British cities and town from Glasgow to Gravesend, culminating in a large 
procession in London 28 May 1989 (Hiro, 1991: 186-7). 
Largely viewed under the umbrella identity of `Asian', it was Muslims of Bradford who 
managed to capture the public imagination most often during the episode. As emotive images 
of bearded men chanting anti-Rushdie slogans occupied the broadcast media, the realisation 
that anti-racist activist discourse cataloguing Muslims as politically `black' may have been 
unhelpful, was slowly emerging. Modood (1992: 272) illustrates this with the example of 
anti-racist campaigners who counter-protested against the Muslim protestors in Bradford: 
"`Fight racism, not Rushdie': stickers bearing this slogan were worn by many who wanted to 
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be on the same side as the Muslims. It was well meant but betrayed a poverty of 
understanding. " 
8.1. Implications 
The Rushdie Affair was a turning point for Muslims in Britain, for not only did it come at 
.a time of 
increased lobbying and Muslim political involvement, but it also ruptured the 
dynamics of this political involvement by demanding that `Muslim' be accepted as a 
legitimate, public, mainstream identity articulation. What the episode successfully 
highlighted was that, thus far, the `race-relations' problematics of Michael Banton and John 
Rex, the class based racialization thesis of Robert Miles, and the inclusive blackness of the 
CCCS, all failed to explain or understand the complexities in expressions of minority identity 
in Britain. Banton's thesis, following on from Park, is a prescription for assimilation since it 
is only in "an integrated order of race-relations" where differences lose their significance that 
social consensus can be achieved. As the episode highlights, Muslims in Britain did not want 
to assimilate at the cost of surrendering their religious heritage, and contested their allocated 
civic status by mobilising for an accommodation of difference by the state. This view is 
succinctly captured by the comments, made at around the time of the protests, by a female 
teacher at a Muslim school in Bradford: "we want the girls here to build up the confidence to 
say to the outside world, `this is me... You have to accept me the way I am'. They are ready 
to integrate on their own terms. "ZZ 
Although Rex's account is less prescriptive, he would similarly hold that Muslims should 
accept the reality of assimilation to a political culture where objections to Rushdie's text on 
the grounds of religious offence should not be entertained (Rex, 1996). Their collective sense 
of grievance would do little to help alleviate the position of Muslims caught - in Rex's words 
-_in some kind of `underclass', for the presence of a sizable population who are not only 
religious but who practice their faith publicly, and the further marginalisation of these 
22 Quoted on Public Eye 20 October, 1989 BBC Television cited in Hiro (1991: 193). 
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communities through the disparity between state recognition of faiths, escapes Rex's account. 
The racialization thesis presented by Robert Miles, meanwhile, offers no space to understand 
the cultural dimension of British Muslim protests. In viewing them as the passive victims of 
racism, it denies their obvious agency in speaking out and mobilising against a perceived 
assault on sources of group identity. As Samad (1992: 508) argued, "the Satanic Verses 
controversy added a new claim of authentic identity, a Muslim identity, which challenged 
assumed loyalties". The idea of an inclusive black identity, as a basis from which to mobilise 
anti-racist struggle, also suffered from conceiving racism in terms of an objection to visible 
differences such as skin colour, as Modood (1992: 272) argued 
The root of the problem is that contemporary anti-racism defines people in terms of 
their colour; Muslims - suffering all the problems that anti-racists identify - hardly 
ever think of themselves in terms of their colour. [... ] We need concepts of race and 
racism that can critique socio-cultural environments which devalue people because of 
the physical differences but also because of the membership of a cultural minority and, 
critically, where the two overlap and create a double disadvantage (my emphasis). 
As well as taking us back to the new ethnicities problematic discussed earlier, specifically as 
it is precipitated by Modood's concern to distinguish between people's `mode of being' from 
their `mode of oppression', the above observation leads us to consider conceptions of racism 
and -just as importantly - the basis upon which to mobilise against it. This reading finds 
resonance in Paul Gilroy's (1992: 60-6 1) influential essay The End ofAnti-Racism, in which 
he argues that "there can be no single or homogeneous strategy against racism because racism 
itself is never homogeneous". This conception eschews the earlier `innocence' and can 
certainly inform current concerns about cultural racism and `Islamaphobia'. 
9. `New'/cultural racisms 
This is important because contemporary racism is less able, according to Barker's (1981) 
influential account, to justify systematic discrimination such as apartheid and white 
supremacy, or the explicit derogation of the `other' in public discourse or conversation. 
Knowledge of the Holocaust and post-colonialism have scuppered the legitimacy of 
biological superiority. Minorities are not simply inferior then, but display pathologies that 
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require corrective solutions. On this understanding, it is only natural that the majority of 
people in Britain should prefer to live `with their own kind'. As the discussion of `Islamic 
Terrorism' in chapter four demonstrates (sec 4-4.4), this new racism is played out on a more 
discursive terrain, and its' cultural emphasis gives it a veneer of democratic respectability 
rather than an irrational unjustness (van Dijk, 1998). It can therefore deny the importance or 
continuity of racism in Britain by arguing that opposition to minority communities in Britain 
is not premised upon racism. To help focus a definition, Modood (1997: 155) argues that 
`, `cultural racism builds upon biological racism a further discourse which evokes cultural 
differences from an alleged British or 'civilised' norm to vilify, marginalise or demand 
cultural assimilation from groups who also suffer from biological racism. " Such new and 
cultural racisms can then be articulated in the guise of incompatibility and/or cultural 
dysfunction which, during the Rushdie affair, "served to reinforce the view that minorities 
who did not want to share the dominant political values of British society pose a threat to 
social stability and cohesion" (Solomos, 1993: 32). Such an understanding was exemplified 
in the sentiments of the celebrated liberal-feminist'author-Fay Weldon (1989). In response to 
Muslim contestations she wrote 
Their hearts are in the right place - it's just that they're a bit primitive. They live in 
this advanced and intelligent society of ours. They insist on their religious right in this 
multicultural, multi-religious, benighted society, and almost convince us our guilt is so 
great. Of course they are not right. You cannot, should not, teach a primitive, fear- 
ridden religion. 
9.1. Islamophobia: real or imagined? 
Defined as "an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or 
most Muslims", Weldon's perception of Muslims in Britain finds a voice in the idea of 
Islamophobia outlined in the Runnymede Trust report entitled Islamophobia: a Challenge for 
us all (1997: 4). This report offers eight argumentative positions that are conceived as 
encapsulating current manifestations of Islamaphobia 
1. Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change. 
2. Islam is seen as separate and 'other'. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is 
not affected by them and does not influence them. 
3. Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist. 
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4. Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism and engaged in a 
'clash of civilisations'. 
5. Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used for political or military advantage. 
6. Criticisms made of the West by Islam are rejected out of hand. , 
7. Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and 
exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society. 
8. Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal. 
This way of conceiving of `Islamophobia' has been widely critiqued. One of the most 
substantive criticisms is offered by Fred Haliday (1999: 898), who argues that the term used 
by the. Runneymede Trust inadequately accounts for the nature of prejudice experienced by 
Muslims. He certainly agrees that there is a problem of racism directed at Muslims as 
Muslims, yet he objects to the operationalisation of the term on the grounds that it is 
misleading 
It misses the point about what it is that is being attacked: "Islam" as a religion was the 
enemy in the past: in the crusades or the reconquista. It is not the enemy now [... ] The 
attack now is not against Islam as a faith but against Muslims as a people, the latter 
grouping together all, especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term. 
Equally, the `Islamaphobic' attack is against states which may be among the most 
secular in the world. (ibid. original emphasis) 
This is echoed in Reisigl and Wodak's (2001: 6) more general criticism of `-phobias' as 
neglecting "the active and aggressive part of discrimination" by conceiving of racism as a 
collection of pathological beliefs. In contrast to the thrust of the Islamophobia concept, 
Halliday argues that the stereotypical enemy "is not a faith or a culture, but a people" and 
therefore its use is misleading because it shifts the analysis away from the `real' targets of 
prejudice. 
Secondly, Halliday argues that the concept of Islamophobia reproduces an essentialist 
understanding "that there is one Islam: that there is something out there against which the 
I'll 
phobia can be directed" (1999: 897). This then passes over the heterogeneity of Islam as a 
cultural system that is a contested field of meaning (Sayyid, 1997), and denies that "what is 
presented as `Islam' may well be one, but by no means the only possible interpretation" 
(Halliday, 1999: 897). Redefining anti-Muslim sentiment like this, he argues, helps expose 
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the discursive variety of Islam as well as the politically motivated actions of those who claim 
access to one true Islam, including what is at stake in their maintaining such privilege. 
Halliday's third criticism combines the previous two difficulties, which he argues lead to 
"confusing" practical results. This is because "issues of immigration, housing, employment, 
racial prejudice, anti-immigrant violence are not specifically religious" in either the UK or 
`the West' as a whole (Halliday, 1999: 899). Finally, he states that: 
[T]he use of the term `Islamophobia' challenges the possibility of dialogue based on 
universal principles [since it] inevitably runs the risk of denying the right, or 
possibility, of criticisms of the practices of those with whom one is having the 
dialogue. Not only those who, on universal human rights grounds, object to elements in 
Islamic or other traditions and current rhetoric, but also those who challenge 
conservative readings from within, can more easily be classed as Islamophobes (ibid. ) 
Halliday argues that this effect of Islamophobia (curtailing dialogue on the basis that the 
`invocation of universal principles violates tradition') is felt at both the national and 
international levels. However it is abuse occurring "within Muslim societies themselves" 
(original emphasis) which receives the most attention, where "horrendous violations of 
human rights [... ] committed, against Muslims, in the name of religion" are shielded from 
criticism (Halliday, 1999: 900). 
Halliday's critique is more sympathetic and substantial than some polemical and less 
academic appraisals from different sides of the political spectrum (cf Malik, 2005)23 There 
23 For example, Kenan Malik has argued that "the Islamic Human Rights Commission monitored just 
344 Islamophobic attacks in the 12 months following 9/11 - most of which were minor incidents like 
shoving or spitting. That's 344 too many - but it's hardly a climate of uncontrolled hostility towards 
Muslims. [... ] It's not Islamophobia, but the perception that it blights Muslim lives, that creates anger 
and resentment. That's why it's dangerous to exaggerate the hatred of Muslims. Even more worrying is 
the way that the threat of Islamophobia is now being used to stifle criticism of Islam". (Transcript of 
`Are Muslims Hated? ', 30 Minutes, 8 January 2005, Channel 4). Malik is not alone in holding this 
view and there are several problematic issues that arise in his analysis that may also be evident in 
others' (Joppke, 2007; Hansen, 2006). For example, it is easy to complain that Muslims exaggerate 
Islamophobia without noting that they are no more likely to do so than others who might exaggerate 
colour-racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, ageism, homophobia or many other forms of discrimination. 
That is that his claim remains a political rather than a comparatively informed empirical claim. 
Secondly, and more importantly, Malik limits Islamophobia to violent attacks and ignores its discursive 
character in prejudicing, stereotyping, direct and indirect discrimination, exclusion from networks and 
so on, and the many non-physical ways in which discrimination operates. As chapter five 
demonstrates, these are the very forms of discrimination that Britain's Race Relations architecture has 
historically developed to prevent and redress. Thirdly, Malik draws upon data gathered prior to the 
events of 7/7, following which, according to the same source (the Islamic Human Rights Commission) 
and using the same indices, there were reported to be 200 Islamophobic incidents in the first two weeks 
after the bombings. These included sixty five incidents of violent physical attacks and criminal 
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are, however, important problems with it. Firstly, few people would argue that human rights 
abuse or the inhumane or criminal activities of (people who happen to be) Muslims should be 
`off limits' to criticism. Part of the difficulty here is that the Runnymede Trust's own 
definition of the concept wherein they suggest that Islamophobia is characterised by an 
"unfounded hostility towards Islam" (1997: 4 my emphasis). This clearly entails an 
interpretative problem of how to establish that such hostility is unfounded24. Secondly, as the 
majority of those British-Muslims who do report experiencing discrimination recount - as 
testimonies to the 2004 Runneymede follow-up report (CBMI, 2004) bear witness - there is 
good evidence to suggest that Muslims experience heightened discrimination and abuse when 
they appear `conspicuously Muslim' than when they do not. 
The increase in personal abuse and everyday racism since 9/11 and 7/7 in which the 
perceived `Islamic-ness' of the victims is the central reason for abuse, regardless of veracity 
of this presumption (resulting in Sikhs and others with an `Arab' appearance being attacked 
for `looking like bin Laden'), suggests that racial and religious discrimination are more 
interlinked than Halliday's thesis allows. For example, the summary report on Islamophobia 
published by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia shortly after 9/11, 
indicated a rise in "physical and verbal threats being made, particularly to those visually 
identifiable Muslims, in particular women wearing the hijab" (Allen and Nielsen, 2002: 16). 
Despite variations in the number and correlation of physical and verbal threats directed at the 
Muslim population among the individual nation-states, one overarching feature among the 
fifteen European Union countries that emerged was the tendency for Muslim women to be 
attacked because of how the hijab signifies Muslim identity (ibid. 35). 
damage, and one fatal stabbing where the victim was accosted by attackers shouting `Talibän' (IHRC 
press release, 25 July, 2005). These criticisms are compounded by the astonishing finding that between 
2001 and 2002, instances of the `stop and search' of `Asians' (categorisations via religion are not kept 
for instances of `stop and search') increased in London by forty one per cent (Metropolitan Police 
Authority, 2004: 21), whilst figures for the national picture point to a twenty-five percent increase for 
the `stop and search' of people self-defining as 'other' (Home Office figures for stop and search 2003- 
4,2006: 24). The latter can include Muslims of Turkish, Arabic and North-African ethnic origin, 
amongst others, for while sixty eight per cent of the British Muslim population have a South-Asian 
background, the remaining minority are comprised of several `other' categorisations. 
24 For example, does hostility to Islam vis-A-vis hostility to all religion make one an Islamophobe? 
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The broader objection to Haliday's account, however, is that institutions such as Church 
of England denominational schools carry a theological element that, when not equally 
available to other faiths, elicits charges of discrimination (as discussed in chapter six). When 
allied, for example, with instances of lesser recognition afforded to Muslim employees to take 
time off from work for religious festivals, then institutional Islamophobia might become a 
legitimate charge if grounds for refusal are explicitly based upon an objection to making 
allowances for Islam in particular (as discussed in chapter five). 
.-ä _At 
the same time, however, it is important to recognise the insightful aspects of 
Halliday's thesis on anti-Muslim racism. These become apparent when we couple it to the 
dynamics of Robert Miles' racialization thesis. If we put to one side the important but, at 
times, reductive tendencies with respect to the role of migrant labour and capitalist 
exploitation as a causal factor for the racialization of minorities, and read it as referring to "a 
process of categorisation, a representational process of defining an Other (usually, but not 
exclusively) somatically" (Miles, 1989: 79), then we are left with a complementary analytical 
tool with which to examine contemporary manifestations of anti-Muslim sentiment. An 
example of how perceptions of Islamaphobia can affect Muslims identity is to be found in 
ethnographic research carried out by Lewis (1994: 178) when during the first Gulf War, he 
found that a Bradford upper school with a largely Muslim intake was overall "pro-Iraq". This 
was because, as Werbner (1994) has also found in her research in Manchester, it was evident 
that most people of Pakistani ethnic origin were sympathetic towards a Muslim country which 
they perceived to be subject to military aggression. As a "demonization of Islam" took place 
in local and national press, the youth perceived their communal identity to be under threat and 
therefore `closed ranks' on the issue with teachers and other non-Muslim students alike. Yet, 
throughout the same period in the same school, no more than two or three students prayed in 
an area set aside for prayer. The fact that their grievances did not translate into prayer, but 
instead heightened their sense of an `associational' identity, supports the distinction between 
Muslim and Islamic identities made earlier, namely that whilst the former can be seen as 
negotiated or not solely prescriptive, the latter are less so. 
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10. Local and global Muslim identities: ethnic, religious or `Rastafari'? 
These dynamics have been examined by Jessica Jacobson (1997,1998) in her 
ethnographic research amongst youth with Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds in East 
London. Her thesis begins by returning to Barth's (1969) argument that ethnic groups should 
be defined according to the boundaries that actors subjectively determine themselves, and not 
simply according to objective classifications based upon ascribed cultural features. She 
argues that although ethnic and religious cleavages can coincide with one another, they often 
offer contradictory modes of self definition. Specifically, she points to a greater tendency 
amongst these youth to emphasise a distinction between religion, culture and ethnicity as 
facets of identity to argue that 
... whereas ethnic 
boundaries are becoming increasingly permeable and cultural 
boundaries are (re-) negotiated, the religious boundaries are remaining clear cut and 
. pervasive and thus serve to protect and enhance attachments to 
Islam (1997: 240). 
The explanation she offers for this distinction develops from the way that ethnicity is 
understood as an attachment to tradition and custom intertwined with cultural practice. 
Ethnicity here is perceived as non-religious in origin. This allows youth of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi descent to distinguish between the universalism of religion and limited locality 
of cultures that migrated from South Asia with an older generation ('disparate loyalties from a 
disparate place') 25 At the same time, Islam, by and large, is central to their sense of who they 
are since 
... they affirm their 
belief in its teachings and regard it as something in relation to 
which they should orient their behaviour in all spheres of life and which therefore 
demands of them a self-conscious and explicit commitment (1997: 239). 
In comparison to their religious identity, Jacobson argues that ethnicity is more peripheral and 
is not understood as a basis from which to frame their experience of the world - she describes 
this as the "religion-ethnic culture distinction". She contrasts this with her second definition 
of "religion-ethnic origin distinction" which involves a perception of identity in terms of 
25 For those who were brought up in Pakistan and emigrated to Britain as adults, Islam was located in 
an oral tradition which was ultimately linked to life-cycle rituals. This form of Islam is seeped in rural 
traditions and inevitably influenced by non-Islamic traditions and arguably has more to do with the 
Pakistan they left behind than with contemporary Pakistan. 
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one's attachment to a place, whilst one's religious identity as a Muslim denotes belonging to a 
global community and commitment to a set of doctrines which transcend national boundaries. 
This then resurrects the idea of the Muslim ummah or `community of believers' (cf Sayyid, 
2000) and echoes Ali's (1992: 113 cited in Modood et al 1994) assertion that "the global 
appeal of intellectual Islam offers the possibility of a wider world to live in", particularly 
when enacted in the local community, since youth can use the political and intellectual 
teachings of Islam to argue and resist parental pressure (based upon an explicitly cultural 
understanding of Islam) as much 'as the pressures of racism and exclusion they experience 
from the majority group. One element in this process, according to Neilsen (1984), is the 
growing tendency for young people to reject certain customs from overseas that their parents 
have resurrected in their British localities. A significant factor for this, also noted by Neilsen, 
is the frequent encounter between Muslims with different ethnic backgrounds and cultural 
expressions, all of whom hold a valid claim on Islam. This leads to a continuous re-appraisal 
of what is legitimately Islamic in orientation: it does, as it were, localise the universal nature 
of Islam. 
Yet Jacobson's thesis is less nuanced than this since because she places ethnic identities 
in binary opposition to religious identities. In doing so she is not alone. Pnina Werbner 
(2004: 898-9), for example, has distinguished between `pure' and `impure' spheres of 
Pakistani diaspora identity in Britain and has argued that in opposition to increasingly 
anglicised South Asian cultural negotiations, Muslims in Britain have become problematised 
through their religious rather than ethnic identities 
Whereas Asians are seen to be integrating positively into Britain, contributing a 
welcome spiciness and novelty to British culture, Muslims are regarded as an alienated, 
problematic minority: their mosques are depicted as hotbeds of radicalism and anti- 
western rhetoric... The tension between the two discourses, pure and impure, is 
necessarily also a source of friction in British Pakistani internal politics between those 
espousing pragmatic integration and those articulating a more oppositional, 
exclusionary politics. 
It is by no means clear, however, whether it is empirically sustainable to maintain Werbner's 
assertion that those positioned in the `pure' (Muslim) sphere are relatively oppositional or 
exclusionary, for it may also be the case that they espouse an equally inclusive notion of 
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public or national identity as those in the `impure' (South Asian) sphere. In beginning to 
think about both these issues, we should not mistake the acceptance of minority cultural 
expressions by a mainstream orthodoxy, as being the sole yard-stick of minority integration, 
particularly since the cultural specificities of one minority identity might not be commodified 
or consumed in the same way as another. 26 What is being argued then- is that Werbner risks 
confusing the two separate issues of (i) how certain forms of difference may or may not lend 
themselves to synthesis, and (ii) whether certain forms of difference are exclusionary by their 
own logic rather than circumstance (i. e. in the face of majority contempt). This repeats the 
distinction between multiculture and communitarian conceptions of multiculturalism set out 
in chapter one, and also negates the potential of Du Bosian synthesis by, like Taylor (chp. 2 
sec. 4.4), endorsing an exclusive conception of plural-Britishness and hyphenated identities. 
Moreover, both Jacobson and Werbner overemphasise the distinctions between "religion- 
ethnic culture/origin" and "pure/impure" spheres. This is because, in contradiction to its 
Barthesian inheritance, recent social anthropology has often overlooked the extent to which 
religious communal identities can themselves inform ideas of ethnicity. For example, 
subscribing to a Muslim identification is not necessarily synonymous with religiosity alone, 
but relates to a transformation of ethnic identity within the context of British society. As 
Samad's (1997) research amongst young people of Pakistani descent in Bradford highlights, 
modern interpretations of Islam are accessed in various mediums and, according to Samad, 
encourages a move away from the oral tradition of Islam that still regulates the lives of the 
older generation who arrived as immigrants. Complementing this shift in identification is the 
move away from briaderi or regional-based identifications, toward a Muslim identification 
which glosses over the sectarianism that permeates Islam for the older generation. As a result, 
identification with Pakistan, or a particular region of Pakistan, becomes less significant and 
`Muslim' becomes increasingly prominent 
26 A good example of this tendency can be found can be found in the section on divided loyalties in 
chapter four (sec 4.1-4.2). 
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Through a burgeoning body of literature in English, the youth can also lever open a 
space on generational issues. In gravitating towards a universal Islam, and glossing 
over the differences that have been so divisive to the older generation, youth of 
Pakistani descent in Bradford can be seen to have assimilated since this only happens 
when - paradoxically - they become more British. 
This is evident in the FNS data (Modood et al, 1997) mentioned earlier, but is contested by 
authors such as Alexander (2000,2002) for whom current interests in Muslim identity have 
informed a public discourse that is heightened by both concerns of Islamaphobia and the fear 
of `Islamic radicalism'. Both of which have "... concurred in the positioning of Islam at the 
centre of political and academic discourse as Public Enemy Number One - Britain's Most 
Unwanted, as it were" (Alexander, 2000: 14). 
Alexander recounts the splintering of the `black' consensus, most notably in relation to 
the Rushdie affair, as leading to increasingly "inward looking" and "self-defining difference" 
which serves to create "seemingly insurmountable boundaries" between various minority 
ethnic communities in Britain: "Difference may be in, it may be all there is, but it is applied 
differentially to communities and often obscures more than it reveals" (Alexander, 2002: 
553). The splintering of difference along religious lines has, moreover, reproduced 
perceptions of a `culture conflict', with young men being portrayed as caught between the 
ethnicity of their parental culture and the universal, self-definition derived from Islam. This 
religious identification, she argues, is often presented as a defensive reaction to forms of 
racism and hostility that cannot be rationalised with reference to their parental culture 
`Like Rastafari before it, Islam thus stands as a psychological barricade behind which 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi young people (usually young men) can hide their lack of 
self-esteem and proclaim a fictional strength through the imagination of the umma 
(Alexander, 2002: 553). 
The general point being made is that such perspectives lead to a "reification" of essentialized 
and problematised identities, articulated in an increased concern about "the Muslim 
underclass". This serves to locate Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities as the lowest point 
in a hierarchy of the deprived, and positions "Muslims as the unwilling and resentful heirs of 
a culture of disadvantage, and as the perpetrators of burgeoning `Asian' criminality" 
(Alexander, 2002: 15). 
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11. Muslim `group' identity: essentialism and hybridity 
Alexander's thesis is threefold. Firstly she accuses writers like Modood of advancing a 
reified Muslim subjectivity which, having shifted the debate on minority identity in Britain 
away from a black/white duality, succeeds in creating a new Muslim/non-Muslim duality. 
Secondly, she argues that the outcome of focusing explicitly upon a Muslim identity, will 
serve to dislocate minority ethnic groups from their "shared structural positionings" and 
common experiences of racism. Finally, she argues that the long term outcome of this trend 
is likely to involve a move away from the idea of identity as something that is fluid and 
malleable, to something that is no longer allowed to be `hybrid' because it is difficult to 
mobilise around heterogeneity. 
Taking each point in turn, and as witnessed in the Barthesian n-account of ethnicity, the 
idea of a group intrinsically involves some degree of positioning within and between the sites 
of `boundaries'. These are not unproblematic, can be multiple, and may be informed by 
common experiences of racism; sexuality; socio-economic positions; geographical locality 
and so forth. In this sense, all groups are socially constructed, and it is clear that people tend 
to associate with those with whom they perceive to share some affinity. One of the reasons 
that it is important to recognise Muslim identity as a `group' identity is that this is how it is 
understood by Muslims themselves. For the purposes of research, therefore, the category of 
`Muslim' becomes no less valid than categories such as `working class', `woman', `black' or 
`youth'. As Modood (1994: 9) has argued, it is inconsistent to protest against the use of 
`Muslim' as an analytical category simply because it has the same "dialectical tension 
between specificity and generality" that all group categories are subject to. This is not to 
`essentialize' or `reify' the category of Muslim as Alexander charges, however, since it can be 
"as internally diverse as `Christian' or `Belgian' or `middle-class', or any other category 
helpful in ordering our understanding of contemporary Europe; but just as diversity does not 
lead to the abandonment of social concepts in general, so with that of `Muslim"'(Modood, 
2003: 100). 
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Alexander's second objection, however, is less valid. As the preceding discussion has 
highlighted, "shared structural positionings" and "common experiences of racism" are no 
longer sufficient grounds upon which to examine the experience of Muslims in Britain alone. 
The discussion of Islamophobia makes this clear. In fact, one of the reasons that Muslim 
identity should be recognised differently from that of `Black', `Asian' or `Minority group', is 
that Muslims are subject to discrimination and exclusion as a group, and so the terms of 
protest against discrimination both refuse and accept the group identities upon which 
discrimination has been based. This is lucidly captured by Maleiha Malik (2005: 50) 
If Muslims see their sense of identity reflected in legal and political institutions, and 
they see their concerns being taken seriously by these institutions, they are more likely 
to comply with the obligations of these institutions without feeling coerced. Therefore, 
in order for Muslims to feel that their concerns are being accurately reflected, it is vital 
that policy makers and legal and political institutions recognise Muslims as a distinct 
social group. 
This attends to the prospect, set out in chapter one, that institutions and social practices 
attribute a minority status to some inherent qualities in the minority group, as if those 
qualities were the reason rather than the rationalization for not taking their sensibilities into 
account. As the previous chapter delineated from Du Bois, this would mean that the subject 
group are more likely to be disenfranchised than alienated so that it is not so much cultural 
difference j`erence as cultural disfranchisement that would shape their struggle i. e. demands for 
incorporation necessarily invoke the differences that have denied incorporation in the first 
place. This does not, however, require us to roll back to an understanding of identity as 
necessarily hostile to `hybridity'. Concepts of `hybridity', and related ideas of `syncretism', 
`creolisation', `melange', have all been widely deployed in discussions of racial and ethnic 
identifications (Bhabha, 1994; Gilroy, 1987; Werbner and Modood, 1997). Similarly, the 
concept of diaspora, although not at first sight necessarily associated with processes of 
mixing, can also be deployed to the same kind of effect, evoking a context or dynamic which 
creates an overlapping heterogeneity (Gilroy, 1993; Brah, 1996). In this sense, hybridity is 
understood as a powerful counter to accounts of primordial, essential or exclusive identities, 
either in ethnic, national, religious or racial settings, and are seen as subversive and 
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dislocating of entrenched categories, particularly in post-colonial contexts. Such accounts 
assume, however, that to talk of an essential identity is necessarily exclusivist and, as 
empirically demonstrated in the case study of Muslim schools in the chapter six, fails to 
appreciate the differences between `strategic essentialism' (Spivak, ' 1988) as a positive type of 
collective self-identification, and `reification' which silences differences (Werbner, 1997: 
229). Alexander seems to have difficulty making this distinction, and so is blind to the 
broader argument that the focus upon `British-Muslims' represents a recognition of "complex 
forms of Britishness" emphasised by British Muslims themselves who are "attempting to 
politically negotiate a place in an all-inclusive nationality" (Modood, 1998: 389). In this way 
we can hope to "retain a description of social group differentiation, but without fixing or 
reifying groups" (Young 2000: 89) so that the following statement by Sher Azam -a 
community leader in Bradford - shouldn't strike us as extraordinary 
We call ourselves British Muslims. Whether or not anybody acknowledges us or 
accepts us, we have decided that this is our country, this is our home and this is where 
our children and grandchildren have decided to live (quoted in Lebor, 1997: 129). 
12. Conclusions 
So where does this leave our discussion of Muslim-consciousness? Firstly, it suggests 
that the literal and prescriptive accounts, surveyed at the beginning of this chapter, do not 
satisfactorily explain the adoption and promotion of Muslim identities per se. That is to say 
that where the common and defining factor is a reference to Islam, this permits enormous 
scope to continually imagine and re-imagine what a Muslim identity entails. Does this mean 
that it is incoherent for Muslim identities to be articulated as simultaneously valid but 
competing ways of expressing hopes, beliefs and desires? The argument offered here is that 
expressions of Muslim identity in all their contested variety cannot be dismissed simply 
because they are subject to the same dialectical tensions - between the general and the 
particular - as other categories (Modood, 1994). As Sayyid (2000: 40,48) reminds us 
... the 
formation of all identities is relational and exclusionary. Identities based on 
faith, gender, class, culture (or whatever) all have this exclusionary and relational 
logic... sometimes, the critique of essentialism has the effect of turning all social 
identities into facades... all social identities are heterogeneous since they do not have 
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an essence that can guarantee their homogeneity... but one should not confuse the 
existence of social identities as being necessitated by some essence... The idea that 
unless there is total agreement among Muslims it is impossible to think of a Muslim 
presence, would suggest that a collective is only possible under conditions of 
unanimity. 
Conceptually, Muslim collectivities can be theorised by the sorts of groupings elaborated in 
ideas of ethnicity, including Barthian accounts of boundary maintenance. This is important 
because it begins to explain how subscribing to a Muslim identification is not necessarily 
synonymous with religiosity alone, but relates to a transformation of ethnic identity within 
the context of British society. For example, the existence or prevalence of Muslim identity 
might be assessed by whether there is strong, moderate, weak or no attachment to the sites of 
boundaries understood as structuring Muslim behaviour. This might include orthodox 
activities such as collective worship or adherence to ritual, but also behaviour deemed Islamic 
by those partaking in it but not expressly derived from a spiritually prescriptive one alone. 
This might include becoming involved in electoral politics or setting out to educate children 
by running schools. At the same time, it is important to remember that these behavioural 
norms need not provide the foundations for attitudinal expressions of Muslim group 
membership or vice versa. This is relevant because, as the FNS data reports, the use of labels 
and the willingness to associate oneself with groups on a general level can inform patterns of 
associational identities that equally harbour a "capacity to generate community activism and 
political campaigns", and so should not be seen as weak simply because they emerge in a 
"mixed form" (Modood et al, 1997: 337). All of this means that the subjective criterion is 
preferred over the objective since, as discussed in relation to the debates and reactions to the 
Rushdie Affair, ' expressions of identity remain situational and can become more pronounced 
at some points and less at others. To understand them requires inquiry into the ways people 
see themselves and seek to be recognised. However, although this subjective element is 
crucial, the adoption of Muslim identity is not reducible to an instance of individual choice. 
For the reasons outlined above, the framing of Muslim identity in contemporary Britain is not 
free of external pressure, objectification and racialisation. That is to say, cultural racism and 
Islamophobia seek to degrade and vilify both the civilisational heritage in the abstract, and 
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the physicality of Muslims as the subject. Thus a Muslim appearance, whether or not the 
bearer is in fact Muslim, becomes a reviled site of contempt, and a signifier for all things 
Muslim or Islamic. 
This leads to the second broad conclusion, which is that earlier political formulations 
have been instrumental in recognising and protecting identities that are equally unstable, 
contested or seemingly dependent upon `choice', i. e. categorisations of racial and ethnic 
minorities generally, including Jewish and Sikh identities. This thesis argues that constructed 
hierarchies of legitimate or illegitimate difference should not be mistaken as a natural order 
of things. Such normative grammars of involuntary identities are obviously disrupted by the 
emergence of Muslim identities which seek all the benefits and protections afforded to other 
minority identities. These identities are neither passive objects of racism nor frozen 
articulations tied to their country of origin. They have emerged in Britain as an articulation 
of Muslim-consciousness. What this thesis addresses next is how these forms of Muslim- 
consciousness relate to cases of Muslim mobilisations for certain forms of civic status, and 
whether we should talk about the British Muslim experience in terms of the double 
consciousness discussed in the previous chapter. It is important to recognise that these 
arguments also contain discursive dimensions that are a central and not a minor feature. To 
explore what is meant by this, the next chapter examines the representation of Muslims in 
public and media commentary. This includes a discourse analysis of the salient themes 




`Seeing oneself through external narratives' - Muslims in Public and media 
discourse 
1. Introduction 
As chapter two illustrated through his discussion of the veil and the construction of the self, 
the manner in which minorities are publicly represented is integral to Du Bois' account of double 
consciousness. That external narratives on minority identity impinge upon the sorts of 
consciousness minorities experience, is a concern captured in his protest that "our worst side has 
been so shamelessly emphasised that we are denying that we ever had a worst side [so that] in all 
sorts of ways we are hemmed in" (1903: 127). This is why Du Bois encourages the cultivation of 
a positive public representation of minorities, so that they might transcend the `peculiar sensation' 
that they are indeed `a problem'. For these reasons public and media discourses can make a 
relevant contribution to the sorts of civic status that minorities experience. An inquiry, therefore, 
into these currents might contribute something meaningful to our specific concern with Muslim- 
consciousness in Britain. With this in mind, the purpose of the present chapter is to explore some 
of the ways in which Islam and Muslims are negatively portrayed in public and media discourse, 
and how some British-Muslims have responded by representing themselves through a 
proliferation of Muslim media sources. 
It is worth noting at the outset that Islam and Muslims in Britain have only relatively recently 
achieved the sort of prominence accepted as a familiar reality today. Adopting a similar 
timeframe to that spelling out the emergence of Muslim-consciousness in the previous chapter, 
Poole (2002: 3) describes how in recent years Muslims have moved from "the margins of 
coverage in the British news media" and from being a "distant object in the consciousness of the 
majority of the British people" to now forming "an uncomfortable familiarity. " She continues: 
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"Islam is suddenly `recognizable' but it is the form in which Islam is known that is of concern 
here". Indeed, and whilst the manner in which Islam might be recognised is various for there are 
multiple ways in which it can be conceived (chp. 3 sec 2-2.2. ), an inquiry into salient negative 
discourses, so that we can examine how and in what ways the `Muslim problem' rests or departs 
from what we know of Muslim minorities in Britain, will explore the following views: (i) that 
Muslims curtail freedom of speech; (ii) are self-segregating; and (iii) are ultimately disloyal and, 
of course, potentially violent vis-ä-vis terrorism. In the same way that the case-studies of Muslim- 
consciousness and discrimination legislation in chapter five and mobilisations for Muslim schools 
in chapter six include some comparison with other minorities, a similar attempt will be made here 
through reference to Jewish minorities at an earlier period of their settlement in Britain. The 
reasons for this are more clearly set out in the discussion when comparisons are made, but include 
the fact that Jewish groups, like Muslims after them, have formed both racial and religious 
minorities. 
2. Muslims and Free Speech 
The previous chapter considered the issue of cultural racism and Islamophobia (sec. 9-9.1), 
and which are returned to in chapter five, to examine the ways in which anti-Muslim 
discrimination are or are not recognised within current anti-discrimination formulae. As 
discussed at length in the next chapter (chp. 5 sec. 3), one example touches upon the overlapping 
issues of Racial Equality and religious discrimination to be found in proposed Incitement to 
Religious Hatred legislation. Indeed, the next chapter details that when the creation of this 
offence was first proposed in a 2001 Parliamentary Bill, it became subject to intense public and 
media debate, a factor which both advocates and opponents have cited as critical to the eventual 
introduction of much weaker legislation by Parliament (see comments by Cohen in chp. 5 sec. 3; 
comments by Toynbee in Meer, 2007b, and also Modood, 2006 and Sacranie, 2006). One of the 
most striking features of this public and media commentary was the dissonance between Muslim 
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groups who argued that the recourse to law was necessary at a time of increased objectification, 
intimidation, and incitement to hatred, and the mainstream media which presented it as an 
example of Muslim incompatibility vis-ä-vis British culture and tradition (in ways reminiscent of 
the discourses evidenced during the Rushdie Affair see chp. 3 sec. 8). 
Contrary to viewing it as an attempt to incorporate an unimpaired Muslim-consciousness into 
the public sphere, it was argued that Muslims were seeking to put their beliefs beyond scrutiny, 
something premised upon a hermeneutic separation of the involuntary and voluntary identities of 
race and religion. A second charge revolved around the extent to which the government was 
thought to be compromising hard won freedoms by cynically placating `angry Muslims' who 
were dissatisfied with foreign policy. A third and dominant discourse characterised the proposed 
legislation as something sought by extremists in their broader project of Islamising Britain. 
Indeed, this last theme drew upon and overlapped with others surrounding `Muslim and Islamic 
Terrorism' in the manner unpacked in the following sections. 
2.1. `Race' and religion are different phenomena 
One of the key objections to the proposed incitement to religious hatred legislation was captured 
in the actor and comedian Rowan Atkinson's signature statement made throughout various 
incarnations of the bill: "To criticise a person for their race is manifestly irrational and ridiculous 
but to criticise their religion, that is a right" (quoted in The Liverpool Daily Post, 7 December 
2004). This is because "[t]here is an obvious difference between the behaviour of racist 
agitators... and the activities of satirists and writers who may choose to make comedy or criticism 
of religious belief, practices or leaders, just as they do with politics. It is one of the reasons why 
we have free speech" (quoted in The Sunday Times, 4 December, 2004). Whilst there is little here 
that might have been prohibited through the proposed instruments, the operating assumption is 
that satire and critique - as opposed to incitement to hatred - would be quelled, whilst the 
possibility that the very same `racist agitators' might use religion, as previously demonstrated 
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(chp. 5 sec 2.3-3), to incite hatred appears to have entirely escaped Atkinson's distinction. A 
cruder form of this logic was invoked by the commentator and liberal activist Joan Smith, who, 
writing in the centrist-libertarian Independent newspaper, argued: "Race is a biological fact, and 
it is wrong to hate people because they belong to a particular ethnic group; religion is a set of 
ideas, voluntarily adopted, which may or may not be offensive to members of other faiths" 
(Independent, 8 December, 2004). The conflation of the concept of ethnicity with that of race is 
particularly interesting in this quotation and is employed in a way which denies that either 
concept is socially constructed or in any way complex. Indeed, the uncritical recitation of racial 
biology in protestations that race and ethnicity are somehow concrete and inescapable facts which 
represent truly `involuntary' identities, whilst religion is entirely socially constructed and 
voluntary, has been a common tendency amongst a range of commentators on the subject. For 
example, it is a technique employed by the former Conservative MP and political sketch writer, 
Matthew Parris who, in the liberal-conservative paper, The Times, argued that "... with race 
relations, the intention is to protect individuals, not ideas, from attack. The difficulty here is that 
(broadly speaking) race defines a human group, rather than an idea, so racial attacks are almost by 
their very nature hateful towards individuals and therefore easily criminalised. Religion, however, 
is essentially an idea, not a group" (The Times, 11 December, 2004). The view that this 
legislation fell outside the Racial Equality paradigm was most trenchantly put by Polly Toynbee, 
of the liberal-left Guardian, who argued that she reserved the `right' to affront religious 
minorities on the basis of their faith 
[I]t is now illegal to describe an ethnic group as feeble-minded. But under this law 
I couldn't call Christian believers similarly intellectually challenged without risk of 
prosecution. This crystallises the difference between racial and religious abuse. 
Race is something people cannot choose and it defines nothing about them as 
people. But beliefs are what people choose to identify with [... ] The two cannot be 
blurred into one - which is why the word Islamophobia is a nonsense (emphasis 
added) (10 June, 2005, The Guardian). 
There are several implications to Toynbee's position that return us to the discussion of 
`voluntary' and `involuntary' identities set out in chapter three (sec. 2.3) and five (sec. 2.2), and 
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which can be elucidated by considering the following analogy. Suppose that a Jewish person 
could `pass' for being non-Jewish. Where they might be subject to discrimination on the grounds 
of their Jewishness they should, according to Toynbee's logic, use this option so that they are (a) 
less offensive to others and (b) less offended by others. In other words, Toynbee's logic dictates 
that those subject to discrimination or hostility should choose, where possible, to change their 
identity in order to avoid discrimination. This, of course, invites the tyranny of the majority and 
contravenes every liberal conception of autonomy, freedom of conscience and expression, 
considered in chapter six (sec 7.1-8), or which Toynbee herself seeks to uphold. Yet, such views 
are openly displayed in her discussion of Muslims, views that include her unrepentant statement 
that: "I am an Islamophobe and proud of it" (Independent. 23 October, 1997). 
2.2. Designed to placate angry labour Muslims 
The discursive exclusion of Muslims from the -Racial Equality paradigm ran parallel to 
accusations that the government was only considering the legislation because it was "[t]errified of 
losing the Muslim vote as a result of the Iraq war" (McKinstry, The Express, 22 September, 
2005). For example, Michael Burleigh of the right-wing Daily Telegraph characterised it as 
... a cynical attempt 
to claw back Muslim support for New Labour that has been 
squandered through the war in Iraq. [... ] Those claiming to speak for the Muslim 
community have played to the traditional Left-wing imagination by conjuring up 
the myth of `far-Right extremism'. In reality, evidence for `Islamophobia' - as 
distinct from a justified fear of radical Islamist terrorism or a desire to protect our 
freedoms, institutions and values from those who hold them in contempt - is 
anecdotal and slight (9 December, 2004). 
The claim that the Labour government were only pursuing the legislation in order to protect votes 
may well have some truth in it although, as chapter five details, the offence was first proposed in 
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001, before the Iraq War. Whatever the underlying 
factors motivating the government, an acknowledgement of the political context in which the 
offence was initially introduced should not undermine the original argument in favour, nor the 
continuing requirement and legitimacy of, such legislation. To be sure, and as chapter five 
clearly demonstrates, the remaining discrepancy in the level of protection and scope for redress 
continues to inform Muslim complaints of inequality (chp. 5 sec. 6). Nevertheless, and in 
agreement with Toynbee, Burleigh dismisses Islamophobia as a myth and rationalizes hostility to 
Muslims on the grounds of self-preservation. He is supported in this view by Simon Heifer of the 
Daily Mail 
The result of this politically correct desire to pander to one small section of society 
will be that everyone will have their freedoms constrained. Moreover-you can be 
sure that the law would not lead to the appearance of Muslim extremists in court 
for attacking the majority religion of Christianity. I cannot see why we should 
make their religion immune from our intellectual or humorous assault (11 
December, 2004). 
Hefer's friend (we) / enemy (they) distinction operates on the understanding that Muslims do not 
form part of the greater British constituency that shares with "the majority religion of 
Christianity" a stake in the national space. These claims and rhetorical techniques perfectly 
illustrate the way in which Du Bois characterised the operation of the veil, in that the majority do 
not see anything other than their own mastery - defined in this case as being a religious majority 
- when they look upon Muslim minorities. 
2.3. Extremists and freedom of speech 
The complaint that "extremists and fundamentalists will be the ones to use this law, rather 
than mainstream groups" was also made by senior barrister Neil Addison. For example, he 
claimed, "if a small Muslim group decides to bring a case against a Christian church in England, 
then everyone who reads about the case will blame all Muslims for it. This kind of action would 
cause resentment, and divisiveness" (quoted in the Lancashire Evening Post, 22 November, 
2004). On one level this was a very reasonable concern for the welfare of an already resented 
minority. On another it contributed to the view that 
[T]his new legislation is nothing to do with good race relations. It is solely based 
on the Government's eagerness to pander to Muslim fundamentalism, whose 
aggressive mentality treats even the mildest criticism as an outrage... No other 
religious group is demanding any change except the Muslims (McKinstry, ibid). 
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McKinstry's accusation that the proposed legislation constituted nothing less than a pandering to 
a Muslim aggressive mentality, is a characterisation which was stretched further by Toby Young 
of the Mail on Sunday, who, invoking the Rushdie Affair, rationalised the present issue in terms 
of a continuing thread of 'fundamentalism', since: "[T]hey've been lobbying for a change in the 
law to make it illegal to attack the Islamic religion ever since Salmon Rushdie published The 
Satanic Verses in 1988" (12 December, 2004). These words almost exactly parallel those spoken 
by the once staunch anti-racist, Dianne Abbot', who, during a Parliamentary debate stated 
The reason why we are troubled is that we remember when the clamour first arose for 
the protection of Islam as a religion, in the wake of publication of 'The Satanic 
Verses' when there were marches, book-burnings and demands for protection. The 
demand then was for a blasphemy law for Islam, and the demand now is for a 
blasphemy law for Islam (Hansard 21 June 2005, column 681). 
In not a dissimilar way, for Peter Kitchens, the proposed legislation threw into relief broader 
civilisational concerns, which conflated issues of difference with those of conquest. For, while 
"the idea of Islamic Britain may seem highly unlikely now... we should remember that Muslim 
armies came within an inch of talking Vienna in 1683 and were only driven from Spain in 1492" 
(The Daily Alai!, 2 Novermber, 2003). Such alarm is characteristic of a debate marked by a 
manifest mis-understanding of the issues, not least the idea that proposed legislation sought to 
protect a religion from critique. At times, the claims of these various commentators display a 
complete failure to interrogate the socially contingent aspects of racism and identity. Even more 
worryingly, much of the common sense argumentation in fact displays a much more malign 
characteristic in propagating the myth that Muslims have an enormous amount of influence and 
power to curtail freedom of speech with the broader aim toward the Islamisation of Britain. 
3. Importation or reference to European discourses 
To some extent this also reflects an importation of European discourses vis-ä-vis the 
`advanced' state of negative relations with Muslims on the Continent. For example, following the 
Danish newspaper J}"llands-Posten's publication of cartoons 'satirising' the Prophet Mohammed, 
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the ensuing fall-out across Europe was clearly presented in some mainstream quarters of the 
British press as a European-wide `clash of civilisations'. In this way Holland, for example, was 
referred to by one Sunday Times commentator as `the canary in the mine' 
Where Holland has gone, Britain and the rest of Europe are following. [... ] Holland 
- with its disproportionately high Muslim population - is the canary in the mine. Its 
once open society is closing, and Europe is closing slowly behind it. It looks, from 
Holland, like the twilight of liberalism... not least freedom of expression. All 
across Europe, debate on Islam is being stopped... and in Britain the government 
seems intent on pushing through laws that would make truths about Islam and the 
conduct of its followers impossible to voice (Murray, 26 February, 2006). 
Whilst these charactcrisations were more prevalent in centre-right publications, the view that the 
cartoons formed part of a broader continental problem was not localised to the centre-right. For 
example, Bruce Anderson of the Independent argued that 
The cartoons did not create the tension. They merely highlighted it. They have 
forced Europe to face a problem which most political elites would rather ignore, 
although it will be one of the major questions of the next few decades: How are we 
to achieve peaceful coexistence with Islam? (6 February, 2006). 
In more combative tcrms, the cartoons were described by the Daly Mail columnist Richard 
Littlejohn in a clash of civilisations rhetoric: 
... the publication or a couple of cartoons in Denmark has absolutely nothing to do 
with freedom of speech. This is war. [... ] In Holland, it was the murder of a Dutch 
filmmaker deemed guilty of showing insufficient respect to Islam. In Spain, it was 
the slaughter of hundreds of commuters in Madrid. In France, it is the routine 
desecration of Jewish graveyards and synagogues (Littlejohn, 7 February, 2006). 
These considerations, it is argued4 are more advanced on the continent than they are in the UK 
because "in Holland and Belgium, liberals have woken up to the fact that Muslims and Islam are 
not their ally. What will it take before their equivalents do the same here? " (Hitchens, 12 
February, 2006, Ala!! on Sunday). 
4. 'Islamic Terrorism' 
It is arguable that the most incendiary and combative opposition to preventing hate speech 
directed at Muslims drew upon salient currents that couple Islam and violence through the 
category of the 'Islamic Terrorism'. This is an analytically unhelpful category, because terms 
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such as 'terrorism', `extremism', 'fundamentalism' and `Islamism' tend to be highly contested 
and relational - and therefore valid only after careful qualification and contextual isation. 1 
However, it is increasingly common to find the portrayal of a seamless association between the 
two! This is an example of what Jackson (2006) has called a culturally embedded 'hard' 
discourse because so many other assumptions compound and reinforce it. One of these is that 
since Muslims and 'Islamic terrorists' are products of a fanatical strain of Islam, the violence that 
is committed by Muslims "evolves out of something inherent in the religion, rendering any 
Muslim a potential terrorist" (Pool, 2002: 4). Whilst some scholars go to great lenghts to argue 
that most Muslims consider violence and terrorism to be an egregious violation of their religion 
(see Haliday, 2003: 107), at the level of public discourse, attempts to de-couple this view are 
often dimissed as oversentive. Thus Tony Blair could recently argue that 
There is a new and virulent form of ideology associated with a minority of our 
Muslim community... let us not be foolish, in our desire not to cause offence.., it's 
daft to deny the fact that they justify their extremism by reference to religious 
belief (8 December, 2006). 
One of the arguments that this has given rise to is that 'moderate' Muslims must take the lead in 
fighting the extremism that underpins this 'Islamic terrorism'. For example, Baran (2005: 84) 
argues that a central counter-terrorism task is "to find ways of helping moderates win the 
theological and ideological civil war currently taking place within the Muslim world" (see also 
Hagqani, 2003). Similarly, hen the former Foreign Secretary Margaret Becket asked Muslims 
' This point is a convincingly made in Denoeux's (2002) argument that the term 'fundamentalism' is 
particularly misleading because of the connotations derived from its origins in early twentieth century 
American Protestantism, and so is not easily applied to Islam and Muslims. Despite the problematic nature 
of the term it remains the case that "fundamentalism is made flesh by drawing upon examples of 'Islamic 
Fundamentalism' [with the effect that) Islamic fundamentalism has become a metaphor for fundamentalism 
in general" (Sayyid. 1997: -7-8). In reality, the dividing line between such categories as `extremists' and 
`moderates' is not only context-specific, but also highly porous, constantly shifting and dependent upon 
subjective value judgements (Modood and Ahmed, 2007). 2 This section demonstrates how this is achieved discursively by taking "an image and set of terms [to] 
provide a basic model Nhich can be deployed again and again as the organising theme in a cumulative 
shaping of social perception" (Trew, 1979: 142). 3 See also his statement that "the security threat that this Islamic extremism poses is the government's 
primary responsibility". 'Prime Minister warns of continuing global terror threat', 5 March, 2004, available 
online at: httpJ/www. numbcriO. gov. uk/outputTagc546I. asp. 
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in Britain "to stand up to extremists" (quoted in The Guardian, 9 November, 2006), or when 
another government Minister, Patricia Hewitt, stated that Muslims "in positions of responsibility 
and leadership need to stand up against the propaganda and against the perverted form of 
extremist Islam that a dangerous minority in the Muslim community wants to impose" (quoted in 
the New Statesman, 25 July, 2005), they were rehearsing the views expressed by a range of other 
senior ministers including Tony Blair, Ruth Kelly (see chp. I sec. 5) and John Reid. 4 
4.1. Divides Lo; J: ies 
indeed, one of the most striking features of the public discussion surrounding Muslims in 
Britain since 9/11 is the extent to which it is marked by a concern over dual and divided loyalties 
and, even more so since 7/7, public perceptions of the threat posed from Muslim disloyalty, a fear 
that frames and reduces complex choices to binary options. This is affectively illustrated in the 
following readers' letters: 
Muslim soldiers have expressed their reluctance to fight in Iraq as they may kill 
fellow Muslims. The old question for these Muslims has become: who is sovereign: 
Queen (the State) or Mohamed? Unfortunately those who perpetrated the 7/7 
bombings clearly gave their answer to that question (Letters, June 10 2006, The 
Independent). 
Muslim fundamentalists feel no loyalty to Britain and the values of democratic and 
peaceful debate, because they adhere to an ideology which does not see any value 
in Britishness (Letters, The Times, 9 June 2006) 
Elsewhere in the press, and throughout the discussion of how such problems will endure, British 
Muslim leadership is accused of appeasing such militant views 
If foreign extremists are a major problem so, alas, are a minority of British-born 
Muslims who place religious fanaticism above any notion of loyalty to their 
country. In such circumstances one would hope for wise leadership within the 
Muslim community. Instead, the supposedly "moderate" Sir Igbal Sacranie pops 
Former home Secretary John Reid has encouraged Muslim parents to monitor their children for signs of 
radicalism: "There is no nice way of saying this... these fanatics are looking to groom and brainwash 
children, including your children, for suicide bombings. Grooming them to kill themselves in order to 
murder others. Look for the telltale signs now and talk to them before their hatred grows and you risk 
losing them forever. In protecting our families, we are protecting our community. " See 
http: /politics. guardian. co. ukAcrrorism/story`/0.1876869,00. html 
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up to say that the July 7 attacks would not have happened if we had not gone to war 
in Iraq. What will be the reason given for the next attack; that we are too pro 
Israeli, or too tough on Iran. This will not do. Those who feel blind loyalty to Islam 
and none whatever to Britain should go and live in an Islamic country and leave the 
rest of us in peace (Leader, Daily Express, 3 June 2006). 
At first sight it may seem that there is little mileage in searching for a comparator to this 
problematisation of British Muslim allegiances, in the way some comparisons could be made in 
the examination of Muslim mobilisations for Muslim schools or anti-discrimination legislation. 
However, if one moves away from the contemporary specificity and focuses upon processes of 
racialisation, a possible analogy reveals itself. 
This can be found in the way in which British Jews at around the turn of the century were 
associated with anarchism and Bolshevism? In these terms the analogy turns on the following 
poles according to which a religious minority is characterised as a potential threat: 
Jews/Anarchist Bolsheviks; Muslims/Islamic Terrorists. It is worth remembering, for example, 
that from the 1860s onwards there were a number of Anarchist uprisings and bombings 
throughout Europe, and London soon became a refuge for some of those involved in these 
s Between 1870 and 1914 some 120,000 European Jews migrated to Britain, and by WWI the Jewish 
population of Britain is estimated to have numbered around 300,000 (Gannet, 1973: 30; Pollins, 1982: 
130). Although this included destitute newcomers fleeing both the Pogroms and economic deprivation in 
Russia, it was a figure supplemented by established British Jews who, through organisations such as the 
Jewish Board of Guardians (JBG), Board of Deputies of British Jews, and Jewish Free Schools (JFS), 
operated as the main provision of welfare to these newcomers. Concentrated in areas of Leeds and the East 
End of London, these new migrants arrived with very little capital and possessions, and were considered 
visibly different to their settled British Jewish counterparts who were in some respects politically and 
socially established (Lipman, 1990: 48). For example, The Board of Deputies of British Jews had become 
institutionally incorporated as the representative body of Jews in Britain, especially under the leadership of 
Montefiore between 1835 and 1873 (ibid. 35). The prosperity of the Victorian period allowed established 
Jewish families to increasingly enter the upper echelons of politics and society, as epitomised, for example, 
in Rothschild becoming the first Jewish Member of Parliament, and these established families increasingly 
assumed a leadership in the complex voluntary bodies within the Jewish community (ibid. 17). 
Simultaneously, there was also evidence of the ability of Jewish leaders to make representations on behalf 
of Jews outside Britain, exemplified by Atontefiore's efforts to protect Jews in Syria and the Ottoman 
Empire. Where these interests overlapped with British foreign policy interests, such initiatives were 
successful (ibid. 37). Yet it was the same foreign policy issues that fuelled extensive and violent anti- 
Semitic episodes, especially during times of crisis. This was commonly presented as the potential threat 
posed by a settled and ostensibly assimilated Other seeking to subvert British interests, and is epitomised 
by what become known as the 'Bulgarian Affair'. This concerned Bejmamin Disraeli's support for the 
established British policy buttressing Turkey against Russia, and the way it was construed as evidence of 
his Jewish origins and bias (Holmes, 1979: 10-12). lt is also exemplified by the manner in which the Boer 
War was presented as a conflict pursued solely to protect Jewish financial interests in the mining industry, 
as explored below. 
117 
movements. While most anarchists were peaceful a tiny minority resorted to violent attacks such 
as the bombing of Greenwich Observatory in 1894 - described at the time as an "international 
terrorist outrage" because anarchist violence was an international phenomenon 
In Europe it claimed hundreds of lives, including those of several heads of 
government, and resulted in anti-terrorism laws. In the siege of Sidney Street in 
London in 1911, police and troops confronted east European Jewish anarchists. 
This violent confrontation in the heart of London created a racialised moral panic 
in which the %hole Jewish community was stigmatised. It was claimed that London 
was `seething' with violent aliens, and the British establishment was said to be "in 
a state of denial" (Malik, 2 February, 2007). 
Long before the "Londonistan" (Phillips, 2006) thesis characterised the capital city as a hot-bed 
of 'Islamic terrorists', it was East End Jews who were said to pose an inassimilable threat. The 
Evening News (22 May 1891), for example, stated that "[t]he advance of Socialistic and 
anarchical opinion in London is commensurate with the increased volume of foreign 
immigration. " Areas in which relatively high numbers of Jews settles in the East End of London 
were referred to as 'colonies', apparently "swarming with socialists and Anarchists of every type 
and almost invariably a Jewish immigrant" (ibid. quoted in Holmes, 1979). During conscription 
at the time of the First World War, Jews were unwilling to align themselves with a Czarist Russia 
that had been responsible for the pogroms. Yet, at the same time, public discourses were widely 
presenting Russian socialism as the ideology of 'the Jews'. As Holmes (1979: 208) recounts 
In common with the Britons, a central stress was placed upon Britain and the 
British Empire as the repositories of Christian civilisation and it was this system 
which was believed to be under attack from Jewish influences... while the 
expression of this fear varied to some extent according to the writer, it was often 
linked to Jewish involvement with Bolshevism. In the course of such discussions - 
which like any other form of socialism was regarded as an alien creed - could be 
described as nothing less than an attempt to gain world primacy in line with the 
prophecies contained in The Protocols. 
In the words of S. II. Jeyes, nearly all Jews were "politically unfit to be suddenly transplanted 
into those democratic institutions for which we have adapted ourselves by a long course of self- 
governing liberty" (quoted in Garrard 1992: 53). Furthermore, Jews were also characterised as 
preying upon freedom of speech and other liberties in the manner that Muslims were described 
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in the previous sections. Indeed the connection with the contemporary representation of a clash 
of civilisations seems striking. Connolly (2005: 6) makes precisely this point 
The cold war generated McCarthyism as an extreme response to threats that the 
Soviet Union posed to Christian faith and capitalism together. The terrorism of Al 
Qaeda, in turn generates new fears and hostilities, and priorities. The McCarthyism 
of our day, if it arrives, will connect internal state security to an exclusionary 
version of the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Such discursive linkages were evident during and after 1917 as the Civil War in Russia pitched 
Bolshevik and British interests against one another. Under the ownership of Lord Northcliffe, 
The Times was implicated in this discourse by, amongst other things, underpinning its critique of 
communism with reference to a `Jewish-Bolshevik' conspiracy. What is of most interest here is 
the intentional use of religious references and the conflation between religion and terrorism. For 
example, the projection of a Jewish vengeance via Bolshevism informed The Times' accusation 
that those who supported peace with the Bolsheviks at the Paris peace conference of 1919 were 
doing so because they were Jewish. This campaign culminated in the publication of The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion by The Times alongside an article entitled `The Jewish Peril' (8 
May, 1920 reproduced in Kaddish, 1992: 31). 
It is helpful to compare past similarities to current public and media discourse which 
assimilates the threat of terror with anti-Muslim sentiment, in the way that Jews became the 
common denominator in anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism. The fact that such similar trends 
are visible in the anti-Semitism of the early twentieth century and the explicit anti-Muslim 
sentiments in circulation now, suggest that the distinctions between `racial' and religious 
categories are less impervious than current formulations of civil and criminal legislation allows. 
Indeed, it is a recognition of this claim that has facilitated certain protections for Jewish 
minorities in the past. However, as chapter five reviewed, this recognition has not yet been 
expanded to afford Muslim minorities today the same level of protection. 
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4.2. Inassimilable & problematic 
This last point might be drawn out further by considering the ways in which current 
conceptions of Muslim cultural dysfunction are presented as explanations for what is described as 
`Islamic terrorism'. Indeed, some commentators have argued that Muslims are inherently 
problematical because they are incapable of making certain trans-cultural changes 
When a generation of Lenny Henry and Meera Syals made it possible to 
invite others to laugh with them about their own communities, those 
communities entered into the canon of Britishness. [... ] ... the most 
dangerous divide now is in culture - and that means Muslim. British 
Muslims arrested last week as terror suspects had families as British as 
Meera Syal's-yet culturally they inhabit another universe. (Toynbee, 7 April 
2004, The Guardian). 
Whilst, as we saw in chapter three (sec 10), Werbner (2004) draws a more nuanced distinction 
between anglicized and religious South-Asian diasporas, The Guardian columnist, Polly 
Toynbee, presents Muslims as particularly problematic because they cannot ridicule themselves, 
and this denies them entry `into the canon of Britishness'. In considering this claim, we should 
be careful not to mistake the acceptance of minority cultural expressions by a mainstream 
orthodoxy as being the sole yard-stick of minority integration, particularly since the cultural 
specificities of one minority identity might not be commodified or consumed in the same way as 
another. This returns us to the different types of multiculturalism discussed in chapter one (sec 
1.7. ), and by reflecting on these different concepts, we can see that Toynbee is confusing the issue 
of how certain forms of difference may or might not lend themselves to synthesis, with the 
separate issue of whether certain forms of difference are exclusionary by their own logic rather 
than circumstance (i. e. in the face of majority contempt). 
As a form of pathologising, this represents one of the key techniques within rhetorical 
argumentation strategies that present a series of general assumptions about Muslim communities 
in a way that belies any variation within this group. Without any regard for the contingent and 
ever-renegotiated nature of Britishness (Gilroy, 1987), Toynbee disqualifies British Muslims 
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from it. It is a tendency she shares with Charles Moore who, in the following extract, subscribes 
to an equally revealing fatalism 
Once there are Islamic financial institutions, how long will it be before Muslims 
insist that the state and business direct all their monetary dealings with Muslims 
through these institutions (boycotting businesses with Jewish connections en 
route)? How long before Muslims, extending the logic of their concentration in 
places like Bradford and Leicester, seek to establish their own law within these 
areas, the germ of a state within a state? And how diverse would such a state be? 
(21 August, 2004, The Daily Telegraph). 
Moore not only emphasises an extreme example of many potential outcomes, but does so in a 
way that misleads the audience into believing that such an outcome is inevitable. Holmes (1979: 
20) has suggested that similar techniques were used to suggest Jewish communities desired self- 
segregation and were attempting to achieve these subversive ends through the malign exercise of 
Jewish social, political and financial power. This was particularly true of the newer Jewish 
immigrants who were attributed a degree of inflexibility derived from their orthodoxy. The 
practice of working on Sundays, for example, was presented as un-English (Gartner, 1973: 52), 
and the ensuing opposition often reflected a rank and file anti-Semitism evidenced in the words of 
union leader Ben Tillet, in the official Independent Labour Party (ILP) paper Labour Leader 
If getting on is the most desirable thing in this earth then the Jew, as the most 
consistent and determined money grabber we know is worthy of the greatest 
respect. That his money grabbing is not universally respected only proves that the 
bulk of civilised nations, even now, do not believe in the commercialistic idea of 
clean hands and blood-stained money (19 December 1894, quoted in Cohen: 1985: 
76). 
In the present context, the unwillingness to uncritically conform to secular liberal values is 
equally salient and is being construed as the greatest obstacle facing Muslim integration. In both 
cases there emerges a tendency toward malign exaggeration of religious and cultural customs, 
which is at a remove from the reality of these groups' actual social, economic and political power. 
For example, both numerically and in terms of social, political, and economic power, Jewish 
East-Enders were, for all intents and purposes, relatively powerless. Yet, they were portrayed as 
exerting enough power to be able to carve out a `new Jerusalem' on British soil. Similarly, the 
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topic of Muslims and Islamic law, or Shari'a, is often used to exaggerate a potential threat. As 
Richard Littlejohn of the Daily Mail bemoans 
There must be no more concessions, no special treatment, no more apologies for 
perceived slights for which we are not responsible. Otherwise where does it end? 
Will we all have to give up alcohol, will all women have to wear the jilbab, will 
Britain become a place where everything stops for prayers, simply to satisfy 
Muslim sensibilities? (10 February, 2006). 
This was exemplified by the incredibly sensationalist reportage of the Policy Exchange's (2007) 
report on Muslim social attitudes - `Living Apart Together'. This generated an avalanche of 
alarming headlines from broadsheets and tabloids across the political spectrum. The Sun told its 
readers that `Islam kids 'reject UK" whilst the normally fair minded Independent uncritically 
adopted Policy Exchange's official line in reporting that "Young Muslims are 'more militant". 
The Daily Mail went further in characterising Muslim youth as `A Generation of Outsiders' 
whilst The Daily Telegraph rounded it up by reporting that "40% want Sharia law in Britain". 
One of the astonishing tendencies displayed throughout this reportage was an uncritical 
acceptance of the findings from a think-thank that has an explicit political agenda. Michael Gove, 
the Conservative MP and author of the book Celsius 7/7 - How the West's Policy of Appeasement 
Has Provoked Fundamentalist Terror and What Has to Be Done Now, is a founding chairperson, 
Charles Moore is another key figure, and the report's lead author, Munira Mirza, is a long time 
critic of Muslims and Race Equality. 
The report itself confirmed that younger Muslims are more religiously observant than their 
parents. Thus 37 percent of their sample of 16 to 24 yr olds would like to see more aspects 
Shar'ia law in Britain, and that this is roughly twice as many as a sample their parents' age. Yet 
it is arguable, for example, that the vast majority of people who describe themselves as Muslim in 
Britain already subscribe to Shar'ia by fasting during Ramadan, eating Halal food, donating to 
charity, observing prayers, celebrating Eid and so forth. Whilst there are undoubtedly aspects of 
Shar'ia that sanction capital punishment, these form only very small part of a vast corpus and are 
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no less subject to debate than those non-Shar'ia practices of capital punishment currently 
exercised in some liberal-democracies. But these qualifications were omitted in both the report's 
analysis as well as the press coverage which characterised British Muslims who aspire toward 
some Shar'ia as medieval (indeed the Daily Star took its readers back a million years to the 
paleolithic era with the headline: "BRIT MUSLIMS WANT THE STONE AGE"). This is 
comparable to denouncing British Christians for believing in the Resurrection and demanding that 
British Jews abandon the Talmud, and it is arguable that such hyperbole is capable of fuelling 
moral panics that do more to distort and reify concerns over minority groups than to precipitate 
solutions, particularly when materially ungrounded claims concerning the disastrous aspirations 
of minorities are consistently articulated as self-evident truths. In another example of how 
Muslims and Islam have been characterised as anti-modem and antipathetic to democratic and 
human rights. Will Hutton, for example, writing in The Observer, argues that 
Islam is predominantly sexist and pre-Enlightenment and that is the core of the 
problem both within the Islamic world and in its relationship with the West. Thus, 
the West has to object to Islamic sexism whether arranged marriage, headscarves, 
limiting career options or the more extreme manifestations, female circumcision 
and stoning women for adultery (11, January 2004). 
Hutton's argumentation strategy opens with a sentence which functions to simultaneously assume 
and conclude that Islam and "Islamic practices" are predominantly "pre-Enlightenment". The 
result of this understanding becomes apparent when seeking to explain "Islam's relationship with 
the West". The latter is counterpoised as a corrective, to pre-Enlightenment exemplars of 
"Islamic sexism"; practices deemed to cause the problematic nature of Islam's incapacity to 
relate to a non-sexist, egalitarian West. So for "West" read "Modern". With this in mind, 
Muslim contributions to British society should be restricted because what Muslim men do to 
Muslim women is both symptomatic of broader "Islamic practices" and is antipathetic to "our" 
beliefs. A combative response is, then, required since "their own cultural context" is evidently 
unable to renew itself without a civilising hand. Such a process necessarily begins by shoring up 
"our" own values and positions all Muslim practices in conflict with liberal freedoms. 
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This sort of argumentation is not dissimilar to that which, less than a hundred years ago, was 
presenting Jews as inassimilable. For not only a variety of assumptions and characterisations 
projected onto Jewish minorities, but public and media discourses maintained that these traits and 
trends were being actively pursued by Jewish communities. Arnold White, for example, an 
influential commentator of that era, writing in the Contemporary Review, characterised the Jewish 
experience in Britain as 
... not that of numbers, nor of 
habits, nor of occupations of the immigrants but the 
fact that, good or bad or indifferent the orthodox immigrants belong to a race and 
cling to a community that prefers to remain aloof from the mainstream of our 
national life, by shunning intermarriage with Anglo-Saxons (Contemporary Review 
xxii 1897: 738). 
White's claim entails a rejection of cultural pluralism in favour of an absolute identification with 
the values and aspirations of an undefined `British national life'. Although undefined, this 
national life is constructed against the presence of Jewish minorities through the implication of 
incompatibility between British and Jewish interests, both domestically and internationally. Like 
many others at the time, White insisted that integration was not a religious question and had 
nothing to do with whether the destitute immigrant believed in the Bible or the Torah (Holmes, 
1979: 105). It was, in truth, a racial question. This was a common and salient position at the 
time coherently exemplified in a letter to the Jewish Chronicle (21 November 1902 - signed by 
an anonymous `Mile End Socialist') 
`Jew versus Gentile' will be my battle cry at every election as long as life is spared 
... the Jew 
has made himself obnoxious through the incarnate instinct of his race to 
every nation where he has now emigrated. This is an historical fact and beyond 
controversy. 
These views proceeded to inform governmental thinking, as is evident in the form of the Royal 
Commission on Alien Immigration (1903: 178,298) which listed Whitechapel and Mile End as a 
`Jerusalem' or a `Second Palestine', reporting complaints that Jews too often "lived `according to 
their traditions, usages and customs' in a way which was wholly deleterious to the English man" 
(Holmes, 1979: 17). That public anxieties over perceived Jewish self-segregation were mired in a 
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racialised resentment was particularly evident when it came to the prospect of accommodating 
difference because 
[I]t was in fact a persistent theme that Jews kept themselves part. `When in Rome 
do as the Romans do' was observed as a guide to social behaviour by `every race 
except the alien Jews', it was claimed. It was pointed out that Jews ignored local 
`customs', `religious observances', `days of rest', and contravened established 
morality (Holmes, ibid. ). 
These conceptions of incompatibility and unassailability were not solely derived from ideas of 
self-segregation, however, but ran deeper in being attributable to the intrinsic cultural disposition 
or make-up of Jews as a race or nation. For example, the East London Advertiser consistently ran 
editorials decrying the frustrating maintenance of a Jewish identity or ways of life 
People of any other nation, after being in England for a short time, assimilate 
themselves with the native race and by and by lose nearly all their foreign trace. 
But the Jews never do. A Jew is always a Jew. No doubt this is due to their desire 
for the formation of a new Hebrew nation, a fact which inclines them to look upon 
themselves as pilgrims in a strange land (6 May 1899, quoted in Holmes, 1979: 
17). 
In summary then, we can discern that some similarities in the public construction of Jews and 
Muslims include the use of categorical assumptions about a whole group (even though such 
assumptions are often based either on no evidence at all, or the actions or words of very small 
groups or individuals). These claims, therefore, make no allowances for the variation and 
divergences evident in almost all social groups. In addition, these constructions often make 
assumptions that religious orthodoxy is derived from the fact of difference itself, specifically 
with respect to the view that an adherence to (non-Christian) religious law is itself a barrier to 
being British. Importantly, there are evident assumptions about dual loyalties and an adherence 
to dysfunctional cultural practices, in the face of what are assumed to be uncontested social 
norms. 
5. The emergence of a British Muslim press 
The sorts of tendencies displayed in the mainstream press coverage of Islam and Muslims in 
Britain, specifically the propensity for mischaracterisation and negative generalisation, have 
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informed the creation of alternative Muslim media sources which set out to reflect "the Muslim 
or Islamic identity of both its producers and readers" and offer a perspective "more aware of and 
sympathetic to Muslims" (Ahmed, 2005: 111). In Britain, publications such as The Muslim 
News, Q-News, Crescent International, Impact International and Trends, media committees at 
the MCB and FAIR, and radio stations such as Radio Ummah and Radio Ramadan have 
increasingly mobilised alternative views to those surveyed above. As Inayat Bunglawala of the 
MCB puts it 
We've often been in a very uneven playing field in the mainstream media, with the 
Tabloid press often rushing to air the most outlandish voices, the most radical 
voices at the expense of ordinary Muslims. Because these are often given huge 
publicity without a necessary context as to how on the fringe the radical groups are 
or what their numbers amount to compared to the mainstream Muslim view. So in 
the end the MCB try to counteract that unfair portrayal of the British-Muslim 
community at the same time as being the focus of it ourselves! (Interview, 21 May 
2006). 
The content and outlook of each of these media committees and news sources is inevitably 
informed by the background of the source itself, including the ideological or political stance of its 
editors and journalists. This is also determined by whether the aim is to provide a current affairs 
source of information or one more concerned with addressing social and cultural issues. For 
example, most Muslim media press publications advertise `Muslim relevant' events and 
activities; publicise charity appeals and often include book reviews. 
There are clear differences, however, between some publications so it is important not to 
amalgamate the various types of publications into a singular genre. For example, The Invitation 
offers an accessible accounts of current affairs, whilst others, such as Q-News, attach much more 
emphasis to the impact of British and international politics on Muslims in Britain. The latter was 
created as a fortnightly tabloid publication, before it evolved into its current, monthly magazine 
format under the present editorship of Fareena Alam. It describes itself as: 
Britain's leading Muslim magazine, providing independent analysis, critique and 
review of politics, culture and ideas. We are read by second and third generation 
British Muslims, parliamentarians, policy makers and educators. A third of our 
readership are not Muslim giving us unique place in the market as a publication 
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which communicates the rich Muslim experience to a diverse audience. The 
philosophy of Q-News is a combination of style, appeal and relevance to the 
Muslim community living in the west and around the world. Over the years, Q- 
News has repeatedly set the agenda, rather than react to it. Our chief interest lies in 
the development of a unique and relevant Western Muslim discourse. 6 
In these terms of encouraging a `Western Muslim discourse', Fareena Alam has herself described 
the issues that most concerned her before taking editorial control: 
I was struggling with questions of who do I want to be: a Muslim journalist or a 
journalist who happens to be Muslim? Islam has an incredible capacity to develop 
distinct cultural forms and expression while maintaining its universal principles... I 
want British Islam to reflect the best of my - and others' - faith and citizenship. ' 
Whilst such publications are a fairly recent emergence, there is clearly a desire amongst them to 
move beyond solely Muslim audiences, with the editor of Impact International describing his 
belief that "in the course of time, the Muslim media are also going to be part of the mainstream" 
(quoted in Ahmed, 2005: 112). Another publication, the Muslim News, epitomises this conviction 
in its determination to reach out beyond its constituency of Muslim readers, whilst at the same 
time taking pride in its role in elevating and accentuating British Muslim-consciousness. It states 
that "the Muslim News has been one of the pioneers of recognising the Muslim community as a 
diverse faith group with a common British Muslim identity". Part of this process has been 
mediated by a remit in which 
The Muslim News reports on what the non-Muslim media does not report. In its 15 
years of publication, it has exposed media's and establishments institutionalised 
Islamophobia on various issues - politics, education, employment and religion. 8 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter examined public and media discourse on Muslims in Britain. Taking its cue 
from Du Bois' account of double consciousness, it has argued that negative public and media 
discourses on Muslims in Britain can impair how Muslims see themselves reflected back. It has 
6 See Q-News website: http: //www. q-news. com/about. htm 
Quoted in the NS Interview - "The petrodollar-funded literalists think their version is the real Islam. I'm 
for an Islam that is at home in Britain", Rachel Aspden, New statesman, 27 February, 2006. 
$ See `About Us' at The Muslim News: http: //www. muslimnews. co. uk 
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argued that this is an example of a reactive Muslim-consciousness since it has informed an 
increasing tendency for Muslims to represent themselves through a proliferation of Muslim 
media sources. These Muslim media sources have simultaneously sought to pluralise the 
mainstream in reaching beyond Muslim audiences. By exploring some of the ways in which 
Islam and Muslims are portrayed across salient axes - and comparatively in relation to some other 
groups - it pre-empts the discussion in the next chapter of race and racism to excavate salient 
accounts of citizenship and belonging, and the implication for a British-Muslim-consciousness 
therein. It is these issues that are further examined in the following chapter, through an 
evaluation of the legal protections afforded to Muslim minorities in Britain. 
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Chapter Five 
Muslims and discrimination: Muslim-consciousness in re-action? 
1. Introduction 
Whilst chair of the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), Julie Mellor once 
complained that "Britain's equality laws are a mess. Inconsistent and incomplete, they offer 
different levels of protection for different groups and none at all for others" (The Guardian, 
16 May, 2002). ' In holding this view she was not alone. 2 Commentators and public policy 
analysts long concerned with the welfare of Britain's ethnic, racial and religious minorities 
(Parekh, 1990; Modood, 1992; 1994; CBMI 1997,2004; CMEB, 2000) have each argued that 
the broad development of anti-discrimination legislation in the United Kingdom has been 
inconsistent. That this is acutely and disproportionately felt by Muslims in the levels of 
protection they are afforded, is a complaint frequently made by an increasing number of 
Muslim organisations (UKACIA, 1993; MCB, 1997; FAIR, 2002; IHRC, 2004a). 3 
  What this means, however, and whether such complaints are valid - in being 
based upon substantive cases - are key contextual questions for this chapter. 
In this chapter, the meaning of double-consciousness differs from that of the last where it 
theorised social formations `striving' to create plural constituencies of participation as 
components of Muslim-consciousness. It is adopted here to explore how certain conceptions 
1 Barbara Cohen, former head of CRE legal policy, echoes many of Julie Mellor's concerns when she 
states that "for various reasons the government appears willing to introduce legislation on one ground 
or within one ground that is inconsistent with the legislation they have recently passed. Equality 
legislation in this country is a mess: for example, in the RRA we have two different definitions of 
indirect discrimination and harassment, different rules regarding where the burden of proof will lie and 
gender and race equality legislation are completely out of sync with each other" (Interview, 7 March, 
2006). 
2 Indeed, several years ago Hepple, Coussey and Choudhury (2000) calculated that a comprehensive 
picture of Britain's discrimination legislation would need to consult at least thirty Acts, thirty-eight 
Statutory Instruments, eleven Codes of Practice and twelve EC Directives and Recommendations. 
3 Amongst others, Arzu Merali of the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) argues that the level 
of anti-discrimination legislation protecting Muslims in Britain has been "inconsistent and getting 
worse. It's difficult to say that there was a point that it was ok; the last fifteen years have been quite 
turbulent with the development of Islamophobia being quite distinct in that period. Not that it hasn't 
existed before, but it has been recognised at a time of a general crisis of confidence in the current 
legislation to protect minorities per se. I think what we can say without doubt is that the situation in the 
last few years has been getting worse, not just with regards to legislation but with the lack of political 
will to deal with it" (Interview, 12 June 2006, see also Ameli and Merali et al., 2004). 
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of discrimination might prevent Muslim minorities from being full participants in British 
society. For example, a key aspect of double-consciousness describes the way in which 
minorities feel alienated and disenfranchised because they are sidelined in the political 
structure of their society; remaining bound by the requirements but not experiencing the 
rewards of citizenship. In this regard, as Arzu Merali of the IHRC has already outlined, one 
persistent complaint concerns a perceived lack of willingness to take seriously both the forms 
of cultural racism and Islamophobia examined in Part B of chapter three, alongside the 
legitimacy of identities accentuating Muslim particularity. 
  Reporting on the second of three case studies, the present chapter extends the 
analysis of how a recognition and reflection of the substantive elements of a 
Muslim-consciousness within anti-discrimination formulae might attend to the 
sorts of double-consciousness described in chapter two. 
What this chapter seeks to do, therefore, is three-fold. Firstly, it examines how we have 
reached the situation described by Julie Mellor, Arzu Merali and Barbara Cohen, and to what 
extent these multitude of legislative instruments are effective. Second, it identifies where 
Muslims in Britain are positioned within this legal framework. This question thus 
understands these two issues as being interdependent, since what will be examined is how 
and in what ways anti-discrimination legislation has historically attended to the experiences 
or conditions of prejudice faced by Muslims in Britain. One way to examine this is through a 
consideration of the antecedents and material outcomes of current anti-discrimination 
legislation, with a particular focus upon the extent to which they are informed by the types of 
racial equality and race relations formulations discussed in chapters one and three. Thirdly, 
this chapter considers the impact and scope of new EC legislation, which, for the first time, 
directly addresses religious discrimination. This will proceed through an understanding of its 
broader implications, specifically its material capacity and limitations. 
By applying the discussion of cultural racism and Islamophobia set out in chapter three, 
this chapter evaluates the way in which these racisms are, or are, not recognised within 
current discrimination legislation. 
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  It is argued that if we reject a normative grammar of race and accept that legal 
categories of race and ethnicity must not be foreclosed to the complexities of 
social contingencies, that include periods of Muslim racialisation, a coherent 
argument for Muslim inclusion under existing anti-discrimination formulae can 
be made. 
Centrally, this chapter shows how the efforts for Muslim inclusion perfectly illustrate the 
movement- from a historically-ascribed identity to a politically self-defined identity that 
contests Muslim-specific discrimination and Islamophobia. 
2. Anti-discrimination legislation 
In the pursuit of some kind of equality of opportunity, and as a criterion of the civic status 
conferred under a tradition of British multicultural citizenship set out in chapter one, it is a 
historical fact that Britain's anti-discrimination and equal opportunities legislation has taken 
an instrumentalist approach. That is, it has often proceeded through group specific legislation 
that has outlawed discrimination in terms of race and ethnicity, gender, disability, age, sexual 
orientation and so forth, whilst encouraging the monitoring of institutional under- 
representation amongst such groups, each of which has been moderated through legal 
precedent and introduced sequentially according to the political climate of the day. In the 
following account, Squires (2004: 75) offers a helpful catalogue of this development of anti- 
discrimination legislation in Britain 
The Labour governments of the 1970s introduced a range of equality laws designed 
to remedy group discrimination (in preparation for joining the European Economic 
Community): The Equal Pay Act 1970, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA), 
the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 
1976. Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome (signed by the UK in 1973) also 
established the principle of equal pay. The Equal Opportunities Commission 
(EOC) and Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) were established to uphold 
these laws. The Disability Discrimination Act was introduced in 1995 and the 
Disability Rights Commission established in 2000. The Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000 amended the 1976 Act (fulfilling recommendation 11 of 
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the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report) and The Race Relations Act 1976 
(Amendment) Regulations 2003 implements the EC Article 13 Race Directive. 4 
Conspicuously absent from this accumulated legislation are any specific instruments 
explicitly addressing discrimination on the grounds of real or perceived religious identity, or 
grouping. Although case law has established precedents in the application of Race Relations 
legislation to prevent discrimination against some religious minorities, namely Sikhs (cf 
Panesar v. Nestle Co Ltd, 1980 [IRLR 64]; Mandla v. Dowell Lee (1983) [2AC 548]; Singh v. 
British Rail Engineering Ltd (1986) [ICR 22]; Dhanjal v. British Steel plc (1994) 
[unreported]) and Jewish minorities (cf Seide v. Gillette Industries Ltd (1980) [IRLR 427]; 
Morgan v. CSC & British Library (1990) [DCLD 6 19177/89]), it has not been extended to 
Muslim minorities. This is because Muslims in Britain have not been recognised as an ethnic 
or racial grouping within the application of Race Relations legislation or the legal precedents 
that this has faciliated. In a somewhat tautological fashion, the RRA extends protections to 
racial or ethnic groups conceived in the following way 
Racial groups are those defined by racial grounds, i. e. race, colour, nationality 
(including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins. All racial groups are protected 
from unlawful racial discrimination under the RRA. 6 
° It is interesting that Squires attributes the development of some of this legislation to Britain's 
impending involvement in the EEC and EU more broadly. This raises the question as to how 
impending inclusion into the EU has also affected the construction of discrimination legislation, if at 
all, in other countries. Recognising this supports Favell's (1998) view that comprehending conceptions 
of anti-discrimination (as part of an equation of citizenship) makes much greater sense through a cross- 
national European perspective, which can help us to learn about pathologies or remedies in relation to 
any one country. See chapter three for a critique of his position (sec. 7), but it is worth repeating here 
that such a perspective risks ignoring - or at least under emphasising - the influence of the post- 
colonial and US civil rights thinking on British race relations, which was evaluated in chapter three 
(sec. 3-3.3. ), as well as the important internal debates in specifically responding to this influence, 
alongside other debates that have exercised British social science on matters of race, identity and 
citizenship (see Banton, 1991; Miles, 1994, and Dummett, 1998). For a descriptive comparison with 
Germany as well as the US see Joppke (1996). Where the adoption of current EU directives sit in 
relation to this argument is discussed below. 
s Although Sikhs were recognised as an ethnic group in Panesar v. Nestle Co Ltd [1979] IRLR 64, the 
implications of this adjudication were given their fullest expression in the House of Lords ruling that 
accompanied Mandla v. Dowell Lee (1983) [2 AC 548], discussed below. This is because in the former 
case it was deemed `justifiable' within the meaning of section 1(1)(b)(ii) of the Race Relation Act 
(1976) that the Nestle Company should require Sikh applicants to shave their beards for reasons of 
work place hygiene, not withstanding that the proportion of Sikhs who could conscientiously comply 
with this requirement was considerably smaller than the proportion of non-Sikhs. 
6 Nationality meaning `national origin' was added to the Act in 1976 following the House of Lords 
decision in Ealing Borough Council exparte Zesko v. Race Relations Board (1972) [AC 342] where it 
was held that Mr Zesko had not been unlawfully discriminated against by Ealing Council who had 
refused to add his name to a council house waiting list on the grounds that he was not a British national 
i. e. prior to the 1976 amendment nationality had meant something closer to race rather than citizenship 
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A clearer description might be to state that the "multiform" concept of race in Race Relations 
legislation is adopted to outlaw "inferior treatment perceived to be based on colour, race, 
nationality, or ethnic or national origins" (Modood, 2005b: 113). In the way that this has 
been applied, however, the courts7 have tried to operationalise an understanding of ethnic 
origin that functions as a wider concept than race. For example, in the case of Mandla v. 
Dowell Lee (1983) that is discussed below, it is clear that the House of Lords concluded that 
there are several characteristics relevant to the identification of ethnic and racial groupings to 
be afforded protection. This requires some explanation and elaboration, firstly, with reference 
to the development of Race Relations discrimination legislation generally and, secondly, 
through an illustrative discussion of the case identified above. 
2.1. Race Relations Legislation 
Conceived in response to the sorts of racial conflict witnessed in the anti-West Indian 
violence of the late 1950s in Notting Hill, and the fear of potential future conflict (Shakur, 
1998)8, there has been legislation in the United Kingdom outlawing discrimination on racial 
grounds since the introduction of the Race Relations Act (RRA) 1965.9 This established 
relatively moderate legislation outlawing discrimination in access to premises open to the 
public such as hotels, bars and restaurants. Three years later, and running parallel to the 
introduction of further immigration legislation in the form of the Commonwealth Immigration 
Act (1968), another RRA extended these protections to the spheres of employment, housing, 
education and the provision of further goods, facilities and services. The main legislation 
currently in force is the RRA 1976 (as amended in 2000 & 2003). This provides individuals 
within the remit of the legislation. See Racial Group in CRE glossary 
http //www. cre. gov. uk/duty/grr/ lossarv. html 
' Particularly the House of Lords, in its capacity as the highest court in the UK before the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
8 Although this is the most commonly held story of the inception of this legislation, according to 
Anthony Lester (who played a key role in drafting the original bill) it is equally true that "[w]hen the 
first Race Relations Act was enacted in 1965, with Sir Frank Soskice at the Home Office, it was done 
in part to an increase in racial anti-Semitism" (Lester, Harsard, 9 November 2005). This is discussed 
further below. 
9 Prior to which Common Law had offered very limited and largely ineffectual protections against 
racial discrimination. See Rawlings (1985) for an analysis of lassez-faire doctrines and their influence 
upon the judiciary's view of race equality legislation. 
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with the right to bring civil proceedings for discrimination, and includes major innovations 
such as a distinction between indirect alongside direct discrimination (discussed below), and 
a statutory duty of `positive action' (see footnote 10 of this chapter). In addition, it furnished 
the newly established Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) with the powers to conduct 
formal investigations as well as to assist individual complainants. This legislation was 
strengthened by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 following the inquiry into the 
London Metropolitan Police investigation of the murdered teenager Stephen Lawrence 
(McPherson Report, 1999), which extended its scope to cover nearly all functions of public 
authorities (for the first time including the police but still excluding the immigration service), 
simultaneously widening the remit of the statutory duty on public authorities to promote race 
equality. 10 The RRA has now been further amended by the Race Relations (Amendment) 
Regulations 2003, which are intended to transpose the EC Race Directive outlined below 
(CRE Good Practice Guide, 2004). There have been several cases of discrimination pursued 
under Race Relations legislation that are relevant to a consideration of the legal protections 
currently available to Muslims in Britain, but the case of Mandla v. Dowell Lee (1983) 
provides the most helpful example. 
2.2. The case of Mandla v. Dowell Lee and Park Grove School" 
This case began after the headteacher of a private school in Birmingham refused to enrol 
as a pupil to the school an orthodox Sikh boy (who wore long hair under a turban) unless the 
boy removed the turban and cut his hair. The headteacher's reasons for this refusal were that 
1° Under section 71 (1) of the Race Relations Act 1976 (as amended in 2000) all public authorities have 
a general duty to promote race equality, that requires them to eliminate racial discrimination, ensure 
equality of opportunity, and promote good `race relations' through such things as outreach work and 
awareness training. There are also specific duties such as the implementation of a written policy on 
race equality, perhaps as part of an overall policy; an assessment of the impact of new and current 
policies on ethnic minority staff, students and other service users, the monitoring of recruitment and 
progression of ethnic minority staff and students, and monitoring grievance, disciplinary, appraisal, 
staff development and termination procedures by ethnicity. The Secretary of State is also empowered 
to impose specific duties on key, listed public authorities. Broadly, these selected authorities must 
publish a Race Equalities Scheme and meet specific employment duties (the scheme is effectively a 
strategy and action plan). 
" Sources outlining the details of this case include The Liverpool Law Review (1983) and the Mandla 
v. Dowell Lee House of Lords Transcript available at 
http"//www hrcr orp-/Safrica/equality/Mandla DowellLee. htm. 
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the wearing of a turban, being a manifestation of the boy's religious origins, would accentuate 
religious and social distinctions in the school which, being a school based on the Christian 
faith, the headteacher wished to minimise. In response, the boy's family sought a declaration 
in the County Court that this refusal to admit him, unless he removed his turban and cut his 
hair, amounted to discrimination against a member of a racial group under section I(1)(b) of 
the RRA (1976). This maintains that 
A person discriminates against another in any circumstances relevant for the 
purposes of any provision of this Act if--(a) on racial grounds he treats that other 
less favorably than he treats or would treat other persons or (b) he applies to that 
other a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to 
persons not of the same racial group as that other but--(i) which is such that the 
proportion of persons of the same racial group as that other who can comply with it 
is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that racial group who 
can comply with it and (ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of 
the colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins of the person to whom it is 
applied and (iii) which is to the detriment of that other because he cannot comply 
with it. 12 
Close scrutiny of this passage reveals how the Act contains scope for redress in cases of 
indirect discrimination, when an individual member or entire racial group cannot comply with 
a requirement, or if that requirement will have a disproportionately negative impact upon a 
certain racial group. Indirect discrimination thus denotes "a rule, policy or procedure that is 
the same for everybody, but may specifically exclude a person or group from a benefit of 
12 This section is modelled on 1(1)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act (1975), which was introduced a 
year earlier, and results, on the one hand, from a practical concern to enact tested legislation and, on the 
other, a shrewd political manoeuvre by the then Home Secretary to find cross-party support for Race- 
Relations legislation from unlikely quarters that had already supported Sex Discrimination legislation. 
The cross-party support also empowered the CRE with the authority to issue legally binding non- 
discrimination notices (see Lester, 1998). Indeed, part of the provenance for the development of a 
more extensive definition of discrimination as including `indirect' discrimination, was the US Supreme 
Court precedent in Griggs v Duke. This witnessed a shift away from formal equality towards a more 
sophisticated understanding of equality and discrimination, and paved the way for overcoming initial 
resistance towards endorsement of the earliest examples of positive action in British anti-discrimination 
law (Sooben, 1990: 38). Roy Jenkins summed up his new attitude in comments on positive action 
measures in the Sex Discrimination Act in the following terms: "I believe that we should not be so 
blindly loyal to the principle of formal equality as to ignore the actual and practical inequalities 
between the sexes still less to prohibit positive action to help men and women to compete on genuinely 
equal terms and to overcome an undesirable historical link" (Hansard, vol. 899, column 514). The 
choice of the civil model, rather than the criminal law paradigm, by the Street Committee was based on 
the Ives Quinn Act first introduced in New York in 1945, which had introduced the idea of a special 
administrative machinery to deal with problems of discrimination. The subsequent prevalence of the 
idea of anti-discrimination commissions in the form of the Race Relations Board (RRB) and 
subsequently the EOC and CRE were also modelled on the US type administrative bodies (see Sooben, 
1990). 
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opportunity, and may have unequal effects on different groups within the organisation" 
(Fahrenhorst and Kleiner, 2001: 148). This contrasts with the more obvious form of direct 
discrimination which needs to be understood less in terms of the motive and more in terms of 
the decision, i. e. if an employer treats an ethnic minority employee less well because of 
customer disapproval of ethnic minorities, or if a trade union operates a colour bar. 
In terms of the Mandla case, the County Court judge dismissed the original petition on the 
grounds that Sikhs were not a racial or ethnic group within the definition of the Act, 
specifically because they could not be defined by reference to ethnic or national origins. 13 
When the boy's family appealed to the next, higher court, they did so with the argument that 
the term `ethnic' embraced more than merely a racial concept, and included a cultural, 
linguistic or religious community. The Court of Appeal, however, decided that Sikhism was 
primarily a religion and that the adherents of a religion did not constitute a `racial group' 
within the meaning of the 1976 Act and, hence, discrimination with regard to religious 
practice was not unlawful under the RRA. The court's rationale remained that a group could 
be defined by reference to its ethnic origins within sections 3(1) of the 1976 Act only if that 
group could be distinguished from other groups by definable racial characteristics, and that 
Sikhs had no such characteristics peculiar to Sikhs. 
In a final attempt that was politically and materially supported by the Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE), which itself sought further clarification on the matter, the boy's 
family appealed to the House of Lords, where Lord Fraser of Tullybelton outlined the Law 
Lords working definition of ethnic groups as incorporating, amongst others, (i) a long shared 
history the group is conscious of as distinguishing it from other groups, (ii) a cultural tradition 
" In making his ruling Lord Denning stated that "Sikhs, as a group, cannot be distinguished by 
reference to any racial characteristics whatever. They are only to be distinguished by their religion and 
culture. This is not an ethnic difference at all" (quoted in the Mandla House of Lords ruling). It is 
worth noting the anomaly here that Sikhs had already been recognised as an ethnic group, by no less 
than a Court of Appeal, three years earlier in Panesar v. Nestle Co Ltd (1980) and that this was little 
recognised at the time of Lord Denning's ruling. One reason for the oversight might be that the 
adjudication in that case went against the claimant because it was deemed `justifiable' within the remit 
of Race Relation legislation that the Nestle Company should require Sikhs to shave their beards for 
reasons of Public Health in application for employment. It nevertheless remains an interesting 
oversight. 
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of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily 
associated with religious observance; and (iii) either a common geographical origin, or 
descent from a small number of common ancestors - which is one of the main criterion for 
identifying group membership, including `perceived' group membership. 14 Using these 
criteria, the House of Lords upheld the boy's appeal, and made the following statement in 
terms of the ability of Sikhs to comply with the school's uniform policy, which is worth 
quoting at length 
It is obvious that Sikhs, like anyone else, `can' refrain from wearing a turban, if 
`can' is construed literally. But if the broad cultural/historic meaning of ethnic is 
the appropriate meaning of the word in the 1976 Act, then a literal reading of the 
word `can' would deprive Sikhs and members of other groups defined by reference 
to their ethnic origins of much of the protection which Parliament evidently 
intended the 1976 Act to afford to them. They `can' comply with almost any 
requirement or condition if they are willing to give up their distinctive customs and 
cultural rules. On the other hand, if ethnic means inherited or unalterable, as the 
Court of Appeal thought it did, then `can' ought logically to be read literally. The 
word `can' is used with many shades of meaning. In the context of section 
1(1)(b)(i) of the 1976 Act it must, in my opinion, have been intended by Parliament 
to be read not as meaning `can physically', so as to indicate a theoretical 
possibility, but as meaning `can in practice' or `can consistently with the customs 
and cultural conditions of the racial group'. [... ] Accordingly I am of opinion that 
the `no turban' rule was not one with which the appellant could, in the relevant 
sense, comply. [... ] I recognize that `ethnic' conveys a flavour of race but it 
cannot.. . 
have been used in the 1976 Act as in a strict racial or biological sense. 
For one thing, it would be absurd to assume that Parliament can have intended that 
membership of a particular racial group should depend on scientific proof that a 
person possessed the relevant distinctive biological characteristics... it is clear that 
parliament must have used the word in some more popular sense [... ]. 15 
In coming to this decision, Lord Fraser argued that "it is inconceivable that Parliament would 
have legislated against racial discrimination intending that the protection should not apply 
either to Christians or (above all) to Jews" (ibid. ), thus further consolidating the protection of 
Jewish religious minorities under the Race Relations legislation previously achieved in Seide 
14 There were also four other, arguably lesser, criteria in addition to those identified above including: 
(iv) a common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group, (v) a common literature peculiar to the 
group, (vi) a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the general 
community surrounding it, and (vii) being a minority or being an oppressed dominant group within a 
larger community. The example they gave for the latter was "a conquered people (say, the inhabitants 
of England shortly after the Norman conquest) and their conquerors might both be ethnic groups". See 
Mandla v. Dowell Lee House of Lords Transcript available at: 
http //www. hrcr. org/safrica/eauality/Mandla DowellLee. htm 
15 Ibid. 
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v. Gillette Industries Ltd, (1980)16, whilst compounding an anomaly by making reference to 
Christians. 
At this time, the adjudication led The Liverpool Law Review (1983: 83) to conclude that 
"a major consequence of the judgment is the protection which will be afforded to other 
groups. For example, Muslims will be a racial group for the purposes of the Act. " That this 
prediction did not materialise soon after, nor in the twenty four years since, points to a 
number of factors in the conception of racial discrimination that require greater exploration 
than Lee's (1997: 6) conclusion that "the prospect of protecting Muslims was simply an 
extension too far for many liberal commentators and judges. " 
2.3. Rules of Extension: RRA, POA, CDA and `racial Islamophobia'. 
In its scope, the RRA definitional criteria was conceived to cover both ethnic and racial 
groupings. As we have seen, the application of RRA criteria in legal judgments has succeeded 
in affording Sikh and Jewish minorities these protections without extending them to other 
religious minorities. This is not an outcome of benign neglect, however, but has involved an 
active denial to legislative recourse. As Modood (2005c: 215) summarises: 
Legal Judgements have included Sikhs, Jews, Gypsies, Rastafarians and others 
within the term [of ethnic group], but Nyazi v. Rymans Ltd (1988) specifically 
excluded Muslims. In 1991, the Appeal Court, by majority decision, overruled the 
recognition of Rastafarians as an ethnic group, and CRE v. Precision (1991) made 
it clear that direct discrimination against Muslims (as opposed to, say, Pakistanis) 
is not unlawful. 
The decisive rationale common to each of these rulings is that since Islam hosts a diversity of 
racial and ethnic differences, being Muslim does not sufficiently meet the criteria of an ethnic 
or racial grouping. For example, in the case of Nyazi v. Rymans Ltd (1988) [EAT 10 May, 
1988 unreported] the industrial tribunal settled in favour of the employer after it held that 
16 Where an industrial tribunal held that discrimination against a Jewish employee could be addressed 
through the RRA if it was based not upon the complainant's religion but on their perceived Jewish 
ethnic origin (see Dobe and Chokkor, 2000: 380). Although the applicant lost his case against his 
employers on this occasion, the Employment Tribunal held that they had been correct to hear the case 
because the alleged anti-Semitic remark was deemed to constitute racial discrimination within the remit 
of the RRA, since `Jewish' was taken to denote being a member of a racial or ethnic category as well 
as being a member of a faith group. See 'Direct Discrimination Case Studies' available at: 
http: //www cre. og v. uk/legal/direct/case 009seide. html 
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"Muslims include people of many nations and colours, who speak many languages and whose 
only common denominator is religion and religious culture" (quoted in Dobe and Chhokar, 
2000: 382). Thus the comments of Lord Fraser on the ability of an individual to adhere to a 
rule contravening the customs and cultural conditions of their ethnic or racial group do not 
apply, and the sorts of ideas of ethnic and racial groupings discussed earlier, including those 
premised upon cultural attributes of conscious value, or attributed racial identity, are also 
ignored. At a time when Muslims are subject to intense public focus, this type of conclusion, 
stressing the ethnic-origin heterogeneity of British Muslim constituencies, as a pre-cursor to 
disqualifying their inclusion from the scope for legal redress under the RRA, arguably 
demonstrates one of the ways in which "the Mandla formulation is out of date and serves to 
subvert the original purpose of the Race Relations Act" (ibid. 373). This can be detected in 
the manner through which the definition of ethnic or racial groups in this civil anti- 
discrimination legislation has also been adopted in criminal law, through the Public Order Act 
(POA) (1986), which introduces the criminal offence of `inciting racial hatred'. 17 As Dobe 
notes (2000: 1-2) 
Legal acceptance as an `ethnic group' is crucial if members of minority groups are 
to be protected from the crudest manifestations of racial prejudice. Indeed neither 
the Race Relations Act (1976) nor the Public Order Act (1986) can be invoked to 
prevent discrimination or hate speech directed specifically at Muslims. [... ] The 
irony is two-fold in that not only is a large proportion of the `black' community 
conferred limited protection by statutes whose express purpose was to provide 
protection for them, but also that they are denied this protection when a crucial part 
of their identity is the basis of the discrimination (or, as the case may be, 
incitement). 
This situation is compounded by further criminal legislation which implements the same 
definition in the prevention of aggravated offences of harassment, violence and criminal 
damage, guided by racial hatred in the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) (1998). This means 
that 
17 Section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986 makes it an offence to use threatening, abusive or insulting 
words or behaviour with the intention of stirring up racial hatred. This was not introduced to protect 
minorities per se. but to maintain public order to the extent that the offence of incitement to racial 
hatred "should continue to be based on considerations of Public Order" (Review of Public Order Law, 
Cmnd 9510/1985, para. 65; see Wolfe, 1987). 
139 
... whilst racial groups are protected, 
including South Asians, an iniquitous anomaly 
in the law established a hierarchy of protected faith communities. Mono-ethnic 
faith communities benefit from protection against discrimination, aggravated 
offences of harassment, violence and criminal damage, and against incitement to 
hatred... [and] the imposition of a positive duty on public authorities to promote 
equality. Multi-ethnic faith communities, like Muslims, benefit from neither 
protection nor equality provision. Unless it could be shown that discrimination was 
racial (on the grounds of colour, for example), or that it was because they were 
`Bangladeshi', rather than `Muslim', some forms of racism began to seem 
legitimised if not entirely legal (Allen, 2005: 53). 
Although Allen's reading risks mischaracterising faith communities, since neither Sikh nor 
Jewish religious minorities are `mono-ethnic' 18, the inadequacy of the ways in which ethnic 
and racial groupings are conceived in the British legal context, including the ways in which 
racism is understood and legislation formulated to prevent and off-set, is increasingly 
apparent. According to several interviewees, some of these ambiguities can be explained via 
the interpretation of key judgments with respect to how current precedents might be related or 
extended to others. Notice, for example, the passing reference to Christians and Jews in terms 
of who would and would not conceivably be protected according to Lord Fraser. This leads 
Barbara Cohen, current chair of the Discrimination Law Association (DLA) and former head 
of CRE legal policy, to argue that, whilst she finds the terms qualifying Sikhs as an ethnic or 
racial group convincing, those achieved in relation to Jews are less so 
I understand how and why we consider Sikhs as an ethnic group through Lord 
Fraser's extended judgement which set out a definition of "ethnic group" that has 
then been applied in various other cases... but I'm less convinced regarding the 
precedent established in the Seide v. Gillette where the court found that Jews are an 
ethnic group... the decision was never tested in the higher courts nor have any later 
cases sought to re-open this question. (Interview, 7 March 2006). 
Part of the reason Cohen remains unconvinced is due to her subscription to the view that a 
certain degree of homogeneity is required amongst groups in terms of their make-up vis-ä-vis 
coverage afforded under the RRA. In contrast to Arzu Merali and the IIIRC, who have "been 
calling for a recognition of the fact that there is such as thing as racial and religious 
1$ For example, Jewish minorities in Britain can incorporate Ashkenazi Jews from Poland, Berber Jews 
from Algeria and African Jews from Ethiopia - all of whom may have different languages, customs and 
cultures. It is also feasible that Sikhs, through conversion, could incorporate different ethnic groupings. 
The importance of recognising this is not to rehearse an anti-essentialist argument, but to argue that - 
like Muslims in Britain - Jewish and Sikh minorities can be ethnically diverse and yet - unlike their 
Muslim counterparts - be considered an ethnic and racial minority in terms of the legislative redress 
available to them under the RRA. 
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discrimination according to the religious category by which people identify themselves and 
are identified against" (Interview, 12 June 2005), Cohen's comprehension proceeds through a 
hard separation of race and religion 
I do not believe there is one homogenous Jewish community in this country. The 
position of Muslims or Roman Catholics is that they are world religions and in the 
UK there are Muslims - or Roman Catholics - of many different ethnicities, and I 
think it would be more difficult for 
, 
Muslims to bring themselves within the 
definition of an ethnic group as laid down in the Mandla case. So I'm saying that 
it's not necessarily logical to expect an almost routine extension in the application 
of a law protecting people against race discrimination to all religious groups 
(Cohen, Interview). 
Opting for a more contextual and historically nuanced reading, the current head of CRE legal 
policy, Razia Karim, contends that these past precedents only really make sense when viewed 
in their historical function as the only legal instruments that were available to post-immigrant 
minorities seeking redress for discrimination 
[P]eople who felt that they had been discriminated against, and they believed it was 
on the grounds of their religion, had to use other laws to seek protection. The only 
one that was really available to minorities was the RRA, but to bring your 
complaint within the RRA you had to argue that the discrimination was on the 
grounds of race... but really if you read the those cases, what the judges are 
concerned with is identifying an ethnic group. [... ] That Muslims didn't have a 
cultural tradition of their own, which included family, social customs and manners 
etc because it's a much wider group and people come from different parts of the 
world and bring into their religion different customs and manners, even though the 
over-riding one was an Islamic one (Razia Karim, Interview, 18 May 2006). 
So in Karim's analysis the issue is very much one of a religious minority being discriminated 
against on the grounds of their ethnicity as opposed their religion, and "those cases 
where.. . groups 
have tried to argue for discrimination on the grounds of religion which took 
place on the grounds ethnicity" (ibid). 
In contrast both to Karim and Cohen's position, Lord Lester (one of the architects of each 
of the bills that led to the 1965,1968 and 1976 RRAs) maintains that there is enough scope 
within current Race Relations legislation to cover both ethnic and religious minorities 
provided that the discrimination faced by each group takes a racial form. This is a key point 
because, in Lester's view, the same coverage afforded to Jews is available to Muslims if the 
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target group have a shared ethnicity - real or perceived - as appears to be the case with what 
he understands as `racial Islamophobia' 
It has been clearly established for a quarter of a century, since the decision of Mr 
Justice Slynn, in 1980 as President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 1980 in 
the case of Seide v Gillette Industries, that Jews are included within the Race 
Relations Act only as victims of racial, and not religious discrimination. [... ] Jews 
are protected under the Race Relations Act not because they have a shared religion 
but because of their shared ethnicity, whether real or perceived by anti-Semitic 
discriminators. Exactly the same protection applies to Muslims. .. who are protected if they have an ethnic identity as well as a religious one; for example, because of 
their colour or national origins. The typical anti-Semite who persecutes Jews does 
not usually do so because of their religion but because of what he regards as their 
tainted ancestry and their blood. [... ] It is racial anti-Semitism... that is made 
unlawful under the Race Relations Act, just as racial Islamophobia is covered 
(Lord Lester, 9 November 2005). 
According to Lester then, the way in which the RRA was conceived can afford redress to 
discrimination suffered by Muslims, irregardless of the reality of group heterogeneity, 
because it is the perception (as Lord Fraser ruled with respect to the popular use of race) of 
homogeneity that the discriminator proceeds from. The key issue, then, is Lester's insistence 
that religious - as well as ethnic - minorities can be subject to `racial' discrimination: 
The true position may be summed up in this way. There is religious anti-Semitism 
and there is racial anti-Semitism. Before the 19`h century, anti-Semitism was 
primarily religious in nature, based on Christian or Islamic interpretations of 
Judaism. That form of prejudice and discrimination is directed at the religion itself 
and usually does not affect those of Jewish ancestry who have converted to another 
religion. That form of anti-Semitism is covered in the religious discrimination 
provisions in this Bill [Incitement to religious hatred Bill], just as religious 
Islamophobia is covered. (ibid. ). 
Despite the controversial charge of doctrinal anti-Semitism against Islam, given the strong 
evidence suggesting that anti-Semitic discourses have only very recently been imported into 
the Islamic vernacular - from Europe - in the post-War era of conflict over Palestine and 
Israel (Armstrong, 2003; Sayyid, 2002; Halliday, 1999), Lester's delineation does provide 
another conception of where doctrinal religious discrimination ends and racial religious 
discrimination begins. This distinction was considered in chapter three with respect to Fred 
Halliday's (1999) critique of the idea of Islamophobia, where it was argued that many British 
Muslims recount heightened discrimination and abuse when they appear `conspicuously 
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Muslim'. 19 The increase in personal abuse and everyday racism since 9/11 and 7/7, in which 
the perceived `Islamic-ness' of the victims is the central reason for abuse20, regardless of the 
veracity of this presumption (resulting in Sikhs and others with an `Arab' appearance being 
attacked for `looking like bin Laden'), suggests that racial and doctrinal religious 
discrimination are much more interlinked than both Lester and the current application of civil 
RRA and criminal legislation recognise. It is understandable, then, that the fact that the 
Regulations do not provide protection equivalent to that which Sikhs and Jews can enjoy 
under the RRA remains a matter of considerable dissatisfaction amongst Muslims. This 
dissatisfaction arises from the disparity that if a Muslim is attacked because they are wearing 
the hijab or walking from a mosque, wearing a beard, tunic or turban, for example, the higher 
penalties incurred by perpetrators of racial harassment under the CDA (1998) would not be 
conferred against such perpetrators of religious harassment. Similarly, this was a blind spot in 
the POA (1986), in which only incitement to racial hatred, denoting "hatred against a group 
of persons defined by reference to colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or 
national origins" is covered (the definition of `ethnicity' in section 17 remains as that 
established under the application of RRA legislation). 
As discussed below, the illegality of the incitement of others to hate members of a group 
because of their religion remains highly ambiguous and must meet a disproportionately high 
threshold before prosecutions become an option. This has allowed the British National Party 
(BNP) to campaign at the last two general elections (and several local elections) on what the 
party described as `the Muslim problem'. Similarly, when the London Borough of Merton 
asked the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to prosecute those engaged in anti-Muslim 
incitement - following the distribution of offensive and threatening material by a BNP 
member - they were refused on the grounds that Muslims were not a racial group and 
therefore not covered by the POA (1986). This is despite, the same BNP member pleading 
guilty to distributing similar material inciting racial hatred against Jewish inhabitants of 
19 As testimonies to the 2004 Runneymede follow-up report bear witness. 
20 See the IRR record of `Backlash' against Muslims since 7 July 2005. www. irr. org. co. uk. 
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Merton (cf Rv DPP ex pane London Borough of Merton [CO/1319/1998]). Indeed, the CRE 
has recounted how it failed to persuade the West Yorkshire CPS to prosecute the BNP for 
distributing a leaflet headed `Islam: Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson, Molestation of 
women' in an area with existing community tensions (Qureshi, 2005). 
According to Dobe and Chhokar (2000: 373), instances such as these "undermine even 
the limited rationale underlying the Public Order Act (1986) [to prevent the outbreak of social 
disorder]. In areas of high Muslim concentration, where literature inciting hatred against 
Muslims is distributed, there is a substantial risk not only of an increase in crime motivated by 
the hatred of Muslims, but also of general violence and disorder ". 21 This criticism is then in 
agreement with Lester's line of reasoning, and was to an extent witnessed in the summer of 
2001 when several Northern English cities were subject to civil unrest and rioting. According 
to Allen (2003), each of these events incorporated a response to perceived incursions by Far 
Right organisations into predominantly Muslim communities. 
. It 
in interesting to learn that CRE practitioners concede this, however, and share the view 
that there is enough scope under current coverage to protect racialised religious minorities. 
The following comment from Razia Karim addresses this very issue and so is worth quoting 
at length: 
I've raised this with the CPS in some particular areas before, including one where 
they were presented with a BNP leaflet. We referred it to the CPS and said that it 
was being distributed in an area with a high number of Pakistani residents who 
found it intimidating, abusive, threatening and insulting and we think you should 
prosecute. They were adamant they couldn't because it was directed against 
Muslims who are not covered by incitement to racial hatred. We argued that you 
can take the view that if it is circulated or distributed in an area with a 
concentration of a racial group - then you have to view it as an incitement to hatred 
of a racial group. [T]here is an example in Glasgow where a BNP activist had sent 
out material that was anti-Muslim but circulated it in an area with a sizable 
Pakistani population and there were prosecutions there. Even though on the face of 
it the leaflet was directed against a religion, they were actually stirring up hatred 
against a racial group. But this is where we come to the practise of what police and 
CPS officers do or don't understand, and this particular CPS region were adamant 
that they could not and would not prosecute. I think it could have been done under 
21 Following the Danish Cartoon Affair discussed in chapter six, the BNP boasted that it had distributed 
over half a million leaflets displaying the inflammatory images of the Prophet Mohammed. In a 
message on the BNP website, its leader, Nick Griffin, urged members to print off the leaflets and "pin 
them to church notice boards" and to "leave them on trains and buses" to protest at the decision by 
British newspapers not to publish the images (quoted in McVeigh, 2006). 
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the incitement to racial hatred provisions, but there was reluctance amongst the 
decision makers to do that (Karim, Interview). 
This supports the argument made earlier in chapter three, that what is required here is a more 
contextual account of racism per se, its interaction with cultural difference, and the 
relationship between cultural racism and Islamophobia in fuelling an incitement to religious 
hatred. In further support of this claim, the summary report on Islamophobia published by the 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia shortly after 9/11 indicated a rise in 
"physical and verbal threats being made, particularly to those visually identifiable as 
Muslims, in particular women wearing the hijab" (Allen and Nielsen, 2002: 16). Despite 
variations in the number and correlation of physical and verbal threats directed at Muslim 
population among the individual nation-states, one overarching feature among the fifteen 
European Union nation-states that emerged was the tendency for Muslim women to be 
attacked because the hijab signified a Muslim identity (ibid. 35). 22 If we reject a normative 
grammar of race and accept that legal categories of race and ethnicity should not foreclose 
deviations arrived at from social contingencies, including periods of Muslim racialisation, a 
coherent argument can be made for Muslim inclusion under coverage established by RRA 
legislation. This argument for inclusion could in fact follow that set out by Lord Simon of 
Glaisdale in his ruling that 
... `racial' 
is not a term of art either legal or scientific... This is rubbery and elusive 
language - understandably when the draughtsman is dealing with so imprecise a 
concept as race in its popular sense and endeavouring to leave no loophole for 
evasion. 23 
ZZ Several recent cases illustrate this further. For example, on 23 August 2007 a man attempted to run a 
Muslim woman over with his car while she waited at a bus stop in Southampton. The woman was 
wearing traditional Islamic dress and a head covering, and reported that the man drove up next to her 
and verbally abused her with anti-Muslim comments, before mounting the kerb and driving after her 
(see htt6: //news. bbc. co. uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/england/hampshire/6972201 stm). Also during August, a 
Welsh Muslim woman was assaulted by a group of people who pulled her hab from her head as she 
walked along the street with a pushchair (see http: //news. bbc. co. uk//go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/wales/6970761. stm). 
One of the most horrific examples includes how a London imam was subjected to a brutal assault and 
left in a critical condition requiring emergency surgery to both of his eyes, after two white assailants 
attacked him on his way to the mosque (see `Imam attacked as anti-Muslim violence grows', 
Independent, 14 August 2007). See also footnote 26 of chapter 3 which reports that there were 200 
Islamophobic incidents in the first two weeks following the London bombings. These included sixty 
five incidents of violent physical attacks and criminal damage, and one fatal stabbing where the victim 
was accosted by attackers shouting `Taliban' (IHRC press release, 25 July, 2005). 
23 London Borough Council ex parte Zesko v. Race Relations Board (1972) [AC 342]. 
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If social contingencies are acknowledged, it becomes possible to apply the Mandla formula to 
Muslims not only on the grounds of racial criteria, but also with respect to ethnic criteria 
according to the definitions discussed in chapter three, not least in thinking about the sorts of 
group boundaries premised upon cultural attributes of conscious value. 
3. Religious aggravation or incitement to religious hatred? 
Partly responding to some of these concerns, and reports of increased anti-Muslim racism 
and Islamophobia, the government introduced legislative provisions under Part 5 of the Anti- 
terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) (2001) which criminalised religiously 
aggravated offences. Section 39 of this Act amends part 2 of the CDA (1998) by 
incorporating religion into its offences covered by sections 28 to 32. This means that, in 
theory, the provisions of the CDA that cover assaults, criminal damage, public order offences 
and harassment, now also cover "racially or religiously aggravated" offences. As a result, if 
an offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by racial or religious hostility towards members of 
a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group, the offender may face 
increased fines and/or sentence enhancement. 
Since December 2001 there have been at least eighteen prosecutions in England and 
Wales for religiously aggravated offences, eight of which resulted in convictions, with six 
amounting to public order offences. One such case was that of Mark Norwood v. DPP (2003) 
[EWHC 1564], in which the high court upheld the conviction of a religiously aggravated 
offence committed by a member of the BNP in Gobowem, Shropshire, who displayed a poster 
depicting the devastation of the World Trade Centre in New York under the words: "Islam 
out of Britain... protect the British people". In his ruling against the plaintiff's defence that 
the poster was not motivated by hostility toward Muslims as a group but, rather, toward Islam 
as a religion, Lord Justice Auld ruled 
The poster was a public expression of attack on all Muslims in this country, urging 
all who might read it that followers of the Islamic religion here should be removed 
and warning that their presence here was a threat or danger to the British people. In 
my view, it could not, on any reasonable basis be dismissed as merely an 
intemperate criticism or protest against the tenets of the Muslim religion, as distinct 
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from an unpleasant attack on its followers generally (quoted in Ahdar and Leigh, 
2005: 381). 
Although this ruling cut away some of the rationale behind supporting the introduction of new 
generic legislation outlawing the incitement to religious hatred, it remains the case that such 
legislation was still desirable to many Muslims because of its potential to bring the 
protections afforded to all religious minorities into some sort of parity. Clause 38 of the 
aforementioned ATCS Bill, amended Part 3 of the POA to extend the existing provisions on 
incitement to racial hatred to cover incitement to religious hatred as well. It proposed to make 
an offence of using words, behaviour, or displaying written material deemed `threatening', 
`abusive' or `insulting' with the intention or likely effect that hatred would be stirred up 
against a group of people targeted because of their religious beliefs or lack of religious 
beliefs. It was thus argued that the incitement to stir up hatred would have to be aimed at 
people and not ideologies, and that just as race is not defined in the remit of race-relations 
legislations (but rather through precedent and case law), neither would be religion in the 
incitement legislation. 
Following a coalition forged by opposition parties in the House of Commons and House 
of Lords, however, with much public support from campaigners (including people who feared 
an embargo on telling religious jokes), the government was forced to amend the legislation to 
criminalise only `threatening' behaviour and not that deemed `abusive and insulting'. It also 
meant that people could only be prosecuted if it was demonstrated that they intended to stir up 
hatred - not if they were `reckless'. So that whilst the original proposals would 
have applied 
to a situation where the defendant did not actually intend to stir up religious hatred, the 
changes meant that the offence would only apply if the prosecution could establish sufficient 
grounds for premeditation. 
The strong opposition that ensued throughout each incarnation of the Bill included 
coalitions of satirists and liberals, conservatives and Christians, most notably the comedian 
Rowan Atkinson, Liberal Peer Lord Anthony Lester (an architect of the RRA), senior 
Barrister David Pannick QC, the Conservative Party front bench, and former Archbishop of 
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Canterbury, Lord Carey. This unique convergence did not escape the notice of the liberal 
activist Joan Smith (2007), who commented: "for once I find myself on the same side as the 
right-wing columnist Melanie Phillips and Don Horrocks of the Evangelical Alliance! " 
As chapter six (sec. 2-3) highlights, one of the most striking features in the political 
discourse throughout the discussion of this legislation was a dissonance between some 
Muslim organisations, who argued that the recourse to law was necessary at a time of 
increased prejudice, intimidation and incitement of hatred, and the mainstream media which 
presented it as an example of Muslim incompatibility vis-ä-vis British culture and tradition. 
Contrary to viewing it as an attempt to incorporate a confident Muslim-consciousness into the 
public sphere, it was argued that Muslims were seeking to put their beliefs beyond scrutiny. 
That there was such little attempt by anti-discrimination liberals with impeccable 
credentials, particularly Lord Lester, to understand the lived experiences of Muslims, has 
continued to inform the view that the discrimination faced by Muslim groups is less urgent or 
important than that faced by other groups. In the words of Iqbal Sacranie, then Secretary 
General of the MCB 
The aim was to provide a level playing field so that the protections that applied to 
race would be extended to religion; for example, criminalising reckless, abusive 
and insulting behaviour directed at an individual because of their faith. It would 
have given Muslims the same protection afforded to Sikhs and Jews in the UK 
(Sacranie, 4 June, 2006). 
Such was the depth of hostility to proposed legislation24, specifically because it was feared 
that such legislation would place Islam beyond the point of scrutiny, that the bar was 
significantly raised. As chapter six (sec 4) details, the opposition to the legislation was also 
informed by a general suspicion of `fundamentalism', `radicalism' and `extremism' amongst 
Muslim communities and, specifically, the fear that such legislation would buttress or further 
encourage these inclinations. 
24 First tied to the ACSA (2001) and subsequently dropped, then attached and withdrawn from the 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill (2004-5) to speed its passage prior to the last general election 
(see Meer, 2008). Each attempt to create this new offence sought to modify the previously mentioned 
Incitement to Racial Hatred found in Part 111 of The Public Order Act 1986. This offence is based 
upon that previously adopted in Northern Ireland in the The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 
1987 PART 111 which has outlawed incitement to Religious Hatred for some years. 
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At the same time, it is important to note that this proposed legislation was not universally 
supported by all Muslim bodies, as Arzu Merali of the IHRC makes clear 
We are kind of nervous about cutting down on free speech; whilst we do have a 
strong position which accepts that there has to be curbs on hate speech, we were 
reluctant to support this legislation because it arrived in the context of a security 
agenda, which itself was very, very problematic.... [inaudible]. Secondly, we also 
looked at the experience of what happened when they introduced incitement to 
racial hatred and it was primarily, and has until today, been used disproportionately 
against black activists. We were not supremely confident that, with or without the 
current climate, anything better would happen with the incitement to religious 
hatred. We were very sceptical of the improvements available with that particular 
piece of legislation (Merali, Interview). 
The Muslim Parliament, led by Dr Ghayasuddin Siddiqui, similarly argued that 
Freedom of speech and liberty may be inconvenient at times but are values we must 
all uphold. The Labour Party is cynically seeking to placate Muslims by promoting 
fudge legislation in Parliament, which they know will not get passed. [T]he 
campaign led by a section of the Muslim community for a new law on incitement 
to religious hatred, amidst an atmosphere of heightened expectation is unwarranted 
(Press Release, 7 March 2005). 
Both share with Barbara Cohen, commentating in her capacity as chair of the Discrimination 
Law Association (DLA) as well as the former head of CRIS legal policy, a view that the 
proposed legislation was a `cynical' attempt to mollify Muslims aggrieved at the war in Iraq; 
not least the MCB who had been lobbying for such legislation, the introduction of which was 
designed 
... to 
keep the MCB happy and to keep them supporting New Labour! It was 
initially offered like the jam on top of some very intrusive legislation: the Anti- 
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which could be seen as likely to target 
Muslims; this part of that bill was subsequently dropped because of the opposition 
to the substance of that bill. The government then quite cynically put it in its 
election manifesto to win the Muslim vote, and to some extent this worked. 
(Cohen, Interview). 25 
Recognising the political context in which it was introduced, however, does not undermine 
the original argument in favour of - nor the continuing requirement and legitimacy of " this 
legislation. Indeed, and although Cohen thinks that "the Lords were right to send it back with 
the proposed amendments", she recognises the remaining discrepancy in the level of 
protection and scope for redress that continues to inform the Muslim complaints of inequality 
25 This is also a salient view expressed in the public and media discourse examined in the next chapter. 
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... the key thing with the 
law as it stands is that it doesn't cover subjectively defined 
`insulting and abusive' experiences but `threatening' behaviour. Obviously this 
will mean a discrepancy between inciting religious hatred and inciting racial hatred. 
[... ] The Discrimination Law Association had a long internal debate on what our 
position should be; in the end we adopted a 4-pronged approach: firstly that the 
government was perhaps the body most responsible for stirring up hostility towards 
Muslims; secondly that most of the examples of `inciting hatred' that have been 
used in the debates involved matters that could and should be dealt with under the 
existing criminal law - so the fault lies with the police and their lack of response 
creates lack of confidence by the Muslim community to report incidents; thirdly, 
any legislation that might inhibit freedom of speech should be carefully scrutinised; 
and fourthly that the law should provide equivalent protection for all religious 
groups (ibid. ). 
The second of her four issues, that concerning the lack of political and judicial will to 
prosecute anti-Muslim racial discrimination, return us to Lester's argument concerning the 
applicability of current legislation, and proves crucial when trying to understand why 
established anti-discrimination legislation has never been extended to protect Muslims. Razia 
Karim rests this firmly at the door of criminal justice agencies 
[W]e would bring complaints to the CPS or the Police and they would say. `look, 
we can't do anything about this because there is no protection from religious 
hatred'. So every time you got a complaint about an advert, a BNP poster or 
leafleting, the police would say, `sorry, we can't do anything'. So we saw a gap in 
the protections. Whereas Sikh and Jewish people could draw on protections 
because they're an ethnic group and can draw on incitement provisions. [... ] I think 
we're happy that we've got something on the statute book [but] I actually think that 
our concerns are even bigger practical ones, which is that even with the incitement 
to racial hatred provisions, we've seen them be under used. They really are not 
used very often or frequently to protect people from racial hatred. 
Although the Norwood finding is a good indication that the judiciary is not wholly ignoring 
anti-Muslim racism and Islamaphobia, this does not off-set the desire for much broader anti- 
religious discrimination legislation that is comparable to the broad range of protections 
afforded under existing RRA legislation, including the imposition of a statutory duty. An 
objection thus arises when institutions make space for, and promote a positive duty to 
recognise, some religious practices and this is not made equally available to other faiths (see 
footnotes 10 and 30 of this chapter). When allied, for example, with instances of lesser 
recognition being afforded to Muslim employees to take time off from work for religious 
festivals, then institutional Islamophobia becomes a legitimate charge, where the grounds for 
refusal are based upon an objection to making allowances for Islam in particular. Continuing 
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with this example of employment legislation, it is possible to identify an interface between the 
genuine improvements and their limitations in terms of resolving some of the tensions 
outlined above. The following section elaborates this point through a discussion of the ways 
in which recent legislation has been adopted. 
4. Article 13 and the Treaty of Amsterdam 
It has been established that UK legislation prohibits discrimination on the grounds of 
racial or ethnic origin, enacts a higher sentencing tariff for racist violence and prohibits the 
incitement of racial hatred. Across the European Union, 26 however, there has been no 
consistent level of protection against racial discrimination and, like the UK, little legislation 
that consistently protects people from discrimination that takes place on grounds of religion, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. 27 In recognition of this, and following proposals set out 
in November 1999, the European Commissionproposed the following, under Article 13 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, in December 2003 
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the 
powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may 
take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Office Journal of 
European Communities C325/33 pp: 11 and Council Directive 2000/78/EC))28 
26 EU [27] Enlargement includes the EU9 who were the European Community in 1980 (France, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Luxemburg, UK, Denmark and Ireland), plus the EU15 who 
were the European Union in 2003 (EU9 plus Spain, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, Finland and Austria), 
and the EU25 which is the European Union in 2004 (EU15 plus the AlO) and now the EU27 which 
amounts to the European Union after Bulgarian and Romanian accession; A10 - the ten countries that 
joined the EU in May 2004 (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, 
Cyprus, Slovakia and Slovenia); A8: The eight Central and Eastern European countries of the A10 
(Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia); A2: Bulgaria 
and Romania, who joined in January, 2007. 
27 Sex discrimination is covered by existing European Union legislation under Article 141 EC (Ex. Art. 
119 EEC). See also Equal Pay Directive Dir. 75/117 EEC; Equal Treatment Directive 1976 Dir. 76/207 
EEC; and Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive 79/7 EEC; Burden of Proof Directive1997 Dir. 
97/80/EC. 
28 Cohen provides an interesting contextual insight when she recounts that "the Race Directive was 
approved in Europe very quickly - this was when Haider had been elected in Austria and there were 
too many racist incidents across Europe so no Member State would want to be seen to be voting against 
an anti-racism measure. For the next directive there was much more politicking going on. The 
Catholic Church used its influence so protection for religious organisations is particularly good. The 
conflicts between the grounds covered by the Framework Employment Directive are now coming out - 
especially conflicts between religion or belief and sexual orientation. If it were not for the EU 
Directives I do not think we would have legislation on religious discrimination or sexual orientation 
151 
On this basis, three broad directives were issued to member states. The first established a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (the Employment 
Directive), which would require member states to make discrimination unlawful on grounds 
of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation in the areas of 
employment and training. The second directive implemented the principle of equal treatment 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (the Race Directive). Like the Employment Directive, 
the Race Directive requires member states to make discrimination on grounds of racial or 
ethnic origin unlawful in employment and training. Unlike the employment directive, it goes 
further in requiring member states to provide protection against discrimination in non- 
employment areas, such as education, access to social welfare, and the provision of goods and 
services. The final directive, meanwhile, sought to establish an `Action Programme', with an 
allocated budget of one hundred million euros over six years, to fund `practical' action by 
member states in promoting equality in all the areas covered by the two directives; effectively 
mirroring the RRA approach to pursuing proactive initiatives in combating discrimination in 
member states. 9 Key objectives include a promotion of `transnational co-operation' between 
organisations in member states, as well as encouragement to tackle discrimination throughout 
the European Union, and to `exchange' ideas and information. 
4.1. Implications and relevancy 
In a similar manner to the way in which the RRA operates, the scope of the Employment 
Directive is not limited to an employee's actual religion or belief, it is simply that they are 
treated less favourably on the grounds of religion or belief. Hence, "the discriminator's 
perception (whether accurate or erroneous) of the religion or belief of the person 
discriminated against will therefore suffice" (Ahdar and Leigh, 2005: 305). Since the 
directives are concerned with laying down broad objectives to ensure that discrimination is 
discrimination and very definitely would not be expecting legislation on age discrimination" 
(Interview). 
29 The Action Programme is administered by the EC, assisted by an advisory committee made up of 
representatives from all the member states. 
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prohibited and that victims are entitled to a minimum level of redress, they do not prohibit the 
introduction of greater degrees of protection, and where higher levels of protection already 
exist, member states will be required to uphold these. In theory, then, anybody working or 
simply travelling within the European Union will enjoy the same minimum level of protection 
from discrimination in all the member states 30 
This legislation has already been tested in the UK with the case of Khan v. NIC Hygiene 
Ltd, (2005) [ET 1803250/04]. The details of the case are that, having worked for the 
company for nine years, Mr. Mohammed Khan used his annual 25-day holiday entitlement 
and another week's unpaid leave to make a pilgrimage to Mecca to perform the Hajj. It later 
transpired that although he had requested the leave in good time, he received no response 
from his employer and was advised by his trade union (TGWU) that if he had heard nothing 
he could assume his request for leave would be granted. Upon his return, however, he was 
suspended without pay and later had his contract terminated. Subsequently, he took his 
complaint to a Leeds employment tribunal which, in January 2005, ruled that he had been 
unfairly dismissed in contravention of the newly introduced regulations. 
In another case of Mohammed v Virgin Trains (2005) [ET 2201814/04], Mr Mohammed 
claimed that he had been dismissed because he had refused to trim his beard shorter than the 
ten centimetres that he argued was required by his faith, and that his requests to wear a 
religious skullcap had repeatedly been refused. The employer argued that Mr Mohammed 
had been offered the job after agreeing to trim his beard to comply with the company's "neat 
and tidy" facial hair policy, and that he had been told that he could wear a skullcap if it was in 
the corporate colours. The employment tribunal found that there was no religious 
discrimination because his dismissal was purely based on poor performance. 
30 It is worth noting, however, that some countries are proving better than others at incorporating these 
directives into national legislative frameworks (see Dhami, Squires and Modood, 2006). Indeed, there 
is evidence which could be interpreted as suggesting that some EU countries have been delaying their 
adoption through various judicial means. It is also worth noting that the directive does not prohibit 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, which is dealt with separately in the Treaty. 
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According to Huang and Kleiner (2001: 128), these examples are symptomatic of a much 
broader trend where "requests for religious accommodation in the workplace may well 
explode over the next decade" 
In the 1960s and 1970s, blacks and women fought for their rights. In the 1980s and 
1990s, it was gays and lesbians. Now it has turned into employers and employees 
and the battlefield is religion in the workplace. As a result, workers are suing 
employers for the freedom to express their religion (ibid). 
The difficulty with this position is that such requests have been in evidence from Muslims in 
Britain since as far back as the 1970s. Typical of such examples is the case of Ahmed v. ILEA 
(1976) [1QB36CA], where it was deemed not unlawful to deny a Muslim teacher the time to 
observe prayers for an hour on Friday afternoons. Nevertheless, it may appear that Huang 
and Kleiner are correct in the sense that episodes of discrimination are rarely discused in 
public and media discourse unless the facts of a case are especially newsworthy. As the next 
chapter discusses, these discourses are promoting a perception of religious exceptionalism 
(see also Meer, 2006; Meer and Noorani, forthcoming). This is particularly the case where 
the complainant is Muslim, an analysis supported by Cohen's view that 
There have been several hundred religious discrimination cases in employment 
tribunals, certainly not all brought by Muslims... Of those that I have read, most 
seem to be about matters like accommodation, when employees can be away from 
their jobs, rather than cases where religious prejudice is the issue. I think that 
Muslims will continue to be prominent because of the continuing anti-terrorism 
measures that fuels Islamophobia (Interview). 
4.2. Limitations 
The EC Race Directive mirrors the wording of UK RRA both in terms of the main 
principles of promoting equality of access and opportunity, and imposing a statutory duty of 
care. However, the Race Directive shares with the RRA the criterion of racial and ethnic 
groupings that exclude religious minorities (which may result from the assumption that 
religion would be covered by the parallel Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
regulations). This situation invites two main criticisms. The first criticism points to the 
limited scope of the legislation which, although encompassing the important arena of 
employment, will continue to deny Muslims in Britain broader legal protections in the areas 
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of social welfare, including health care, and public services, education and housing, amongst 
others. This is a point made by Arzu Merali when she notes: 
... the application that 
is afforded in employment doesn't, go across the board so 
again we're in that position again where some communities are covered from 
religious discrimination because they are accepted as racial minorities while others 
are not. And again, Muslims are out of that loop! (Interview). 
This is of particular concern given the levels of disadvantage experienced by Muslim 
minorities in these very areas31 (Abrams and Houston, 2006; Performance Innovation Unit 
(PIU), 2001; Modood et al 1997), and is further undermined by the fact that there is no legal 
aid available for people to bring their cases, which means that, "while you could claim the 
moral high ground if you like, you couldn't take it through the courts unless you had the 
appropriate resources which, on a practical side, we see day in day out because it's very hard 
to bring forward cases" (Merali, Interview). Crucially, this legislation does not stipulate 
regulatory or enforcement functions as in the case of RRA. Karim summarises both the 
reasons and the implications of these shortcomings: 
We can't deal with these cases [of religious discrimination] because the Act that sets 
up the CRE doesn't allow us to. It was discussed at the time but rejected, fair to say 
probably by both parties, the CRE and the Home Office, that we wouldn't venture 
into religious discrimination cases. So there's no one place where a person can go to 
for advice if they felt they'd suffered religious discrimination. [... ] There are very few 
advice agencies with the funding to represent people in front of the tribunals, if you 
are lucky enough to live in an area where you have such advice centres, you might 
get help there. Otherwise you would have to fund it privately and pay for your own 
lawyer, or do it yourself. The success of discrimination cases before a tribunal is 
very low already, and I think most people who are litigants in person fail. So on the 
face of it, we have the law and that's very welcome, but there are real problems with 
access to justice and enforcing those rights, and I think that remains a big issue for 
victims of discrimination on religious grounds (interview). 
31 For example, Abrams and Houston (2006) and Modood et at (1997) found that Muslims have 
disproportionately lower incomes and higher rates of unemployment. They have comparatively lower 
skills both in education and in vocational training. They are more likely to reside in deprived housing 
situations and disproportionately suffer from bad health. The PIU (2001) report on ethnic minorities 
found that Muslims are generally more likely to say that they feel unsafe at night both in their homes 
and walking alone in their neighborhoods. In the context of social and economic conditions, more than 
half of all Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, who are a significant part of the Muslim community in Britain, 
live in the 10 percent of the most deprived wards in England and Scotland. Around one third of these 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis live in properties that are deemed `unfit' within the private sector. Around 
30 percent live in the most deprived neighbourhoods. 
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4.3. Implementation 
The second issue is the manner in which this legislation has been implemented, since the 
government initially adopted it via secondary legislation by transposing it onto existing 
legislative instruments, rather than introducing it through a new Parliamentary Act. 
According to Cohen, "... the government felt that after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and the 
Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 they had spent enough time dealing with race and that 
their priorities and parliamentary schedules wouldn't allow for another race bill" (interview). 
A new Single Equalities Act32 was advocated by the Forum of Action against Islamophobia 
and Racism (FAIR) for the reasons that: 
A single Equality Act would show the indivisibility of the principle of equality and 
encourage strong links between groups facing discrimination. It would place all 
grounds of discrimination on an equal footing, providing an equal level of 
protection to all groups that suffer discrimination. More importantly, the 
amalgamation would rid the area of anti-discrimination law from the confusion, 
complexities and inconsistencies that currently exist (FAIR, 2002: Section 4, 
Paragraph 20) 
An implementation of the employment directive through new primary legislation would also, 
according to FAIR, have allowed "Muslims to participate in the public media and 
parliamentary debate on the issue [and] see that the main political institutions in this respect 
are taking their main political demands seriously" (FAIR, 2002: section 4: paragraph 97). 
32 On 30 October 2003, the Government announced its intention to establish a single Commission for 
Equality and Human Rights (CEHR). This announcement followed the consultation - Equality and 
Diversity: Making It Happen - which launched the most significant review of UK equality institutions 
in a generation. The Government then wrote a White Paper called Fairness for All: A New Commission 
for Equality and Human Rights. The enabling legislation, the Equality Bill, was considered by 
Parliament and introduced as The Equality Act (2006). It is a precursor to the promised Single 
Equality Act, the aim of which is to combine all UK equality enactments and to provide comparable 
protections across all equality strands. Those explicitly mentioned by the Equality Act (2006) include 
age; disability; gender; proposed; commenced or completed gender reassignment; race; religion or' 
belief and sexual orientation. The Discrimination Law Review (DLR) was set up alongside an 
independent Equalities Review, chaired by Trevor Phillips, to look at the underlying societal and 
cultural causes of disadvantage and inequality. The Equalities Review published an interim report for 
consultation on 20 March 2006 and its final report, Fairness and Freedom, on 28 February 2007. So 
far, however, it remains the case that there is no proposed Religion Equality Duty, and because 
Muslims are excluded from coverage afforded by Race Relations legislation, the absence in protection 
means that public authorities in local communities where there are large numbers of Muslims are not 
required to take the needs of Muslim communities into account. According to Cohen, "[another] 
review of discrimination law is unlikely to happen again for a long while so we need to take the 
opportunity as a bare minimum to harmonise some quite disparate pieces of legislation. What many of 
us want is for new legislation to do much more than prevent discrimination. It should be working 
towards substantive equality. That isn't just about the "diversity" or stopping less favourable treatment 
but includes measures that will tackle historic disadvantage and longstanding inequalities" (Interview). 
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4.4. Precedents, material scope and direct and indirect discrimination 
There are indeed precedents for the sort of approach required to establish a new single 
Equalities Act, which could harmonise anti-discrimination legislation and have an 
amalgamated body to monitor its implementation. For example, in the United States these 
two issues are addressed through the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EOEC) - 
a quasi-governmental agency responsible for investigating claims of racial, sexual and 
religious discrimination in the workplace - which monitors the application of the Workplace 
Religious Freedom Act (1970). Article VII of this Act requires that companies make 
`reasonable efforts' to accommodate religious practices and beliefs. For example 
Employers cannot schedule examinations or other selection activities in conflict 
with a current or prospective employee's religious needs, inquire about an 
applicant's future availability at certain times, maintain a restrictive dress code, or 
refuse to allow observance of a Sabbath or religious holiday, unless the employer 
can prove that not doing so would cause an undue hardship (Huang and Kleiner, 
2001: 132) 
This followed the case of Katz v. Sears which involved a dispute between an orthodox Jew, 
Kalman Katz, and the large chain retailer Sears Roebuck. The latter refused to employ the 
former as a repair technician, not because he did not meet the skills criteria stipulated by the 
application details, but because adherence to religious instruction forbade Mr. Katz from 
working Saturdays - the retailer's busiest days for repair technicians. When Mr. Katz took his 
complaint to federal law court, Sears Roebuck was adjudged to be at fault in discriminating 
against the claimant because of his upholding of religious beliefs 33 
5. Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR) 
As a potential precursor to a single Equalities Act (see footnote 32), the government has 
created a new Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR), which will have 
responsibility for promoting different UK equality strands and enforcing anti-discrimination 
laws on all grounds set out in Article 13. It will also promote (but not enforce) the narrow 
33 Unlike the religious discrimination instruments in article 13, the US legislation was extended to some 
educational and other public institutions of local and federal government in 1972. 
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provisions of the Human Rights Act (HRA) and international human rights conventions such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Covering race, gender, sexual 
orientation, age, disabilities, religion and human rights, and with an annual budget of £57m, 
"the CEHR will be one of Europe's largest human rights bodies" (Birt, 2006: 4). Although 
some of its structure and function remains undecided, and is unlikely to be operational before 
2008, the current chair of the CRE, Trevor Phillips, has been appointed to head the new body. 
As chapter one details, Phillips is an outspoken critic of multiculturalism and has already 
stated that Muslim faith schools pose a threat to the coherence of British society, and that 
British Muslims seeking to live according to principles of the shari `a should leave the country 
(Bowcott, 2007). According to one Muslim commentator this "propensity to rhetoric has 
arguably helped to isolate and stereotype Muslims rather... than understand, support and help 
them" (Birt, 2006: 4). What it also suggests is that the delivery of anti-discriminatory and 
equality policy on the basis of religion "is in the hands of someone who has such little 
sympathy or liking for Muslims. " (ibid). Whilst this may be a little strong, there certainly 
appears to be a dissonance between Phillips and Muslim communities on a number of key 
issues concerning the public recognition of Muslim identities. More generally, Merali raises 
concerns over the effectiveness of this new body with respect to carrying out race equality 
duties, and where Muslims once might have been able to fit into 
[W]hat has traditionally been understood as the race-relations mandate seems to be 
regressing rather than being taken further, so that in itself is a hugely worrying 
development and we're finding it quite difficult to see how that situation has come 
about, but I think it reflects the lack of willingness of government to engage with 
the grass roots, including Muslim organisations, with regards to discrimination on 
these topics (Merali, Interview). 
Equally, and as a precursor to this charge, some Muslim organisations have already pointed to 
a loss of confidence in the CRE as it currently stands, specifically in terms of its commitment 
to tackling anti-Muslim discrimination. This complaint is situated in a general picture of CRE 
operational withdrawal described by Cohen and supported by Karim below. While the latter 
rationalises this withdrawal, in terms of a broader CRE strategy, the former laments the 
practice as politically motivated 
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The CRE itself seems to be disengaging from frontline community work and 
links.... The current mantra is `integration not litigation' and in 2004 the CRE 
provided legal representation to only one case. No other individuals were 
represented by the CRE either in tribunals or civil proceedings! The not 
unsurprising result has been to dissuade applicants from pursuing their cases. It's 
absolutely ridiculous - there's no point in having good laws if the people the Jaws 
should benefit can't use them (Cohen, Interview). 
The Muslim community may feel that we're not taking their cases and litigating on 
their behalf, but I think many other groups would feel the same because our 
litigating strategy had changed in that we were taking fewer cases and the cases are 
more strategic. [... ] It's partly a general trend' where we felt that after many years 
of doing high volume case work and litigation, there was a genuine need to move 
towards a strategy that would last across a sector or a group with one case rather 
than the 10 or 20 cases. (Karim, Interview). 
The view amongst some Muslim organisations that the CRE has proven ineffectual is not 
easily explained away by stressing CRE operational imperatives. Indeed, there is evidence 
that Muslim bodies such as the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) are increasingly 
materially supporting cases where the claimant is not assisted by the CRE because the issue 
concerns anti-Muslim discrimination 
I think the CRE has recently suffered a huge loss of credibility irregardless of the 
IHRC or other organisations taking any cases forward. I'm not against 
organisations being strategic but... the problem with the CRE is that they haven't 
highlighted anti-Muslim racism, and they're extremely hesitant and largely do not 
take on cases that directly discriminate against Muslims. Just speaking in a wider 
context, and therefore with colleagues in other organisations in the race-relations 
industry, some of the things that very senior members of the CRE have been saying 
about multiculturalism and so on itself has detracted from its legitimacy as an 
organisation. It's kind of positioned it very much in the government camp, again 
dictating from the top down on what it is to be a minority; what we can get and 
what we should expect and so on. Rather than actually looking at the experiences 
of what a community are and how to go about redressing that (Merali, Interview). 
Merali's complaint perfectly captures the Muslim objection to how anti-discrimination 
legislation has both historically been conceived and how it currently operates to exclude 
Muslims, creating a hierarchy of protected identities in recognising the racism perpetrated 
against some religious minorities and not others. 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that Muslims in Britain are subject to a dissonance in not being 
beneficiaries of anti-discrimination legislation - as Muslims - whilst remaining full recipients 
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of its obligations. This impairs the sorts of civic status that Muslims enjoy and returns us to 
the Du Boisian characterisation set-out in chapter two (sec 3.2a), which describes the way in 
which minorities feel alienated and disenfranchised because they are sidelined in the political 
structure of their society, remaining bound by the requirements but not experiencing the 
rewards of citizenship. It is argued that what is required is a principled operation of anti- 
discrimination legislation vis-ä-vis Muslims which can distinguish between the right to 
religious freedom and the right to non-discrimination on the grounds of religion. For 
example, whilst the former is concerned with those who are committed to Islam as religious 
believers, the latter could be concerned with how discrimination against Muslims has the 
ability to pick out individuals on the basis of discernable characteristics, to assign individuals 
to a group, to give emphasis to those criteria that are used to stigmatize, and that reflect 
pejorative or negative assumptions based on the individual's membership of that group. 
This chapter has argued that a more flexible approach should be adopted, one that draws 
upon factual evidence and gives weight to the self-perception of individuals and their 
communities about their own sources of identity. Such an approach might allow us to explore 
the social contingencies of a Muslim identity; its saliency and interaction with other sources 
of identity. Indeed, this chapter has shown how the efforts for Muslim inclusion perfectly 
illustrate the movement from a historically-ascribed identity to a politically self-defined 
identity that contests Muslim-specific discrimination and Islamophobia. This movement is 
complemented by evidence that Muslim bodies such as the Islamic Human Rights 
Commission (IHRO) are increasingly materially supporting cases where the claimant is not 
assisted by established bodies because the complaint concerns anti-Muslim discrimination. 
Another example of Muslim autonomy is explored in the final multi-method case studies 




Muslim Schools in Britain: Muslim-consciousness in action? 
I think we're at a very interesting stage. The metaphor I use is that the first Muslims that 
came here were like the farmer standing on the ground; they were standing on it but didn't 
have roots in it. But their seed has been scattered with some falling on good ground, others 
falling on stony ground and yet some being blown away in the wind. In some ways we're 
only now at the beginning of establishing a genuine Muslim presence in the United Kingdom 
and that presence is from the seed of the second and third generations. 
Idreas Mears, Association of Muslim Schools (AMS) (Interview, 1 April 2006). 
1. Introduction 
Earlier chapters have delineated the emergence of a heterogeneous Muslim identity and 
characterised it as a form of Muslim-consciousness. Reporting on the last of three case 
studies the present chapter examines the relationship between this Muslim-consciousness and 
mobilisations for Muslim schools. Indeed, there are now over one hundred independent and 
seven state funded Muslim schools in Britain, and their place within the British education 
system remains subject to intense debate (Parker-Jenkins et aL, 2005; Fetzer and Soper, 
2003). This is arguably due to the frequency with which Muslim schools are cited in various 
deliberations concerning Muslim civic engagement, political incorporation and social 
integration. Whether they are frowned upon and viewed as an obstacle to social harmony 
(Dawkins, 2007; Grayling, 2006; Bell, 2005; NSS, 2004; HPG, 2001) or welcomed as a 
panacea or antidote to a prescriptive or coercive assimilation (Bunting, 2006; Ameli., et al 
2005; AMSS, 2004; Hussain 2004; CBMI, 2004,1997), Muslim schools have undoubtedly 
emerged as a highly salient issue that at times reinforces and at other times cuts across 
political and philosophical divides. 
At the same time, and despite the proliferation of literature on Muslims in Britain that has 
multiplied as one seeming crisis has given way to another, very little research has consciously 
tried to investigate how an increasingly salient articulation of Muslim identity connects with 
the issue of Muslim schooling (as it equally might with other key arenas of British 
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citizenship, including protection from discrimination, an issue taken up in the following 
chapter). Thus, and despite sustained Muslim mobilisations for Muslim schools within and 
across diverse Muslim communities, surprisingly little is known of how these mobilisations 
are being undertaken, what is being sought, and, more generally, why Muslim schools are 
deemed to be an important issue for some Muslim communities. 
It is argued that Muslim schools make an ideal case through which to examine the 
emergence and meaning of Muslim-consciousness within and amongst British-Muslim 
communities themselves, alongside the way that this is understood at an official level. In 
part, this is due to the significant interaction that is required between Muslim parents, Muslim 
educators, local education authorities (LEAs) and the Department for Education and Skills 
(DIES) throughout the creation, operation and monitoring of Muslim schools in the manner 
described below. By characterising the Muslim-consciousness discussed in the previous 
chapter as a kind of self-consciousness for itself, located squarely in the Du Boisian tradition 
set out in chapter two, the current chapter explores the relationship between this 
consciousness and Muslim mobilisations for faith schools. The chapter chiefly examines 
whether an incorporation and reflection of Muslim-consciousness in education can assist or 
prevent this Muslim-consciousness from turning inward, rather than striving outward, in 
potential synthesis, as a meaningful and reciprocal British-Muslim identity. 
" For these reasons, the first part of this chapter examines the relationship 
between governmental policy and identity articulations presently informing 
Muslim mobilisations, before contextualising these mobilisations within a 
historically peculiar British schooling context. The second part discusses some 
of the broader philosophical, political and sociological literature concerning how 
Muslim educators answer frequently made charges against Muslim schooling. 
Particular attention is afforded to the argument for autonomy, the role of civic assimilation in 
the remaking of British-Muslim constituencies, as well as Muslim curricula objectives and 
concerns over social cohesion. Each of these issues is explored through the adoption of an 
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integrated, multi-method case study analysis in the ways set out in the introduction to pursue 
the three-fold questions below 
" Firstly, why have there been sustained Muslim mobilisations on the issue of 
Muslim schools within and across diverse Muslim communities? 
" Secondly, what does the engagement or non-engagement of Muslims over the 
issue of education reveal about their incorporation into a rubric of British 
citizenship, specifically with respect to their civic status and participation? 
" Thirdly, how can a recognition and reflection of the substantive elements of a 
Muslim-consciousness within the sphere of education attend to the sorts of 
double-consciousness discussed in chapter two? 
2. The Policy Context 
It is worth briefly setting out the public policy context with respect to Muslim schools 
here at the beginning, where a concise overview can be gained by turning our attention to a 
recent watershed in Muslim schooling, in order to facilitate more advanced discussion later in 
the chapter. This watershed was achieved in 1998 when, after eighteen years of a 
Conservative administration, Tony Blair's newly elected Labour government delivered on a 
promise in its election manifesto and co-opted two primary schools Islamia School (in Brent, 
London) and Al-Furqan School (in Birmingham) into the state sector by awarding them 
Voluntary Aided (VA) status, and with it an allocation of public money to cover teacher 
salaries and the running costs of the school. It arrived "fourteen years and five Secretaries of 
State after the first naive approach" (Hewitt, 1998: 22), when Muslim parents and educators 
had only begun to get to grips with the convoluted application process to achieve state 
funding, and were operating in the context of a Conservative government that was hostile to 
the idea of state funded Muslim schools. 
Both the aforementioned Islamia and Al-Furqun schools had already undergone a strict 
inspection by the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) and had more than met the 
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appropriate governmental criteria required of independent schools applying for state funding. 
Alongside the obvious, such as the delivery of a good standard of education and the economic 
feasibility of a school, these criteria require (i) the adoption and delivery of the National 
Curriculum (ranging from a `thinner' to `thicker' adoption depending on whether the school is 
VA or Voluntary Controlled (VC) as discussed below); (ii) the appointment of appropriately 
qualified staff; (iii) the provision of suitable school buildings; (iv) equality of opportunity for 
both male and female pupils, and (v) consideration of parental demand. 
All of this is of course premised upon the "need" for a school in a given area based upon 
the number of available pupil spaces. In the past, this has been cited as the principle reason 
for - having met all other criteria - refusing some Muslim schools to opt into the state system, 
whilst simultaneously inviting other religious schools in similar areas to do so (see AMSS, 
2004: 20 and Parker-Jenkins 2002: 279). Nevertheless, the success of these two schools was 
given further impetus in the Government White Paper, Schools: Achieving Success (200 1)1, so 
that nine years and another four Secretaries of State later the current number of state funded 
1 This developed into a more reserved public commitment after the northern riots in the summer of 
2001 were partly understood as an outcome of Muslim self-segregation (Cantle, 2001), and the 
discursive fall-out of 9/11 bled into public and media appraisal of all Muslim and Islamic education, 
often likening it to certain Madrasses found on the sub-continent where rote learning takes precedence 
over the cultivation of `independent' thinking. For example, Labour MP Tony Wright, commenting on 
Muslim faith schooling, stated that "[b]efore September 11 it looked like a bad idea, it now looks like a 
mad idea" (BBC News, 22/11/2001 available at: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/education/1670704. stm). 
By the time the initiative reached the legislature in the form of the Education Act 2002, however, it 
regained some of its' initial impetus. Hence Paragraphs 66-67 provide for the creation of new 
secondary schools, and set out the responsibilities of the LEAs and the procedures to be followed to 
this end. The summary booklet for the Bill states in paragraph 2.10 "We are also taking steps to 
encourage greater innovation in the creation of new schools. In particular, we will take steps to allow 
greater involvement of external partners in the provision of wholly new schools [Para 2.11 is about 
setting up city academies] 2.12 Innovation in the provision of new schools will also be extended much 
more widely. Where a new secondary school is required, the LEA will advertise, so that any interested 
party can put forward proposals for a new school. Any promoter, including a community or faith group, 
an LEA or another public, private or voluntary body can publish proposals. These will be judged on the 
basis of their educational merits, value for money and the outcome of consultation". Para 5.30 then 
sets out the Government position in its fullest, stating that: "Faith schools have a significant history as 
part of the state education system, and play an important role in its diversity. Over the last four years, 
we have increased the range of faith schools in the maintained sector, including the first Muslim, Sikh 
and Greek Orthodox schools. There are also many independent faith schools and we know that some 
faith groups are interested in extending their contribution to state education. We wish to welcome faith 
schools, with their distinctive ethos and character, into the maintained sector where there is clear local 
agreement. Guidance to School Organisation Committees will require them to give proposals from 
faith groups to establish schools the same consideration as those from others, including LEAs. 
Decisions to establish faith schools should take account of the interests of all sections of the 
community. " 
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Muslim faith schools has risen to seven. In addition to those previously mentioned, this figure 
includes Al-HYrah (a secondary school in Birmingham), Feversham College (a secondary 
school in Bradford), Gatton Primary School (in Wandsworth, South London), Tauheedul 
Islam Girls High School (Blackburn, Lancashire) and The Avenue School (another primary 
school in Brent, London). 
Given the existence of over 4,700 state funded Church of England schools, over 2100 
Catholic, 33 Jewish and 28 Methodist schools, Muslim campaigns for equality of access and 
opportunity in the faith schooling of Muslim children, in the state sector, is indicative of "a 
modern society which is widely perceived as increasingly secular but is paradoxically 
increasingly multi-faith" (Skinner, 2002: 172). If we consider how successfully the 
influential public policy document on British education, the Swann Report (1985), had shifted 
the mainstream agenda away from faith schooling in the state-sector as a realistic educational 
option for minority ethnic children, this `paradox' is particularly interesting. Fearing that 
faith schooling for minority students would intensify their difficulties, the Swann Report 
concluded 
... the establishment of 
`separate' schools could well fail to tackle many of the 
underlying concerns of the communities and might also exacerbate the very 
feelings of rejection and not being accepted (Swann Report, 1985: 509). 
These "underlying concerns" are discussed in the next section of this chapter, but it is worth 
noting that they include the complaint by Muslim parents and educators of being afforded an 
impaired citizenship in not receiving the same ratio of provisions available to other major 
faith groups. Such complaints suggest that any sense of rejection has only increased (see 
below and AMSS, 2004; Anwar and Bakhsh, 2003), and are accentuated when we review the 
current situation of the Church of England overseeing just over a quarter of all state schools, 
and the near impossibility of their being de-coupled from the Established Church (neither 
desired nor proposed by advocates of Muslim faith schooling) (cf Modood, 1997). For 
example, Arzu Merali from the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), a proponent of 
Muslim schools and author of a recent report on the topic (IHRC, 2005c) argues that her 
Organisation's involvement has been precipitated due to this very issue 
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Our involvement has come on the back of a very real perception amongst the 
Muslim community that the struggle was to challenge a really lopsided way of 
funding faith schools by not basing it upon need or demographic variations and so 
forth. There was an understanding of why Catholic schools were funded but not 
why newer faith groups like Jewish communities were afforded these provisions 
and Muslim communities, with the largest range of children of school age in any 
community, weren't given the same support. It's part of the established 
Islamophobia, a perception of Muslims that sees something wrong with them, that 
they lack the capacity and so on (Merali, Interview 12 June 2006) 
One way of examining whether or not this is a valid complaint is to look at the very issues 
Merali raises, namely the numerical and demographic data on Muslim children, including 
their ethnic composition and what it means in terms of identity articulations. This includes a 
consideration of whether or not a recognition and reflection of Muslim constituencies in the 
ratio of educational provisions afforded to Muslims can be explained by reference to 
`established Islamophobia'. 
3. Key data and identity implications 
Numerically, Muslim children of school age are disproportionately present in the British 
education system, making up nearly six per cent (500,000) of the school population from 
under three percent (1.8m) of the national population (Halstead, 2005: 104, see ONS, 2005). 
Reflecting the particularly youthful demographic of British-Muslims, where 33.8 per cent fall 
into the 0-15 year age bracket and 18.2 per cent into the 16-24 year category (Scott et al, 
2001), in some LEAs Muslim children comprise a significant presence within school districts 
and wards. This is partially the result of concentrated settlement patterns by first generation 
migrant workers (often intensified by "White flight" to the suburbs (cf Ratcliffe, 1996)) 
which, in cities such as Bradford, means that roughly 33 percent of total school population is 
of predominantly Muslim minority ethnic origin (OFSTED Audit Commission 2002). The 
outcome is that "a significant number of inner city schools in Bradford almost exclusively 
serve the Muslim population" (Halstead, 2005: 110), a pattern not uncommon in other cities 
home to significant post-war minority ethnic settlement (as listed in chp 3 and appendix 2). 
As the discussion in chapter three would suggest, Muslim pupils throughout the British 
education system herald a diverse ethnic composition which mirrors that of the Muslim 
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population as a whole. Alongside the Pakistani (40 per cent) and Bangladeshi (20 per cent) 
contingent, it includes Turkish and Turkish Cypriot; Middle-Eastern; East-Asian; African- 
Caribbean (10 per cent); Mixed race/heritage (4 per cent); Indian or other South Asian (15 per 
cent), and not an insignificant number of White converts and Eastern-Europeans (1 per cent) 
(Burgess and Wilson, 2004). However, and as the concluding part of chapter three stressed, 
this ethnic heterogeneity need not rule out the prospect of an over-arching and differentiated 
Muslim identity. This is because Muslim educators appear to recognise this diversity whilst 
adopting what Werbner (1997) and Tariq Modood (2005) have characterised in their different 
ways as a type of "strategic essentialism" (Spivak, 1988). That is that although Muslim 
pupils are "multi-cultural, multi-racial and multi-lingual in nature, it is the faith dimension of 
their lives which provides the unifying character" (Parker-Jenkins, 1995: 93). This 
understanding is clearly very evident in the view of Tahir Alam, trustee of Al-Hurah 
secondary school, director of the teacher training wing of the Al-Hijrah Trust, and chair of the 
MCB education committee 
[T]he experience they [pupils] will have in the school context will be broader than 
that of their home life. They will retain their, for example, Bangladeshi type 
cultural understandings of Islam, traditions, notions and beliefs so on, they will 
have those but they will get broader as people from different understandings will be 
there as well. And many of these [Muslim] schools have children from Somali 
backgrounds, Arab backgrounds, Pakistani and Bangladeshi and so on. So they are 
quite mixed from the point of view of national and cultural backgrounds, but the 
unifying thread is of course Islam in Britain (Alam, Interview 20 May 2006). 
The head teacher of Islamia, Abdulla Trevathan, and deputy head of AI-Hyrah, Akhmed 
Hussein, both share this understanding when they report their enthusiasm in encouraging 
ethnically heterogeneous but Islamically inclusive interpretations of Muslim identity within 
the ethos of their schools 
... children come 
to see that there are Muslims who come from a different culture 
who have a different way of doing things, and yet there's very strong common 
themes i. e. the Qu'ran and prayer. For example, we have some kids here from 
North Africa where during prayer the hands are down by the sides, and again 
differently kids from Iraq so there are all these different encounters going on. It's 
actually very freeing but stresses that amongst that diversity there's essential 
themes (Abdulla Trevathan, Interview 6 March, 2006). 
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Children at our school are not from one ethnic culture. We have children from 
Africa, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia and many other backgrounds, as 
well as England. When they are present in this setting, there is no separation 
between those cultures... once pupils have an understanding of their over-riding 
faith, and what their faith says about how to relate to people with other values, their 
mind will be more open (Akhmed Hussein, 9 February 2002 quoted in The Tablet). 
This rehearses much of the discussion in the opening sections of the chapter three, with 
respect to what `Islam' and `being Muslim' entails, and is returned to in the closing sections 
of this chapter with respect to the ideals contained within Muslim school curricula. It is 
worth noting, however, that this imagining of a Muslim and Islamic identity in Muslim 
schooling goes hand in hand with a re-imagining of British identity. This is very evident in 
Trevathan's characterisation of the Islamia Primary `ethos', one of the oldest Muslims 
schools in Britain and one of the first to receive state funding. 
... if anything - this school 
is about creating a British-Muslim culture, instead of, as 
I've often said in the press, conserving or saving a particular culture, say from the 
subcontinent or from Egypt or from Morocco or from wherever it may be. 
Obviously those cultures may feed into this British-Muslim cultural identity, but 
we're not in the business of preserving... it's just not feasible and it's not 
sensible... it's dead: I mean I'm not saying those cultures are dead but it's a dead 
duck in the water as far as being here is concerned (Trevathan, Interview). 
Trevathan is obviously keen to partner the Muslim dimension with the British so that instead 
of suffocating hybridity or encouraging reification, for example, the outward projection of 
this internal diversity informs a Du Boisian like pursuit of hyphenated identities. The 
casualty in this `steering' of British-Muslim identity is the geographical-origin conception of 
ethnicity, and the scramble to de-emphasise the `ethnic culture' in favour of an ecumenical 
Islamic identity soon gives rise to a key complaint. This includes the lack of provisions 
within comprehensive schooling to cater for identity articulations that are not premised upon 
the recognition of minority status per se, but which move outward on their own terms in an 
increasingly confident or assertive manner, based upon the subscription to a common Islamic 
tradition. Idreas Mears, director of the Association of Muslim Schools (AMS) stresses this 
position 
I think a general point which is very important to get across is that state schools do 
not handle the meaning of Muslim identity well for the children. In actual fact, the 
way that general society looks at Muslims is as an immigrant minority-ethnic- 
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racial-group and how young people are made to look at themselves through the 
teaching in state schools tells them "you are this marginal group/minority group 
and have therefore got to integrate with the mainstream". So there's a process of 
marginalisation and that often leads to resentment. But in a Muslim school that 
identity is built upon being a Muslim not an ethnic minority. The impact of being 
Muslim is very different because the role of the Muslims in any situation is to be 
the middle nation to take the middle ground and be the model as witnesses of 
humanity. I think it gives young people a greater sense of who they are and how 
they can interact in society and therefore learn that Islam is not just a thing that is 
relevant to minority rights. Islam is relevant to economy, to foreign policy, etc 
which means that we're not getting on to a stationary train but a train that is 
moving (Mears, Interview 1 April 2006). 
This `train' which moves between sites of boundary maintenance was understood in chapter 
three as an articulation of Muslim-consciousness. Mears expresses a `clean' version of 
Muslim-consciousness that is free from ethnic and racial markers and therefore does not 
correspond to the lived reality, but is expressed as a hope to be realised through Muslim 
schooling environments. It is a desire evident in the findings of Patricia Kelly (1998: 203) 
who, in her ethnographic study of schooling choices made by Muslim parents with both 
secular and Islamic worldviews, concluded that "as some less-religious families do opt for 
specifically Muslim education, we can consider this as an example of a decision selectively to 
emphasise this pan-ethnic (Muslim) group identity, in order to reap whatever benefits - 
economic, social and psychological as well as spiritual - it offers. " This rationale permeates 
the Association of Muslim Social Scientists' (AMSS) (2004: 11) manifesto, Muslims on 
Education, in which `Muslim' refers "not only [to] practising adherents of Islam, but also 
those who identify themselves `Muslim' (without necessarily being practising) or who belong 
to a household or family that holds Islam as its descendant faith. " 
As chapter three argued, this conception of Muslim identity is expressed and consolidated 
in survey data that inevitably includes both types, behavioural and attitudinal, but reports that 
74 per cent of a representative adult Muslim sample in Britain say that religion is `very 
important' to them (Modood et al, 1997: 331) without necessitating an inquiry into their 
degree of religiosity, let alone what this might entail behaviourally. It also emphasises that 
much of the motivation for Muslim schooling reflects the desire of Muslim parents who 
embrace it as an avenue through which to instil some sense of a Muslim heritage in all its 
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heterogeneity. What this means for the development of the child's autonomy (Marples, 2005) 
and where this desire sits in relation to the charge of `indoctrination' (HPG, 2001) is 
discussed in the second half of this chapter, but it is worth noting here that there is no entirely 
coherent view amongst all Muslim parents about faith schooling2 and, since over ninety-seven 
per cent of Muslim children are educated in state schools, Muslim parents and broader 
communities recognise that where they wish to transfer aspects of their religious heritage onto 
their children it is the character of state schools that they will have to change3 (Ansari, 2004). 
This understanding has informed - and continues to inform -a parallel debate about the 
schooling of ethnic minority children which has been raging since the nineteen sixties; the 
role and content of the school curricular, and parental rights (Crowther Report, 1960; 
Newsom Report, 1963; Plowden Report, 1967; Coard, 1971; Bagley, 1973; Rampton, 1982; 
Taylor and Hegarty, 1985; Swann Report, 1985; Burnage Report, 1989; Basit, 1997). The 
words of Bradford's first Muslim Lord Mayor are instructive in demonstrating the strong 
2 There exists no national survey that systematically examines Muslim parents' desires on this issue but 
according to one source 50 per cent of South Asian Muslim parents are in favour, which contrasts with 
80 per cent suggested by the Muslim Educational Trust (see Shaikh and Kelly (1989)). Interestingly, 
the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (1997) found that the ethnic composition of a school 
was more important for white respondents than it was for ethnic minorities, whilst preference for 
religious composition interestingly ranged from Catholics, who were the most inclined to desire faith 
based schools, to Hindus, who were the least inclined for faith based schooling, with Muslims and 
Protestants falling somewhere in the middle (see Modood et al 1997: 323). 
3 It is this realisation that has made schooling a "major area of struggle for equality of opportunity and 
assertion of identity" (Ansari, 2004: 298), and an area where "in the face of major opposition from 
broad sections of... society" (ibid) Muslims have succeeded in having some basic 'needs' recognised, 
eg. provision of halal (Kosher) meals. In this respect some LEAs have historically developed in 
directions that others have not. From a multicultural perspective one of the most progressive is that of 
Birmingham, which in 1975 introduced a new Agreed Syllabus of Religious Education "which required 
that pupils learn about and learn from the great world faiths present in the city" (Hewer, 2001: 517). 
Another was Bradford which promoted innovations such as the provision of halal meat in schools in 
1983. Indeed, in 1982 the LEA in Bradford issued guidelines stating that all residents of the city had 
an equal right to the maintenance of distinctive identities derived from culture, language, religion and 
custom, and that so far as was compatible with individual needs, the authority's provision of services 
should respect the strength and variety of cultural values. Another was that all children in Bradford 
were entitled to equality of treatment, equality of opportunity and equality of services and should be 
offered a shared educational experience. Both of these positions were set out in the LEA's policy 
statement and gave rise to the following statement of aims: (i) to seek ways of preparing all children 
and young people for life in a multi-cultural society; (ii) to counter racism and racist attitudes, and the 
inequalities and discrimination which results from them; (iii) to build upon and develop the strengths of 
cultural and linguistic diversity; (iv) to respond sensitively to the special needs of minority groups. 
Whilst it recognised the organizational difficulties of achieving these aims, it was convinced that the 
educational needs of ethnic minority children could be met within a comprehensive education system 
based upon a common school curriculum (City of Bradford Local Administrative Memorandum No 
2/82), also see Singh (2002). 
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feeling amongst many Muslim parents that, rather than looking to separate schooling, a focus 
upon the state system should be encouraged: "I don't want separation in any form.. . what we 
want is our cultural needs, especially in the education system" (quoted in Halstead, 1988: 52). 
This is of course qualified by the observation that "many Muslims who themselves do not 
favour separate Muslim schools maintain that the choice should be available to others" 
(Ansari, 2004: footnote 78), parallel to choices available to other groups. The onus is then 
placed upon the state to accommodate Muslim communities, parents and children as they 
have other faiths. 
At the same time, the validity of this rationale - that Muslim minorities who mobilise for 
Muslim faith schooling are simply seeking an expansion of the faith schooling sector - is 
rejected by prominent figures in both anti-religious and anti-racist camps alike. Terry 
Sanderson, President of the National Secular Society, for example, is convinced that 
... we're 
heading towards a catastrophe unless the government change their policy, 
and there seems to be no difference of opinion between any of the main parties and I 
can't see a change happening, and we're heading towards further separation in 
education by the creation of more faith schools. The more Christian one they create, 
the more the clamour becomes for Muslim schools to be created and I think it's a 
disaster because the only way that we're going to break down barriers between 
people is to bring them together at a very early age and this government is going in 
completely the opposite direction to that. It is creating schools that will keep them 
separate (Interview with Tarry Sanderson, 8 June, 2007) 4 
In less apocalyptic but equally strident terms, Dan Lyndon, director of the `black history 4 
schools' project and a leading member of the Black and Asian Studies Association (BASA), 
voices similar objections on the grounds of separatism and in-egalitarianism 
I am worried about the development of faith schools because I think that just 
encourages separation... Personally, I would never teach in a religious school. 
Whatever religion, absolutely fundamentally, no. [... ] I think if you took the 
approach of religions supporting tolerance and supporting loose moral code which we 
follow then I think there is no reason why they can't be compatible with anti-racist 
education. I suppose if you had the idea of, if you've got an area where you are 
prioritising one over the other then that's going to cause conflict and that's going to 
cause problems. If you come from an egalitarian philosophy then hopefully that 
should over ride that (Interview with Dan Lyndon, 13 June, 2007). 
5 
4 The issue of `contact' is addresses at length later in the chapter (see sec. 8). 
Though this is not a universal view amongst anti-racists, not least because some have, in the past, also 
endorsed the need for `black' schooling. To this end Lee Jasper, race equality advisor to the London 
Mayor, clarifies his own position: "What I did advocate is the following: that there are already majority 
black schools that have majority white teachers and white governors, what I've said is that if you have 
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The most nuanced and historically informed assessment, however, is offered by Tony Breslin, 
Director of the Citizenship foundation 
The fact of the matter is that if one looks at the history of the emergence of any group 
of faith schools they have tended to emerge from a desire to strengthen and support 
that faith in a particular societal setting. Catholic Schools are a case in point. I'm not 
convinced that we are at that starting point today. The starting point of the first 
generations of faith schools, were much more mono cultural societies. Faith schools, 
it seems to me, offer a lot in terms of ethos and all the rest of it. I just wonder 
whether non-faith schools can do the same thing and whether we should seek to get 
them to do that. [... ] Part of the debate clearly about faith schools at the moment, is 
not really about faith schools, it's just the specificity of Muslim Schools, and I think 
people should be more honest about that. [... ] I don't think that because a particular 
group was granted the right to build a faith school fifty years ago, it is a rationale to 
grant that to a different group now or another group in fifty years time. I think it's 
about saying, where is our society at (Interview with Tony Breslin, 12 June 2007). 
Breslin is undoubtedly correct to highlight the historical dimension of faith schooling 
(discussed at length in sec. 6) against which contemporary arguments concerning parity are 
often made, as well as the centrality of Muslim mobilisations to these arguments. Yet, whilst 
it may be true to say that Muslim communities have been the most vocal in seeking inclusion 
in the faith schooling sector, to what extent is it true to say that they themselves have 
premised these mobilisations solely upon the issue of parity and, if they have not, what other 
factors have been and remain salient? 
4. Muslim motivations for faith schools 
Bearing in mind the diversity in being Muslim, a number of factors coalesce to inform the 
broad interest in Muslim schooling. 
4.1. Holistic Education 
The first and arguably broadest factor is paralleled by the interest in other religiously 
informed faith schooling, and stems from the desire to incorporate more faith-based 
a school that s 90 or 80% per cent of one ethnicity or another, then its quite proper to expect the 
teaching staff and governors to reflect that local community. That was my view and I'm still of that 
view, and when majority black churches want to get together and do that they should be able to do so. 
That doesn't extend to creating an apartheid regime within education but it does extend to creating the 
choice for minority communities" (Interview with Lee Jasper, 26 July 2007). 
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principles into an integrated education system, so that the `whole person' can be educated in 
an Islamic environment (AMSS, 2004; Hewer, 2001). This would presuppose faith rather 
than treating it as something extraneous to education and external to its major objects 
(Ashraf, 1990). For example, one of the recommendations to emerge from the First World 
Conference on Muslim Education states that "education should aim at the balanced growth of 
the total personality through the training of spirit, intellect, the rational self, feelings and 
bodily senses" (cited in AMSS, 2004: 12). Two approaches proposed by the AMSS in their 
position paper on Muslim schools include the Steiner and Montessori approaches, both of 
which encourage personal and team responsibility while "the child's creativity is also given 
full freedom for expression" (ibid: 19). Hence the objective is to encourage intellectual, 
spiritual, and moral development within an Islamic ethos and framework. Thus, at Islamia 
School, Abdullah Trevathan states that a key curriculum objective is to prevent sources of 
Islamic guidance from becoming extrinsic to educational development, "where the sunnah 
and the Qu'ran... becomes the third person in an encounter". In his view, children will only 
properly know, explore and evaluate knowledge presented within an Islamic environment if 
the children are incorporated into Islam's interpretative traditions 
There are two types of views of the divinity in theological perspectives: in classical 
terms one is tashbih which is like Allah's nearness, immersion in our daily life or 
divine interventions in daily affairs, and the other is tanzih: the incomparability or 
what they call negative theology, the absolute omnipotence, distance from the 
individual... Now I believe what we're trying to do in this school is to return to a 
more tashbih... it's very important that they're [the pupils] exposed to the classical 
ussal al-figh... basically the methodology of applying principles to different 
situations, rather than taking or transporting rules or regulations out of another time 
and another place... literally (Trevathan, Interview). 
Perhaps surprisingly, given its pragmatic emphasis upon the present, part of this project at 
Islamia School proceeds through an introduction to classical Arabic; presented as a conduit 
through which this holistic immersion can begin 
We teach classical Qu'ranic Arabic. We think it's fundamental to the flowering of 
Muslim culture that the language of its philosophy, the language particularly of its 
spirituality is taught. And also there are key concepts such that if you've got the 
Arabic you immediately have access to that nuance, that feeling that the word 
evokes! (ibid). 
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Islamia School is not alone in this view, for it is common to find the teaching of Qu'ranic 
Arabic listed on many Muslim Schools' curricula and mission statements (IHRC, 2005c). 
This manner of incorporating faith-based principles into an integrated education system, as 
opposed to a more straightforward approach of teaching genesis or religious history, for 
example, is the preferred approach that is advocated by the Association for Muslim Schools 
(AMS). To this end Idreas Mears describes how a child's understanding of the interpretative 
traditions within Islam is akin to wielding a powerful educational `tool' that is simultaneously 
spiritual and educative 
Muslims are people that bring down a meaning to an event: we're creatures of 
meaning, and a Muslim expresses his real meaning by his evada because he sees 
that the ultimate meaning is to be a worshipper of Allah but then bringing that 
down onto the axis of events changes how you act in the world. So I think the most 
important for Muslim schools is to give young people that as a tool in their hands 
that they can pick up and run with (Mears, Interview). 
The characterisation of Muslim schools as providing Muslim children with something like a 
`launch-pad' is returned to later in the chapter during the discussion of autonomy (sec. 7.1), 
but it is important to stress that this view is not advanced naively by the Mears. In a measure 
of increasing confidence, critical self-evaluation, and institutional networking, the AMS has 
been at the forefront of creating an inter-faith `inspectorate' to monitor the content and 
standard of different faith based schooling. This is informed by the recognition that whilst the 
areas of numeracy and literacy are stringently monitored by OFSTED, religious instruction is 
more likely to be left to the school's discretion and so may not always be of an appropriate 
standard 
The AMS has made an application to the DfES to deliver inspection services for 
OFSTED inspections of independent Muslim Schools. And we've done it in 
conjunction with a group of independent Christian schools - the Christian Schools 
Trust. We've joined together to create the `faith schools inspectorate' and we will 
be able to inspect member schools: Christian or Muslim. As well as looking at the 
areas that are necessary in the OFSTED criteria as to whether a school is providing 
numeracy and literacy and citizenship skills etc, we will be looking at how the 
school is delivering the religious ethos, because up until this point we accept that 
Muslim schools are Muslim schools because they say so. There's no real 
inspection of that and there can be a whole spectrum of people delivering nothing 
about Islam at all, but instead being a cultural protection zone for children and 
that's happened for children quite a lot, especially in the early years when the main 
criteria of a Muslim school wasn't about teaching Islam but the protection of 
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Muslim girls from going into the state system. It was culturally driven rather than 
Islamically driven I think (Mears, Interview). 
Once again, Mears is at pains to stress the distinction between school premised upon an ethnic 
origin conception of Islam, driven by a desire for `cultural protection zones', and an 
Islamically driven environment that moves outward to build upon evaluative criteria already 
established and in place. This gives support to Jacobson's (1997) "religion-ethnic culture 
distinction" discussed in the chapter three (sec. 10), which argues that ethnicity is increasingly 
peripheral amongst some British-Muslims. Placing ethnicity in binary opposition to religion 
is, however, not necessarily the best explanation of this tendency when compared to the 
alternatives discussed throughout chapter three and summarised in the conclusion (sec 9.4). 
4.2. Separation of sexes 
The criticism that Muslim schools can serve as cultural protection zones is sometimes 
made through pointing to the evidence of Muslim parents' preferences for single sex 
schooling (Dawkins, 2007; Grayling, 2006; Bell, 2005; NSS, 2004; HPG, 2001). To be sure, 
and through an interpretation of Islam which posits that "after puberty boys and girls should 
be separated" (Hashmi, 2002: 14), there is certainly a desire to develop `safe' environments 
for post-pubescent children, and in this regard single-sex schooling undoubtedly appeals to 
Muslim parents (Hewer, 2001). The retention of single sex schools was recommended by the 
Swann Committee (1985) and their increasing non-availability may also be influencing 
Muslim parents' interest in faith schooling 
Is this conservatism an example of the sorts of cultural protection zones feared my 
Mears? It is worth noting how, according to Trevathan, this is not an expression of separatism 
since "in many ways the community want their children to be raised in a safe environment but 
still aspire to what successful people aspire to in the west" (Interview), namely social mobility 
through education. According to Hussain of Al-Hyrah school, a school which maintains 
separate teaching rooms, the motivation for single sex schooling is "to ensure that they 
[pupils] are more focused on their studies.... it is primarily about their learning". Elsewhere, 
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the Muslim Parents Association (MPA) formed in 1974 on this single issue, and continues to 
support the creation of a number of independent single-sex Muslim schools. In addition to 
Al-Hyrah, the creation Feversham College in Bradford was to some extent modelled on 
Catholic faith schooling (Halstead, 1991), by employing separate teaching rooms (cf Haw, 
1998). This is not a policy desired for primary schooling, however, and is contradicted by 
some existing co-educational Muslim schools that employ mixed teaching classes. So while 
the demand for single sex schooling is neither universally sought by Muslim educators, nor is 
unproblematic, it is not without precedent amongst other groups, and to view it as an example 
of Muslim patriarchy suggests that it is implausible that valid pedagogical arguments may be 
supportive of single-sex schooling (Keaton, 1999). This is, then, undoubtedly an issue that 
requires further, ideally comparative, inquiry. 
4.3. Specialist Training 
A third factor informing the Muslim interest in faith schooling is the current lack of 
specialist training in Islamic religious sciences, the provision of which might allow young 
people to "be educated to serve their communities as potential religious leaders" (Hewer, 
2001: 518). This includes the desire to have more British trained theologians who can discuss 
theological issues with a contemporary resonance to the lived experiences of being Muslim in 
Britain. The immediacy of this requirement is illustrated with the example of unsuitable 
religious instructors, including non-British Imams that are unfamiliar with the particular 
contexts and experiential lives of Muslims in Britain 
The problem is that there's a vacuum here because the mosques just aren't set up to 
deal with the problems of modern people. If you import an Imam from Egypt or 
from Pakistan and somebody comes to them with a problem which is within a 
modern European context, it would often be things that the Imams would have 
never encountered in their lives and so have no means - or the wrong means - of 
dealing with it (Trevathan, Interview). 
Tahir Alam sketches out some of the dynamics informing the considerations and balances that 
schools must take into account when off-setting the desire for `home-grown' religious 
instructors, with broader and more wide-ranging programmes of education 
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There are schools that do actually give more curriculum time to more traditional 
sciences, you call it theology but I would call it traditional sciences to do with 
Sunnah and Hadith and those sorts of subjects. So there are schools that do 
specialise in this but they also do English, Maths and Science... they just don't 
allocate as much time to these subjects as they would if the school was funded by 
the state. So there you have the flexibility as an independent institution so, 
currently, all those that are state funded couldn't have the luxury of being able to 
do that. I think schools would say that yes they would like more time but there's 
not enough time to deliver the national curriculum, which is a requirement, as well 
as devoting adequate time to really focus properly on some of the traditional 
sciences and subjects as well. So there's a trade-off, I suppose, and a debate about 
the balance in each school (Alam, Interview). 
At the same time, Alam is not alone amongst advocates and co-ordinators of Muslim 
Schooling in Britain who point to an inevitable limitation in the scope to incorporate, into the 
state sector, schools which do deliver a greater proportion of theological education and 
training, in order to attend to the aspiration for establishments that can offer specialist 
training 
If a school wants to retain an emphasis on teaching traditional sciences, and for 
them that's important perhaps, then they may well be reluctant to receive funding 
because they then have to teach the national curriculum and compromises have to 
be made on other things such as teaching the Qu'ran and Islamic history to a level 
they would like and so on. So some of those institutions that specialise in these 
areas are not going to come into the state sector, because if they did they'd have to 
drop everything else and change the nature of their institution to a very large degree 
and that's not what they're about (ibid. ). 
The enthusiasm for, hesitation at, becoming co-opted into the state sector is returned to below 
with a more detailed consideration of the factors informing or dissuading successful 
independent Muslim schools from seeking voluntary aided status. 
4.4. Ethnocentric curricula on Islam 
Fourthly, in order to impart more accurate knowledge of Islamic civilisations; literature; 
languages and arts (both past and present), there is a desire to see broader aspects of Islamic 
culture embedded within the teaching and ethos of school curricula, which are otherwise 
normatively couched within a Christian-European tradition. As it stands, however, and as 
Alain recognises, there appears to be scope in existing conventions to address some of these 
concerns 
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The national curriculum does lend itself to a reasonable degree of flexibility, and 
you can read it objectively when you're teaching geography, history or so on, and 
you can be fairly inclusive, barring resource issues. There's a lot of material 
available to teach the national curriculum from a certain sort of perspective if you 
like, so if you wanted to be more inclusive of the Islamic perspective whilst 
delivering the national curriculum, there is a pretty decent scope for that (Alam, 
Interview). 
Whilst this maybe so, it remains the case that the sorts of materials currently adopted in the 
teaching of Islam are often unsatisfactory. For example, Douglass and Shaikh's (2004) study 
found that throughout commonly used textbooks, Islam is rarely portrayed in the ways its 
adherents understand, but more through the ethnocentric perspectives of editors who frame 
their commentary for textbook adoption committee audiences. Common examples of the 
sorts of inaccuracies that follow from this tendency include the portrayal of the prophet 
Muhammad as the `inventor' of Islam, rather than a messenger or prophet, as well an artificial 
separation of Islam from other monotheistic faiths. This has led Ameli et a! (2005: 26) to 
argue that "it is difficult to escape the conclusion that textbooks deliberately downplay or 
exclude connections between Islam and Abraham in order to maintain neat partitions among 
the symbols, beliefs and major figures. This complaint feeds into the broader charge that 
LEAs have only "tinkered with the largely ethnocentric curricula, leaving Muslim children 
feeling alienated and with damaged self-esteem" (Ansari, 2002: 22). 
4.5. Low educational attainment 
Finally, there is concern over the lower educational attainment of some Muslim children, 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani boys in particular, and the belief that greater accommodation of 
religious and cultural difference will help address this low achievement and prevent further 
marginalisation from taking place. 
There is a gap between British Muslims and other groups that underscores the 
urgency of the need for target-based policies to address these problems if we're 
going to ensure that Muslims don't become an underclass in society... 
underachievement in education will have a knock on effect for employment and so 
on (Inayat Bunglawala, Interview, 21 May, 2006). 
According to ONS (2004) data, nearly 50 per cent of men and women of Bangladeshi ethnic 
origin and 27 per cent of men and 40 per cent of women of Pakistani ethnic origin hold no 
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academic qualifications (see also Haque (2002)). Educational outcomes amongst young 
Muslims in relation to this general ethnic breakdown are similarly concerning. According to 
some sources, in 2000 only 30 per cent of young males with Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic 
origin achieved five GCSEs6 at grades A*-C, compared with 50 per cent of the national 
population as a whole .7 Within this, 
however, data from the National Literacy Trust (2004) 
highlights how in Birmingham (home to around 125,000 Muslims - the largest concentration 
of a Muslim population outside London) Muslim girls have been outperforming Muslim boys, 
with 50 per cent of girls of Pakistani origin (compared with 33 per cent of boys) and 58 per 
cent of girls of Bangladeshi origin (compared with 43 per cent. of boys) achieving five GCSEs 
at grades A*-C or more. 
According to Halstead (2005: 136), these figures indicate a "sense of alienation and 
disaffection felt by many young male Muslims at school", an assertion given empirical 
support in a study undertaken by the IQRA Trust (see Pye, Lee and Bhabra (2000), and which 
was also raised by the CMEB (2000: 152) which recommended that the government 
implement targets to decrease the number of school exclusions currently experienced by some 
Muslim groups. While it is accepted that parental education and social class play an 
important role in shaping these educational outcomes, Halstead (2005: 137) lists a host of 
other relevant issues: "religious discrimination; Islamophobia; the lack of Muslim role models 
in schools; low expectations on the part of teachers; time spent in mosque schools; the lack of 
recognition of the British Muslim identity of the student. " According to Alam, Muslim 
schools sensitive to these experiences can help elevate educational outcomes 
On the whole the Muslim schools are performing pretty well; they're better than 
their like for like in state sector... In terms of the focus they provide for their 
children, and the dedication, and quite often many of the teachers in these schools 
are not even qualified, teachers, yet their students get better results than people who 
are qualified! You do get examples where Muslim schools in the independent 
sector perform badly, but they're resource issues really, to do with under-funding 
and not really anything else... shoe string budgets and you can't really do anything 
on those. Barring those sorts of schools, and there are a few around, the vast 
6 The General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) is the standard qualification for students 
enrolled in compulsory schooling until the age of 16 years. 
7 For a much fuller statistical summary see Halstead's (2005) excellent discussion from which I draw. 
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majority of schools in fact - if you take into account the student budgets that they 
operate on - what they do is in fact quite remarkable (Alam, Interview). 
The academic achievements of Muslim schools Alam is pointing to include the examples of 
100 per cent of G. C. S. E entrants from Al-Furqan Community College (Birmingham), 
Leicester Islamic Academy, Madani School (Tower Hamlets), Tayyibah School (Hackney), 
and Brondesbury College (Brent) achieving five or more passes at grades A*-C; along with 
Feversham College (Bradford) achieving 53 per cent of such passes, higher than the national 
average (and well above the Bradford average). It is also evident in the successes of Islamia 
School coming first (or third, depending on the measure used) in a district of fifty-one schools 
examined at the key stage two level (ibid). 
5. Form and structure of schools 
Where Muslim parents have opted out of the state-sector, desires for more holistic 
schooling have resulted in the creation of over one hundred independent schools with a 
Muslim ethos, educating over 14,000 pupils from ethnically diverse communities in 
predominantly inner city areas. These institutions deliver both `secular' and Islamic 
education, and are best described as Muslim schools with "the goal of living up to the 
standards of Islam, rather than implying its achievement" (Dunn and Shaikh, 2004: 8). 
Typically established in homes, mosques and similar buildings by groups of concerned 
parents and community activists8 (Hewer, 2001: 518), the vast majority are low-fee schools in 
poor quality buildings which, unsurprisingly, lack many of the basic facilities common to 
state schools (Walford, 2003). The main reason for this is financial insecurity. Since they 
rely upon community support and are seldom purpose built, they may open and close 
depending upon the resources and stability afforded by the local Muslim communities 
themselves. Thus every school is, according to Trevathan, "a microcosm of the society 
around it, " which means that. despite being private institutions, they are better thought of as 
a Tahir Alam is not exceptional in recounting his story of involvement: "I got involved in education 
sometime ago just to help local schools to maybe improve their standards and provide some kind of 
rigour and challenge in relation to performance... that's why I got involved locally and then tried to get 
these issues on the agenda elsewhere through my involvement with the MCB". 
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"community-based schools" since they rarely operate commercially. 9 A good example is Al- 
Furqan school in Birmingham, one of the first primary schools to be awarded state funding. 
It started in 1989 as "a drop-in centre for families who were home-schooling older girls rather 
than sending them to non-Muslim co-educational schools" (Walford, 2003: 287). 
From this initial development, it progressed quickly and was later co-opted into the state- 
sector. This type of school contrasts, however, with `schools for Muslims' and there is a 
subtle but important distinction between these two. In the case of Muslim Schools, "the 
intention is to develop an entire ethos consistent with religious values", whilst `schools for 
Muslims' might aspire "to being fully Muslim in nature but in reality tend to be characterised 
by a religious identity that does not go much further in terms of developing curricula and 
ethos, often due to staffing and financial difficulties" (Parker-Jenkins (2002: 278). This 
distinction is sharpened by the AMSS' (2004: 11) analyses which uses the term `Muslim 
School' 
... to 
describe a school that seeks to promote an overtly Islamic education for its 
pupils. This is in distinction to schools with a large number of Muslims or indeed 
those that provide education that is acceptable to Muslims, both of which we have 
classified as `Non-Muslim Schools'. In no way is this a derogatory distinction 
between the two. 
5.1. Registration 
All independent schools are now required to register with the Department of Education 
and Skills under The Education (Independent School Standards) (England) Regulations 
(2003). Failure to do so risks the prospect of closure and since the criteria are not dissimilar 
from the conditions that must be met before VA status (discussed in the next section) can be 
achieved, it was feared that these guidelines would have a disproportionate affect on Muslim 
schools. One such recent closure has included Scotland's only Muslim School, Muhammad 
9A fascinating illustration of the community focus involves pastoral advice to pupils' parents: "One of 
the things we've realised frequently is that first of all we're not just a school - we're much more. In 
many ways we're educating parents as much as we're educating children and frequently we get a 
request for an appointment to see me and they'll insist that it's something personal, and then they'll 
come in and they won't be parents or prospective parent, but a married couple having relationship 
problems. So myself and Sheikh Ahmed, who is the imam here, would - if we could - give some 
marriage counselling. And we will do that if the parents are of our children because it's part of our 
responsibility to the children as educators" (Abdulla Trevathan). 
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Zakariya girls' secondary near Dundee which, having offered "a very limited curriculum, 
consisting of Arabic, sewing and cookery" (quoted in the Daily Record, 25 January 2006), 
has now been removed from the Register of Independent Schools. It is therefore surprising 
that these guidelines are viewed as a process necessary to raising the basic standard of all 
would be Muslim schools. The is evident is Mears' account 
There always was a history of starting up and then not managing to continue. 
Those schools were born and died, almost like they were still born. Whereas now 
if they get through the registration process they're prone to grow very quickly. At 
this point I actually welcome anything that makes Muslim schools more rigorous in 
their own standards and it doesn't just have to be about the registration and 
inspection process which looks at the general criteria of Education. Now, where 
they do come into existence, they're stronger schools than they would otherwise 
have been. (Mears, Interview). 
In this sense, not only has the requirement been embraced but its effects welcomed 
There was a lot of concern in some quarters, as it made the process more rigorous, 
and it raised the benchmark. So you're required to have a proper building and a 
better quality of teaching and so on. So the benchmark is higher and you're given 
limited time to achieve full registration, but you can be provisionally registered 
where the benchmark is very low to start with, basically nothing, really, depending 
on how many children you've got, and then they give you two years to make sure 
you reach some of the other requirements, which are essential for you to be a 
registered school. So it's a more rigorous process but I think it hasn't had a 
negative effect, because all it means is that people need to be in a better position 
before they start, and have a reasonable plan for the capital and financial plan that's 
required. So people have had to raise their game, if you know what I mean, so I 
suppose it's been positive in that sense, although it's made life difficult for some 
schools (Alam, Interview). 
Of course the incentive for official registration is the accompanying professional inspection 
and advice (Hewer, 2001: 518), with the long-term aim of becoming co-opted into the state 
sector under the status of a Voluntary Aided (VA) school. This process has often been co- 
ordinated by organisations such as the AMS and the Islamic Schools Trust (IST), which 
facilitate many schools dialogue with LEAs and the DfES. 
6. Government funding and `Voluntary Aided' schooling 
The notion of VA schools has its roots in the organic creation of a `dual system' 
(O'Keefe, 1986) organised in terms of parallel, but interacting, state and faith based 
schooling. On the one hand this resulted from the "contributions of parish clerics to village 
teaching, church foundation grammar schools" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
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which established churches as almost "exclusive providers in the early stages of progress 
towards universal education" (Skinner, 2002: 173). On the other hand, and not withstanding 
the hesitancy of Victorians to get involved in "what had, hitherto, been a purely private 
concern" (Parker-Jenkins, 2002: 275), the social and economic upheaval of the industrial 
revolution led to the realisation that education was "an important agent of social reform to 
assist the nation in it's economic endeavours" (ibid). This culminated in the creation of a 
statutory system of public education with the 1870 Elementary Education Act. As Skinner 
(2002: 174) notes, however, this failed to satisfy competing Christian bodies in their views 
about education, the practice of providing schooling, and the money with which to do so 
The established church of England was not the only powerful Christian 
denomination in Britain. In Scotland, the majority of Scottish people were not 
Anglican but Presbyterians. Protestant nonconformists were strong in Wales and 
England. The increase in early 18' century migration from Ireland meant that 
Roman Catholic presence was also increasing. These groups stood out against the 
state for giving every opportunity to the Church of England to proselytise through 
the education system (emphasis added). 
In general terms, the introduction of the 1944 Education Act sought to reach a compromise 
between the historic contribution of faith groups and their internal differences with the 
increasing role of the state in education. This was pursued through awarding independent 
faith schools the option - subject to meeting the appropriate standards and criteria - of 
becoming `Voluntary Aided' (VA) or `Voluntary Controlled' (VC). The former status allows 
the provision of denominational religious instruction and acts of worship, as well as the right 
to appoint teachers on the understanding that the school accept half the cost of any structural 
or building improvements. In addition, the majority of school administrators could be drawn 
from the diocesan board of education or religious authority. The latter, meanwhile, incurred 
no financial responsibilities but the schools would have to surrender all denominational 
worship, and the majority of administrators would be provided by the LEA. 
Most importantly, for this discussion is that, although it was not anticipated that "other 
religious groups would one day like to take advantage of the provisions" (Hewer 2001: 518), 
the relevant clauses of the 1944 Act did not specify which denominational groups were to be 
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included in the scheme. Less encouragingly, however, the position that Muslims have found 
themselves in relation to this provision is that 
... new schools are rarely required and 
built, so that if Muslim schools are to be 
admitted to the Voluntary Aided category they will of necessity be already in 
existence. In effect, this means that, in the future, a state funded Muslim school 
will already exist either as a local authority `public' school or as a private 
establishment. (Hewer 2001: 518). 
This has led to a number of campaigns by Muslim organisations to take over schools with a 
significant concentration of Muslim pupils already in attendance. The most recent effort has 
culminated in a campaign by the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) in Scotland to turn a 
currently Roman Catholic School in Pollockshields (Glasgow), which has an eighty per cent 
Muslim pupil intake, into a VA Muslim school (for more examples see Hashmi, 2002: 15). 
One of the leading proponents of the MAB's campaign is Osama Saeed, who argues that 
We are the second-largest faith grouping in Scotland after Christianity yet we do 
not have a single Muslim school. Muslim children have to attend supplementary 
classes on weekends and evenings for their Islamic studies, and Muslim schools 
would go a major way to redressing this problem. (Saeed, 2005: quoted in the 0 Glasgow Evening Times). ' 
It is difficult not to view this example as evidence of Hewitt's (1998: 22) conclusion that 
Muslims who prefer denominational education are "merely following in the footsteps of 
Anglicans, Catholics and Jews in seeking to give their children a solid foundation in their own 
faith before they are let loose in the wider world". The preceding discussion illustrates that 
the British education system has historically managed a multi-faith system, with the 1944 
Education Act containing within it the provision for government support of schools formed by 
Muslim groups. 
10 This contrasts negatively with the success of other schools such as Al-Hijrah: "For some schools it 
was a long battle, but for AH it wasn't really, as 
it got its status within the year of applying, as soon it 
applied it got it more or less straight away. 
Its quite a rigorous process but turned out to be more or 
less straightforward in the end (Alam, Interview). " 
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Part B: Considering the charges 
What the discussion thus far has not addressed is how Muslim educators can address some of 
the key arguments against Muslim schools. These range fron a principled philosophical 
opposition to all faith schooling through to more focused arguments concerning the nature of 
Muslim schools and their impact on social cohesion in particular. 
7.1. The Argument for Autonomies 
For example, one of the most commonly held views of education is that it should 
encourage the development of rational and moral autonomy which, in the recent liberal 
tradition, is characterised by the work of Ronald Dworkin (1985) Amy Guttman (1995) and 
Joseph Raz (1986), amongst others. This position opposes all forms of faith schooling and 
strenuously argues that all autonomy-supporting societies must guard children from "believers 
who wish to impose on them a non-autonomous conception of the good life" (White, 1990: 
105). Thus, according to Akerman (1980: 139), education should provide children with "a 
sense of the very different lives that could be theirs - so that, as they approach maturity, they 
have the cultural materials available to build lives equal to their evolving conceptions of the 
good". This is a central argument contained within the Humanist Philosophers' Group's 
(HPG) (2001: 10) influential pamphlet, Religious Schools: The Case Against, which begins 
by charging faith schooling with `indoctrination', characterised as limiting the autonomy of a 
child by implanting beliefs that neither empirical evidence nor rational argument might 
change. They then state that 
... given the 
importance of fundamental religious and value commitments to a 
person's life, such commitments should be entered into only subject to all the 
normal requirements for valid consent: in particular, competence, full information 
and voluntariness. Religious schools... are likely to violate these requirements, 
partly because of (younger) children's lack of autonomy and partly because of the 
nature of such schools' missions. 
According to this perspective, young people in religious schools are denied both the option 
and opportunity to develop the competencies in making informed choices, specifically 
because such schools are predisposed to indoctrinate and proselytise. 
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There are two very interesting and equally challenging responses to this argument. The 
first begins by rejecting the a priori assumption that faith schools are necessarily out to 
indoctrinate and proselytise. For example, and in a similar manner to which Muslim 
educators view their schools as a place of Holistic Education, the educational philosopher 
Terrence McLaughlin (1992: 123) introduces the idea of multiple launch pads for autonomy. 
This means that although one starting point for a child arises from the experience in a 
common school, this does not invalidate others because 
... another possible and 
legitimate starting point is from the basis of experience of a 
particular `world view' or cultural identity; a substantiality of belief, practise or 
value, as in (say) a certain sort of religious school. Such schools, in relation to 
which parents can exercise legitimate rights of choice, would not seek to entrap 
their pupils in a particular vision of the good, but try to provide a distinctive 
starting point from which their search for autonomous agency can proceed. 
This offers a more contextual comprehension of how a child's autonomy may be developed 
and is more comfortable with competing conceptions of education amongst different cultural 
constituencies within a multicultural context that is not hostile to the wishes of religious 
peoples (Modood, 2005b; Spinner-Halev, 2000). More recently, McLaughlin et al (2003) 
have gone further in arguing that it is quite feasible for faith schools to adopt an approach 
towards education that is relatively neutral - such as those favoured by the AMSS, outlined 
earlier. They argue that since children have to accept many things on trust in order eventually 
to progress to autonomy (and possibly reject those things later), religion should be treated no 
differently. 
Nevertheless, the HPG rightly questions whether indoctrination can ever be avoided, 
given the difficulty of teaching religion in such a way that children can grasp and appreciate it 
in any depth without necessarily accepting beliefs which are difficult, if not impossible, to 
revise or reject when one has reached an adult age. This is an important criticism which leads 
to a related debate about the nature of religious knowledge and the conditions under which it 
can be acquired. Espousing a "Christian perspective" on this matter, Ahdar and Leigh (2005: 
233) argue 
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... a Christian upbringing need not involve hampering a child's autonomy regarding 
critical and independent thought. It is just that critical thought and the right use of 
reason ought to be undertaken from a base of faith first. [... ] This is autonomy, but 
not of the Enlightenment kind. It eschews self-direction and self-mastery by the 
individual's use of unbounded reason. The radically autonomous self cannot live 
the good life; reason is tainted by the Fall. We are back to a Christian paradox 
again. It is not a matter of fostering self-esteem but rather self-denial; lose oneself 
in God to truly find oneself. 
The Muslim perspective meanwhile eschews the idea of reason being tainted by `The Fall' 
since in Islam humanity is brought into the world in a state of innocence (fitra) much like a 
blank-sheet (tabula rasa). This means, "the concept of `original sin' as presented in Christian 
theology is non-existent in the newborn child" (Hussein, 2004: 319), something returned to 
during the discussion of what a Muslim school's curriculum might look like. In the meantime 
we should take from Ahdar and Leigh (2005) the implication that, unless a child acquires this 
knowledge at a sufficient depth of understanding, they will not be able to exercise valid 
consent anyway, so that from their perspective the goal of autonomy is already thwarted. 
Accordingly, the curriculum and environment of the religious school may be essential to the 
achievement of a level of understanding that makes informed consent (and thus autonomy) 
possible. 
The second potential response to the HPG's charge of indoctrination has two parts to it 
but begins by making a relational argument which contests the assumption that secular 
schools can avoid indoctrination by being a-religious. For example, Arnsone and Shapiro 
(1996) point to a sleight of hand by arguing that in non-religious contexts certain possibilities 
or options are only made available to adults because they have prioritised them to the 
exclusion of many others in childhood, e. g. developing skills in certain arts or sports. As 
Ahdar and Leigh (2005: 228) argue 
The rigorous keeping of a child's future to maximise adult opportunities would, in 
effect, deprive the child of the possibility of becoming a professional ballerina or 
footballer. Could it not be argued that the same applies to religious upbringing? 
A much stronger objection is made by Grace (2002: 14), however, who laments the degree of 
bad faith central to the charge of indoctrination against religious faith schools, specifically 
because secular schools are not themselves ideologically free zones 
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Secularism has its own ideological assumptions about the human person, the ideal 
society, the ideal system of schooling and the meaning of human existence. While 
these assumptions may not be formally codified into a curriculum subject 
designated `secular education' as an alternative to `religious education', they 
characteristically permeate the ethos and culture of state-provided secular schools 
and form a crucial part of the `hidden curriculum'. 
The view that there is a bias permeating secularist charges against faith based schooling, with 
respect to negating a child's autonomy, is shared by some Muslim educators. Although this 
often begins by pointing to the inconsistency described by Grace (2002), it does not end 
there. If we follow Trevathan and Mears' response to this charge we find a more qualified 
and nuanced insight than that accompanying the equivalence argument 
I'm not arguing that indoctrination doesn't take place here; it's just that it also 
takes place everywhere else. Secular society continues to see itself outside of 
dogma and doctrine - but that's ridiculous because it uses both to indoctrinate a 
system of beliefs and values. Now, there is reprehensible doctrinarian and I think 
that is when the child is not made free to make decisions concerning their own 
thinking. In the classroom, that would translate into the teacher telling them that 
such and such is the case and any other argument is false. If the teacher however 
speaks about something and says that within this understanding there are other 
views which he or she or `the Muslims' may not agree with for such and such a 
reason - then you're presenting the child with a fuller picture (Trevathan, 
Interview). 
All schools are indoctrinating processes, basically, so I think that you need to 
understand that before asking the question. I think there are stages of education 
that ought to make your understanding of that process more acute, and I don't think 
that enough emphasis is given in education to the play aspect, for too many formal 
learning processes are coming in. too early. And I think that's because of the 
academic success criteria that is quite prevalent amongst the Muslim community, a 
lot of Muslim schools also try to push the formal learning processes. Also, a non- 
Muslim parent might say that we want you to educate our child but they are not a 
Muslim therefore we don't want them to do the prayer. At that point I think the 
Muslim school will be quite able to say that your child will be there to observe the 
prayer but they won't be made to do the prayer. Neither would we stop them if 
they chose to or not. It's an interesting point because we would say that when a 
child came of age at 14 that they would have the choice anyway, so it wouldn't be 
relevant whether the parent said yes or no. But we haven't got to that point yet 
(Mears, Interview). 
This then rehearses the objection to viewing non-religious schooling as a neutral enterprise, 
and simultaneously invites the different and equally broad objection to modes of political 
integration that try to separate public and private spheres in some civic-national convention 
(cf Guttman, 1994). The distinction is elaborated upon after a consideration of the 
relationship between these conceptions of autonomy and conceptions of `good citizenship'. 
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7.2. Good citizens 
There is a genuine and problematic tension between espousing a HPG type of radical 
autonomy argument against religious education whilst, simultaneously, holding the 
reasonable view that the education process should contribute to the cultivation of future `good 
citizens'. This is epitomised by the states' interest in ascribing and inculcating liberal or civic 
virtues, a point famously set out in Rawls' (1993: 199) formulation: 
... political 
liberalism... will ask that children's education will include such things 
as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, they 
know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a 
legal crime... Moreover, their education should also prepare them to be fully 
cooperating members of society and enable them to be self supporting; it should 
also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honour the fair terms of 
social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society. 
This sort of thinking is evident in the current drive in Britain for `citizenship education' 
(QCA, 1998), which entails a clear desire to engender a particular `civic morality' amongst 
young people through imparting knowledge of political functions and historic practices, as 
one of the opening paragraphs of the Citizenship Education Committee, chaired by Sir 
Bernard Crick, reports 
We aim at no less than a change in the political culture of this country both 
nationally and locally: for people to think of themselves as active citizens, willing, 
able and equipped to have an influence in public life and with the critical capacities 
to weigh evidence before speaking and acting; to build on and extend radically to 
young people the best in existing traditions of community involvement and public 
service, and to make them individually confident in finding new forms of 
involvement and action among themselves (Qualifications Curriculum Authority, 
1998: paragraph 1.5) 
This begs the question, however, as to when the impetus behind wanting to form `good' or 
`active' citizens will actually conflict with the growing autonomy of the child. To put it 
another way: "at what point should he or she be free to reject liberalism and make mature, 
illiberal, choices of his or her own? " (Ahdar and Leigh, 2005: 231). The implication being 
that to make the objection to faith schools on the basis that they might curtail the child's 
autonomy can be inconsistent, given that the inculcation of any sort of civic morality can be 
subject to the same charge. 
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In our assessment of Muslim faith schooling, therefore, we should be careful not to stand 
behind universalistic and perfectionist positions that are overly abstracted from experiential 
contexts, in advance of looking at the "hard cases" (Favell and Modood, 2003). These offer 
many examples of academic excellence and fully integrated future citizens within the context 
of the historically specific schooling compromises discussed earlier. This is view a shared by 
McLaughlin (1992: 115). who has argued that 
Ethical and philosophical reflection must be conducted in relation to this fuller 
range of complex considerations and not in an abstract way independent of them. 
It is rash, for example, to condone or condemn certain kinds of separate school 
solely on grounds of philosophical principle. Much depends on how the 
institutions actually operate, and what their effects actually are on students and the 
broader community. 
7.3. Civic assimilation and the remaking of Muslim constituencies 
This embedded reading of autonomy can be interpreted as a critique of liberal 
perfectionist thinking that is often too abstracted from the lived relations and real world 
contexts in which Muslim schools seek to operate. It is an argument made by Parekh (2000: 
202-3) when he contests the civic assimilationist approach, based upon a neat separation of 
public and private spheres, on the grounds that such a view fails to take account of institutions 
that encompass both 
The school educates future citizens, and has a political dimension. However, since 
children are not just citizens but also human beings and members of the relevant 
cultural communities, their parents and cultural community have a vital interest in 
their education, which makes the school a cultural institution that belongs to private 
or civic realm. If we stressed the former, we would have to treat the school as a 
public institution subject to the control of the state and ignore parental choices and 
cultures; if the latter, we would reach the opposite conclusion. 
This sort of approach allows for the recognition of other intersecting issues affecting the 
articulation of Muslim-consciousness in Britain (Roy, 2004; Sayyid, 2002). The shape and 
impact of these issues are subject to debate, but amongst Muslims in Britain it is evident that 
there is an attempt to reconfigure what being a Muslim in the West means, and part of this 
process is linked to the issue of schooling. As Johnson and Casteli (2002: 33) have argued 
Islam in the West is itself undergoing a change. As part of this change, Muslim 
schools are engaged in creating an identity for the school, the students and the 
larger communities associated with them. Most Muslim schools in England are 
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multi-ethnic and draw children from a wide range of social and economic 
backgrounds. Although mono-faith they portray diverse interpretation of Islam. ' 
[... ] It would not be an exaggeration to describe their task as developing a kind of 
English Islam which is new and is finding its way and its identity within this new 
context. 
We find many aspects of this argument, expressed both as a hope and objective, amongst 
Muslim educators. This has already been demonstrated by Abdulla Trevanthan's view that - 
if anything - Islamia School is about creating a British-Muslim culture". This view fits 
nicely with Idreas Mears description of the same phenomena that Johnston and Casteli (2002) 
are trying to capture 
I think that what is interesting is that a kind of British Muslim Identity is only just 
emerging. I think that's basically because the schools and communities were 
controlled by a framework led by the elder generation and that people still saw 
themselves as an immigrant minority coming together to protect their culture, and 
in a sense still relate to another place being home. I would call them English 
Muslims, Welsh Muslims and Scots Muslims because British still has a sense of 
being abstract and being a political identity whereas region has much more to do 
with place and invites the rest of society to say `yes you're an English Muslim' 
rather than an Asian Other that is suggested by British Muslim. Then something 
will have actually changed, both in how the Muslims are viewed but also in how 
they see themselves... At that point I think the Muslims become much more 
relevant to general society and we'll start to see some very interesting things 
happen, I think (Mears, Interview). 
This argument returns us to the third issue motivating the desire for Muslim faith schooling. 
This is linked to the aspiration for more British trained theologians who could discuss 
theological issues with a contemporary resonance to the lived experiences of being a British- 
Muslim. It is argued that such developments - if publicly endorsed - could provide 
opportunities through which Muslim children would be able to confidently negotiate and 
reconcile the requirements of their faith with their rights and responsibilities as British 
citizens. This relationship is, therefore, almost dialectical, a view shared by Hussein (2004: 
322) who concludes that "Muslim schools are needed so that Muslim youth will be able to 
11 Basam Elshayyal, a teacher at Islamia School, captures this well when she says that "the faith aspect 
in schooling is really important. We try to achieve a holistic approach to their lives rather than 
compartmentalising everything. The ethics and morals permeate the whole attitude of the school. So 
we teach them that they can be a citizen of the world and a positive contributor in every area of their 
lives - in the wider world, within their family, with different religious groups" (quoted in CBMI, 2004: 
52). 
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comprehend and contextualise Islam in their environment (Britain). Thus, this also requires 
the Muslim schools to try to achieve a wider British identity. " 
S. Muslim curriculum objectives and social cohesion 
In support of such a project Ashraf (1990 reproduced in Ameli et al 2005) has outlined a 
possible curriculum "Faith" framework. Interestingly, he begins by advocating an autonomy 
argument that seeks to "eschew any form of indoctrination or compulsion to religion" (cited 
in Ameli et al 2005: 27-8) before distinguishing between two core curriculum aims. The first 
is concerned with beliefs and values (cognitive and affective respectively), and includes the 
following priorities 
[... ] 1.5 Awareness that god has created different racial groups so that we may 
know each other and live in harmony, respecting the different and differing 
customs, values, beliefs and languages of the main cultures of the country. [... ] 1.6 
Awareness that the richness of each community depends on how far it can 
appreciate and value the achievements of other communities and assimilate them 
for the benefit of its own existence. 1.8 Development not only of tolerance and 
concern for the rights and beliefs of others, but a commitment to practical 
engagement on their behalf on the basis of the awareness that in the eyes of God all 
have equal rights and are entitled to justice. 
Meanwhile, intellectual, emotional and social skills development are addressed in the second 
curriculum aim 
2.1 Nurturing and development of the powers of reasoning, reflective and critical 
thinking, imagining, feeling and communicating amongst and between persons. 2.2 
Learning how to maintain, develop and renew (and not merely preserve) the social, 
economic and political order on the basis of values that are fundamentally derived 
from great religious traditions and human practice. 2.3 Cultivation and 
development of the physical well being of pupils. 2.4 Cultivation and development 
of the abilities of communicative competence both in spoken and written form and 
through a number of modes including verbal, numerical, mathematical and artistic. 
2.5 Awareness of the interplay of performance and change in the social process so 
that the roots [... and] tentative nature of human condition and interaction are also 
understood. 2.6 Knowledge of modern science and technology and an awareness 
and a critical understanding of their relationship to socio-cultural ethics [... ] 2.7 
Mastery of scientific and other skills necessary for work and living in modern 
society. 
It would be beneficial here to explore these ideal type curriculum interests in relation to the 
concerns over social cohesion and social fragmentation that frequently arise in debate 
surrounding Muslim schools (see Meer, 2007a; 2006). For example, the IIPG (2001) argue 
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that it is the lack of `contact' amongst children from different religious backgrounds in 
separate schools that gives rise to fragmentary social situations ' 
If children grow up within a circumscribed culture, if their friends and peers are 
mostly from the same religion and hence also, very likely from the same ethnic 
group, and if they rarely meet to learn to live with others from different 
backgrounds, this is hardly calculated to provide the acceptance and recognition of 
diversity. We have clear evidence to the contrary in Northern Ireland, where the 
separation of Catholic Schools and Protestant schools has played a significant part 
in perpetuating the sectarian divide (HPG, 2001: 35) 
Although Catholic schools form an illustrative example here (see Short (2002) and McNichol 
(1988) for a powerful rebuttal to this example), and whilst the charge of ethnic exclusivism is 
not empirically tenable in an analysis of Muslim schools - bearing in mind the ethnic 
heterogeneity in the category of Muslim discussed earlier - the rest of the objection finds 
resonance in a commonly held view that any emphasis upon religious particularity results in 
inter-religious hostility. Responding to these charges, the educationist Geoffrey Short (2002: 
570), drawing upon empirical work with Jewish faith schools, has argued that, since neutrality 
as "the pre-requisites of successful contact cannot be guaranteed", the benefits of mere 
contact between children "are of limited value, for changes in attitude tend not to generalise 
[emerge substantively] out of the original contact situation". This is not an advocacy for 
apartheid as much as a rebuttal to a commonsense assumption in that. for Short, the relevant 
consideration is not one of contact "but anti-racist education which can, in principle, be 
undertaken as effectively in a faith school as in non-denominational one" (ibid). This is 
evident - if not central - to Ashraf s (1990) curriculum outline which uses Islamic principles 
to proactively accord universal dignity and worth, irrespective of ethnic, religious or racial 
difference. 
Both Ashraf (1990) and Short (2002) might be characterised as advocates of Gordon 
Allport's (1954) path-breaking work on the social-psychology of racism, which suggests that 
one of the most effective ways to impart knowledge about people different to oneself is 
through academic teaching in schools, rather than a naive laissez faire approach which 
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assumes that mere exposure and contact with `difference' will resolve prejudices. This is 
reflected in Mears' description 
I think the most important thing to note - and I think more of the Muslim schools 
are realising this - is that Islam is not solely for Muslims. It's for all of mankind. 
And the role of Muslims is to establish justice and meet the needs of all people, so 
that Muslim schools are for all children and they're about delivering education... 
And I think that what's going to happen with the Muslim schools is that as they 
find their way they will become much more creative in the way that they deliver 
education. That they will begin to have a significant impact on general education 
theory and practice in this country, and I'm really excited to see that happen. I 
think it's going to be a natural growth process, and part of that will actually happen 
not from the existing teachers but from young people who are brought up in 
Muslim schools (Mears, Interview). 
Mear's optimism may be seen as an development from the first stage solution envisaged 
thirteen years ago by Shabir Akhtar (1993: 43), who encouraged a type of `delayed 
assimilation' into the education system where "a limited amount of isolation" can enable 
Muslims to "gain the confidence and security... to assimilate on [their] own terms". Akhtar 
was of course making reference to the historical context of faith-schooling in Britain, and 
found himself in agreement with the Roman Catholic Bishop of Leeds, David Konstant, who 
has previously stated that the effect of separate Catholic schools has been integration rather 
than fragmentation. This, he argued, was because "having our own school within the state 
system helped us to move out of our initial isolation to become more confident and self 
assured" (quoted in The Times, 1 January 1991). 
9. Conclusions 
9.1. Pragmatic Muslim-consciousness 
The preceding analysis has explored how a Muslim-consciousness connects to the movement 
for Muslim schools, and specifically why Muslim minorities are seeking an incorporation and 
reflection of this Muslim-consciousness within the arena of education. Rather than turning 
inward, it is argued that the arena of education is witness to this consciousness seeking out 
new forms of synthesis in negotiating a meaningful and reciprocal British-Muslim identity. 
An important part of this involves a pursuit for the recognition of identities that are otherwise 
veiled by a collage of images positioning Muslims in Britain as "Public Enemy Number One 
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- Britain's Most Unwanted, as it were" (Alexander, 2000: 14). In trying to shake off these 
attributions, the mobilisation for Muslim schools marks an important shift in the movement 
of a consciousness for itself. from a community's historical ascribed identity to a political 
self-constructed identity. That Muslim mobilisations are engaging with a range of established 
educational conventions, norms, regulations and precedents, suggests that, contrary to 
Charles Taylor's assumption discussed in chapter two, Muslims in Britain are demonstrating 
a willingness and ability to proceed through the sorts of multicultural claims-making set out 
in chapter one. The findings of this chapter call into the question the sorts of exclusivity in 
predetermined notions of Muslim-incompatibility presented in Taylor's thesis. In so doing it 
accentuates a divergence between Taylor and Du Bois's idea of recognition, since the latter is 
more genuinely dialogical and does not seek to a priori exclude some minority claims- 
making from the process of politics. 
9.2. Impaired civic status? 
It is remains, however, as Osama Saeed protests, that the second most populous faith in 
Britain receives little state recognition in terms of faith schooling provisions. Where Muslim 
constituencies are granted greater participatory space in the shape of provisions for Muslim 
schooling, it is evident from the testimonies of Muslim educators that a synthesis between 
faith requirements and citizenship commitments is a first order priority. This is the key point 
because it appears increasingly unjust not to afford Muslims in Britain the same ratio of 
schooling provisions as other faith groups, particularly since this has historically proved to be 
an effective method of integrating religious minorities throughout the development of the 
education system in Britain. Is there currency then in Merali's charge that Muslims are 
subject to an impaired enjoyment of a civic status, and that this is partly due to being 
perceived in certain sorts of negative ways? 
195 
9.3. Islamophobia and the security agenda 
The fall-out from the current security agenda described at the very beginning of this thesis 
is difficult to ignore, specifically in the conception of Muslims and Islam through the 
discourses captured by the Runneymede Trust's (1997,2004) catalogue of pernicious 
stereotypes surveyed in chapter three and chapter four. These include descriptions of 
Muslims as irrational, primitive, sexist, violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of 
terrorism and engaged in a `clash of civilisations', so much so that the prospect of affording 
Muslim minorities faith schooling provisions would risk encouraging and further cementing 
these values and behaviours. Arzu Merali suspects that it is for these reasons that Muslim 
schools have been recognised so little and so late, whilst Tahir Alam sees the situation more 
in terms of broader issues, including the relative newness of Muslim communities in Britain, 
though he equally displays an awareness of external perceptions shaping the terms of Muslim 
minority success 
I think unfortunately, in the public arena and particularly in the media discourse, 
we're not beyond that... I think sadly, this sort of spectre of segregated, Muslims 
hating the rest of the world remains out there at the moment and Muslim schools 
with being flagged up in creating these monsters or fifth-columnists in British 
society. So, even now we'll have Muslim schools with real resources rather than 
scrapping around for the funding that others have, this is still going to be this huge 
question mark around them in the public arena -I don't see that going away 
(Merali, Interview). 
You have to remember that the Muslim community is a very recent community in 
this country, we're a very young community, but I think the participation levels 
within the last five years.. . and the vibrancy of participation 
has been very 
encouraging... There's a lot of work to be done of course, and this is the 
challenging situation that we find ourselves in. That we are under higher scrutiny 
than other communities, and how we respond to that and change wider society's 
perceptions perhaps will be essential to how the Muslim community develops. 
(Alam, Interview). 
9.4 Conclusion 
All of the themes of political and personal commitment, of striving for self knowledge 
and a sense of self, and of the essential material and moral conditions necessary for self 
realisation that inform a Du Boisian conception of consciousness are apparent in the 
preceding discussion, and return us to the typology set out in chapter two. Ansari (2004: 14) 
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convincingly captures this broad feeling of being dispossessed, much of which has to do with 
a sense of powerlessness and political impotence 
Since the power to decide policy, distribute resources and arrange the various 
affairs of society rest with the majority . community, Muslims have suffered disadvantage and exclusion, and consequently their identity has been shaped by 
negative interactions with this society. 
Moreover, and having engaged with some of the main sociological and philosophical currents 
at work in the debate surrounding Muslim schooling in Britain, the preceding discussion 
advocates a more contextual sensitivity in recognising the scope for multiple and/or 
simultaneously valid accounts of autonomy presented in Muslim curriculum objectives and 
their implications for social cohesion. This simultaneously contains the Du Boisian 
prescription that we must recognise and value differences in order to achieve unities. These 





11 Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
1. Is there a Muslim double consciousness and what does this mean? 
This thesis has aimed to make both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the 
study of Muslims and multiculturalism in Britain. It has approached this through asking 
how Muslim-consciousness connects to the sorts of civic status that Muslims in Britain are 
seeking, compared to that they are currently afforded, and how accounts of minority 
consciousness gleaned from the work of W. E. B. Du Bois can elucidate our understanding of 
this. This has necessarily included reference to the types of civic status that have prevailed 
for other minorities under the terms of a peculiarly incremental, and often precedent-based, 
British multicultural tradition. This is a tradition that is metaphorically counterpoised - in 
Roy Jenkins' famous words - to "a flattening process of assimilation", and which has raised 
expectations of equal treatment derived from the actual process of managing diversity rather 
than a substantive assumption of sameness. 
These issues were theoretically set out in chapters one, two and three, and then 
empirically pursued through multi-method case studies examining salient Muslim 
mobilisations for legislation to protect Muslims from discrimination, in chapter five, and the 
state funding of Muslim schools, in chapter six. The thesis has argued that a focus upon 
Muslim-consciousness, alongside a reflection on the ways this consciousness Js understood 
politically and discursively, through the public and media commentary that was examined in 
chapter four, allows us to capture the interaction between agency and structure. This enables 
us to observe the operation of at least two types of consciousness: one that exists in itself and 
one that exists for itself. 
This thesis has sought to retrieve this distinction from the ideas W. E. B. Du Bois. Thus 
chapter two teased out the layered distinctions and implications of these two kinds of 
consciousness to show the way in which Du Bois, unlike Hegel and some later 
multiculturalists, recognised the manner in which coercion could be a partner or competitor in 
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processes of inter-subjective recognition. Du Bois' work demonstrates how and why these 
interactions impact upon the kinds of, self-consciousness (in itself and for itself) that, 
consequently, emerge and develop. Indeed, it was argued that Du Bois' ideas prove 
invaluable in capturing the dual character of unrecognised minority subjectivities and their 
transformative potential, as well as the conditions of impaired civic status that are sometimes 
allocated to minorities by mainstream society. 
In chapters five and six these distinctions were adopted in the conceptualisation of 
Muslim mobilisations-as-consciousness as witnessed in (i) anti-discrimination and (ii) 
educational claims-making, through the explicit projection of Muslim group identities 
examined in chapter three. To justify this, chapter three mapped the movement from a 
historically ascribed identity toward a politically self-constructed identity - as the emergence 
of a self-consciousness for itself - by tracing the adoption and projection of the Muslim 
identities embodied within this movement. Through a focus upon their form, their content, 
and how they might be contrasted with other minority identity mobilisations within the British 
political context, it showed that Muslim identities have emerged relatively recently, through, 
and sometimes in opposition to, British race and ethnicity thinking. The implications of this 
became paramount in the ensuing chapters, from which four main types of Muslim- 
consciousness might be deciphered. Whilst in truth there is overlap and interaction between 
each kind, it is argued that enough consistency exists in their form and content to delineate the 
following four tendencies that move progressively outward. This outward movement is taken 
to reflect the Du Bosian characterisation of the development of a minority consciousness from 
being in itself (as `impaired' and `reactive') to a minority consciousness that is for itself (as 
`pragmatic' and potentially `synthesized'). 
I. Impaired Muslim-consciousness 
As chapter two illustrated, the manner in which minorities are publicly represented is 
integral to Du Bois' account of double-consciousness, through his discussion of the veil and 
the construction of the self. That external narratives on minority identity impinge upon the 
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sorts of consciousness minorities experience is a view captured in his protest that, "our worst 
side has been so shamelessly emphasised that we are denying that we ever had a worst side 
[so that] in all sorts of ways we are hemmed in" (Du Bois, 1999 [1903]: 127). This is why he 
encourages the cultivation of a positive public representation of minorities, so that they can 
transcend the `peculiar sensation' that they are indeed `a problem'. For these reasons, chapter 
four argued that the wave of negative public and media discourses concerning Muslims in 
Britain that has recently emerged can impair how Muslims see themselves reflected back. In 
an example of a reactive Muslim-consciousness, this has informed the increasing tendency for 
Muslims to represent themselves through a proliferation of Muslim media sources that are 
seeking to provide alternative perspectives from, and thereby plural ise, the mainstream. 
1.2 Reactive Muslim-consciousness 
Reporting on the second of three case studies, chapter five extended this analysis to the 
arena of anti-discrimination formulae that, alongside education, are considered to be a 
cornerstone of the sorts of British multicultural citizenship (and the civic status this confers) 
surveyed in chapter one. By applying the discussion of cultural racism and Islamophobia 
elaborated earlier, particularly in chapter three, the ways in which these racisms are or are not 
recognised within current anti-discrimination protections were examined in chapter five. 
This proceeded through a genealogy of anti-discrimination legislation to show how we have 
reached where we are; to what extent the current situation works differently for different 
groups, and where Muslims are positioned within this. It was argued that, in rejecting a 
normative grammar of race through an acceptance that legal categories of race and ethnicity 
must not be foreclosed to the complexities of social contingencies (including periods of 
Muslim racialisation), a" coherent argument for Muslim inclusion under existing anti- 
discrimination formulae could be made. The fact that Muslim bodies, such as the Islamic 
Human Rights Commission (IHRC), are increasingly materially supporting cases where the 
claimant is not assisted by the CRE because the complaint concerns anti-Muslim 
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discrimination, indicates the way in which a Muslim-consciousness for itself is emerging to 
engage and challenge established policy orthodoxies. 
1.3. Pragmatic Muslim-consciousness 
In reporting on the last of three case studies, chapter six examined the relationship 
between Muslim-consciousness and Muslim mobilisations for Muslim schools in an attempt 
to problematise an increasingly salient articulation of Muslim identity. Due to the significant 
interaction that is required between Muslim parents, Muslim educators, local education 
authorities and the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) in the creation, operation and 
monitoring of Muslim schools, this was an ideal case through which to examine the 
emergence and meaning of Muslim-consciousness. The inquiry focused upon priorities 
within and amongst British-Muslim communities themselves but also considered the way that 
these have been understood at an official level. It concluded that the impulse for Muslim 
schools is located squarely in the Du Boisian tradition set out in chapter two, and that an 
incorporation and reflection of Muslim-consciousness in education can prevent Muslim. 
consciousness from turning inward, by instead striving outward in synthesis as a meaningful 
and reciprocal British-Muslim identity. 
1.4. Synthesized Muslim-consciousness? 
A potential fourth type of Muslim-consciousness may be found in a synthesised or 
hyphenated identity. As chapter two outlined, Du Bois' discussion of different sets of 
`strivings' were quite distinct from the potentially debilitating effects of earlier types of 
double consciousness, since they began with a resource and achieved a new synthesis. In 
drawing upon Hegelian phenomenology, it could be argued that Du Bois concluded that the 
fate and consciousness of different parties within a polity would necessarily become 
interdependent, or inextricably linked, in a process that meant they would effectively have to 
`sink or swim' together. Similarly, one of the conclusions of this thesis is that precisely this 
predicament currently faces Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain. At what point, 
if at all, 
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will the emergence of a Muslim-consciousness be recognised as a legitimate constituent of 
British citizenship? And at what cost will Muslim constituencies be denied a participatory 
space in the form of provisions for Muslim schooling, discrimination legislation, and non- 
derogatory representation in mainstream public and media discourses? 
Through the cases elaborated in this thesis, it is evident that there is a movement for some 
sort of synthesis by Muslims themselves. Britain boasts a public sphere that has historically 
included and incorporated other religious minorities. The question with which it is currently 
faced, is can it accommodate Muslims in a manner that will allow them to reconcile their faith 
commitments with their citizenship requirements? 
2. The emergence of `radical Muslim-consciousness' as a new research agenda? 
.- As the 
hitherto four fold typology re-establishes, the thesis has almost entirely focused 
upon mainstream Muslim communities seeking inclusion in the public sphere, an inquiry that 
has proceeded through an explicit concern with the domestic, and not international, agendas. 
Having established this, it is important to recognise the ways in which newer political issues 
are shaping social science research agendas vis-ä-vis Muslims in Britain. One example 
concerns the way in which there currently appears to be a re-orientation in the interest in 
Muslim-consciousness, a shift that is focused through a securitised lens that is no longer 
limited to the domestic agenda. It is perhaps appropriate to conclude this thesis by 
commenting on the content of this shift, and noting the extent to which it has arguably been 
precipitated by the London bombings of 7 July 2005, and other terrorist related incidents 
involving British Muslims. 
A potentially illustrative example of the current re-orientation can be found in Ed 
Hussain's (2007) recent account, The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I 
Saw Inside and Why I Left. Hussain's biographically-led arguments concern the nature of 
some Muslim identities, specifically their alleged `radical' (anti-western) and ambitious 
(proselytising) content, which indicates that the topic areas which this thesis has primarily 
focused upon are no longer the only salient issues concerning Muslim identities in 
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- contemporary British politics and society. This portrayal of a Muslim-consciousness that, to a 
large extent, emerges outside of the issues that that have been examined here, has been 
warmly received by commentators, 
' and suggests that an inquiry into `radical Islam'2 must 
form part of any contemporary or emerging research agenda on Muslims in Britain. 
To date, however, there is very little credible academic research that explores 
organisations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the other fringe movements that Hussain chronicles 
in his populist and contested account (Butt, 2007). Nevertheless, several very recent 
exceptions to this general trend testify to the interest in what might be described as the 
emergence of `radical Muslim-consciousness', as a contemporary research agenda, as well as 
the problematic nature of such inquiry. 
The first and most sympathetic can be found in Tahir Abbas' (2007) edited volume 
entitled Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective. In it Abbas argues that "the 
communities from which many radicals emanate are generally removed from formally 
engaging in the political process" (pg, 4) and that "by giving them [Muslims] a sense of 
belonging, identity, or association with a struggle that transcends their everyday boundaries 
and barriers... Islamists have moved in with a twisted message of salvation and redemption" 
(pg, 17). This of course assumes a degree of naivete and/or susceptibility amongst some 
sections of Muslim communities, given the ease with which they are apparently being led 
astray by Machiavellian Muslim figures. As such Abbas fails to offer either a sociologically 
or politically convincing comprehension of what a `radical Muslim-consciousness' might 
entail and, arguably, proceeds from a confused, under-developed and 
fatalistic social 
psychology of Muslim identities per se. This 
is illustrated by the following paragraph in 
which Abbas (2007: 9) concludes that "young Muslim 
individuals experiencing acute social 
exclusion and faced with multiple challenges and confrontations 
in relation to religion, culture 
and society, [find] their only solution 
is to take a radical Islamic perspective. " This of course 
1 Amongst others, Anushka Asthana (2007) describes Hussein as the "true Islamic voice", whilst 
Martin Amis (2007) is convinced that his account is the "most accurate portrayal of the dark side of 
Islam", a view shared by Johann Hari's (2007) conclusion that it is a timely insight into the 
psychologies of people convinced of the 
"great gay-Jewish conspiracy". 
See chp. 6 sec. 4 for a critique of such terminology. 
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contradicts the key conceptual innovation of this thesis: that, following Du Bois, we should 
view forms of Muslim-consciousness, in all their variety, as representing developments of 
consciousness in and for themselves, in a way that does not solely attribute or reduce 
identifications to ascribed or imposed categorisations that deny Muslim agency. 
. Whilst 
Abbas underplays the potential fruition of consciousness in and for itself, in the 
manner elaborated throughout this thesis, it is neither satisfactory that, in an indication of the 
novelty of this area, other alarmist and even less nuanced contributions and interventions 
over-emphasise the scope and prevalence of a `radical Muslim-consciousness'. For example, 
whilst the unscholarly accounts of Michael Gove's (2006) Celsius 7/7 and Melanie Phillips' 
(2006) Londonistan: How Britain created a terror state within have received much attention 
in public and media discourse, a recent - and more sociologically competent - report from the 
Policy Exchange (2007: 32) has legitimised a view that a `radical Muslim-consciousness' has 
emerged from "a deeper yearning" for identity held amongst "many British Muslims". 
, 
According to the report's authors, this is because "older forms of political and national 
identity have come under attack or have diminished. " That means, the authors contend, that 
the growth of "Islamism in the UK over the past two decades has been encouraged 
by ... official policies. 
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Amongst the policies lamented by the authors include those that have facilitated the move 
to devolved or regional assemblies, alongside anti-racist education programmes and equal 
opportunities legislation, with no clear rationale or distinction to support their assertions. As 
such, their analysis amounts to an overly deterministic account which avoids asking the 
simple, but important, question: if, as the authors claim, multiculturalist policy and other 
identity related politics discourses play a role in the `radicalisation' process, could the 
recognition of Muslim identity not also be an important tool to deterring or alleviating 
radicalisation? For, it is equally plausible that the public affirmation of a mainstream 
Muslim-consciousness, that has access to equitable education and protection from 
3 For a critical comment on this report see Smyth and Gunning (2007). 
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discrimination, could stifle the expansion of the sorts of `radical' consciousness feared by the 
Policy Exchange and others. 
It is the argument of this thesis that this outcome is not only plausible and desirable, but 
is also, in fact, most likely. Indeed, some of the most convincing and nuanced research that is 
emerging on `radical Muslim-consciousness' supports this. For example, in his interim 
submission to the Department for Communities and Local Governments (DfLG), entitled The 
Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (a study in progress), Tufayal Choudry 
(2007: 21-2) sets out a five point summary. This incorporates both the individualistic and 
social-psychological concerns pertaining to the emergence of a radical Muslim consciousness. 
Choudry's conclusions are drawn without ignoring the sociological and political dimensions 
of their emergence and, consequently, are worth quoting at length 
First, the path to radicalisation often involves a search for identity at a moment of crisis. 
Whilst defining oneself is part of the normal process of identity formation among young 
people, for those who are at risk of violent radicalisation, this process creates a `cognitive 
opening', a moment when previous explanations and belief systems are found to be 
inadequate in explaining an individual's experience. Second, underlying the identity crisis 
is a sense of not being accepted or belonging to society. The intensity of such feelings is 
reinforced by experiences of discrimination and racism, a sense of blocked social 
mobility; and a lack of confidence in the British political system. Third, as part of this 
process individuals seek to construct a sense of what it means to be Muslim in Britain 
today. The appeal of extremist groups reflects, in part, the failure of traditional religious 
institutions and organisations to connect with young people and address their questions 
and concerns. Fourth, a lack of religious literacy and education appears to be a common 
feature among those that are drawn to such groups. The most vulnerable are those who 
are religious novices exploring their faith for the first time. Fifth, the discourse of 
`British-Islam' is emerging as a powerful response to `radical Islam'. 
It is on the last point that I would like to end this thesis. On the emergence of a hyphenated 
Muslim-consciousness achieved in a new synthesis that, for Du Bois, heralded a solution that 
could be re-configured in on-going contestations of citizenship and civic status. This, believed 
Du Bois, would allow minorities to eschew the peculiar sensation that they are `a problem', 
and instead allow them to see their `strivings' incorporated into mainstream society and 
politics in a way that would herald reciprocity and mutual respect., What is preferred here, 
therefore, is a nationally framed focus, albeit with open boundaries, that does not, in advance, 
analytically advance or preclude social or political phenomena as they impact upon it. As the 
thesis has demonstrated, this means that a focus upon Muslim-identity and mobilisations 
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through a national focus has been the most appropriate approach in capturing the meaning and 
operation of contemporary Muslim-consciousness in Britain, and the at least five types of 
which this concluding chapter has typologised. As such, this contribution has sought to make 
inroads into to our understanding of Muslim-consciousness in Britain, with the view that the 
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Appendix I 
The population of Great Britain by Ethnic group and religion 
Any 
other No Not Christian Buddhist Hindu Jewish Muslim Sikh religion religion stated Total 
All ethnic groups 0 71.82 0.26 0.98 0.47 2.78 0.59 0.28 15.05 7.76 100.00 
White 75.50 0.11 0.01 0.49 0.35 0.01 0.24 15.54 7.73 100.00 
Briti5h/Scottish 75.72 0.10 0.01 0.45 0.13 (). 01 023 1'). 16 '1.69 100.011 
Irish 85.68 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.02 0.26 6.16 7139 100.00 
Other White 62.93 0.32 0.09 2.33 8.27 0.04 0.58 16.06 939 100.00 
Mixed 52.33 0.71 0.86 0.47 9.73 0.42 0.59 23.34 11.55 100.00 
Asian. Asian BritisNScottish 4.09 0.61 23.14 0.08 50.37 13.86 0.90 I A2 5.53 100.00 
Indian 4.96 0.18 46.82 0.06 12.60 29.20 1.73 1.79 4.61., 100.00 
Pakistani 1.12 0.03 0.08 0.05 91.90 0.05 0.05 0.56 6.17 100.00 
Bangladeshi 0.52 0.06 0.61 0.04 9242 0.04 0.01 0.45 5.84 100.00 
OtherAsian 13.46 4.83 26.34 0.30 37.48 6.16 0.95 3.55 6.92 100.00 
Black Black BritishifScottish 71.04 0.13 026 0.08 9.36 0.06 0.44 7.58 11.06 100.00 
Black Caribbean 73.73 0.17 0.29 0.10 0.79 0.03 0.59 11.25 13.06 100.00 
BlackAfrican 68.80 0.07 0.21 0.05 20.03 0.09 0.22 2.37 8.17 100.00 
Other Black 66.48 0.20 0.36 0.14 6.00 0.07 0.65 12.15 13.95 100.00 
Chinese, other ethnic group 26.79 15.22 0.67 0.54 12.79 0.51 0.70 36.09 8.68 100.00 
Chinese 21.12 15.13 0.07 0.05 0 33 0.04 1) 51 53.00 9.7'., 10O. 00 
Any other ethnic group 32.81 15.32 1.31 1.06 26.02 1.00 0.91 14.02 7.54 100.00 
All non-White groups 30.07 2.00 11.91 0.18 3042 7.11 0.72 9i9 8.10 100.00 
Source, 11101 census , 
Ott ice for Nat ional Staticoicc, 211(11 cen sus, General R egister Office for `.. cotland 
Appendix II 
The population of Great Britain by Ethnic group and region 
Yorkshire 
North North and East West South South England Great East West Humber midlands Hellands East London East West England Wales &Wales So and Britain 
All adtnicgroups 2515 4730 4965 4172 5.267 5,388 7,172 8.001 4928 69,139 1,903 52,042 5.062 57,106 
Wltib 
British /Scottish 2.626 4.203 4.551 3.908 4,538 4927 4289 7.305 4102 42.761 1,787 65,536 6,833 50.366 
Irish 9 77 33 35 73 61 220 82 32 62A 18 642 69 691 
Other White 21 75 57 57 63 136 595 222 81 1,308 37 1,365 78 1,423 
Mbw 12 63 65 63 73 98 226 86 37 663 18 661 13 676 
Asian, Asian Brit Mcdtish 311 230 222 169 386 122 867 187 33 2,010 25 2276 56 2.329 
hdian 10 72 51 122 179 51 637 89 16 1.029 8 1.037 15 1,052 
Pakistani it 117 146 28 195 39 143 59 7 707 8 715 32 767 
Ban jadeshi 6 26 12 7 31 19 153 15 5 275 5 281 2 283 
Other Asian 3 15 12 12 21 13 133 26 5 239 3 241 6 267 
Blac1, Black BritisWSoottich A 42 31 39 106 1A 783 57 21 1,133 7 1,140 8 1,118 
Black Caribbean 1 2p 21 27 82 26 34k 77 12 561 3 566 2 566 
Black African 3 16 10 9 12 17 379 25 6 676 6 480 S 685 
01herBlack 0f' 5 3 6 10 S 40 5 2 95 1 96 1 97 
chino ., othr. thnic groups 10 40 22 20 30 35 193 62 22 635 11 447 24 473 
Ch r ese 6 27 12 13 tb 20 80 33 13 221 d 227 16 243 
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All non4hite groups 60 374 324 272 593 263 2,069 392 113 OR 62 4521 102 4623 
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Appendix III 
"GET OFF YOUR KNEES" 
Print media public intellectuals and Muslims 
in Britain' 
Nasar Meer 
This article examines perceptions of British-Muslims deployed by "print media public intellectuals" 
(PMPI). lt argues that PMPI embody a particular type of "mediatized intellectual" whose public 
discourse on Muslims is crucial in determining how issues emerging from the politics of 
multiculturalism are understood. Adopting a "theory of argumentation" (Richardson, 2001) 
derived from a critical discourse analysis methodology (CDA), it investigates the political content 
of messages disseminated by (1) conservative nationalist and (2) secular liberal PMPI through their 
newspaper opinion columns. The findings suggest that PMPI argumentation ranges from an overt 
hostility to a qualified discrimination (the former through exclusive accounts of belonging and the 
latter through a combativelcivilising liberalism), and that-moreover-there is a convergence 
between these two positions in their anti-Muslim sentiment and desire to regulate the lives of 
ethnic Others (Hage, 1998). There are four parts to this article: the first part outlines what a public 
intellectual is and where PMPI stand in relation to this, the second part discusses some Muslim 
attempts to elicit forms of recognition from the state under a rubric of multiculturalism; the third 
part outlines the chosen CDA schema of analyses and PMPI output; and the fourth part concludes 
by encouraging us to recognise and examine further the importance of PMPI argumentation in 
public discourse. 
KEYWORDS Discourse analysis; Foucault; journalists; multiculturalism; Muslims; print-media; 
public intellectuals 
Introduction 
The pious counterposition of good or unavoidable ethnocentrism against regrettable but 
exceptional racism, is an empty charade favoured by those who evade and mystify the 
moral and political responsibilities that fall to critical commentators in this most difficult 
of areas. (Gilroy, 2000) 
At bottom, the intellectual in my sense of the word, is ... someone whose whole being is 
staked on a sense of being unwilling to accept easy formulas, or ready made cliches, or 
the smooth ever-so-accommodating conformations of what the powerful or conven- 
tional have to say and what they do. (Said, 1994) 
Through a series of newspaper articles challenging the idea of "Islamophobia", the 
Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee echoes a chorus of print media journalists who share 
her protest that "these days criticising any aspect of Islam risks landing you down among 
the racists" (Toynbee, 2004d). This is particularly worrying because British Muslims "still 
too rarely speak out against terror" and "excuse, rather than refute, the many ferocious 
verses calling for the blood of infidels in their holy book-verses that justify terror" 
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(Toynbee, 2004d). Her standpoint locates her amongst some illustrious company. The 
former Observer editor, current columnist and eminent political economist Will Hutton, 
for example, is eager to condemn a pervasive "Islamic sexism-whether it be arranged 
marriages, headscarves, limiting career options" or "female circumcision" to which 
we "cannot give ground in the name of multiculturalism" (Hutton, 2004a). Along 
with other prominent print media journalists, both Toynbee and Hutton fear that 
Muslims are currently at odds with something integral to life in Britain, if not with 
modernity itself. 
Two immediate points of concern emerge from these comments and are worth 
addressing at the outset. The first is that anti-Muslim racism or "Islamophobia" should not 
be characterised as fictional charges designed to obstruct critical engagement with 
interpretations of Islam. Islamophobia incorporates a documented interaction of 
traditional and cultural racisms with a historical dimension that is often drawn upon in 
popular discussion (Runnymede Trust, 1997). The second is that each writer has 
mischaracterised both Islam and multiculturalism, respectively (these points are developed 
below). 
As a result of the first two concerns, however, there emerges a third and equally 
pressing issue: if the absolute worst side of an already racialised minority is continually 
exhorted under a banner of free speech the outcome-rather than aiding its cessation- 
will be to intensify processes of racialisation through sanctioning such discourse as 
credible. This, naturally, will make the minority group more defensive and less willing to 
accept legitimate criticism where it exists, they will effectively "be hemmed In on all sides" 
(Du Bois, 1978, p. 222). These concerns help frame the focus of the proceeding analysis 
upon print media journalists who are, as the opening lines from Paul Gilroy might imply, 
important commentators integral to this process. 
Who and What are Print Media Public Intellectuals? 
This article is focused explicitly on the print media as the source of a vast array of 
public information available to local, national and international audiences, and is 
consumed within and between a host of social cleavages marked by class, gender and 
ethnicity differentials amongst others (Husband, 2000). From such an understanding, it is 
reasonable to suggest that an analysis of print media content might reveal something 
valuable about common beliefs and underlying value systems, and represent one means 
of studying a society itself (McQuail, 1994). 
As producers of content in this medium, there exist a number of influential print 
media journalists with art authority that stems from both their ability to reflect certain 
aspects or segments of society, whilst simultaneously raising public awareness of 
particular issues and events; setting agendas for public discussion and influencing 
(directly or indirectly) public opinion. As a result, we might begin to characterise some of 
these journalists as public intellectuals, as print media public intellectuals (PMPI), 
particularly those with an acknowledged expertise across a diverse range of topics 
upon which they choose to comment, an expertise that is drawn upon to frame 
discussions or messages? 
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PMPI and Public Intellectuals 
Paradoxically there is at present a wealth of literature lamenting the "decline" of the 
public intellectual (Molnar, 1994; Posner, 2001), anti-intellectualism (Hofstader, 1973; 
Johnson, 1989) and philistinism (Furedi, 2004). As a cause for anxiety amongst academics 
and sections of the intelligentsia, particularly when coupled with fears of "dumbing down" 
(Jacoby, 2000) and cultural populism (Eagleton, 1996), these concerns rarely, if ever, take 
into account a continuing feature of intellectualism that is signalled in the work of print 
media journalists, even where there is room for such an analysis amongst established 
accounts. For example, in describing the emergence of modern intellectuals, Zygmunt 
Bauman (1987) has sought to contrast "intellectuals as legislators", people usually in the 
service of state institutions, with "intellectuals as interpreters" who interpret texts, public 
events or other artefacts by deploying their specialised knowledge to interpret and explain 
things on behalf of the public. The conception of a print media journalist as an interpreter 
of-and commentator upon-public events certainly accords with the latter of Bauman's 
distinctions, and also feeds quite well into Antonio Gramsci's (1973) seminal description of 
what a "traditional intellectual" looks like, i. e. somebody who occupies an established and 
structured space or occupation. 
Print journalists as "Committed" Intellectuals? 
Making a distinction between "critical" and "functional" public intellectuals, Jean- 
Paul Sartre (1974, p. 285) argues "the duty of the intellectual is to denounce injustice 
wherever it occurs", as opposed to merely doing so according to party interests. The 
implication being that public intellectuals should extrapolate outwards from a universal 
ethical standard on some issues, whilst conserving their independence by-para- 
doxically-being publicly "committed" intellectuals in order to comment freely without 
known constraints. 
It is open to debate as to'whether PMPI have the autonomy to transcend the party 
line of their newspaper or its particular editorial' One can certainly think of examples 
where this has been the case, and although I have already argued that part of the strength 
of PMPI actually stems from their ability to reflect certain aspects or segments of society, 
this is simultaneously dependent upon a perception of independence, which inevitably 
involves some deviation from the norm. 
Simultaneously, PMPI can never entirely shake off the responsibilities and restric- 
tions conferred upon them by their employment on a newspaper. Yet it Is unclear whether 
non-print media public intellectuals would gain the necessary exposure through a 
particular media outlet did they not already suit a particular editorial line, whether 
they were aware of it or not. Hence we should not dismiss the degrees of autonomy or 
room for manoeuvre available to PMPI, since it is arguably no less than that afforded to 
other public intellectuals or "independent" commentators. This observation then adds 
weight to the significance of PMPI, since established journalists-who are the focus of this 
paper-are afforded legal contracts and a degree of notoriety that arguably reassures 
them of their occupational position, as well as a regular space In which to articulate their 
messages. 
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Print journalists as 'Intervening" Intellectuals? 
Complaining that Sartre's notion of a "committed" intellectual represents a fictitious 
ideal of universality-fighting for universal truths and freedoms, and assuming the task of 
speaking for humanity as a whole-Michel Foucault (1977) advances the idea of a more 
specific intellectual who can intervene on the side of the oppressed over particular issues, 
whilst never claiming to "speak" on the behalf of anybody. Foucault's general concern 
here is that an adoption of universal positions that necessitate speaking on the behalf of 
others might actually function to rob them of their already limited agency, i. e. power is 
exercised over those who are known through discourse, so that those who produce 
discourse exercise the power to enforce its validity. 
To conceive of the intellectual solely in Foucauldian terms, however, is no more " 
helpful than Sartre's conception for our analysis of PMPI. This is because the intellectual 
"interventions" conceived of by Foucault can surely not stand outside of broader ethical/ 
political conceptions of what is acceptable and what is not; what is good and what is not. 
There is, however, a Foucauldian position derived from his account of power that can, it 
will later be argued, be of significant help in this respect. 
Print journalists as "Mediating" Intellectuals? 
In a more recent contribution, and one which tries to address the broader task of 
how we should approach thinking about "the norms of intellectual practice", Thomas 
Osborne (2004, p. 445) describes the emergence of "the intellectual as mediator". This is a 
type of intellectual who, in addition to Bauman's legislator and interpreter, contributes 
ideas that are "meant to get us from one place to another, to move things along" in a 
"mediatized" performance, such that: 
Perhaps such images of "where we're at" or "the state we're in" are just the necessary 
correlates of the fact that all of us have to orientate ourselves in a mediatized society; one 
which is traversed by mediations and mediators of a multitude of kinds. It is not simply 
that we are all necessarily mediators now but that the world itself is imaged through 
various media, and not least by mediator intellectuals ... (Osborne, 2004, p. 445) 
This is an eminently more helpful contribution to any effort to pin down the 
currency of PMPI argumentation, since it is not a concern with absolutes or dichotomies of 
roles adopted by intellectuals, but points instead to the possibility that PMPI could be 
important "mediators" in the diffusion of ideas to a broader public. 
It follows that the idea of a PMPI can accord with the definition of a public 
intellectual when messages serve to cultivate public notions on events, and contribute to 
the formation of a particular collective consciousness. The intellectual should then question 
and scrutinise existing ideas as well as introducing or facilitating newer ones in a public 
fashion. It is therefore reasonable to expect PMPI to offer informed comment, and-at the 
very least-an understanding aimed at avoiding stereotypes and unscrutinised con- 
jecture. This is doubly important given their training and ethos as journalists, as well as the 
fact that they occupy a particularly privileged position as intellectuals, since the 
dissemination of their messages takes place through an established conduit of influential 
mass newspaper circulations (including the electronic media) 
4 
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PMPI Conservatism, Liberalism and Racism 
The presence of Muslims in what we might think of as comprising the "public 
spherei5 in Britain has recently become increasingly conspicuous. Not simply that Muslims 
have become more "visible" as a minority because of problematising episodes such as 
September 11, although this inevitably informs part of a broader picture, but rather a 
growth of what Tariq Modood (1992,2005) has described as an "ethnic assertiveness" 
amongst Muslims themselves. 
Muslims and the Politics of Identity 
Under a rubric of multiculturalism, this is signalled in the very real attempts to secure 
forms of "recognition" (Taylor, 1994) from the state. Through collective petitioning or 
lobbying these include, amongst others, the state funding of religious schools, legislation 
preventing the incitement to religious hatred, and a greater public recognition of certain 
faith-related "requirements" so that specific issues can be mediated when they develop, 
i. e. allowing amendments to uniforms, whether in school or employment, as a reflection of 
personal modesty derived from religious instruction. At the same time, such an increased 
emphasis upon what some perceive to be a strategic deployment of religious affiliation by 
organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), 6 or the notion of a "core" 
Muslim identity in particular, has proven problematic for both anti-racist (cf. Alexander, 
2000; Sivanandan, 1991,2000) and secular liberal rights-based discourses (cf. Barry, 2001; 
Chambers, 2002), in addition to objections from conservatives (cf. Scruton, 2004). 
Clearly observed during the Rushdie affair, when some Muslims petitioned the state 
with a request to broaden the remit of its legislation on blasphemy to cover Islam as it 
does Christianity, they have simultaneously sought to contest assimilatory narratives of 
"Britishness" by engaging in a debate over a national identity that is invariably symbolised 
by a Christian mainstream orthodoxy/established Church of England (Modood, 1997). 
Liberal and Conservative Responses 
To this the liberal response translates into an antipathy for accommodating beliefs 
or practices that might be seen to legitimise or perpetuate ethical standards that 
compromise a number of fundamental rights. These normally include (1) freedom of 
speech and freedom of expression; (2) the right of group exit (so that group membership 
should not coerce individual autonomy); (3) the freedom from violence or threat of 
violence; (4) the equal status of women, including (a) the prohibition of "forced" marriages 
and (b) an objection to female circumcision' amongst others. From a 'conservative 
perspective, it involves prioritising the continuity of historically grounded or imagined 
national ideals and customs. This typically includes (1) recognising and consolidating the 
monarchical-constitutional link evident in the established church; (2) identifying a core 
"majority" national identity to which minorities are required to assimilate; (3) contesting 
allocations of public provisions for minority cultural practices; (4) minimising govern- 
mental or legislative interventions recognising the diversity of minority populations. 
The PMPI examined in this article (identified in Table 1) are chosen for being broadly 
representative of these secular liberal and conservative nationalist camps, and within this 
they were selected because of the saliency of their notoriety in the public imagination. 
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TABLE 1 
Print media public intellectuals 
Newspaper Strong conservative Weaker conservative Strong secular Weaker secular 
nationalist nationalist liberal liberal 
The Telegraph Charles Moore 
Kevin Myers 
The Daily Mail Melanie Phillips 
Simon Heffer 
The Times Anthony Browne 
Michael Buleigh Michael Grove Matthew Parris 
The Observer Will Hutton 
The Guardian Polly Toynbee David Aranovitch 
Nick Cohen 
This is obviously impossible to measure in any scientific sense, but since this is a discursive 
rather than quantitative exploration, the chosen sample was deemed satisfactory. 
"White Fantasies" of Ethnic Others 
It is my contention that the above PMPI engage in a discussion about Muslims by 
deriving a "bottom line" approach. This is an understanding that goes something like this. 
-. " 
Since both camps are too often deterred from encroaching upon issues of "difference" in 
fear of the charge of cultural intolerance, what must be preserved-in the name of the 
Enlightenment, modernity and occidental progress of the last 200 years-are certain 
thresholds or touchstones of political liberalism and political conservatism. These must 
neither be crossed nor compromised in fear of encouraging the thin end of a culturally 
relativist wedge. 
This assertion becomes progressively more contentious because I would like to 
argue that secular liberal PMPI share with conservative nationalist PMPI a series of 
assumptions that underpin their commentary on Muslims in Britain. These assumptions 
are based upon what Paul Gilroy (1987) once called "ethnic absolutism", and what we 
might think of as an exclusive national space. That is that the platform of Britishness to 
which they subscribe is both exclusionary and intransient. By this I refer to what Hage has 
described as: 
... practises which assume, 
first an image of a national space; secondly, an image of the 
nationalist himself or herself as master of this national space and, thirdly, an image of the 
ethnic/racial "other" as a mere object within this space. (Hage, 1998, p. 28) 
This is important because (1) it helps inform and sustain "the white fantasy" (Hage, 
1998) that PMPI have the right to intervene and regulate the lives of ethnic Others, whilst 
(2) cementing the myth that it is the presence of these ethnic Others-rather than broader 
societal discourses-that perpetuates racism. 
It would be easy here to suggest that this closed national space allows Muslims to 
become a target by proxy in the way that, in his most recent book, Gilroy (2004) has 
argued that members of the black diaspora become the floating signifiers of a post- 
colonial melancholia in Britain (and by that a constant reminder of its status as a defeated 
empire). There is, however, more to PMPI responses than this, specifically in the way that 
ideas of political liberalism and conservative nationalism are deployed as a resolute 
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defence against unacceptable conventions, epitomised by the way that Brian Barry (2001) 
has recently expounded secular liberalism as an "uncompromising fighting creed" and 
Roger Scruton (2004) has sought to "retrieve" accounts of British national identity before 
placing them beyond renewal. 
Topai Under Analysis 
It is in this context that the argumentation of PMPI forms, in itself, a subject 
important to the "challenges" posed by Muslims in Britain because journalistic output "is 
simultaneously constitutive of [the] social identities, social relations and systems of 
knowledge and belief" (Wodak, 1995, cited in Richardson, 2001) of the more empowered 
sections of society. I cannot overstate how important this last point is to ensuing debates 
surrounding Muslims and multiculturalism. This is because, as Favell and Modood (2003, 
p. 493) have argued, academics and policy makers too often "rely on the unchallenged 
reproduction of anecdotal facts usually taken from newspapers" which fail to do justice to 
the complexity of "hard cases", and encourage a conflation between fact and fiction. ' For 
these reasons the analysis presented in the results focuses explicitly upon how Muslims, 
multiculturalism and accounts of nationhood are presented both in general terms, 
through rhetoric, and how they are presented in specific terms, through example. This 
ranges from how multiculturalism is conceptualised by PMPI in general terms, to more 
specific details informing assumptions about funding for faith schools and proposed 
legislation preventing incitement to religious hatred. 
Methods and Methodology 
With this in mind, discourse analysis was used to examine the systems of knowledge 
and beliefs reproduced in PMPI commentary. As a research method, discourse analysis can 
mean a range of things that emphasise an examination of the ways that text and "talk" 
contribute to particular modes of understanding our social world (Silverman, 2000). 
Foucauldian Knowledge/Power 
Influenced by Foucault's concern to signpost shifts in moral, ethical and, ultimately, 
historical notions of legitimising power or authority (keenly observed by Foucault as being 
exercised in conceptions of "madness", "sexuality", "punishment" etc. ), discourse analysis 
is useful in highlighting the degree to which the conditions behind a specific "problem" lie 
in its textual assumptions. Hence, it might provide an awareness of less obvious 
motivations by making us ask ontological and epistemological questions. 
This emerges in reading Foucault's (1979, p. 93) understanding of power, an 
understanding which urges us to focus an examination of power relations at the level of 
everyday life, rather than upon an analysis of role of the state or the power of one "class" 
over another alone. This is outlined in, amongst other places, The History of Sexuality 
where he argues that power emanates from every point in the social field, since it is not a 
monolithic force, "an institution, and nor a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are 
endowed with; it is the name one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a given 
society". The implication being that power is exercised unseen amongst dominant discourses 
or modes of knowledge, which reinforce particular perceptions and understandings, inform 
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norms, and re-assure values. This is the overriding understanding that I would like to 
extract from Foucault's account during our analysis of PMPI. Although one might not 
agree with this interpretation and, amongst other things, the patent denial of structure in 
Foucault's account of power (Fraser, 1989; Harstock, 1990), particularly as a coercive force 
(Ramazanoglu and Holland, 1993), it is important to recognise the value of his insight not 
as a teleological theory, but as a sort of "toolkit" (as Foucault, 1980, p. 145, himself 
stressed). 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Argumentation Strategies 
Using this toolkit to focus upon what we can think of as the argumentation 
strategies evident in the print media, it is argued, can help illuminate the political content 
and implications of PMPI argumentation in an informative and comparable manner. 
Drawing upon his extensive analysis of argumentative discourse on "race" in reader's 
letters, John Richardson has argued that unpacking argumentation reveals 
... the structured and 
directed manner in which texts achieve their persuasive goal(s)- 
in essence, their dialectic and pragmatic aspects-are of central importance in 
evaluating the power of argumentative dialogue, made all the more so when we 
acknowledge the discursive potential of texts to modify power relations In other fields. 
(Richardson, 2001, pp. 144-5) 
A feat achieved through three broad and interdependent strategies of public 
argumentation: 
" Firstly, there's the "topical potential" where "speakers or writers choose the material they 
find easiest to handle" (Richardson, 2001) and, often in doing so, mischaracterise and 
present a selective or preferred readings of an argument, corresponding to established or 
dominant discourse. This, naturally, also refers to what is omitted from the discussion. 
" Secondly, there's the strategy of adapting to "audience demand" by adopting "a 
perspective most agreeable to the audience" (Richardson, 2001) because, after all, 
argumentation aims at "securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed" 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyeca, 1969, cited in Richardson, 2001). One example of this is 
the recourse to the "common sense" of an audience, either through implicit or explicit 
assumptions, since common sense "is founded upon the unquestioned and unques- 
tionable truths" (Richardson, 2001), and can be linked to assumptions made through tacit 
knowledge which may, in turn, depend upon (silent) references to particular theoretical 
paradigms (cf. Kuhn, 1962). 
" Thirdly, there are "presentational devices" which "frame their contribution in the most 
effective wordings" (Van Emerson and Houtlosser, 1999, p. 484). Loaded figures of 
speech, suggestive definitions or visual images and rhetorical questions are examples of 
such devices. 
Findings 
The main strategies drawn of PMPI (identified in Table 1) argumentation became 
apparent in the following themes or topoi. Where they are numbered this is for ease of 
reference and-unless otherwise noted-they retain the structure and form of how such 
arguments were presented when published. 
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Muslims and Islam are Anti-modern and Antipathetic to Democratic and 
Human Rights 
This is a broad but recurring theme, and is epitomised by Will Hutton who, writing in 
The Observer, argues that 
1. Islam is predominantly sexist and pre-Enlightenment- 
2. and that is the core of the problem 
3. both within the Islamic world and in its relationship with the West. 
4. Thus, the West has to object to Islamic sexism- 
5. whether arranged marriage, headscarves, limiting career options 
6. or the more extreme manifestations, female circumcision and stoning women for adultery. 
7. We cannot give ground in the name of multiculturalism. [... ] 
8. We should certainly respect diversity, but we cannot abandon or qualify our own beliefs In 
the process... 
9. we cannot and should not respond with an unrigorous, soft multiculturalism that pleads 
such values are equivalent to our own and legitimate within their own cultural context. 
(Hutton, 2004a) 
Hutton's argumentation strategy opens in line 1 with a sentence which functions to 
simultaneously assume and conclude that Islam and "Islamic practices" are predominantly 
"pre-Enlightenment". The result of this understanding becomes apparent in lines 2,3 and 
4 when seeking to explain "Islam's relationship with the West". The latter is counterpoised 
as a corrective to pre-Enlightenment exemplars of "Islamic sexism"; practices deemed to 
cause the problematic nature of Islam's incapacity to relate to a non-sexist, egalitarian 
West. So for "West" read "Modern". With this in mind, Muslim contributions to a 
multicultural public sphere in line 7 should be restricted because what Muslim men do to 
Muslim women is both symptomatic of broader "Islamic practices" and is antipathetic to 
"our" beliefs in line 8. A combative response is, then, required (line 8) since "their own 
cultural context" is evidently unable to renew itself without a civilising hand. Such a 
process necessarily begins by shoring up "our" own values and returns us to the idea of a 
"bottom line" thinking discussed earlier, which mistakenly positions all Muslim practices 
under a rubric of multiculturalism as necessarily conflicting with liberal freedoms (cf. Barry, 
2001). 
This is repeated by David Aranovitch, writing in The Guardian, over Muslim requests 
for the granting of public money to Muslim faith schools: 
1. What is going on here ... is an attempt to protect the young from modernity. 
2. Parents believe their kids are threatened by the materialism and immorality of other 
peoples' kids. [... ] 
3. My fear is that this emphasis on faith schooling is an attempt, albeit unconscious-to 
return us to the days before feminism, 
4. an attempt which affects all of us. (Aranovitch, 2004) 
In addition to the anti-Enlightenment possibilities outlined by Hutton, Aranovitch 
draws our attention to a potentially separatist philosophy informing Muslim parents' 
intentions to send their children to Muslim faith schools in lines 1 and 2. The fact that this 
is "an unconscious" attempt, suggests (line 3) that there is something pathologically 
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dysfunctional in the cultural framework and mode of discourse adopted by Muslim 
parents themselves. 
Heralding an argument about Muslim faith schools in general, Aranovitch ignores 
the more obvious motivations for Muslim parents in choosing to send their children to 
Muslim faith schools. These might include the educational merits of sending children to 
schools that, on the basis of examination results, outperform their counterparts in the non- 
faith sector (Association of Muslim Social Scientists, 2004, p. 33). Although examination 
results should certainly not be used as the sole yardstick for evaluating education, the 
academic record of Muslim schools combined with the significantly cheaper tuition fees in 
comparison to other independent schooling (Association of Muslim Social Scientists, 2004) 
makes them very appealing to parents who wish to encourage their children to explore 
their religious heritage. The fact that such concerns are omitted from his reading Indicates 
that the strength of Aranovitch's argument is based more upon assumptions made 
through implied knowledge, than the empirical reality at hand. 
Asking religious peoples to "get off your knees", a similar perception is reiterated by 
Polly Toynbee of The Guardian who, although objecting to faith schools of all religions, 
argues that Muslims in particular 
1. want to keep their children separate, 
2. while most parents who choose Christian faith schools do it to help their children get 
ahead. (Toynbee, 2004c) 
Her statement in line 1 is of course a substantive assertion, and one that requires 
some empirical inquiry in the form of an attitudinal survey of some sort. Since such 
evidence is neither referred to in her subsequent article, nor known to be available to the 
author, it would not be unfair to suggest that such speculation on the part of Toynbee 
serves to mischaracterise and present a selective or preferred reading of an argument, 
corresponding to established discourses which understand Muslims as "separatist" (cf. 
Cantle Report, 2002). 
Conceptualising Multiculturalism 
Islam's anti-Enlightenment implications herald broader consequences for PMPI 
discussion of multiculturalism in Britain. As a subject topic, multiculturalism is repeatedly 
framed as heralding a clear "choice" between "integration" and "separatism". Whilst the 
former is largely understood as "assimilation", so that the terrain of "Britishness" might 
remain unchanged, the latter is frequently typified by the rhetorical example of "self- 
segregating communities" in Bradford and elsewhere. This feeds directly Into PMPI 
discussion of a visible Muslim presence in the public sphere, specifically in the way that it 
challenges cultural hegemonies. For example, Hutton argues that 
1. as Westerners respect Islamic mores when in Islam, 
2. so the Islamic community has to respect Western mores when in the West. (Hutton, 2004a) 
Coupling geography and religion in line 1 (Islam as a place outside of the West), this 
sentence is based upon the assumption that since "the Islamic community" in the West Is 
largely foreign, it should take to following the good example set by Christians who 
willingly adapt to the ways of "Islamic mores". This is of course premised upon the 
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understanding that since Muslims are likely to be inalienably foreign, they should not be 
thought of as contributing to, let alone comprising, the make-up of "Western mores". This 
binary "East/West" distinction then, seems essentialist, outmoded and empirically 
unsustainable given the number of Muslims currently residing in Britain who were born 
and brought up in the United Kingdom. ' 
Focusing explicitly upon an understanding of cultural difference within multi- 
culturalism, Toynbee makes a distinction between outwardly moving, "humorous" and 
"inviting" cultural manifestations, on the one hand, and "dangerous", divisive and insular 
communities emerging under the guise of an ill-fated multiculturalism, on the other: 
1. When a generation of Lenny Henry and Meera Syals made it possible 
2. to invite others to laugh with them about their own communities, those communities 
entered into the canon of Britishness. [... ] 
3. ... the most 
dangerous divide now is in culture-and that means Muslim. 
4. British Muslims arrested last week as terror suspects had families as British as Meera 
Syal's-yet culturally they inhabit another universe. (Toynbee, 2004b) 
The implication being that assimilation (and the disappearance of distinct 
communities) facilitates an entrance "into the canon of Britishness", whilst maintaining 
a more distinct Muslim identity is "dangerous" and encourages British-Muslims to "inhabit 
another universe". This is evidenced by the arrest of "terror suspects". Their subsequent 
release, however, would do little to facilitate their re-insertion into Toynbee's more 
acceptable paradigm, since the concern here is more with the perception of a general 
threat. So great is the perceived threat posed by Muslims in Britain that it "leads" Michael 
Burleigh of The Telegraph to encourage a policy of racial profiling 
1. The British people need to be told exactly where that threat comes from, 
2. however politically incorrect the answer may be, what concrete measures are being taken 
to deal with it, and how they themselves can help. 
3. [... ] our educators should think hard about their failure to inculcate our values, be they 
religious or secular or a combination of the two in the minds of Britain's very own 
generation of terrorists. (Burleigh, 2004) 
Line 1 reinforces the certainty of a "threat", before political correctness is portrayed 
in lines 2 and 3 as hampering "the British people" in response to this threat, since It has 
failed to "inculcate our values" to "Britain's very own generation of terrorists" (line 5). It Is 
interesting that line 4 encourages the inculcation of religious values. Since they are "ours", 
however, they are unlikely to deviate from those derived from the established church. This 
passage is helpful in exemplifying the standard conservative nationalist position outlined 
earlier, as well as the "white fantasy" the PMPI have the right to regulate the lives of ethnic 
Others. 
This enemy within/fifth column has been cultivated under a policy of multi- 
culturalism, which relegates what The Times columnist Anthony Browne sees as a 
historically grounded national identity 
1. by stripping Britain of its culture and traditions ... 
2. a dangerous rising tide of anger is being caused. 
3. This prevents social cohesion and integration ... 
4. who could want to integrate into a culture that is committing suicide? (Browne, 2004) 
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There are two main issues in this apocalyptic vision of an unravelling of the social 
fabric of Britain. The first is rehearsed in suggestive phrases in lines 1 and 2 reminiscent of 
Powellite predictions that the continuing presence of ethnic Others will succeed in 
generating conflict, and the second is that a broader idea of "Britain" will fall away as a 
result (line 4). 
This alarm is shared by Melanie Phillips of The Daily Mail, who cites what she 
describes as a loss of national history as a catalyst for national decline. This history Is 
implicitly tied in line 2 to the continuity of a Christian hegemony where religion Is 
recognised in public life 
1. ... it's a desire to create an entirely new kind of society by destroying the old one. 
2. That means, among other things, repudiating the Christian basis of British culture. 
3. If there simply aren't enough people who can identify with the country's history, then it 
cannot be taught. 
4. And since a nation is rooted in history, its identity then unravels ... 
5. there is no longer any sense that there's a 'we' to have a past at all. (Phillips, 2004) 
Seeing the rubric of multiculturalism in terms of immigration politics meanwhile, 
Toynbee offers the example of French responses to the presence of visible Muslims in the 
public sphere as a necessary task: 
1. Yesterday the French banned Islamic schoolgirls from wearing headscarves in a 
provocative assertion of Frenchness 
2. against the perceived threat of alien beliefs. The Belgians are considering following suit. 
3, This is an expression of the political pressure over immigration that most European 
governments feel: 
4. if even the tolerant Netherlands can be rocked to its foundation by migration-panic, then 
no nation is safe. 
5. Immigrants may not all be Islamic, but Islam is the most visible and alarming threat from 
foreigners 
6. to hard-won secularism, tolerance, feminism or social democracy. (Toynbee, 2004a) 
Conferring the title of "tolerant Netherlands" upon the Dutch in line 4 serves to 
emphasise the exceptional nature of a Muslim presence to which these "tolerant" 
governments must necessarily respond. In lines 5 and 6 Islam is described as heralding 
"the most visible and alarming threat" to ideas of "feminism", "tolerance", "social 
democracy" and "secularism" which Toynbee believes are interchangeably alien to Islam. 
The fact that she considers "visibility" an important criteria suggests that there is a 
racialised element to such a criteria since it is not clear whether a less-visible white Muslim 
member of the national community presents such a threat. Moreover, lines 1,2 and 3 
mirror the conservative nationalist position concerned with regulating the lives of ethnic 
Others discussed earlier. 
This way of conceiving of Muslims as "foreign" takes us back to Will Hutton's earlier 
discussion, and is consolidated by the Daily Mail columnist Simon Helfer, who argues that: 
1. to a few non-Christians, 
2. who have chosen to live in this Christian country with its Christian head of state and 
Christian established church, 
3. the display of our majority culture is deemed very offensive indeed. (Helfer, 2004a) 
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Once more, the sum of "our majority culture" is made up of "Britishness" as 
"Christian" and vice versa. The solution? According to Heffer 
1. simply disowning multiculturalism isn't enough. 
2. We, as a people, and the Government, must make strenuous efforts to promote and 
defend our culture, 
3. and especially the place of Christianity in it and the rights to self-expression by Christians. 
(Helfer, 2004a) 
In line 2, Heffer's "strenuous efforts" integrate "we, as a people" with the 
"government" in the defence of "our culture". This conflation of a common people with 
a common culture, represented and enshrined in government, is staple conservative 
thinking. But this determination to "disown" (line 1) multiculturalism is also encouraged by 
liberal PMPI argumentation, specifically in seeking to catalogue a perceived litany of 
current failures manifested from misconceived policy in the past. 
Historic Failures and Current Threats Posed by Multiculturalism 
According to Toynbee, greater "honesty" in these matters is to be commended, as is 
evidenced in her congratulatory words to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE)1° chair 
Trevor Phillips, who 
1. breaks with unthinking platitudes about the richness of all diversity in a multicultural 
society, 
2. as if any difference was a self-evident asset. 
3. On the day a 17-year old Muslim is charged with conspiracy to cause explosions, it doesn't 
feel so. 
4. Phillips says it was an error to let alien communities stay in their silos. (Toynbee, 2004b) 
Multiculturalism is "unthinking" (line 1) according to Toynbee because it encourages 
"alien communities to stay in their silos" (line 4). This is an important admission because 
1. Atrocity will be done in the name of a rogue crazed creed, 
2. destroying the infidel for heavenly virgins ... 
3. we are looking into the face of an insane and unassuagable cult. 
4. No kind of multiculturalism "understands" this. (Toynbee, 2004b) 
So not only are we facing an obvious and immediate threat from a "rogue crazed 
creed" (line 1), which departs from all recourse to rationality in its masculine Insanity- 
since Islam encourages the "destroying of the infidel for heavenly virgins" (assumedly 
female, line 2), but we are also threatened by the systemic perversity that 
1. Islamic ideas that find the very notion of democracy incompatible with faith 
2. are beginning to be taken seriously 
3. by those who should defend liberal democracy. (Toynbee, 2004d) 
This thin end of the wedge returns to haunt us in the shape of the fears held by The 
Telegraph columnist Charles Moore: 
1. Once there are Islamic financial institutions, 
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2. how long will it be before Muslims insist that the state and business direct all their 
monetary dealings with Muslims through these institutions (boycotting businesses with 
Jewish connections en route)? 
3. How long before Muslims, extending the logic of their concentration in places like 
Bradford and Leicester, 
4. seek to establish their own law within these areas, 
5. the germ of a state within a state? And how diverse would such a state be? (Moore, 2004) 
Moore bases his concerns upon two implicit assumptions. Firstly, he perceives 
Muslims as being intrinsically anti-Semitic so that they will, given the chance, inevitably 
boycott Jewish businesses (line 2). Secondly, he assumes that there exists a strategic 
"logic" to the concentration of Muslims in Bradford and Leicester; a separatist logic held by 
Muslims themselves (lines 3 and 4). The former point is speculative and involves a tacit 
assumption-since he cites no available evidence upon which he is basing this view- 
and the latter does not accord with what is known about the pattern of migration and 
settlement amongst immigrant and post-immigrant groups (cf. Ratcliffe, 1996; Ratcliffe et 
al., 2001). In addition, Moore invokes the descriptive metaphor of a "germ" (line 5) to mean 
inception when referring to Muslim intentions. Such terms of reference are historically tied 
to explicitly racist discourses in the discussion on minority ethnic groups in Britain (cf. 
Gilroy, 1987)-something inevitably resurrected here in the shape of a virulent multi- 
plication of "Muslim concentrations". 
Adopting a different tact from which to critique the idea of multiculturalism, Simon 
Helfer makes recourse to an image of the most vulnerable being neglected by the 
appeasement of minority groups, which inevitably necessitates the redeployment of 
scarce recourses to "politically correct jobs" 
1. it is scandalous that, in a society that wastes tax payers' money by the billion 
2. on useless, 
3. politically correct jobs and 
4. nonessential bureaucrats, 
5. money cannot be found to provide dignified and stable 
6. care for our elderly. (Heller, 2004b) 
In the space of five lines, Helfer manages to lament multiculturalism as "scandalous", 
"useless", "nonessential" and "wastes tax payers' money", whilst a "dignified", "stable" 
"care" for "our" elderly is sacrificed. The "billions" lost in this process are not meanwhile 
accounted for in the rest of his article. 
Bizarrely, one of the current threats posed by multiculturalism, according to Melanie 
Phillips, is evident in the murder of Stephen Lawrence. 
... a remarkable report 
by Greenwich Council produced in response to the murders of 
Stephen Lawrence and two other local black boys. One of the principal reasons for the 
murderous rage of white youths, it said, was that they had no national identity to be 
proud of and to give their lives meaning. White children, it said, "seem like cultural 
ghosts, haunting as mere absences the richly decorated corridors of multicultural 
society". (Phillips, 2004) 
Rather than focusing upon a litany of systemic and institutional negligence on the 
part of the authorities (MacPherson Report, 1999), Phillips draws our attention to one of 
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the "principal reasons" for "murderous rage" amongst white boys, reasons squarely 
located at the door of multicultural society. 
Islam Gets Special Treatment 
Another theme emerging in PMPI discourse is the idea that Islam and Muslims are 
afforded special treatment at the expense of other beliefs and groups. It is a useful 
argumentation strategy that sits well with an established complaint that, post-Rushdie, 
Muslims are incapable of accepting criticism or understanding the appropriate dimensions 
of satire to which all areas of British social life are subject from time to time. It is invariably 
encompassed in the assertion that, according to Matthew Parris 
... you can get away with verbal aggression 
towards Christianity which would be 
considered unacceptable if directed towards Islam. (Parris, 2004) 
and is exemplified in Anthony Browne's understanding that 
the BBC's editorial policy bans criticism of the Koran, but not the Bible. (Browne, 2004) 
Even though this is not an acknowledged BBC policy, it would be perfectly 
understandable to Toynbee, since 
officialdom is easily frightened of Islam, with good reason. (Toynbee, 2004c) 
In similar vein, and complaining that an editorial line in a leading conservative 
journal was insulting to Christians, Kevin Myers asks 
1. can you imagine Britain's Islamic communities- 
2. which have provided 1,200 volunteers for training in Taliban camps in Afghanistan- 
3. being jeered at in such nasty adolescent tones? (Myers, 2004) 
Quite how this figure has been ascertained is not sourced or referred to in the 
ensuing discussion, but it seems extraordinary. What is less so, however, is the pattern that 
emerges from the above argumentation. Although Toynbee, as a strong secular liberal, 
would seek to critique Christianity in a way unacceptable to Kevin Myers, a strong 
conservative nationalist, both argumentation strategies seek, rhetorically, to position Islam 
and Muslims as beyond the pale of legitimate critique in fear of conflict or uproar. 
The content of this theme feeds seamlessly into PMPI contestation regarding 
proposed legislation to prevent the incitement to religious hatred, likely to be Introduced 
in the 2005-2006 parliamentary session. ' What is particularly interesting in PMPI 
argumentation is that it indicates most clearly upon what issues both political liberalism 
and conservative nationalism converge when discussing Muslims in Britain. 
New Legislation Preventing that Incitement to Religious Hatred Will Be 
Used by Proxy to Defend "Ideas" (Religion) Rather than its Followers 
Simon Heller argues 
1. Muslims are already protected against hatred by the laws that protect us all. 
2. All Mr Blunkett would achieve by passing his ridiculous law would be to make certain 
minorities feel they are special cases. 
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3. ... the majority in this country who subscribe to a broadly Christian culture 
4. would continue to bear the insults from non-Christians and Leftists 
5. who hate the nation's traditional values. (Heller, 2004b) 
Reverting to the previous theme whilst re-coupling the link between "Christian 
culture" and "the nation's traditional values" (line 3), Helfer seeks to assimilate those of no 
religion to Christianity whilst, ironically, his concerns are endorsed by some of those 
"Leftists" he seeks to lament. For example, Toynbee argues that 
The law will protect the believers, not their beliefs. That difference appears to escape 
most Muslims. Ministers keep reassuring critics that "only four or five people a year" are 
likely to be prosecuted in rare cases. If so, then the Muslims who lobbied hard for this law 
are destined for deep disappointment-and much anger. (Toynbee, 2004e) 
The potential insurgency suggested in Toynbee's concerns over "Muslim anger" 
aside, her anxiety is shared by Simon Heffer. Although located in very different camps, 
there is some convergence amongst PMPI on this issue, particularly in PMPI conceptions of 
Muslim motivations for asking for such legislation. Where Muslim lobbyists make the 
recourse to legislation by citing the lack of publicly responsible discourse, PMPI 
argumentation interprets this as further indication of Muslim separatism and intolerance 
of historically British values. 
Not Enough Self-criticism by Muslims Themselves, External Criticism Leads 
to Charges of Islamaphobia 
Fearing that such legislation will consolidate the conceptual understanding of anti- 
Muslim racism sometimes understood as "Islamaphobia", Toynbee suggests that 
1. The occasional note of reason from moderate Islamic groups is so weak it hardly makes 
itself heard. 
2. I had challenged the legitimacy of the idea of Islamaphobia 
3. and warned of the danger to free speech of trying to make criticism of a religion a crime 
akin to racism. 
4. I pointed out yet again that theocracy is lethal. 
5. Wherever religion controls politics it drives out tolerance and basic human rights. 
(Toynbee, 2004d) 
There are at least four implicit points in this passage. The first point is that only those 
deemed as "moderate Muslims" can offer anything resembling "reason", which is why so 
little in Islam is reasonable given how so few moderates there are to speak out (line 1). This 
carries the related implication that each Muslim bears the burden of responsibility in 
representing Islam, so that the failure to speak out confers upon all Muslims the "guilty" 
actions of a few. This could simultaneously be a weaker statement however, in asking 
"moderate" Muslims to contest the ground occupied/seized by extremists. 
The second point serves to relegate the charge of "Islamaphobia" as bogus and 
illegitimate through a strategy of denial (line 2). This is a consistent position adopted by all 
PMPI who perceive proposed protections as serving to place religion beyond the point of 
scrutiny. This is important because PMPI argumentation ignores the complexity of anti- 
Muslim sentiment in Britain as comprising not a theological objection to Islam, but 
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heralding a composition of colour and cultural racism embodied by the ethnic signifier of 
being "Muslim" which comprises and objectifies the explicit projection of both 
(Runnymede Trust, 1997). 
The third point depicts religion as waiting to prey upon free speech, so that 
considering the sensibilities of Muslims will set us down the road to a theocracy (lines 3 
and 4). The fourth point draws upon previous themes is resurrecting the image of one's 
customary values being "driven out" by an accommodation of religion (line 5). 
In the following passage, Toynbee is keen to stress a discourse of urgency in that we 
are increasingly deterred by Islam and the presence of Muslims from speaking out. The 
content of the complaint, meanwhile, returns us to the first theme to emerge in the 
analysis: Islam as anti-modern and pre-Enlightenment. 
1. Fear of offending the religious is gathering ground on all sides. 
2. It is getting harder to argue against the hijab and the Koran's edict that a woman's place is 
one step behind. 
3. It is beginning to be racist for teachers or social workers 
4. to object to autocratic patriarchy and submission of women within many Muslim 
communities. (Toynbee, 2004d) 
This discourse works in three stages. The first stage involves making a general 
secularist point in line 1. The second stage uses a version of Islam in line 2 that invokes 
examples of misogyny as indicative of the treatment of Muslim women in Islam. Islam is 
the only example. In stage three, the apparently "neutral" secular position discursively 
switches into an anti-Muslim argument. It is helpful in highlighting how by a process of 
constant association, people and issues come to thematically define one another. At the 
same time, it points to one of the most interesting themes to emerge from an analysis of 
PMPI argumentation strategies. This is an anxiety to maintain the "right" to publicly affront 
religious beliefs. 
Need to Maintain the Right to Affront Religious Peoples 
Toynbee views it as a case of 
Standing against religious apartheid, atheists come into their own here. Those who are as 
anti-Christian as they are anti-Islamic can oppose state promotion of any religion without 
discrimination. (Toynbee, 2004c) 
This returns us to the earlier discussions surrounding proposed legislation 
preventing the incitement to religious hatred, as is described by Matthew Parris of The 
Times as thus: 
1. It follows that the less tolerant any religious group is of criticism or mockery, 
2. the greater the protection the proposed new law will offer them. 
3. But these may be the very faiths or sects which ought to be confronted- 
4. confronted and attacked for the very intolerance and self-righteousness which, if this 
measure becomes law, will be adduced as evidence of their "sensitivity". (Parris, 2004) 
This is all the more worrying for Will Hutton, who believes that there is a dialectic at 
work in acts of anti-Muslim racism which somehow entails a moral equivalence of 
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Islamicism and racism against Muslims, so that the latter cancels our sympathy for the 
former. 
1. Racist acts against Muslims are growing explosively, 
2. reciprocated by Muslim death threats against prominent politicians. (Hutton, 2004b) 
Muslim Political Alliances are a Coalition of "Bad" Projects 
Conceptualisations of the political alliances to have emerged between the anti-war 
coalition and British-Muslims, in objecting to the war in Iraq, are largely negative amongst 
PMPI. They fairly consistently see such alliances as being forged from a common "hate" of 
America. For example, Toynbee argues that 
1. the liberal dilemma over Islam is not unlike the prevarications of some over communism in 
the cold war. 
2. To attack the atrocities of the reds put you in bed with the anti-socialist Thatcher/Reagan 
red-baiters. 
3. It is bizarre ... how the left has espoused the extreme Islamicist cause: as "my enemy's 
enemy", 
4. Muslims are the best America-haters around. (Toynbee, 2004d) 
This passage immediately denies any possibility that "the Left", as she conceives the 
anti-war coalition, might already comprise activists who are simultaneously Muslim. 
Moreover, in excluding any possibility that "the Left" might find a legitimate cause in 
Muslim opposition to the war in Iraq on humanist grounds, she relies upon a rehearsed 
stereotype evident in line 4 that "Muslims are the best America-haters around". 
Additionally, Toynbee explicitly objects to these alliances on the grounds that they are 
anti-rational 
1. the natural allies of the rationalists have decamped. 
2. The left embraces Islam for its anti-Americanism. (Toynbee, 2004e) 
She is not alone in her view. Nick Cohen, for example, laments "many of the Left" 
who 
1. to their shame ... have 
broken with the Enlightenment to perform this manoeuvre. 
2. They have ridden the Islamic wave ... (Cohen, 2004b) 
whilst George Galloway, according to Michael Grove of The Times, 
... enjoys the support of 
both the Socialist Workers' Party of Britain and the Muslim 
Association of Britain (MAB). Bringing Britain's leading Trotskyist organisation into 
alliance with the group which recently invited the homophobic and pro-suicide-bombing 
Dr Yusuf al-Qaradawi to London is quite a feat. (Grove, 2004) 
As a final comment on this section, it is interesting to note that in opposing 
legislation preventing the incitement to religious hatred, Toynbee argues that "campaign- 
ers against this bad law should not be deterred by some of the bad company they join" 
(Toynbee, 2004d), whilst arguing that a traditionally secularist Left should be deterred by 
its association with Muslim groups. 
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Conclusions 
This article sought to examine the idea that particular print media journalists assume 
the role of public intellectuals. Having first reviewed some influential accounts of 
intellectualism, it attempted to survey the relationship of PMPI to representations of 
Muslims in Britain, and to identify how PMPI cultivate public notions and contribute to the 
formation of a particular consciousness. 
Through an analysis of argumentation strategies, the discussion highlights a 
convergence between commentators adopting a secular liberal and conservative 
nationalist position. This convergence is evidenced in how the reproduction of rehearsed 
stereotypes exercise the power to reinforce particular perceptions and understandings of 
Muslims in Britain. These stereotypes simultaneously serve to inform dominant norms and 
reassure exclusive accounts of belonging, and are perhaps best exemplified in PMPI 
argumentation on multiculturalism. Here, having adopted a combative attitude to the 
recognition of difference, PMPI argumentation problematises Muslims in Britain by 
rehearsing the view that it is their very presence which invites the racism they might 
face, whilst simultaneously assuming the right to intervene and regulate their presence. 
By encouraging us to focus upon the production of knowledge through language, a 
Foucaudian-inspired discourse analysis of PMPI argumentation strategies allows us to 
conceptualise how the production of discourses exercise the power to enforce their own 
validity, to the extent that established accounts of the public intellectual may actually fail 
to appreciate the degree to which they themselves are shaped by discursive currents. By 
this I point to Bauman and Sartre's failure to be more self-reflexive in their analysis of the 
role of the public intellectual as mere "interpreter" or lionised "committed" intellectual, 
extrapolating outwards from a universal ethical standard, particularly in comparison to 
Osborne's idea of the intellectual as a "mediator". With this in mind it falls to social 
scientists in this area to examine and scrutinise further the currency PMPI argumentation 
as it moves beyond the confines of newspaper journalism to inform and create public 
knowledge. 
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NOTES 
1. This article was researched, composed and submitted prior to the events of 7/7. In the 
aftermath to these terrible events, PMPI discourse has demonstrably served to provide a 
salient narrative in conceptualising the fallout-both material and discursive-and its 
impact upon Muslims in Britain. It is for this reason and those made in the main body of 
this discussion that social scientists should engage with the content of PMPI discourse 
with a greater urgency and substance than we have thus far demonstrated a willingness 
to do. 
54 NASAR MEER 
2. Examples of what I mean by this include, amongst many others, (1) columns addressing 
fiscal matters by Will Hutton who, having authored several influential books including 
The State We're In (1996), The State to Come (1997), The Revolution That Never Was: an 
assessment of Keynesian economics (2001) and The World We're In (2002), obviously has 
an acknowledged expertise in political economy; (2) articles covering aspects of social 
welfare ranging from the implications of the minimum wage to private finance Initiatives 
in the NHS by Polly Toynbee who, having published contributions including A Working 
Life (1973), Hospital (1977), The Future of Care for Older People (1996) and Hard Work: life 
in low-pay in Britain (2003), carries significant weight in her commentary on social issues; 
(3) the Times contributor Anthony Browne with The Euro-Should Britain Join: yes or no? 
(2001); (4) and Telegraph columnist Mark Steyn with The Face of the Tiger and Other Tales 
from the New War (2002) and America Alone: our country's future as a lone warrior (2005); 
(5) along with Kevin Myers' An Irishman's Diary (2000); (6) Charles Moore's The Life of 
Margaret Thatcher (2005) and How to Be British (Policy Choice S. ) (1995); (7) Daily Mail 
columnist Simon Heffer's biography of Enoch Powell Like the Roman (1989), Nor Shall My 
Sword: reinvention of England (1999) and What Tories Want (2000); (8) Melanie Phillip's All 
Must Have Prizes (1998); (9) Peter Hitchens' The Abolition of Britain (2000); (10) Andrew 
Marr-who is also a high-profile broadcast journalist-often pens columns of national 
identity and British political culture, and has published The Battle for Scotland (1995), 
Ruling Britannia: failure and future of British democracy (1996) and The Day Britain Died 
(2000); (11) Nick Cohen is another print journalist who has published several texts on 
current political culture with contributions including Cruel Britannia: reports on the sinister 
and the preposterous (2000) and Pretty Straight Guys (2004a); (12) Yasmin Alibhai-Brown's 
No Place Like Home (1995), Imagining the New Britain (2001 a), Mixed Feelings: the complex 
lives of mixed race Britons (2001 b) and Some of My Best Friends Are... (2004), amongst 
many others offer an indicative sample in making this point. 
3. Two examples can help illustrate this point. During the 1999 NATO-led intervention in 
Kosovo, Julie Burchill of The Guardian was openly and consistently hostile to the pro- 
intervention stance advanced by her paper. Four years later as her paper adopted a 
broadly anti-war stance on the US-led invasion of Iraq, she deployed an aggressively pro- 
war argument (see Burchill, 1999a, 1999b, 2003a, 2003b). Sam Kiley of The Times, 
however, resigned in protest at what he described as being forced to adhere to the 
newspaper line on Israeli-Palestinian relations, stating that "the Times foreign editor and 
other middle managers flew into hysterical terror every time a pro-Israel lobbying group 
wrote in with a quibble or complaint and then usually took their side against their 
writers. I was told I should not refer to 'assassinations' of Israel's opponents, nor to 'extra- 
judicial killings or executions'. No pro-Israel lobbyist ever dreamed of having such power 
over a national newspaper and its key writers" (see Evening Standard, 2001). 
4. An understanding that leads the Independent columnist Yasmin Alibhai-Brown to argue 
that "print media journalists set the agenda. What appears in the newspapers is picked 
up by the broadcasters who frequently recycle in more subtle and acceptable forms" (see 
Alibhai-Brown, 1998, p. 118). 
5. Literature on the idea of the public sphere is lengthy and complex. For the purposes of 
our discussion we should understand it as involving the two interdependent possibilities 
of a "communicative" and "institutional" space (cf. Habermas, 1989; Dahlgren, 1991) 
where democracy can be practised and citizenship rights expressed somewhere between 
government and society. This is achieved formally through the election of governments 
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and informally through the pressure of public opinion. Secondly, the mass media are 
increasingly central to this process since they distribute information to citizens and, at 
least in theory, facilitate "independent" forums for public debate (cf. Curran, 1991). 
6. Inaugurated in 1997, the MCB is an umbrella organisation of over 250 local, regional and 
national organisations. Its aims include the promotion of consensus and unity on Muslim 
affairs in the UK; giving voice to issues of common concern; addressing discriminations 
and disadvantages faced by Muslims in Britain; encouraging "a more enlightened 
appreciation" of Islam and Muslims in the wider society; and working for "the good of 
society as a whole". With a view to representing British Muslims, it lobbies government 
and holds discussions with various public bodies. See www. mcb. org. uk. 
7. Without attempting to make any argument in favour of, or excuse, the prevalence of 
practices of female circumcision, it is worth recognising how often it is depicted as a 
routine problem amongst Muslims in Britain, particularly for South Asians,. by PMPI such 
as Will Hutton (referred to at the beginning) when there is no evidence known to the 
author which would support such an assumption. This should instead be read, it will be 
argued in the main text, as an indicator of the extent to which the standard PMPI reading 
of minority practices function to reify a range of different issues. 
8. In making a broader point about the currency of media discourse, Van Dijk argues that 
"speakers routinely refer to ... newspapers as their source (and authority) of knowledge 
or opinions about ethnic minorities". Hence, "social theories are (re)produced in the 
social worlds by the news media, influencing audience attitudes, values and beliefs, 
principally through their reinforcement" (Van Dijk, 1999, cited in Richardson, 2001, p. 
148). 
9. According to the Office for National Statistics there are approximately 1.85 million British 
citizens (forming 2.9 per cent of the national population) who describe themselves as 
"Muslim". Of this figure, roughly 50 per cent-just under one million-were born in 
Britain. 
10. The CRE is a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation created after the 
implementation of Britain's first race-relations legislation in 1976. It has no legislative 
powers but acts as a public watch-dog "to tackle racial discrimination and promote racial 
equality". In recent years its current Chair, Trevor Phillips, has spoken candidly in 
demanding a greater degree of assimilation from Muslims in Britain. See www. cre. gov. uk. 
11. This follows the government's unsuccessful bid to introduce the legislation alongside the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001)-brought in with the assurance that the 
clause would prevent the Act from adding to the anti-Muslim backlash after September 
11. Leaving Muslims in Britain otherwise susceptible to overt public discrimination, i. e. 
the propagation of anti-Muslim literature for political propaganda, as witnessed in recent 
electoral materials circulated by the British National Party. Organisations such as the MCB 
and Islamic Human Rights Commission have made no secret of their lobbying 
government for the introduction of this legislation. 
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Appendix IV 
All interviewees gave informed consent for the use of their transcribed interviews 
throughout this thesis. All research was conducted in accordance with British 
Sociological Association (BSA) and University of Bristol ethical guidance and 
requirements. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their prominence and/or 
their demonstrable expertise in relation to the respective topics. All interviews were 
tape recorded and then transcribed, before being sent to the interviewee for 
clarification. 
List of Interviewees 
Tahir Alam, trustee of Al-Hijrah secondary school, director of the teacher training 
wing of the Al-Hijrah Trust. 
Yousif Al-Khoei, the Director of the Al-Khoie Foundation. 
Tony Breslin, Chief Executive of the Citizenship Foundation. 
Inayat Bunglawala, Public Affairs spokesperson for the Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB). 
Barbara Cohen, Chair of the Discrimination Law Association (DLA) and former head 
of legal policy at the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) 
Lee Jasper, anti-racist activist and race-equality advisor to the London Mayor. 
Razia Karim, current head of CRE legal policy, Razia Karim, 
Dan Lyndon, Head of History at Compton Secondary School, director of Black 
history for Schools and member of the member of Black and Asian Studies 
Association (BASA). 
Idreas Mears, Director of the Association of Muslim Schools (AMS) 
Arzu Merali, Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) 
Terry Sanderson, president of the National-Secular Society (NSS). 
Abdullah Trevathan, Headteacher of Islamia Primary School. 
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